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Introduction 
Y. Kaya, N. Nakic'enouit5, W.D. Nordhaus, F.L. Toth 
Most economic studies of energy systems and their development have fo- 
cused on the classical question of allocating scarce resources. Over the 
last few years, however, there has been a shift in emphasis from resource 
constraints to environmental consequences and limitations. Energy-related 
emissions - particularly greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide - are an im- 
portant contribution to growing concerns about global warming and adverse 
environmental change in general. Policy measures advanced to alleviate en- 
vironmental disruption, especially in the energy sector, encompass a broad 
spectrum of techno-economic adjustments and social-behavioral responses. 
Technological and economic measures for achieving environmentally 
compatible development have been and continue to be studied. Great 
progress has been achieved in modeling energy-economy interactions, pro- 
ducing greenhouse gas emission scenarios, and estimating the costs of miti- 
gation and emission reduction. On the other hand, there is great uncertainty 
about the impacts of the anthropogenic global warming, possible adaptation 
measures, and their associated costs. There are a few studies on the com- 
parative assessment of mitigation and adaptation costs, and the potential 
benefits of these measures. Since these are all long-term issues ranging into 
the next century, their assessment also requires a degree of understanding 
of possible development paths the world may take in the absence of global 
warming. These development paths could then be used as a reference against 
which to measure mitigation, impacts and adaptation. Furthermore, it is of- 
ten difficult to compare studies due to different assumptions, methodology, 
and temporal and spatial scales. 
A three-day international workshop on "Costs, Impacts and Possible 
Benefits of C 0 2  Mitigationn was held in October 1992 to review current 
research and analysis of economic costs and possible benefits of measures 
for responding to global climate change, and to critically evaluate knowl- 
edge gaps and future research activities. The workshop was ceorganized 
by the Japanese Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry 
(CRIEPI), the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
the National Science Foundation (NSF), Yale University, and the Energy 
and Industry Subgroup of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(EIS/IPCC). Some 80 scientists, mainly economists, from more than 20 
countries participated in the workshop, including many of the foremost re- 
searchers working in the field. (The workshop was followed by a two-day 
meeting on technological issues related to climate change organized jointly 
by IIASA and EIS/IPCC. Many of the participants stayed for the subsequent 
workshop.) 
The workshop was opened by Peter de Jhos i ,  Director of IIASA and 
Akira Yajima, Vice-President of CRIEPI. After brief introductory state- 
ments by the workshop organizers, Bert Bolin, the Chairman of the IPCC, 
began the proceedings by stating that in the future the IPCC would un- 
dertake economic analyses of climate change with the same vigor that it 
has demonstrated in its other scientific assessments, and that this workshop 
marked the beginning of this effort. Subsequently, the new Working Group 
I11 of the IPCC was organized and includes economic assessments in its 
activities. 
The workshop was organized in the form of five sessions covering the 
economics of climate change, its impacts, mitigation costs, policy instru- 
ments, and modeling issues. Each of these sessions started with two or three 
invited papers and contributions by invited discussants, followed by general 
discussion. The four parts of these proceedings reflect the written contribu- 
tions and discussions of the five workshop sessions. They are preceded by an 
introductory paper to this volume that summarizes both these proceedings 
and the findings and discussions of the workshop. 
We would like to extend our thanks to the workshop participants and 
contributors who provided the essential intellectual substance during the 
sessions and discussions, and to the co-organizing institutions which pro- 
vided the financial support to bring such a distinguished group of scientists 
together. We are also deeply indebted to Lourdes Cornelio, Sarah James, 
Christina Kugi, and Lieselotte Roggenland for their valuable help and assis- 
tance in the preparation of this volume. 
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Measurements for Measures: 
Current Economic Analyses of Climate Change 
Ferenc L. Toth* 
IIASA, ECS, Laxenburg, Austria 
Economic analyses related t o  various aspects of global climate change have 
received increasing attention over the past few years from audiences both 
within and outside the economics profession. The wide range of issues in- 
volved in the problem commonly called "global warming" has lured a large 
variety of studies that  seek to  clarify specific aspects of the problem. Results 
have been summarized in a few books so far, but the bulk of the research 
has been scatteringly reported in numerous journals, institute reports, and 
mimeos. There is clearly a need from time to  time to  take stock of the re- 
sults, sort out knowns and unknowns, and identify promising future research 
directions. 
IIASA's intention with organizing the International Workshop on Cost, 
Impacts, and Possible Benefits of COz mitigation in September 1992 was 
precisely this. In retrospect, and looking a t  the impressive collection of new 
results embodied in the subsequent papers in this volume, the workshop 
fulfilled its goals. It has become the latest member of a series of important 
meetings of which earlier ones were reported in, for example, Dornbusch and 
Poterba (1991), Wood and Kaya (1991). 
The present overview has two major objectives. First, it is intended to  
provide a short review of the papers included in the volume and explain the 
logic behind their arrangement. Second, it attempts to  put the workshop 
and its product into the context of the current global warming debate. My 
summary is explicitly not intended to  steal the thunder and present results 
of individual papers. I think they are all worth reading for their own merits. 
What is offered here is rather an overview of the variety of approaches, 
some very new and innovative, the diversity of opinions, views, and value 
judgements. The summary is hoped to  be useful for readers by providing an 
overall framework for the collection and some background information about 
each paper. 
Section 1 is addressing general issues of global warming economics and 
policy by reviewing papers in Part 1 of the book. The next section is dealing 
*This paper has greatly benefited from the thoughtful comments of Bill Nordhaus. Com- 
ments by N. NakiCenoviC, M. Clark, and G.  Klaassen are also gratefully acknowledged. 
with impacts and damages largely based on papers in Part 2. There we find 
three different extensions of damage assessments: one across geographical 
regions, another one across macroeconomic sectors, and the third covering 
global agricultural production. Section 3 is devoted t o  studies estimating 
costs of a large variety of proposed measures to reduce C 0 2  emissions. It 
is based on global models in Part 3 of the volume. Regional and national 
estimates of COz abatement costs follow in the next section by reviewing 
papers in Part 4. Finally, Section 5 provides a short summary of the new 
developments in the economic analysis related to  climate change. 
1. General Issues (Part 1) 
The primary objective of the workshop was to  review what kind of advice 
can state-of-the-art economic analysis provide in 1992 for present-day GHG 
policy. The result may appear to  be surprising to some: damages from 
C 0 2  doubling are relatively modest while the costs of significantly slowing 
global warming are relatively high. This conclusion was supported both by 
comparing results from a variety of empirical studies that assessed potential 
damages from climate change and costs of different GHG mitigation options, 
and by several conceptual studies evaluating the economic costs and foregone 
benefits of early vs. delayed action with a view to  different time schedules 
of information acquisition and learning about the climate system and the 
magnitude of damages. 
This general statement entails two immediate qualifiers. First, it by no 
means implies the overall inclination of the economics community toward 
inaction about the potentially serious threats associated with anthropogenic 
climate change. Mankind as a whole or individual societies may decide t o  
undertake various sorts of actions to  mitigate greenhouse-gas (GHG) emis- 
sions a t  any level of costs they find affordable, but proponents should, a t  
least a t  this point, not rely on economic analysis to  supply ammunition. 
Action based on ecological concerns (nature is fragile), moral principles (it 
is unethical to  plunder nature), or any other a priori consideration might 
be perfectly legitimate, as they are in numerous other cases ranging from 
workplace safety t o  protecting the stratospheric ozone layer which did not 
pass the test of balancing marginal costs with marginal benefits. 
The second qualifier is related to  the acknowledged shortcomings of dam- 
age and cost assessments conducted so far. I return to  these problems later, 
but it should be noted here that only part of the criticism leveled a t  these 
studies stem from purely economic grounds; most objections arise from ex- 
ternal, non-economic considerations. There is little room for constructive 
debate when criticism stems from a different set of axioms. 
This topic leads to a more general debate that  constitutes the major line 
of division in economic analysis of environmental problems. It was prevalent 
a t  the workshop and it is also apparent in the papers collected in this volume. 
One approach is rooted in neoclassical mainstream economics and attempts 
to  gradually extend the scope of analysis t o  include environmental spillovers, 
in our case the measurable and quantifiable damages of climate change as 
well as the costs of averting or a t  least delaying climate change. The starting 
point of the other approach is an incomplete understanding of ecological sys- 
tems from which hard constraints are derived and imposed on the economy 
with little respect for the relative costs and benefits. In the climate case it is 
ultimately to  stop GHG emissions and prevent climate change. A superficial 
expectation might be that the two viewpoints are approaching each other 
and will meet sooner or later, but this is only a tempting illusion. 
Differences in the attitudes and problem perceptions underlying the 
above division are apparent in legislative procedures and in economic anal- 
yses required to  support them in different countries. The precautionary 
principle has been adopted for environmental politics in many countries. It 
calls for early actions as opposed t o  waiting for complete scientific certainty 
and regards any potential environmental damage intolerable. In our case it 
implies that  climate change must be prevented. If this is the starting point 
then assessments of potential impacts and damages are practically irrelevant 
and the scope of analysis is restricted t o  finding the least expensive policy 
instruments to  reach this objective. 
In contrast, if the principle is that policy measures must pass a benefit- 
cost test then damage estimates become equally important but, unfortu- 
nately, the complexity of analysis increases by an order of magnitude. As 
they gradually evolved over time, benefit-cost analyses proved to be increas- 
ingly effective for short-term, local, relatively simple environmental decision 
problems. It takes a large amount of determination to  use this tool for long- 
term, large-scale, and complex environmental problems like climate change. 
Yet, in the absence of more appropriate tools, we need t o  try t o  improve 
the ones we have rather than imposing arbitrary constraints on our policy 
proposals. Some papers in this volume document recent improvements in 
traditional damage and cost estimates, others propose and demonstrate the 
viability of profoundly new approaches. 
A closer look a t  the literature of economic analysis about global warming 
shows major imbalances. 
First, the number of studies estimating the costs of GHG/C02 mitiga- 
tion strategies is overwhelming compared to  the number of efforts assessing 
the benefits. 
Second, cost studies largely rely on rigorous analytical tools, in most 
cases a single, sophisticated and thoroughly tested computer model, as op- 
posed t o  damage estimates that need to  rely on a variety of fragmented and 
in many cases self-contradicting impact assessments t o  derive an aggregated 
damage result. Impact assessment studies tend t o  focus on one specific crop 
in one region, inundation and property loss from sea level rise in another, and 
water resources in a third. Moreover, many studies analyze impacts under 
a 2 x C 0 2  equivalent climate1 and, at the same time, carbon fertilization 
effects of a 2 x C 0 2  concentration. 
Third, the evaluation of mitigation costs over time has proven to  be 
possible by integrating the most important macroeconomic dynamics (GDP 
growth, productivity improvements, energy use) into the overall framework 
of analysis. This way, future costs of various abatement strategies are related 
to projected future GDP values and baseline emission trends. In contrast, 
impact assessments and thus damage estimates tend t o  focus on 2 x C 0 2  
climate scenarios and superimpose them on present-day economic and tech- 
nological conditions. 
Finally, and to  a large extent explained by the previous points, the 
spread of results is much larger for damage assessments (in terms of poten- 
tial GDP losses due to an assumed level of global warming) than for cost 
estimates (using the same terms to  measure economic losses from a specified 
rate of reduction in C 0 2  emissions). This seems t o  hold despite the appar- 
ent gap between results of top-down and bottom-up models applied in cost 
estimates. 
No wonder that  these imbalances invite a lot of criticism when the results 
are integrated into a benefit-cost framework. They also point toward the 
need for further improvements on both sides, and probably for profoundly 
new approaches on the damage side. 
Beyond obvious differences in the multitude of factors t o  be considered 
and in the complexity of the analysis in damage vs. cost estimates, one 
possible explanation for the above imbalances is that for the latter it was 
possible t o  extend earlier energy-economic models (both macroeconomic and 
engineering types) by incorporating additional constraints in the form of di- 
rect emission target levels or incentive-based instruments, like carbon taxes. 
'That is, global climate change induced by an elevated concentration of all radiatively 
active trace gases which corresponds to the effects of doubling the COz concentration in 
the atmosphere. 
Another motivation may have been that cost assessments and studies of dif- 
ferent cost reduction schemes (permit trade, tax revenue recycling, etc.) will 
be important on their own right (and regardless of the damage results) if 
there will be a policy decision to undertake emission mitigation strategies for 
other than or beyond purely economic reasons. It is difficult to tell whether 
due to  the convenience of availability of well established models or due to 
the perceived need for these kinds of results even in the absence of full cost- 
benefit justification, but cost studies are certainly by far the most advanced 
area of greenhouse economics and modeling. 
Several papers in the volume review the current situation in greenhouse 
economics and policy. Papers in Part I can be divided into two broad cate- 
gories. Following an introductory statement by Yajima (this volume), Nord- 
haus and Cline address practical problems related to climate policy. Peck 
and Teisberg, and Kolstad shed light on the conceptual problems of decision 
making under significant amounts of uncertainty but with the possibility of 
learning. 
Nordhaus (this volume) focuses on the level and type of policy interven- 
tions that can be proposed on the basis of results from the relatively few 
systematic benefitlcost analyses completed so far. He also provides a long 
list of issues where the reduction of our vast ignorance might profoundly 
change both terms in the costlbenefit balance. His aversion for hasty and 
overambitious GHG control policies is based on empirical costlbenefit calcu- 
lations, but it is also supported by a conceptual study presented by Peck and 
Teisberg (a  summary in this volume based on Peck and Teisberg, forthcom- 
ing) who explore the relationship between the value of information about 
impacts and damages and the optimal time path for emission control. 
The two-year period before the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 was characterized by mixed 
expectations about the coverage and stringency of a global climate conven- 
tion that had been expected as a major product of the meeting. Similarly, 
the post-Rio period has witnessed mixed evaluations of the actual outcome 
(Parson et al., 1992; Haas et al., 1992). Cline (this volume) evaluates the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in a broader context of long-term 
evolution of efforts to  mitigate climate change and with a view to new results 
in atmospheric sciences and economic analysis. 
While Peck and Teisberg use exogenously specified dates of when un- 
certainty about global warming damages is resolved, Kolstad's model (this 
volume) includes a dynamic learning process. His study is based on an ex- 
tended version of the DICE model developed by Nordhaus (1992a) and covers 
two basic processes considered irreversible over a reasonable time horizon: 
emissions (because CO;! remains in the atmosphere for a long period) and 
mitigation investments (which are practically lost if they turn out to  be 
unnecessary after they had been committed). His results provide fascinat- 
ing insights into how relative time-paths of the learning process and major 
emission reduction commitments might influence the magnitude of economic 
losses from over-action vs. inaction. 
2. Impacts and Damages (Part 2) 
The shape and relative position of the damage function synthesizing measur- 
able economic damages of climate change impacts is determined by a broad 
range of geographical, socioeconomic, and technological factors. The dam- 
age function is bound t o  change over time as those factors change even if the 
underlying climate change scenario remains the same. 
The economic impacts of climate change are generally thought to  be 
negative. Some negative impacts will be offset by positive effects in the 
same sector or economic activity, e.g. yield losses due to  reduced maturation 
period partly offset by the atmospheric carbon fertilization effect, or part of 
the increased demand for space cooling in the summer will be offset by 
reduced costs of space heating in the winter if average temperature increases 
hold across the whole year evenly. Other negative impacts in one sector 
might be partly or fully compensated by positive impacts in other sectors in 
the same national economy. Very few studies dared t o  estimate the positive 
impacts of warmer climate, and even fewer the economic benefits associated 
with them. 
Considering the long-term trend of human activities becoming less 
vulnerable t o  climatic fluctuations and climate in general (Ausubel 1991, 
Schelling 1992), actual damages even in 30 but certainly in 50 t o  100 years 
will inevitably be lower than damages calculated by superimposing whatever 
future climate on today's economy. The general pattern is global although 
if we assume a saturation pattern in increasing climate-independence as a 
result of economic development, the autonomous rate of decrease in climatic 
vulnerability will be higher in developing countries, that is in regions that 
are thought to be the most vulnerable to  climate change today. 
A considerable part of the negative impacts can be offset by adapta- 
tion. Parallel to decreasing climatic vulnerability, adaptation capacity is 
also bound to increase with economic development, again in regions where 
losses associated with global warming are expected to be highest. 
There are several aspects of adaptation that make the assessment of 
this damage reduction potential difficult and largely non-existent up until 
now. First, the size of adaptation costs depends on the timing of adaptive 
measures relative to the visibility of impacts. Proactive adaptation is much 
cheaper than "see and react" adaptation. For example, abandoning long- 
term programs the results of which might be eliminated or severely degraded 
by climate change, and supporting social processes that enhance adaptive 
capacities at  the farm, local, and regional level are obviously cheap proactive 
adaptations. 
The second factor to consider is the positive spill-overs from any form 
(proactive or see and react) of adaptation. If adaptation measures produce 
benefits in addition just to  offsetting the negative impacts (and in many 
cases there is evidence that they would) these "extra-benefits" should be 
deducted from the cost accounts which should include direct adaptation 
costs only, similarly to the "netting-out" the monetary value of positive 
spillovers from the total abatement costs. Numerous no-regret adaptation 
strategies can be identified in natural resource management (protective and 
rehabilitative measures), economic policy (modified price, subsidy, export, 
and import strategies), institutional mechanisms (legal and government sys- 
tems), research and development (in agricultural, coastal-protection, and 
water management technologies), and many other areas (see Toth, 1992). 
One major problem with climate impact assessments as practiced today 
is the apparent contrast between the very detailed climate change scenar- 
ios (e.g. daily temperature, precipitation, and other data under 2 x C 0 2  
equivalent climate) and the very casual treatment of future socioeconomic 
and technological development patterns. In agriculture, for example, the 
evolving patterns of climate change will be intertwined with other dynamic 
processes affecting the resource base (degradation and depletion), with reha- 
bilitation and redevelopment efforts (drainage, land reclamation), and with 
other factors in the social and economic system (values, laws, technologies, 
cultural practices). 
In general, what are badly needed for the next round of global warming 
impact and damage assessments are careful and imaginative baseline studies 
of socioeconomic development in the absence of climate change. Scenarios 
and assumptions about climate change superimposed on these dynamic base- 
line scenarios would provide more realistic assessments of the actual threats 
and potential damages. These studies would also serve as a more realistic 
basis for evaluating adaptation options, their costs, and their non-climate 
related benefits. Finally, these scenarios could serve as a more realistic 
framework for improved cost estimates as future options for more or less 
aggressive carbon abatement could be simultaneously assessed. 
Creating these detailed, long-term scenarios is no mean task. It is rela- 
tively easy to construct global and regional scenarios by assuming different 
rates of change in various macroeconomic indicators, efficiency and diffusion 
parameters. It is much more difficult to depict what agriculture may look like 
in the Muda region of Malaysia (currently providing the bulk of the country's 
rice production) or in Mauritius (currently earning half of the export income 
from a single commodity, sugar) in the year 2030 or 2050 in terms of land 
ownership and farm size, level of mechanization and chemical control, types 
of management practices at the farm level; and the nature of agricultural 
policy (cheap food, liberal, protectionist) and control tools at the macroe- 
conomic level. Yet, all these and probably much more is needed in order to  
conduct realistic impact assessments which include the broad future range 
of adaptation options with their associated costs, and to  construct an em- 
pirical damage function as a realistic measure of climate impacts. The first 
attempts have already been made in this direction with moderate success; 
see for example the MINK Study by Resources for the Future (Rosenberg 
and Crosson, 1991; Rosenberg et al., 1992) and UNEP's study in Southeast 
Asia (Parry et al., 1992; Toth, 1992), yet there is a need and plenty of room 
for further improvements. 
The first serious and systematic effort to quantify economic damages 
from climate change (Nordhaus 1991b) seems to  have become a benchmark 
or reference point t o  several other studies, results of which were presented 
at the conference. Many authors criticize the Nordhaus estimates for its 
omissions and limited scope (see, for example, Cline, 1992 Chapter 3, who 
also provides his own estimates which are somewhat higher than those of 
Nordhaus; Ayres and Walter, 1991); others followed its basic principles and 
extended it to  other world regions. One such extension is by Fankhauser 
(this volume) to  the global scale which is interesting because some of his 
major world regions overlap or are reasonably close to the world regions 
used in the cost assessment studies (see Part 3.) 
The convenient and customary direction of climate impact assessments 
is "bottom-up". They typically start with one or more agricultural crop(s) 
in one or more small region(s), then aggregate a t  the level of economic 
(sub)sectors and larger regions, and finally, if regional coverage permits, 
synthesize results a t  the scale of the national economy (see Parry e t  al., 
1988; Carter et al., 1992). Point estimates of the damage function pegged to  
the 2 x C 0 2  and other prominent benchmarks, and the partial equilibrium 
framework to  analyze their economic implications provide useful first grade 
estimates. Nonetheless, the long-term dynamic interaction between the evo- 
lution of the climatic system and economic development calls for a dynamical 
version of the damage function. Moreover, in addition to direct impacts on 
sensitive sectors and associated costs, economic impact assessments should 
also include indirect and induced impacts of climate change. Scheraga et 
al. (this volume) use the dynamic, general equilibrium Jorgenson-Wilcoxen 
model and present the first "top down", dynamic analysis of total economic 
impacts of a small set of climate-induced changes (rise in agricultural produc- 
tion costs, rise in electricity costs, and rise in expenditures associated with 
coastal protection). Despite the numerous caveats suggested by the authors, 
the approach is a major step towards improved impact and economic dam- 
age assessments. Here again, the reader should compare results from this 
state-of-the-art general equilibrium model with other damage assessments in 
this volume and elsewhere. 
There is a consensus that agriculture will be the economic sector most 
severely affected by global climate change. Acknowledging all the flaws of 
past agricultural impact assessments, they provided at least a baseline for 
a primary economic evaluation of the impacts. While the Scheraga et al. 
study discussed above takes agricultural impacts and calculates cumulative 
effects within a single economy, Fischer et al, (this volume) follow a different 
approach. They take farm and national level impacts from many countries 
and several world regions and use a global agricultural-economic model to  
analyze effects on and adjustment processes within the world food and agri- 
cultural system. Given the magnitude of changes in the global food supply 
projected by this study, global climate change does not appear to  be the 
major threat t o  feeding this world. 
Ever since economists began attempting t o  formulate a rigorous analysis 
of the cost and benefit balance involved in global warming, their results have 
been received with suspicion and criticism. Grubb (this volume) provides an 
excellent summary of the various kinds of criticisms leveled at damage esti- 
mates using the 2 x COz benchmark level. Jansen (this volume) extends this 
criticism by addressing issues like substitutability between climatic and eco- 
nomic utility and the threats of irreversible ecological changes. Yet, critics 
have so far failed to  present convincing evidence for a systematically pre- 
pared damage assessment resulting in much higher damage costs and thus 
significantly higher benefits from GHG abatement. 
One popular and recurring item of criticism leveled a t  the monetary 
assessments of climate change induced damages is the neglect of such anal- 
yses for non-economic goods, environmental services and amenities outside 
the national accounts. The problem is, of course, that their current value 
is in itself difficult t o  determine, let alone their future value. Attempts t o  
impute some monetary value based on their estimated contribution to  past 
and present economic wealth generation or based on their current manage- 
ment often lead t o  surprising results. In Malaysia, for example, whatever is 
left of the mangroves today will have disappeared due to  coastal develop- 
ment long before see level rise induced by global warming. Similarly, coral 
reefs in many regions of the world have been and will continue to  be under 
much more severe threats from illegal fishing methods (poison, dynamite) 
and other mismanagement than from rising sea level. A proper balancing 
of our limited resources spent on environment should direct money where 
it buys the largest amount of protection or prevents the more likely dam- 
age. In many cases and in many countries, it is not the mitigation of global 
warming. 
It is clear from both the admittedly imperfect damage estimates and 
their critical reception that  innovative new approaches are badly needed to  
support economic impact assessments. One such attempt is presented by 
Mendelsohn et al. (this volume). The authors are dissatisfied with the pro- 
duction function approaches based on agronomical crop-development models 
that  tend to  bias upwards crop losses and thus significantly overestimate re- 
lated economic damages by ignoring a broad range of adaptation options. 
They propose a market-based approach that relates climatic conditions to  
farm-land prices and thus to  (Ricardian) land rents. The Ricardian approach 
captures all long-term market adaptations and eliminates the upward bias 
inherent in damage estimates based on production functions. The modelers 
mobilize huge data  sets in order to  capture the rich diversity of factors af- 
fecting the geographical allocation of agricultural production and land use, 
and some of their conclusions are clearly instructive. Yet, application of the 
Ricardian model may prove t o  be more difficult in other countries and world 
regions where important assumptions of the model (perfect competition for 
land and associated equilibrium in land prices, and perfectly competitive 
input and output markets) do not hold and/or data  t o  estimate the model 
are simply not available. 
Persistent problems in empirical studies, whether traditional or innova- 
tive, continue t o  make conceptual studies an important source of guidelines 
for greenhouse research and policy. Precise quantification of the damage 
function is not yet possible and will not be for a foreseeable future. Peck ( a  
summary in this volume based on Peck and Teisberg, 1993) provides valuable 
insights in how the size of the potentially averted damage can be assessed 
(and corresponding abatement policies proposed) on the basis of information 
about the curvature (exponent) of the damage function. 
3. Costs of Control: Global Estimates (Part 3) 
With the KO Framework Convention on Climate Change, greenhouse warm- 
ing moved to  a respectable position on the international environmental policy 
agenda. Despite the increasing number of studies, it is still not clear what 
the global costs of possible alternative international agreements would be 
and how these agreements might reshape energy production and consump- 
tion, much less overall economic development globally and in major world 
regions. 
The debate is revolving around two main issues. Some model calcula- 
tions show little long-term effect on atmospheric GHG concentration from 
rush and aggressive emission reductions. Others argue that  a t  least the  low or 
negative cost options for C 0 2  abatement should be utilized and initial price 
signals should be given to  markets and technological development about the  
possible need for more ambitious emission reductions in the future. The 
second major issue is still open despite a number of plausible explanations: 
if studies identifying a negative tail of the cost curves are correct, why are 
these opportunities to save money and C 0 2  emissions not utilized. 
Papers in this volume that report results about the potential economic 
losses associated with a large variety of policies currently proposed or under 
serious consideration by national or international organizations demonstrate 
the impressive development in the field of long-term, large-scale modeling 
of economy-energy interactions in recent years. A survey conducted a few 
years ago (Toth et al., 1989) could identify only a small number of models 
that  had the necessary geographical coverage and detail, temporal scale and 
resolution, and economic and energy system disaggregation to  become useful 
tools in studies of various aspects of global environmental change. Despite 
the  then small number of models, their results were difficult to  compare 
because they were based on different baseline assumptions and were driven 
by different exogenous conditions. 
The situation is completely different today. Models are proliferating 
and there has been an increasing demand for their comparative appraisals 
from different perspectives and for different purposes and audiences. One 
would almost be tempted to conduct a review of the review studies covering 
those like, for example, by Nordhaus (1991a), the OECD Model Comparison 
Project (Dean, this volume; Dean and Hoeller, 1992; Hoeller et al., 1992), 
and IIASA7s International Energy Workshop (Manne et al., 1992). 
Probably the best indicator of the development and usefulness of mod- 
eling projects is the activities of the 12th Energy Modeling Forum (EMF12) 
results of which are reported by Gaskins and Weyant (this volume). EMF12 
brings together a large variety of energy-economic models into a common 
framework of analysis. Participating teams agreed t o  run a set of standard- 
ized scenarios. This approach provided comparable results in the first place, 
but it is also helpful in understanding t o  what extent differences in results 
are due t o  incorporated or omitted relationships, underlying assumptions, 
or other reasons. 
Despite the overall development in the modeling field, each model is de- 
veloped with a specific purpose and is intended to  investigate a specific range 
of issues. As a result, each model is better than the others along a specific 
set of criteria but usually a t  the price of omitting important relationships. 
Thus there is still plenty of room for improvements. A new global multi- 
sector and multi-regional general equilibrium model developed by McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (this volume) is designed t o  address the weakness of current 
models in dealing with the linkages between national environmental policies 
and international trade. It will certainly be worth including in the next 
round of an EMF-like effort. 
There seems t o  be a strongly held general belief about greenhouse miti- 
gation that  if one world region acts alone, even if it is a large, economically 
powerful, and major emitter region, the global benefits of unilateral action 
will be negligible and the costs for that particular region will be high. Yet, 
there are contrasting views declaring that short-term and direct losses for 
the pioneering region will be handsomely compensated by long-term and 
indirect benefits accruing from being the first. 
One of the few concrete GHG/C02 emission mitigation proposals seri- 
ously considered in policy circles these days is that  of the European Commu- 
nity t o  stabilize its C 0 2  emissions by 2000 a t  the 1990 level. The proposed 
policy instrument is a gradually phased-in combined carbon and energy tax. 
Manne and Richels (1993) investigated the economic costs of this proposal 
and its impact on expected future C 0 2  emissions by using an appropriately 
modified version of their five-region global model Global 2100 (Manne and 
Richels 1992). Koopman et al. (this volume) address the same issue but 
they use a variety of models (which were developed for different purposes) 
and their own calculations under different scenarios of carbonlenergy tax 
recycling and off-setting. One important general lesson is worth highlight- 
ing here. In the modified Global 2100 model, the EC region is probably 
the most homogeneous one except for the single-country regions of the USA 
and China. Yet, the Koopman et al. study documents the amazingly wide 
range of differences among EC member countries in economic development, 
macroeconomic structure and export composition, household expenditures, 
and carbon intensity of electricity generation. These differences are likely t o  
be further enhanced by the admission of new applicants over the next few 
years and imply the necessity for yet another compensation/redistribution 
scheme among member countries under an EC-wide tax regime. 
If there are major differences in economic structure, energy use, and re- 
lated carbon emissions among countries in a relatively homogeneous region 
like the EC, then the differences across world regions are even bigger. This 
suggests that a uniform reduction in C02  emissions worldwide might not be 
the best solution for political and economic reasons. Therefore, many au- 
thors propose a global tradable C02 emission permit scheme. Three papers 
analyze various aspects of such trading schemes and they all extend earlier 
frameworks of analysis by experimenting with innovative ideas. Edmonds et 
al. (this volume) take a modified version of the Edmonds-Reilly-Barns model 
and investigate the costs of three alternative mechanisms of implementing 
a hypothetical international protocol: uniform taxes, tradable permits, and 
individual (regional) targets. Manne and Rutherford (this volume) combine 
carbon permit trading with oil and gas trade in yet another derivative of the 
Global 2100 model. The study by Okada and Yamaji (this volume) is based 
on an extended version of the IEA/ORAU model (Edmonds and Reilly 1985) 
and incorporates regional C02  taxes and carbon fixation options with their 
associated costs into a global, interregional trade model of carbon emission 
rights. 
Despite the already mentioned improvements in energy-economic model- 
ing, one persistent problem keeps bothering both economists and engineers. 
This problem is the apparent, and in some cases astonishing, gap in C 0 2  
abatement cost assessments between macroeconomic (dubbed top-down) and 
engineering-economic (bottom-up) models. Wene (this volume) offers his ex- 
planation from the systems engineer's view. Yet, the final word on this issue, 
if at  all possible, seems to  be far away. This is an important research area 
in the future. 
The last paper in Section 3 represents a transition between global and 
regional models. Matsuoka et al. (this volume) present a general GHG emis- 
sion and absorption model that also includes a simple climate model. The 
overall model is global with a specific focus on the most dynamic region of 
the world economy, the Asia-Pacific region. Their results are preliminary 
but the approach holds the promise of an improved understanding of the 
costs and benefits of global warming in this extremely diverse part of the 
world. 
4. Costs of Control: National and Regional 
Estimates (Part 4) 
Global assessments of GHG abatement options and associated costs, and 
especially their distribution across world regions, between energy exporter 
and energy importer countries, between different MDC and LDC groups 
are important for negotiators working on the next round of international 
agreements. They provide insights into the relative merits of various global 
policy instruments, possible schemes to share the costs and to compensate 
for losses, leakages resulting from the migration of carbon-intensive activ- 
ities to non-participating free riders and the like. Though valuable, this 
information is only a small part of what negotiators at international fora 
and policymakers responsible for national policy formulation need to know. 
The willingness of each state to  participate in more or less ambitious 
international GHG agreements and the stringency of domestic policies will 
be determined by the costs individual countries need to pay for it and ul- 
timately what national governments can get their voters and influential in- 
terest groups to accept. Large number of earlier studies concluded that, for 
a given national commitment to a specific international agreement, national 
costs of compliance can be significantly reduced by carefully choosing the 
appropriate primary policy instrument and a set of offsetting mechanisms. 
These types of national studies are of special importance for countries who 
are major players in the international GHG arena either because of their high 
current contributions to  global emissions or because of their large reserves 
of fossil fuels, mainly inexpensively extractable coal. 
The latest vintage of the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model (this volume) is a 
useful example of this kind of analysis. By estimating parameters of a highly 
disaggregated (I would call it "top-to-deep-down") general equilibrium model 
econometrically from long historical data sets, the authors give their model a 
respectable memory of long-term evolution processes. This makes all model 
parameters and especially elasticities more suitable for long-term future anal- 
yses than single-point parameterization. Although the perfect substitution 
assumption used in the model does not permit modeling the depletion of 
fossil fuel sources, this is not an important limitation as proven geological 
stocks will not be depleted over the model's time horizon of roughly one 
century. This powerful tool is then used to evaluate macroeconomic costs of 
different GHG policy instruments for the US economy. 
The model and the results presented by Hourcade (this volume) for 
France are in a sharp contrast with the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen study. Com- 
pared to the US and, in fact, to most other countries in the OECD group, 
France is a low C 0 2  intensive country due to its ambitious nuclear energy 
program. This characteristic would suggest that  further reductions in C 0 2  
emissions would be difficult, and it even raises the danger of massive future 
increases. In contrast to  the US approach, the French model falls in the cat- 
egory of engineering-type bottom-up models. By analyzing the phenomenon 
of technological bifurcations, the paper reveals a new way of looking a t  long- 
term implications of near-term technological decisions involving very similar 
set-up or short-term costs and presents an  interesting perspective to  think 
about endogenous technologies. 
Japan has traditionally been very sensitive to any threat to  its high rate 
of economic growth. Its reliance on imported sources of energy makes the 
issue of climate change even more important. It is therefore not surprising 
that  several studies have been conducted in Japan to  assess the options 
and costs of COz emission reductions. Amano (this volume) presents a 
comparative analysis of these studies covering a broad range of multi-sectoral 
dynamic optimization models and different types of econometric models of 
the Japanese economy, and series of global models as well. 
One of the major sources of uncertainty in all global models is the pace 
and character of economic development in general, and the evolution of the 
energy sector in particular over the next two t o  three decades in countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, dubbed as the EEFSU 
region in most recent global models. In 1986, probably the "last year of 
peace" before economic decline became evident in most EEFSU countries, 
their contribution to  the global COz emissions was more than impressive. 
It was 26 percent compared to their population share of 8 percent, and a 
share in global GDP of about 6 percent.2 On the "Top 20" list of countries 
ranked according to  their relative (percentage) contribution to global C 0 2  
emissions, the USSR ranked 2nd, Poland 8th,  the GDR 13th, Czechoslovakia 
15th, and Rumania 17th. In terms of per capita emissions, which is probably 
better a t  characterizing their distorted economic structures and wasteful use 
of energy, the GDR was a sovereign leader leaving the US behind by a fair 
margin, Czechoslovakia ranked 3rd ahead of Canada, the USSR 6th,  right 
'It is notoriously difficult to prepare comparable GDP estimates for the formal 
centrally-planned economies. A casual review (Begg et al., 1990) reveals differences on 
the order of 5 to 7 times between various calculations. The numbers here are based on 
some middle-ground estimates and the author's calculations. 
behind Australia, and Poland 7th ahead of the then smaller FRG. Rank 10 
for Rumania in front of Japan is also worth mentioning. 
With a view to  the importance of the region in past C 0 2  emissions and 
its potential contribution to future emission reductions at the global level, 
the two contributions from Russia included in this volume are of special in- 
terest. First, much of the in-depth data about the FUSSR energy systems 
have only recently become available to  the international expert community. 
Second, analysis and evaluation of these systems by those who have the most 
experience with them are most relevant in the phase of economic transfor- 
mation. Bashmakov (this volume) approaches the COz mitigation problem 
by taking an inventory of the relative costs and benefits of energy efficiency 
improvement options in different sectors of the national economy. Kononov 
(this volume) presents three scenarios of the transition period up to  2010 
and estimates energy use and C 0 2  emissions under these scenarios. Once 
again, the reader is invited t o  compare these papers and draw the conclu- 
sions. In my view, both papers hold important lessons for global modelers 
who probably need t o  change many parameters in their models to  reflect 
changes in the EEFSU region. 
China is by no means less important in the global GHG problem. 
Jiankun et al. (this volume) present results of a major study on the future 
of the Chinese energy system. Among many others, an important merit of 
his analysis is that  it follows through a wide range of detailed technological 
options under several macroeconomic development scenarios. 
Most studies about global GHG mitigation declare explicitly or assume 
implicitly that  developing countries cannot be expected to undertake costly 
measures in the short t o  medium term to  reduce their C 0 2  emissions. Yet, 
several studies are underway t o  estimate costs and benefits of C 0 2  abatement 
options in the LDC region. Pachauri and Khanna (this volume) point out t o  
the special constraints to be considered when analyzing costs of mitigation 
options in developing countries. In addition, they present cost curves of 
COz abatement for several Asian countries and for Brazil. Moreira (this 
volume) discusses a series of economic, institutional, and technological policy 
options to enhance C 0 2  mitigation in Brazil. Biomass-related options, that 
is slowing deforestation and large-scale afforestation, occupy a prominent 
place on his list of GHG policies. 
Papers in Section 4 reflect the large variance in estimates of GHG/C02 
mitigation costs produced by national and regional studies to  date. The 
large variety of modeling approaches, the broad range of initial assumptions, 
and major differences in the principles and techniques of cost accounting 
has produced such a rich diversity of results that is simply bewildering t o  
policymakers. In order to make these results comparable across countries 
and regions, some generally agreed standards are needed for national cost 
studies. Halsnaes and Mackenzie (this volume) report results from a study 
conducted on the methodological aspects of abatement cost calculations. 
The debate among economists about global warming, its impacts and 
damages, the feasibility and costs of its mitigation, and the diversity of policy 
recommendations from the economics community is a relatively small part 
of the overall climate change debate. The summaries prepared from time to  
time (Houghton and Woodwell 1989, Schneider 1989a, 1989b; White 1990) 
report progress on individual topics or single components of the problem in 
atmospheric sciences, but they do not seem to push the overall debate sub- 
stantially further. Ausubel (this volume) considers a selected set of issues in 
the general global warming debate and relates them to recent developments 
in their economic counterpart or equivalent. By relating recent estimates of 
global warming costs and benefits to a frightening list of other environmental 
problems which need attention and funding, he creates especially instructive 
examples about the real size of financial assets that look so negligible in 
terms of national or world GDP percentages. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Throughout this paper, and in fact throughout the collection that follows, 
one item recurrently emerges and it is the issue of spatial and regional aspects 
in both impacts and prevention of global climate change. The magnitude of 
economic damage and the range of possible adaptation options depends on 
the regional level of aggregation. Impacts on a single farm and adaptation 
possibilities for an isolated farmer are very different from what we see at  
the scale of a regional economy or a t  the national level. Similarly, incentives 
and opportunities for shorter and longer term COz abatement at  a specific 
power plant, industrial unit, or residential heat supply system might be very 
different from the broad range of legal, technological, and economic options 
available a t  the regional or national scale. 
All this points toward the need for an iterative type of analysis where 
results of many more and improved regional and national studies are inte- 
grated into a global framework. Conclusions from the global analysis should 
then be fed back into the next round of national and regional studies. Both 
national studies and the global synthesis should consider various aspects of 
mitigation and adaptation simultaneously. Mitigation and adaptation stud- 
ies should be based on the same baseline scenarios of socioeconomic and 
technological development. This approach offers hope for more consistent 
and reliable results. These results are, in turn, badly needed for formulating 
national GHG policies (based on the national impacts, costs, and benefits) 
and for negotiating international agreements (based on an improved under- 
standing of national stakes and interests). 
Recent studies about the economic aspects of global climate change have 
produced major developments in several areas. A variety of new ideas and 
new results were first presented at  this Workshop. An incomplete list of new 
developments includes the following. 
a Many features of the global warming problem make traditional methods 
of analysis difficult to  apply or even inadequate. New ideas and inno- 
vative approaches are in great demand in order to make our economic, 
social, and technological analyses of climate change more relevant for 
policy makers. The approach to estimating agricultural impacts based 
on Ricardian rents by Mendelsohn et al. or the technological bifurcation 
analysis by Hourcade (both this volume) are excellent examples of the 
kinds of creative thinking necessary to overcome barriers of traditional 
analytical tools. 
a There has been a gradual increase in the geographical coverage of dam- 
age estimates. This was made possible by the proliferating regional and 
national climate impact assessments conducted in many world regions. 
Although the methodological underpinnings of these studies are, at  best, 
mixed and many of them do not permit us to derive monetary estimates, 
we now have a substantially improved knowledge base for damage as- 
sessments than the initial attempts which applied a simple multiplier to 
derive damage estimates for LDCs from those calculated for MDCs. 
a The time horizon of the analysis has been dramatically extended. 
Economists have traditionally considered time horizons of 20 to 30 years 
at  most. The very long-term nature of climate change demands analyses 
a t  much longer time scales. Recent analyses face this challenge: Cline's 
(1992) analysis covers 300 years, some of Nordhaus' analyses with the 
DICE model extend over 400 years. These time scales, of course, raise 
new problems especially about the parameters affecting the intertempo- 
ral allocation of resources, notably the discount rate. 
a Parallel to the increasing time horizons, there is a clear tendency away 
from the comparative static analyses based on 2 x COz equivalent im- 
pact and damage assessments towards truly dynamic analyses. Various 
types of dynamic energy-economy models have been used to  prepare cost 
estimates for many years, but dynamic approaches have only recently 
been applied in the benefit calculations. Scheraga et al. and Fischer et 
al. (both this volume) present very different but promising advances in 
this direction. 
Probably the most significant breakthrough in the economic analysis of 
global warming has been the integrated analysis of impacts of climate 
change and costs of mitigation in a single dynamic framework. The 
DICE model by Nordhaus (1992b) integrates the dynamics of emissions, 
atmospheric processes, climate change, its impacts, as well as costs and 
benefits for the first time into a single, albeit simple, synoptic model. 
Alea iacta est, and although this was not the last roll of the DICE, the 
results are worth thorough consideration. 
Some results presented at  the conference also point toward the next, 
more detailed modeling framework integrating both cost and benefit calcu- 
lations, at  least for the U.S. economy. Two separate papers make use of the 
Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model. Scheraga et al. (this volume) use it to  prepare 
a full-scale economy-wide damage estimate while Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
(also this volume) calculate costs of various C 0 2  abatement strategies. Clos- 
ing the loop both at  the atmosphere/climate side (which will require esti- 
mates of non-US and other non-C02 emissions) and at  the optimal resource 
allocation side, similarly to DICE, will be by no means a straightforward 
task, but it is not difficult to envision that it will be done soon. The result 
will be a powerful tool for integrated costlbenefit assessments, at  least for 
the American economy. The G-Cubed model by McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(this volume) holds the promise of the possibility of extension for similar 
analyses at the global scale. 
All these results and new developments suggest that even in the short- 
term 
the reliability of economic analyses will continue improving even in the 
absence of major improvements in the scientific understanding and pre- 
diction of climate change on the natural science side; 
methodological approaches, modeling techniques, and other analytical 
tools available for economic analyses of global climate change will be 
more sophisticated, better tied to  the special characteristics of the global 
warming problem, and more appropriate to  handle results from the next 
cycle of atmospheric and climate research. 
Several papers presented at  the workshop and included in this volume 
support these expected short-term improvements in our economic assess- 
ments. Plenty of evidence is provided by historical examples, by conceptual 
an d  empirical studies, by  cost and  benefit assessments, by mathematical  
models a n d  simple reasoning, t h a t  t h e  globe may  lose more by  premature 
action t h a n  by losing a few years from inaction while details of sound a n d  
economically efficient action can b e  developed. This  suggests t h a t  in  t h e  
short  r u n  investment in  information is likely t o  result in be t te r  pay-offs t h a n  
investment in mitigation. 
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Part 1 
General Issues 

Global Climate Change on the Policy Agenda 
Akim Yajima 
CRIEPI, Tokyo, Japan 
On global environment issues, lots of information, sometimes excessive, have 
been showering on us. People understand these appeals t o  save the Earth 
fairly well by now. But do they really feel it in their hearts? As you may 
agree, it seems that we fail in transforming the understanding into a feeling 
of impending perils which need immediate policy measures and actions. 
I t  may be asked why have people so neglected t o  prevent the worsening 
conditions of the Earth? Because we have been trapped by that familiar way 
of thinking, "OK, it is indeed important, but we have a lot to  finish before 
that!" This is what I call a moratorium of thought or state of inaction. 
Then what factors underlie this moratory attitude of people? I believe 
there are four. 
First, as in every age, many people innocently believe in human abili- 
ties; in general, people place too great a faith in the ability of technology and 
market mechanisms t o  solve problems. They believe that the market will be 
formed whenever necessity arises, and technologies will break through the 
impasse. Such optimistic, one hundred percent belief in markets and tech- 
nologies cannot be a convincing argument for environmental issues involving 
irreversible phenomena. 
Second, the environmental and energy resource issues are typically in- 
terregional and intertemporal. So far, however, under the conventional so- 
cioeconomic regimes, what has almost always been pursued is a partial opti- 
mization for a specific region or nation or generation. Current consumption 
or today's self-interest has been favored over a more optimal allocation of 
resources. 
For example, Japan, a resource-poor country, has benefitted enormously 
from a relatively free access t o  the resources of other nations, often in ways 
that  worsened conditions elsewhere. It now has a responsibility t o  ease and 
improve the plight of others. 
Third, until relatively recently, environmental resources have been con- 
sidered external in the process of industrialization. The environmental costs 
were not part of cost calculations; hence there was little incentive to  use 
environmental resources efficiently. Now we face the challenge of how to  
internalize and how to allocate these environmental costs. The environmen- 
tal costs, such as those of greenhouse effects, are yet difficult to estimate 
with accuracy. But I believe that even if this is the case, at  least part of 
the costs should be immediately internalized so that people recognize it as 
clearly as possible. Both business and consumers should be prepared to bear 
the present and future burden of this kind of cost internalization. This, I 
suppose, is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition for all policy 
measures to become effective. Perhaps I should stress that the cost of re- 
covering environmental destruction is far higher than the cost of preventing 
it. 
This leads to my fourth point, that is, the uncertainties in the data 
concerning environmental impacts. These data are composed of quite diverse 
factors and tend to  accumulate uncertainties. Furthermore, even the values 
claimed to be critical for the global environment and human life are often 
difficult to  prove objectively. So, people are apt to take the ambiguities due 
to  such uncertainties as a kind of leeway or time to spare before taking action. 
It is often emphasized from a short-term viewpoint to avoid overshooting in 
environmental policies using the uncertainties as an excuse. But I would like 
to stress that it is essential to underline the "minimum regret policy" taking 
into consideration the long-term irreversibility in environmental destruction. 
To solve fundamentally the problems associated with global resource 
scarcity and negative environmental impacts, we need a breakthrough in 
technological development. However, it often takes many years before inno- 
vative technologies can be practically applied, even if we start development 
immediately. Until then we have to  gain time by adopting policy measures 
like action plans, funding plans and agreements, one by one, and steadily 
build up achievements. Of course, enormous time will be required here too, 
before all the nations and economies jointly act along the line of a prescrip- 
tion. Every participant has his own interests, sense of value, and culture. 
This often produces conflict. 
There is no time to  spare, yet time is slipping by. We must move away 
from the tendency to  delay taking decisive action. We must get a common 
recognition or common sense of the plight of the Earth as an objective fact. 
What we should do first of all for this purpose is to construct quickly an 
open environmental database and an integrated network to  collect and dis- 
tribute information on a global scale, in order to foster a common recognition 
of crisis of the Earth. 
Various difficulties will lie along the way; violation of political secrets, 
funds too enormous to  raise, existence of technical barriers, and so on. Yet, 
no action plan can become effective unless the common recognition over- 
comes national self-interests. 
I believe that IIASA is, and will continue to be, one of the very im- 
portant nodes in this global information network. I also believe that this 
international workshop is an important step in this direction. Through ex- 
cellent presentations, animated discussions, and further cooperation of all 
the distinguished participants here, this workshop will make a substantial 
contribution toward our common target. 

The Economics of Greenhouse Warming: 
What are the Issues? 
William D. Nodhaus 
Cowles Foundation, Yale University 
New Haven, CT, USA 
1. Introduction 
The globe faces a profound challenge in the years ahead in addressing the 
problem of global warming in an efficient and equitable manner. Some would 
argue that  inaction holds perils for our economies and ecological systems, 
while others hold that  the most serious dangers arise from zealous and over- 
ambitious government regulation. The perspectives on this issue will differ 
depending upon one's professional focus or national interest. An ecologist 
will worry about the loss of precious coral reefs while an economist will fret 
about the loss of precious national output. Americans look a t  the prospect 
of regulation slowing growth in living standards, while Japanese might see 
regulation as allowing faster growth of exports. A coal producer would be 
threatened by the tendency of carbon taxes to  reduce demand, while a low- 
lying country would be threatened by the tendency of global warming to  
raise sea level. Large, rich, and mobile countries might feel they could easily 
adapt by moving poleward or installing more air conditioners, while small, 
poor, low-lying, and immobile groups see nothing but misery piled on misery. 
There is ample room for debate and alternative viewpoints here. 
Much economic analysis today has come from the perspective of the rich, 
adaptive, and mobile countries, a perspective that is hardly representative of 
the late 20th century. But we are speaking of impacts in the 21st and 22nd 
century, so it might be that this perspective will apply t o  many more regions 
in the future than it does now. In these remarks, I will focus on efficient 
mechanisms for coping with the threat of global warming. Recent studies 
suggest that these mechanisms will only be used in high-income countries 
which have ample resources t o  devote t o  longer-term objectives. Moreover, 
I will concentrate on issues of efficiency and will leave for another day issues 
of the distributional burden of policies. 
2. Choices for Efficient Regulation 
The efficient choice of policies poses thorny issues for governments because 
it requires difficult choices in five distinct areas: selecting the appropri- 
ate areas for intervention, finding the right level of intervention, choosing 
the most efficient tools for minimizing the net economic harm from exter- 
nalities, coordinating policies where there are international spillovers, and 
because greenhouse warming poses serious issues of decisionmaking under 
uncertainty. Because governments operate as monopolists in the industry 
of regulating environmental protection, there is no market test on any of 
the four choices. Governments can make many sound or foolish decisions 
on regulating externalities without bankrupting the country or being driven 
from office. In some cases, such an overregulating acrylonitrile, the political 
and economic effect of excessively zealous regulation are trifling; in others, 
such as regulating health and safety of nuclear power plants, an industry can 
be sent to its grave. The issues involved in greenhouse warming are a fine 
example of these issues. 
1. To intervene or not to intervene? Government must decide whether 
greenhouse warming is sufficiently serious as to warrant the setup costs of es- 
tablishing a new regulatory mechanism; the Bush administration has argued 
that doing so is premature, while many European governments have made 
commitments or even imposed carbon taxes. The preponderance of scientific 
opinion is that this is a sufficiently serious problem to warrant intervention, 
and economists are coming to that point of view as well. But this leaves the 
kind of intervention and the stringency of interventions to be determined. 
2. Finding the right level of intervention has proven extremely elu- 
sive even amongst those who argue for taking steps to slow climate change. 
Should governments take "no-regret" policies or impose light or heavy tax or 
regulatory steps? A good measure of the stringency of global-warming poli- 
cies is the level of "carbon taxes", which are taxes on emissions of greenhouse 
gases like COz. The European Community (EC) has proposed a carbon tax 
of around $100 per ton carbon (which would more than triple the price of 
coal in the USA); by contrast, my studies suggest that a carbon tax of $5 
to $10 per ton carbon is the maximum that is justified by a cost-benefit 
comparison, and the $100 carbon tax would be much worse than nothing; 
and the US government has argued for doing nothing. There is much room 
for constructive analysis and debate here. 
3. The third design issue in this area is the policy instrument. In the 
United States, command-and-control approaches have been the major tools 
for accomplishing our regulatory objectives. Academic studies have found 
that US regulations have tended to  be between modestly and enormously 
cost-ineffective. Only recently and rarely have market instruments been 
employed, although there is increasing recognition in the policy community 
of the importance of cost-effective instruments. The use of taxes on ozone- 
depleting chemicals, the experiment with tradable C 0 2  permits, and the 
EC7s contemplating of carbon taxes are hopeful signs of a trend toward 
using more efficient regulatory tools. 
4. Combatting greenhouse warming will require international coordina- 
tion of policy in much the same way as do trade policies or exchange-rate 
mechanisms. There has been much criticism of the slow progress in reaching 
international agreements with meaningful and binding targets, and mecha- 
nisms for ensuring that targets are reached. While some deplore the snail's 
pace in reaching international agreements in global warming, a more cautious 
view would recall the fate of the first four cholera conventions, the League 
of Nations, the Treaty of Versailles, the Gold Standard, Bretton Woods, 
and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the interwar disarmament 
treaties, SALT 11, and the Maastricht Treaty.' The cautious would suggest 
that  a slow movement toward consensus may be preferable to  a questionable, 
fragile, and ambitious agreement crammed down the throats of reluctant leg- 
islators and voters. All these difficulties should not drive us to  the Sununist 
conclusion that nothing is better than anything, but it surely would forewarn 
us that temporary inaction is sometimes preferable to  makeshifts. 
5. An additional thorny issue concerns uncertainty. As scientists, we 
must admit that our estimates are crude, the models are primitive, the 
future is uncertain, and our ignorance is vast. Faced with our profound 
ignorance, should we respond like the Bush Administration on the environ- 
ment, waiting until the uncertainties are resolved before acting? Or like the 
Reagan Administration on defense, pursuing spending programs because of 
the uncertainties about future political developments? Should we assume 
the worst case on climate change and species losses as we traditionally have 
with ballistic missiles and a t  the Fulda Gap? 
Modern decision sciences would argue that none of these are correct. 
An appropriate approach t o  uncertainty is t o  weigh the consequences and 
likelihoods of potential outcomes and to  take actions which would maximize 
the net benefits of expected policies. To wait for uncertainties t o  be resolved 
may involve forgoing inexpensive steps that will prove highly beneficial if 
the dice rolls unfavorably; t o  wait until uncertainties are resolved is likely to  
'The perils of the Treaty of Versailles were foreseen in J.M. Keynes, Economic Con- 
sequences of the Peace (1920) while a history of international agreements in cholera is 
contained in R.N. Cooper's Can Nations Agree? (1988). 
mean waiting forever; literally to defend against the worst case will quickly 
bankrupt any imaginative government. In games against nature, a best- 
guess strategy is likely to  come tolerably close to  an optimal policy - the 
exceptions being where the stakes are very large, the outcomes are highly 
asymmetrical, or learning takes place over time. 
While the appropriate treatment of uncertainty is not a controversial 
theoretical issue, it often poses daunting problems of estimation and imple- 
mentation. The sheer complexity of problems of decisionmaking under un- 
certainty will overwhelm most analysts and decision makers, for the already- 
complex issues surrounding greenhouse warming are further complicated by 
branching of probability, learning, and decision trees. Data problems are 
compounded because the trees depend on subjective probabilities, future 
values, and evolving technologies that cannot be found in any handbook of 
economics or physics. Coping with uncertainty pushes our analysis to  the 
limit. 
3. Science as the Handmaiden of Government 
I have described some of the issues that governments face in designing effi- 
cient approaches to  greenhouse warming. I next turn to  the role of economic 
and other sciences as handmaidens to governments. Government leaders 
clearly will have their own views about the issues - as is clear from this year's 
American Presidential election - but scientists can properly help frame the 
issues so that the goals of governments are effectively attained. In this final 
section, I will lay out five areas where governments need careful analytical 
work in the economics of greenhouse warming. 
1. At the synoptic level, economists rely upon cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA) to determine the answers to the first two issues above - whether to  
intervene and at  what level of stringency. (In a formal sense, of course, the 
first is subsumed under the second as deciding whether the level of regulation 
should be zero or not.) Cost-benefit analysis involves weighing the costs 
and benefits of interventions and choosing that level of intervention where 
the incremental benefits no longer exceed the incremental costs. It is often 
forgotten that CBA can be either quantitative or qualitative. For many 
areas - such as constitutional decision on free speech, custody decisions on 
children, or making medical mistakes2 - a qualitative CBA underlies the 
decision because quantification is impossible. In greenhouse warming, by 
'Recall T.H. Huxley's qualitative cost-benefit analysis on medical education: 'There is 
the greatest practical benefit in making a few failures early in life." 
contrast, much is quantifiable and we should insist that  policies pass a cost- 
benefit test as we would for hospital or road construction, defense, or training 
programs. Therefore a first area where we need much more attention if we 
are to  design efficient policies is to  construct careful, empirically based cost- 
benefit analyses. 
2. To construct meaningful CBA, we must have measures of costs and 
benefits over time that  are reasonably reliable. The major uncertainty today 
lies in the area of benefits, where quantification of the benefits (or damages 
averted) has been extremely difficult and equally controversial. Nonetheless, 
to  ensure that  our policies are efficient, it is absolutely critical that  more 
attention be paid t o  the impacts side of the equation. In a rough calcula- 
tion of the  value of information in global warming, I found that  for studies 
of greenhouse-warming policies, reducing uncertainty about the impacts of 
climate change appears to  have the largest single payoff and, a t  the same 
time, t o  receive only modest government support. Up t o  1990, there was no 
general support for research on the impacts of climate change. Virtually all 
the support of research in the USA into the impacts of climate change has 
been a spinoff of research on agriculture; yet 97 percent of economic activity 
in the USA today is in the nonfarm sector. The result of this is that  we know 
very little about the impacts of climate change in the nonfarm sector and 
even less about the impacts in developing countries. There is much fruitful 
research t o  do in these areas. 
3. In the area of greenhouse warming, there has been good progress 
on the study of costs, and, while not without controversy, we have several 
alternative approaches and estimates of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Figure 1 shows the results of a survey I undertook two years 
ago, collecting the  costs of reduing GHG as compared t o  the  marginal cost 
of reduction (or implicit tax rate). Figure 2 adds t o  this figure the results 
of a recent model comparison undertaken by the OECD. There is clearly a 
substantial difference in opinion of the models, and there is no convergence 
in the most recent studies. I believe that ,  notwithstanding the  remaining 
dispersion in results, we have learned a great deal from economic models of 
the costs. 
There is, however, one major open issue in cost studies which does 
not emerge from the surveys shown in Figures 1 and 2. This involves 
what is sometimes called the difference between the "top-down" and the 
"bottom-up" approach. More precisely, the difference is between economic- 
equilibrium models and engineering-optimization models. In economic equi- 
librium models, markets and decisions are assumed t o  be efficient and there 
Tax Rate [$ per ton C, 1989 prices] 
Figure 1. Marginal cost of C 0 2  reduction (cost per ton C 0 2 ,  1989 prices). 
are no costless GHG reductions (except in situations with classical external- 
ities). By contrast,  engineering-optimization models contain technological 
possjbilities for zero-cost or even negative-cost reductions in GHGs. An ex- 
ample often cited is energy conservation, in which it is claimed tha t  there is 
insufficient investment in energy conservation because of incomplete informa- 
tion, defective incentive structures, or too high a discount ra te  of consumers. 
In the  colloquialism of economics, this view is not only tha t  there are free 
lunches, but  tha t  in a selected set of restaurants you can get paid to  eat.  
An example of the contrast between these two approaches is contained in 
the  recent US National Academy of Sciences Report on greenhouse warming 
(see Figure 3).3 The  step functions show the  results of the engineering- 
optimization studies undertaken by the Panel while the shaded region is a 
representation of the  dispersion of the  economic-equilibrium models shown 
in Figures 1 and 2. The  latter approach finds a sharply increasing and 
positive cost function while the  engineering-optimization finds tha t  between 
10 and 40 percent of US GHG emissions can be reduced at  negative or  zero 
3 ~ a t i o n a l  Academy of Sciences Press, 1991, hereafter Policy Implications. 
Figure 2. Marginal cost of C 0 2  reduction (cost per ton C 0 2 ,  1989 prices). 
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Figure 3. Emission reduction (billion tons C 0 2  equivalent per year). 
costs. One of the major issues facing modelers is to reconcile the discrepancy 
between these two approaches. 
4. Many who analyze the perils of future climate change argue that the 
major concern is not the smooth and linear projection that comes out of 
mainstream climate and economic models. Rather, it is the low-probability, 
high-consequence events - possibly even catastrophic changes that are dif- 
ficult or impossible to  foresee - which cause the most concern about green- 
house warming. One statement of this point of view is the following from 
the National Academy Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:4 
Large changes in climate have happened in the past. Desperate masses of 
people have fled drought or flood in places with marginal farmingand grow- 
ing population. These disasters occurred before greenhouse gases began 
increasing, and they could occur again. The panel knows of no convincing 
attempt,  however, to  compute the probability of cataclysmic changes such 
as the stopping of the current that warms Europe. Because the probabil- 
ity and nature of such unexpected changes are unknown, the panel cannot 
project their impacts or devise adaptations to  them. 
If we heed the words of the National Academy panel, then we at  the 
same time are advised that one of the major concerns is the potential for 
major ecological disruptions yet we have no systematic way of assessing 
the likelihood of those events. My own research comes to much the same 
conclusion: while we can assess the impacts of modest changes in climate, 
the impact of major, rapid, and discontinuous system shifts is so far outside 
the range of historical experience that we can hardly expect to  pull a reliable 
economic model out of the tool box to appraise the damages. 
I will not attempt to  lay out an answer as to  the right way to model the 
economics of decisionmaking with uncertainty and learning although I admit 
to having a few ideas. Rather, I would urge a collaborative effort of physical 
scientists, economists, and decision scientists to  develop both the tools and 
empirical distributions that will help our governments come to  grips with 
these difficult issues. 
5. The final issue involves the question of institution design. It is easy to 
become pessimistic about the likelihood of reaching sensible policy responses 
to the threat of global warming. The need to address the potential issues 
raised by future climate change is daunting for those who take policy analysis 
seriously. It raises formidable issues of data, modeling, uncertainty, interna- 
tional coordination, and institutional design. Because the economic stakes 
are enormous, involving investments on the order of hundreds of billions of 
*Policy Implications. p. 45.  
dollars a year to  slow or prevent climate change, we can hardly expect in- 
terested parties in the coal, oil, or forest industries to leave argumentation 
to  scholarly studies in the Journal of Economic Theory. Moreover, any ef- 
ficient policy must be adopted by all major countries and have appropriate 
incentives for billions of consumers and firms. 
All these somber thoughts should not lead t o  despair. Rather, they 
emphasize the importance of careful scientific and policy analysis and es- 
tablishing or strengthening institutions which contain incentives that  are 
compatible with thoughtful balancing of long-run costs and benefits of so- 
cial investments. The key' concept here is incentive-compatible mechanisms 
or decision processes - ones in which the incentives would lead individuals to  
actions that are in the long-run interests of society as a whole. The attrac- 
tiveness of markets is exactly the incentive compatibility of Adam Smith in 
which profit-maximizing firms and utility-maximizing individuals are led in 
perfectly competitive markets "as if by an invisible hand" to  behavior that 
serves society. 
At the outer limit of incentive-incompatible mechanisms are markets in 
which there are extensive externalities over space and time and no external- 
ity is more pervasive than global warming. One proposal for an incentive- 
compatible mechanism is a carbon tax system in which carbon taxes are 
levied a t  the cost-beneficial level. Such taxes would be preferable t o  regula- 
tory interventions because taxes provide incentives to minimize the costs of 
attaining a given level of GHG reduction while regulations often do not; in 
addition, raising the prices of fossil fuels will give a boost to  private-sector 
efforts on vital new low-GHG technologies; and for countries starved for 
low-dead-weight-cost revenues, the taxes would allow reductions in deficit 
reductions or other burdensome taxes. 
However, while carbon taxes are a near-ideal incentive-compatible mech- 
anism for harnessing private interests to  public uses, there is no comparable 
mechanism to  ensure that governments set the correct level of the tax. As I 
suggested above, governments can be overzealous or slackers in setting their 
carbon taxes, and there is no market in governments that will guarantee 
sound decisions. Among the major challenges that face social sciences is to  
devise mechanisms that give governments appropriate incentives to  set their 
national policies at levels that will balance long-run global costs and benefits 
of actions t o  slow climate change. This is a worthy challenge. 

Greenhouse Policy After Rio: 
Economics, Science, and Politics 
William R. Cline 
Institute for International Economics 
Washington, DC, USA 
1. Introduction 
At the Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992, most nations signed 
the international framework convention on climate change. The agreement 
committed signatories to  develop plans for limiting emissions of greenhouse 
gases. For the industrial countries, it provided that by the year 2000 emis- 
sions would be reduced to &'earlier levels", and a subsequent paragraph in 
the text cited 1990 levels as a benchmark. Whereas much of the publicity on 
the treaty focused on its failure to establish binding commitments, in prac- 
tice it amounts to a relatively strong regime for best efforts toward limiting 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Notably, as an initial framework 
convention the climate change is considerably tougher than its counterpart 
for stratospheric ozone depletion, the 1985 Vienna convention. 
This essay first reviews recent debates in economic analysis of global 
warming, and notes perplexing implications of certain recent scientific find- 
ings. It then turns to the issue of the international policy strategy for the 
1990s. The discussion places considerable emphasis on the role of the devel- 
oping countries. 
2. Recent Economic Analysis 
Benefits and Costs of Action. Cline (199223) provides a benefit-cost analy- 
sis for an aggressive international program of limiting carbon emissions to 
four gigatons of carbon (GtC) annually (and restraining other greenhouse 
gas emissions commensurately). This program, equivalent to  the most ambi- 
tious considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
amounts to an initial reduction of emissions by about one-third. Because of 
likely future growth of the world economy and emissions, the cutback from 
baseline is on the order of 80 percent by 2100 and even greater thereafter. 
@Institute for International Economics, 1992 
My analysis adopts a 300-year horizon, because only by that time will 
deep-ocean mixing begin to limit atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide. I 
estimate that under business as usual, the central estimate for global warm- 
ing amounts to 10 OC by late in the 23rd century, with an upper bound 
of 18 OC. Damages in agriculture, from sea level rise, in higher electricity 
requirements for air conditioning, in water scarcity, human health, and nu- 
merous other categories could be large. With 2-112 OC warming by 2050 
(the conventional 2 x C 0 2  benchmark), a moderate central estimate would 
place damages at  one percent of GDP, but damages could easily reach two 
percent of GDP with plausible higher estimates for species loss and includ- 
ing air pollution effects.' If warming turns out to be at  the upper-bound of 
4-112 OC for 2 x C02 ,  economic damage by 2050 could exceed four percent 
of GDP. Moreover, these estimates are calibrated for the US economy, and 
could be greater for more vulnerable countries (but lesser for other, presum- 
ably high- latitude, countries). For very-long-term warming, my estimates 
suggest that economic damages could be in the range of 6 to 20 percent of 
GDP, depending on the severity of warming and the degree of nonlinearity 
assumed in the damage function. 
The analysis compares the benefit of avoiding the bulk of these damages 
against the costs of doing so, and uses existing energy-economic-carbon mod- 
els to estimate those costs. Typically these models find that it costs on the 
order of one to three percent of GDP to reduce carbon emissions by 50 per- 
cent from baseline by the middle of the next century. My estimates assume 
that an initial reduction in emissions by about one-fifth can be achieved at  
zero cost, based on the engineering estimates of gains from movement to  
best practices. The calculations also include emphasis on low-cost forestry 
measures over the first 30 years, as discussed below. The overall analysis 
concludes that the benefit-cost ratio comfortably exceeds unity for the ag- 
gressive action program, if a risk-averse approach is taken and greater weight 
is placed on the high-damage variants than on low-damage o u t ~ o m e s . ~  
The Discount Rate Debate. The benefit-cost analysis applies state of the art 
discounting methodology (Arrow-Kurz-Bradford-Feldstein; see e.g. Gram- 
lich, 1990). All investment effects are converted to consumption equivalents 
with a shadow price on capital, and then the social rate of time preference 
'Measures to reduce global warming would reduce air pollution as well, so their "bene- 
fit" would include not only the greenhouse damage avoided but also the gains from lower 
air pollution. 
2 ~ h e  full analysis is given in Cline (1992b). A policy-oriented synthesis appears in 
Cline (1992a). 
(SRTP) is used for discounting. Following Ramsey (1928), I argue that the 
rate of "pure time preference", for myopic preference of earlier consump- 
tion regardless of income level, should be zero, an especially appropriate 
assumption for inter-generational comparison. That leaves discounting only 
for utility growth. I apply a constant relative risk aversion utility function 
with the elasticity of marginal utility set a t  -1.5 (faster decay of marginal 
utility than under the unitary elasticity of the more conventional logarith- 
mic utility function). With average per capita income growth of one percent, 
the result is an SRTP of 1.5 percent, and an effective discount rate on the 
order of two percent once capital shadow pricing and capital productivity 
are taken into account. 
Lawrence Summers of the World Bank and Thomas Schelling of Harvard 
and the University of Maryland have criticized this approach as applying 
too low a discount rate; James Tobin of Yale University has endorsed it 
(Summers, 1992; Stokes, 1992). It would seem useful at this juncture t o  
seek a t  least greater agreement on the nature of the disagreement. 
With Nordhaus (1992a, 1992b), I concur that the discount rate may 
usefully be separated into what he calls "growth discounting" and pure time 
preference. Growth discounting is the component associated with declining 
marginal utility as income rises. In my benefit-cost approach, it is the SRTP. 
In approaches optimizing a stream of utility, growth discounting is taken care 
of directly in the utility function, whereas the return on capital investment is 
incorporated in the optimal choice of savings rates over time. For example, 
with rising per capita consumption, the logarithmic utility function already 
shrinks the contribution of additional future consumption by a degree com- 
parable to  that  from time discounting a t  the rate of per capita consumption 
growth (Cline, 199223, ch. 6).3 Any discounting beyond the amount already 
implicit in this shrinkage for declining marginal utility is pure time prefer- 
ence discounting. It would clarify matters, then, if economists could agree 
that  essentially they disagree about the rate t o  use for pure time preference, 
or myopia. 
It is important t o  recognize that the disagreement is not about the rate 
of return on capital. The question is not whether lower rates of return 
should be permitted on environmental projects (Summers, 1992). Within a 
given capital budget, the projects with the highest return should be adopted, 
environmental or otherwise. The point, however, is that in evaluating the 
'With a logarithmic utility function, a given percentage change in consumption in 
the future is equivalent in utility to the same percentage change today, even though the 
absolute change in the future is far greater because it applies to  a higher per capita income. 
output of the project, there should be shadow pricing of environmental ef- 
fects. In particular, there should probably be a shadow price for damage 
from carbon emissions. In arriving at this shadow or accounting price, it 
is necessary t o  use an appropriate SRTP as described above in an overall 
evaluation of greenhouse policy. But with the carbon shadow price in hand, 
normal discount rates should be applied a t  the level of development project 
analysis. 
A final word on the discount rate. Some imply that the alternative t o  
action on greenhouse gases is to  take the resources and place them wholly 
into investment, and then after decades or centuries compensate the future 
generations for greenhouse damage by endowing them with the massive pro- 
ceeds of other goods and services resulting from this investment. Advocates 
of this approach should recognize that it requires explicit political action to  
levy a tax for the compensatory investment fund, rather than merely the 
argument that such compensation could be implemented. They should also 
recognize that  it may prove physically impossible t o  make an intertemporal 
investment transfer over decades and centuries. We do not know what con- 
sumption goods will be desired in the distant future, nor how to  construct 
investment goods that produce only second-stage investment goods for an 
unbroken chain of investment until that time. In short, the "full invest- 
ment opportunity cost" argument is implausible and an inappropriate basis 
for applying the capital investment rate of return as the discount rate in 
greenhouse benefit-cost analysis.4 
Optimal Emissions Paths. Nordhaus (1992a, 1992b) has constructed a Dy- 
namic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model to  examine optimal emis- 
sions over time. His initial results with DICE resemble his earlier conclusions 
with a comparative static model: only modest reductions in emissions are 
optimal, on the order of 10 percent cut from baseline in the initial decades 
and only 15 percent by 2100 (leaving absolute emissions far higher a t  that  
time than now). The DICE model has important improvements, includ- 
ing a 400 year horizon that makes it possible t o  consider the much higher 
"very-long-term warming" that I have emphasized. 
I have conducted alternative experiments using the DICE model (Cline, 
1992~) .  Although my results are preliminary, they show several key results. 
First, Nordhaus has a much lower baseline of carbon emissions by late in 
'The consumption-equivalent method, in contrast, does give weight to the capital rate 
of return, but assumes instead that only a portion of the resources diverted for greenhouse 
avoidance come out of investment, whereas the bulk come out of consumption. 
the 23rd century than those in my projections, primarily because he has a 
decelerating rate of total factor productivity growth that leads to  lower world 
GDP and emissions. With a lower baseline of emissions, global warming is 
less of a problem (reaching only about 5-112 O C  by the late 23rd century), 
and given levels of target emissions constitute smaller reported percentage 
cutbacks from baseline. Second, even using Nordhaus' optimization model, 
the optimal path for carbon emissions cutbacks is far more aggressive if a 
low rate is assigned to pure time preference. Thus, a t  a pure time preference 
rate of 0.5 percent but assumptions otherwise as in the Nordhaus  estimate^,^ 
the optimal path for reduction of carbon emissions is about 30 percent from 
baseline in the initial decade, rising to 50 percent by 2100 and 85 percent 
by 2200. Moreover, this outcome is obtained even without incorporating 
high-damage variants into the a n a l y ~ i s . ~  
In short, the DICE model offers important advances in merging green- 
house climate analysis with economic optimization. However, my initial 
experiments with the model suggest that its policy implications may be far 
closer to those from my simpler benefit-cost evaluation than suggested by 
the preliminary findings reported by Nordhaus, if appropriate modifications 
are made for baseline, pure time preference, and other parameters. 
There are more general points to be made about studies of optimal emis- 
sion paths. First, especially with intermediate or high discount rates they 
will tend to defer carbon abatement until relatively late in the horizon. Yet 
as a matter of political economy, we should be skeptical of a global strategy 
that assumes later generations will be prepared to  take extreme measures 
whereas the present generation is unwilling to  take mild ones. Because of an 
optimization model's alternative of investing, it can easily reach a flip-flop 
solution in which there is minimal abatement for several decades and then a 
switch to nearly complete carbon elimination. The politics of the first phase 
are easy to  imagine, but those of the second phase would seem nearly impos- 
sible. Second, such scenarios seem likely to miss the steeply rising trade-off 
between the usual basket of goods and services and the scarcity value of 
environmental goods, although in principle this trade-off should be captured 
in the warming damage function. 
5As Nordhaus uses the logarithmic utility function, which has "utility growth discount- 
ing'' of one percent per annum when per capita income is growing at one percent, the 
approach most comparable to my SRTP of 1.5 percent is to set the pure time preference 
rate at 0.5 percent. 
'In addition, other experiments with the model indicate that optimal abatement may 
be understated by the model's additive rather than multiplicative treatment of radiative 
forcing from non-carbon greenhouse gases. 
3. Recent Scientific Findings 
Two scientific studies published in recent months raise a fundamental para- 
dox about the amount of greenhouse warming to date. The first (Charlson 
et al., 1992) reports that: 
Current climate forcing due to anthropogenic sulfate is estimated to be 
-1 to -2 watts per square meter, globally averaged. This perturbation is 
comparable in magnitude to current anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing 
but opposite in sign (p. 423). 
Anthropogenic sulfate refers to  sulfate aerosols emitted to the atmo- 
sphere from urban pollution. Incoming solar radiation reflects from these 
particles, which increase the earth's "albedo" or reflectivity, both directly 
and indirectly through their stimulation of the formation of low clouds 
(whose impact is primarily to reflect incoming shortwave radiation rather 
than to  further trap outgoing longwave radiation). 
The Charlson et al. finding is remarkable by itself, because it implies 
that we should have observed no greenhouse warming to date. Aerosols from 
urban pollution should have fully neutralized radiative forcing from increased 
carbon dioxide concentrations. There has been "masking" of greenhouse 
warming that would be unveiled if urban pollution were reduced, or even if 
its albedo effect failed to rise sufficiently in the future to  offset rising carbon 
concentrations. 
This paradox was compounded with the publication of a second recent 
study (Penner et al., 1992), which found that: 
... smoke particles from biomass burning ... act to reflect solar radiation 
directly [and] also can act as cloud condensation nuclei, increasing the 
reflectivity of clouds. Together these effects ... may add up globally to a 
cooling effect as large as two watts per square meter, comparable to the 
estimated contribution of sulfate aerosol (p. 1432). 
In other words, the burning of (primarily tropical) forests is emitting 
smoke aerosols that have an impact comparable to urban pollution in mask- 
ing greenhouse warming. Indeed, taken together, the two effects provide 
twice as much negative radiative forcing as the estimated positive radiative 
forcing from greenhouse gas buildup to date. We should have been observing 
global cooling over the past few decades, rather than warming.' 
My interpretation of these two studies is that they seriously increase 
the likely greenhouse warming that is in the pipeline but presently being 
'Note that there was indeed cooling in the Northern hemisphere from the 1940s to the 
1970s. 
masked by anthropogenic aerosols. Together, they provide a compelling 
explanation for any shortfall of observed past warming from the amount of 
transient warming predicted by the General Circulation Models. For this 
reason, the 1990 IPCC judgement placing the "best guess" estimate for 
the climate sensitivity parameter (A)  a t  2.5 OC for a doubling of carbon 
dioxide equivalent above preindustrial levels would seem downward biased. 
The IPCC chose this level, which is below the midpoint of the previously 
accepted range of 1.5 OC to  4.5 OC, because of the shortfall of observed 
transient warming from levels predicted by the general circulation models 
(GCMs). Yet the most recent GCM runs had tended to  predict a climate 
sensitivity parameter on the order of 3-112 to  4 OC. The double-masking 
effect of sulfate and smoke aerosols suggests the recent, hotter GCM runs 
may have been right after all.8 
Another recent scientific development is the natural laboratory experi- 
ment provided by the eruption of the Philippine volcano Pinatubo. Sulfate 
aerosols from the eruption were expected t o  cause global cooling of about 
112 OC for two years or so from the increased albedo, based on estimates 
of the GCMs (Kerr, 1992; Washington Post, 19 May, 1992). By the first 
several months of 1992, global cooling was occurring by about the amount 
predicted (ibid). The eruption thus provided verification of the GCMs that ,  
if it holds up, will be another basis for confirming their estimates of the 
climate sensitivity parameter. 
As the findings on aerosol masking illustrate, the scientific understanding 
of global warming is evolving. The Rio framework convention was judicious 
in explicitly providing that scientific uncertainty is not a basis for postpon- 
ing action. At the same time, however, remaining scientific uncertainty does 
seem to  warrant a "best efforts" approach rather than legally binding emis- 
sions limits by the end of the decade, essentially the strategy adopted a t  
Rio. 
4. North-South Cooperation 
The current state of both the science and economics points toward a decade 
or so of cautious but meaningful action t o  begin limiting emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases while carrying out intensive research t o  
verify the severity of the problem and identify the proper extent of future 
action. The Rio Summit showed, however, that it will be a major challenge 
'The evidence in the ice core data is also more consistent with the higher range for A. 
See Cline (1992b, p. 27). 
to mobilize participation by all countries. Many would say that US refusal 
t o  adopt binding limits was a major instance of such difficulty, although 
US representatives contended that the American action plan was one of the 
most concrete in the world. 
Regardless of the degree of cooperation among the industrial countries, 
it was evident at Rio that there is even more doubt about whether, and 
on what terms, the developing countries would be prepared to  participate in 
greenhouse restraint. There was a strong tone at Rio of reviving the "North- 
South conflict" from the 1970s, with a focus on the transfer of resources 
from rich t o  poor countries. The implicit theme was that whereas previous 
"threats" from the South (oil and commodity power) had failed to mobilize 
large resource transfers, perhaps the environmental threat would provide the 
leverage t o  do so. 
Mutual Interests. This orientation of the negotiations was unfortunate. It 
tended to  relegate the substance of greenhouse risk to secondary importance 
and focus attention on bargaining over the traditional problem of sharing 
global income. Yet global warming is a new problem with concrete stakes 
for the South as well as the North. 
There has been some tendency to depict the greenhouse problem as a 
new infatuation of environmentalists in rich countries, a concern that is a 
luxury the poor countries cannot afford. Indeed, the World Bank's review 
of environmental problems in developing countries had the overall tone that 
global warming was far down the list in importance (World Bank, 1992). 
In fact, Lawrence Summers of the World Bank has been quoted as arguing 
essentially that any diversion of developing country resources to  greenhouse 
abatement would be a mistake considering that tens of millions of people 
die annually from poverty, and that such life-saving measures as providing 
safe drinking water should have much higher priority than limiting global 
warming (New York Times, 31 May 1992).' 
Suppose for the moment, however, that scientific uncertainty were re- 
moved, and that global warming was indeed demonstrated to be extremely 
likely to  reach the dimensions outlined above over the long term. Under 
these conditions, it would be a serious mistake for the developing countries 
to  consider the greenhouse problem to  be a luxury for only the North to  
worry about. The fact is that some of the most severe consequences would 
- - 
'The same argument would seem to imply more broadly that investments in electricity, 
steel, and certainly television sets or other luxuries should be postponed until safe water 
and other life-saving infrastructure are available for all. 
be likely t o  occur in developing countries. The risk of damage from sea-level 
rise for Bangladesh is well known, but sea level damages could also be high 
in such countries as Egypt, China, Brazil, and numerous other developing 
countries. For example, one study indicates that in China, Shanghai and 
other important cities could be submerged (Cline, 1992b, p. 112). Simi- 
larly, an international team of agricultural researchers coordinated by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency has concluded that agricultural dam- 
ages from global warming would tend to be the most severe in developing 
countries, in part because their ability to  adapt would be relatively limited 
(Rosenzweig and Parry, 1992). Recent work by EPA also seems to  suggest 
that health damages from global warming would tend to  be more severe in 
developing countries .I0 
The real issue, then, is not that greenhouse warming involves a trade-off 
between the interests of the North and the South, but instead that it involves 
a trade-off between the present generation and the future generation in both 
the North and the South. There is a modicum of analytical validity to  
greater emphasis on the present in the South, because of lower per capita 
income relative to expected future levels and thus a higher (utility-based) 
time discount rate." Broadly, however, responsible leaders in developing 
countries should consider their descendants just as much as leaders in the 
industrial countries should. 
Recognition that developing countries are likely t o  experience greenhouse 
damages at  least as severe as those in industrial countries should help return 
the question from one perceived of as a zero sum game, involving threats 
from the South to  elicit bribes from the North, to a positive-sum game where 
broad participation can minimize damage in both areas. 
The Rio Blame Game. Nor is it helpful to blame the North because the 
rich countries have emitted the most carbon historically. Almost all of past 
emissions occurred without awareness of any global warming damage. More 
importantly, it is the large increases in future emissions - rising to  some 
ten times today's levels - that threaten to impose high warming, not the 
stock of carbon from past emissions. The developing countries are expected 
to contribute the lion's share of future emissions, because they will account 
for nearly 90 percent of world population and the largest increases in per 
''In these various dimensions, more severe damage occurs in the developing countries 
despite the fact that their geographical concentration in the lower latitudes would suggest 
warming by less than global means. 
"Even this justification is shaky, however, in view of the near-zero increase in per capita 
income in sub-Saharan Africa over the past three decades (World Bank, 1992, p. 219). 
capita income. Even today, developing countries are responsible for 45 per- 
cent of carbon emissions if deforestation is included (29 percent excluding 
deforestation; Cline, 1992b, pp. 331-34). 
Action Stages for Developing Countries. Because considerable scientific un- 
certainty remains, it is reasonable to expect the industrial countries to  un- 
dertake relatively greater abatement efforts at first, just as the rich tend to 
spend relatively more on insurance than the poor. When and if a new phase 
of sharply increased scientific certainty begins, more energetic measures by 
the South would be appropriate. Even then, the objective would likely be 
limiting future emissions increases in the South (to perhaps no more than 
twice current levels), rather than seeking absolute reductions below present 
rates. In both phases, additional financial assistance from North to South is 
appropriate to cover a major portion of the cost of abatement. 
5.  An Action Program for the 1990s 
The implicit and nearly explicit consensus coming out of Rio was that in in- 
dustrial countries, by the year 2000 greenhouse gas emissions (chiefly carbon 
dioxide) should be no higher than in 1990; moreover, developing countries 
should also be attentive to  limiting emissions. Ideally the implementation of 
this broad objective should be on an efficient basis. Technically, that would 
require different proportionate cutbacks from baseline in different countries 
in view of varying marginal cost of emissions reduction. Efficiency would 
also require credit for sinks (planting trees) and cross-border efforts (e.g. 
payments by the Netherlands to Poland to reduce Polish carbon emissions 
for purposes of meeting Dutch reduction targets). 
Eficiency Campaigns. The place to start is probably public campaigns to 
move toward the best-practices frontier. In the United States, public util- 
ity rate structures should be revised to create incentives to conserve energy. 
Reasonable revisions in standards for buildings and automobile fuel efficiency 
should be pursued. Information pooling should be pursued through coordi- 
nated "model home energy configuration" programs that help overcome the 
"public good" nature of investment in information. 
Carbon Tax. It is difficult to  see how much real progress will be made in 
limiting carbon emissions until a price penalty is attached to them. My own 
preference is for an initial tax on the order of $5 per ton of carbon, rising 
to  $40 by the year 2000 (still only 12 cents per gallon of gasoline). Others 
would prefer keeping the tax toward the low end of this range (Nordhaus, 
1992a), but even implementing a tax on that level would send an important 
signal to  firms that economizing on carbon emissions in the future will be 
important. The hybrid carbon and energy tax proposed in the European 
Community is an important political breakthrough, but it is less efficient for 
purposes of greenhouse policy than a pure carbon tax. 
In the US context, the excess burden of the existing tax structure from 
disincentive effects means that about 30 cents of each dollar collected is a 
deadweight loss to  society (Jorgenson and Wun, 1990). Shifting the compo- 
sition of taxes toward carbon taxes should therefore provide an important 
partial offset to  abatement costs through reduction of this loss. Moreover, in 
the United States the need to restore fiscal balance places a further premium 
on the identification of politically feasible taxes. 
During the 1990s, it seems highly un likely that a carbon tax could (or 
perhaps even should) be levied internationally. The sums are potentially 
too large for countries to  entrust to international entities. Nonet heless, na- 
tionally imposed and collected taxes would broadly have the effect of leading 
toward efficient abatement, especially if set a t  comparable rates among coun- 
tries. 
In the first decade, some fraction (at least 10 percent) of carbon tax rev- 
enue in industrial countries would appropriately be channeled to  developing 
countries to  support specific programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
(such as the adoption of non-carbon energy technologies or the reduction of 
deforestation). Because a carbon tax will have a disproportionately large 
impact on coal production (as coal has a higher carbon content per unit of 
energy), it would be fair to allocate some of the carbon tax revenue toward 
relocation and retraining of affected workers in the coal industry. 
Research. By late in the next century the world economy may have to  be 
largely carbon-free, if cutbacks from baseline on the order of 80 percent prove 
warranted as in my analysis. That outcome is difficult to envision without 
important technological breakthroughs. 
Analyses of technological change argue that in some areas such as solar 
energy and especially biomass, there is potential for massive departure from 
carbon-based technology but there is also a need to  make an initial break- 
through in such aspects as infrastructure as well as production technology. 
Essentially, such observers are arguing that we face the type of problem il- 
lustrated in Figure l. At time 0 (today), unit cost of this technology (on 
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Figure 1. Efficient infant-industry subsidy under environmental externality. 
curve NC) exceeds that  of carbon alternatives (curve CC). Technical change 
is expected t o  reduce unit cost to  levels a t  or  below that  of non-carbon tech- 
nologies over time. However, the amount of any such future cost advantage 
is likely t o  be sufficiently limited that there is insufficient compensation t o  
adopting the non-carbon strategy today. That  is, the future savings rep- 
resented by area B over the planning horizon are too small to  warrant the 
initial excess cost as represented by area A (especially after discounting). 
Explicit inclusion of the negative externality of the carbon-based tech- 
nology would increase its social cost curve, to  C'C'. With this evaluation, 
the initial excess cost area would shrink f r o q A  (=ace) to  bcd, whereas the 
area of future savings would expand from B (= egh) t o  dfh. The calculus 
would now favor an initial subsidy t o  the non-carbon technology because 
future savings would more than compensate. 
Greenhouse policy in the 1990s should include some stimulus t o  research, 
development, and adoption of non-carbon energy technologies (including 
biomass because of its closed-cycle, zero net-emissions nature). l2 In the  
United States, public funding for research for renewable energy has fallen 
sharply over the past decade. This trend should be reversed. 
12Biomass grown for fuel absorbs the same amount of carbon from the atmosphere that 
it releases when burned. 
There is a key interaction between research and the carbon tax. The tax 
provides an incentive t o  focus research efforts on carbon-saving methods, and 
is thus likely t o  increase the rate of technical change in these technologies. 
Moreover, part of the carbon tax revenue can be used to  fund research. 
Forestry Measures. Carbon can be removed at some $15 per ton through 
afforestation and a t  less than $10 per ton through reduced deforestation, 
compared with costs reaching $100-$250 per ton through cutbacks in in- 
dustrial emissions a t  levels on the order of 50 percent or so from baseline. 
Curbs on deforestation and programs of afforestation should be included in 
the initial decade of greenhouse policy. Reduced deforestation in develop- 
ing countries should receive financial support from the North. My program 
of aggressive action includes an international afforestation effort to  plant 
260 million hectares in forest (of which 150 million would be in developing 
countries). An efficient long-term strategy would emphasize the use of new 
forested area for the production of biomass energy. 
Removal of Carbon Subsidies. Many countries subsidize coal and oil. Shah 
and Larsen (1991) estimate that nine large developing and Eastern Euro- 
pean countries spend $40 billion annually on energy subsidies, and the for- 
mer Soviet Union another $90 billion; the removal of these subsidies would 
reduce global carbon emissions by an estimated eight percent. MacKenzie 
et al. (1992) have estimated that US drivers receive an implicit subsidy of 
as much as $300 billion per year, or $2.25 per gallon of gasoline. Even if 
their estimates are pared down to  eliminate costs that would persist even 
with non-carbon fuel (road construction and maintenance, police, value of 
untaxed parking, accidents, noise) and t o  omit direct evaluation of carbon 
damage (which they place a t  $27 billion annually or more), a subsidy of 
about 26 cents per gallon remains ($25 billion as motorists' share of secu- 
rity in the Middle East and $10 billion in air pollution). Outright subsidies 
to  coal in Germany and, arguably, the oil depletion tax allowance in the 
United States, are further examples of carbon subsidies. At the very least, 
an internationally coordinated greenhouse strategy can ask that nations stop 
subsidizing the use of carbon, even if they are unwilling to  begin taxing it. 
Subsidy removal should be directly in the economic interests of the nation 
in question (though not politically palatable t o  the interest groups that have 
enjoyed the subsidies). 
Population. One of the most notable shortcomings of Rio was the absence 
of a hard-hitting position on population growth. It is evident that over the 
long term, emissions will depend on economic scale, and thus on population. 
In an aggressive carbon limit program, the carbon budget will be about 0.4 
tons per person per year if population stabilizes at 10 billion, but about half 
that or less if some of the pessimistic population scenarios materialize. In 
view of eventual carbon abatement costs of at least $10 per ton annually and 
more probably $100 to $250 per ton, it is likely to be worth an investment on 
the order of $1,000 or more to secure a steady-state population that is lower 
by one person. That much money should go far toward reducing population 
growth (e.g. through educating young women, strengthening social security 
programs, etc.). What is needed is an ideological breakthrough, considering 
that it is already known that living standards can improve more rapidly with 
slower population growth. 
6. Beyond 2000 
The Rio agreement appropriately provides for at  least two international re- 
views of greenhouse strategy by the year 2000. Let us suppose that by that 
year the scientific evidence is considerably more certain and substantially 
confirms the warming prospects outlined above, including the likelihood of 
high very-long-term warming. Under those circumstances, it will be appro- 
priate to shift to a more intense international regime to limit and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
In this second phase, a logical first step would be widespread application 
of carbon taxes at stiffer rates. The taxes could still be levied and collected 
at the national level, but with greater international coordination on rates, 
and with an explicit international program to channel some of the revenue to 
those developing countries that adopt aggressive greenhouse abatement pro- 
grams of their own. If such an internationally coordinated tax program failed 
to achieve substantial limitation of emissions within a reasonable period (e.g. 
5 to 10 years), it could be necessary to move to a regime of international 
carbon quotas with tradable permits. 
The tradable permit approach would ensure closer adherence to target 
emissions. However, it would directly raise the equity and efficiency issues 
associated with determining the initial allocation of the quotas. A reasonable 
point of departure would be to set initial quotas based equally on three 
shares in world aggregates: base year population (for equity), GDP (for 
production needs), and carbon use (for realism at the outset). Over time, 
the weights would be phased down for carbon use (sooner) and GDP (later), 
eventually leaving base year population (not contemporaneous, lest there 
be an incentive to  population growth) as a solely equity-based criterion for 
allocation. Such an approach would automatically provide resource flows 
to  the developing countries, as their shares in carbon quotas would exceed 
their shares in use, so that they could sell permits to industrial countries 
and receive revenue thereby. 
The second-phase regime would ideally rely on positive incentives to  
countries to  participate in emissions restraint, in the form of revenue-sharing 
of carbon taxes channeled to  developing countries that adopt abatement 
programs. If positive incentives proved inadequate, then a t  some point it 
would be appropriate to  impose negative incentives, probably in the form 
of trade penalties on countries that make little or no effort t o  limit carbon 
emissions. The Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone depletion provides 
a precedent for such penalties. 
7. Conclusion 
Despite its bad press, the Rjo agreement marks a significant beginning and 
workable initial framework for serious greenhouse policy. Recent scientific 
developments if anything reinforce the prospect of future global warming by 
increasing the estimated masking currently hiding the warming already in 
the pipeline (from urban pollution and smoke particles from deforestation). 
The evolving economic literature on the issue seems amply capable of leading 
to  the conclusion that the abatement game is worth the candle, although here 
the verdict is likely to  turn on whether a substantial time discount factor 
should be permitted for pure myopia (and in intergenerational analysis). 
Much scientific work remains t o  be done, however, including examination of 
warming and its damage over the very long term (some three centuries). 
In the meantime, a whole array of initial measures would seem to  make 
eminent sense, as outlined above. The principal area for debate in the initial 
phase would seem to  be just how high to  set a carbon tax and how much 
incentive t o  provide to  technical advance in carbon-saving technologies. Ac- 
tion in the other areas (movement toward best practices, subsidy removal, 
forestry measures, population measures) should largely make sense even with 
a relatively low assessment of the optimal carbon penalty. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we use the Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment (CETA) 
Model to investigate the value of information about global warming. The 
CETA model represents world-wide economic growth, energy consumption, 
energy technology choice, global warming, and global warming costs over a 
time horizon of more than 200 years. In CETA, energy technologies and the 
oil, gas, and coal resource bases are inputs to  an energy submodel, which 
supplies energy inputs to  a production submodel, and the COz by-product 
to  the warming submodel. In the production submodel, energy, labor, and 
capital inputs are used to produce output which is then allocated to con- 
sumption, investment, energy costs, and damage costs of warming. Because 
energy costs (and energy-technology choices) are considered together with 
warming damage costs, the time paths of COz emissions and carbon taxes 
in our model reflect an optimal balancing of the cost of emission reduction 
and the benefit of reduced global warming. 
2. Parameter Sensitivities 
We begin our investigation of the value of information by exploring the 
sensitivity of optimal policies to  variations in key parameters. We do this a t  
two points in time: 2030 (before a major transition to  coal based synthetic 
fuels has occurred) and 2100 (well into this transition). We find that optimal 
emissions tend to  be insensitive to  parameter variation in 2030, but not in 
2100. This implies that resolving uncertainty about these parameters before 
2030 is not likely to  have high value - if roughly the same policy is optimal in 
'This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or of its members. 
this time frame regardless of parameter values, little is gained by resolving 
uncertainty about these values. Second, and conversely, the sensitivity of 
optimal emissions in 2100 implies that resolving uncertainty well before 2100 
is likely t o  have relatively high value. 
Our sensitivity results also suggest a subset of key parameters on which 
we focus in our subsequent value of information analysis. These are pa- 
rameters which have significant effects on optimal emissions, and which (for 
technical reasons) affect the benefits rather than the cost of C 0 2  emission 
control. These key parameters are the warming rate per C 0 2  doubling and 
the parameters specifying, the warming damage function. 
3. Valuing Informat ion 
To investigate the value of information about uncertain parameters, we use 
the paradigm suggested by decision analysis. In this paradigm, information 
is valued as the difference between (1) the expected value obtained if the state 
of the world is known before a policy must be adopted, thereby allowing 
a potentially different policy to  be applied in every possible state of the 
world, and (2) the expected value obtained if a single policy must be adopted 
(without knowledge of the state of the world) and then applied across all 
possible states of the world. 
In using this approach, a central issue concerns how the emissions con- 
trol policy under uncertainty in chosen. In the standard decision analysis 
approach, this policy is set so as to maximize expected net benefits. How- 
ever, the global warming problem is being considered in a highly political 
context involving governments of many countries with differing perspectives 
and interests. In this context, emissions control policies chosen in the ab- 
sence of good information may be far from the optimal policy. Thus we 
present results assuming both that the policy under uncertainty is optimal, 
and that  the policy is arbitrarily chosen in the political process. 
There are numerous challenges in valuing information in the context of 
the global warming problem. First, there is a very large number of uncertain- 
ties involved in global warming. Second, available assessments of parameter 
uncertainties are typically limited to  possible ranges at most, while infor- 
mation on distributional shapes and possible correlations among uncertain 
parameters is not available. Third, perfect information rarely becomes avail- 
able all a t  once - instead, there is a continuing process of updating "best 
estimates" over time as information is developed. Finally, even without un- 
certainty, modeling of global warming is computationally demanding, since 
warming involves complex natural and human systems over a time scale 
measured in centuries. 
In the face of these difficulties, we adopt certain simplifications in this 
paper. First, based on our parameter sensitivity results, we limit our consid- 
eration to  three key parameters affecting the benefits of emission reductions. 
Second, for most of our analysis we treat each parameter in turn as the only 
uncertain parameter, and represent its probability distribution using three 
points, with probabilities 116, 213, 116 for the Low case, Central case, and 
High case, respectively. However, we do conduct an experiment t o  explore 
the implications of joint uncertainty about more than one parameter. For 
this experiment, we simplify our problem even further by assuming that  the 
two parameters are independently distributed and that  these parameters 
can take on only a High or Low value, each with probability 112. Finally, 
in all the cases we consider, we assume that information perfectly reveals 
parameter values. 
4. Results Assuming Optimal Policy Under 
Uncertainty 
When we consider single parameter uncertainty assuming that  policy under 
uncertainty is chosen to  maximize expected net benefits, our results suggest 
that  the value of information can be up to  hundreds of billions of dollars. 
For the key parameters we consider, we find that  the value of information is 
greatest for information regarding the potential warming anticipated from 
a given increase in C 0 2  concentration; however, the value of information 
regarding the future damage costs of warming is nearly as great. 
In general, these value of information numbers seem t o  justify devoting 
substantial resources to  resolving global warming uncertainties. Also, since 
global warming research budgets are now directed primarily a t  resolving 
scientific uncertainties like that about the extent of potential warming, our 
results provide some support for the position that budgets for research on 
impacts and adaptation are relatively under-funded, and should be given 
more resources. 
Although resolving uncertainty produces a large benefit relative to  not 
resolving uncertainty, the benefit of resolving uncertainty quickly is surpris- 
ingly low. Specifically, we find that  the benefit of resolving uncertainty now 
instead of 20 years from now is roughly 2 percent of the overall benefit of 
resolving uncertainty. This result is due t o  the fact that  the optimal energy 
use policy in our model would be about the same over the next couple of 
decades, for any resolution of uncertainty about the key model parameters. 
However, by the middle of the next century, optimal energy use policies will 
become more sensitive t o  the key model parameters. Consequently, the ben- 
efits of accelerating uncertainty resolution by 20 years would be much higher 
later on. 
To obtain a rough sense of the implications of joint uncertainty about 
two or more model parameters, we conduct an experiment in which we treat 
two parameters as jointly uncertain and independently distributed. Our 
results from this experiment are generally consistent with those for single 
parameter uncertainty. However, there are some noteworthy differences. 
First, the value of information about either uncertain parameter is higher 
when the other parameter is treated as uncertain, rather than treated as 
known and equal t o  its Central case value. Second, the value of resolving 
uncertainty about both parameters simultaneously is well in excess of the 
sum of the values of resolving information for each of the two parameters 
treated as the only uncertain parameter. This result suggests that the sum 
of the values of information for two or more parameters each treated as 
the only uncertain parameter understates the value of resolving uncertainty 
about all those parameters a t  once. 
5.  Results Assuming Arbitrary Policy Under 
Uncertainty 
In the forgoing analysis, we assumed that emissions control policy under un- 
certainty is based on an optimal balancing of the expected costs and benefits 
of emissions reduction. We also present some results assuming that policy 
under uncertainty is arbitrarily determined by a real world political process 
involving the governments of many countries with differing perspectives and 
interests. 
While it is difficult to  forecast what kind of emissions reduction policy 
might emerge from the political process, whatever policy emerges is unlikely 
t o  be the optimal one. We consider two possible suboptimal policies that  
might emerge: one is a policy of no emissions reduction before uncertainty is 
resolved, and the other is a policy of limiting emissions t o  the 1990 level until 
uncertainty is resolved. In either case, we assume that when uncertainty is 
resolved, the policy will revert t o  the optimal one for whatever state of the 
world is revealed. 
When policy under uncertainty is arbitrarily chosen, we find that  the 
value of resolving uncertainty now instead of twenty years from now is much 
greater than when policy under uncertainty is optimal. Specifically, if the 
arbitrary policy under uncertainty were to be no emissions reduction, the 
benefit of resolving uncertainty is an order of magnitude greater; and if the 
arbitrary policy were to  be an emissions limit at  the 1990 level, the benefit 
is three orders of magnitude greater. 
These results contrast sharply with our earlier ones that suggested there 
was not a great deal of urgency in resolving global warming uncertainties 
when an optimal policy is used under uncertainty. Evidently, if early res- 
olution of uncertainty can head-off implementation of inappropriate C 0 2  
control policies, early resolution has huge benefits. 
6. Conclusions 
The global warming problem is a complicated one, and placing a value on 
resolution of global warming uncertainties is a difficult task. In this paper, 
we present a first effort at  such an analysis. Obviously, there are important 
caveats that should be attached to our analysis. 
First, the CETA model cannot perfectly represent the future for the next 
200 years, even if the key parameters of the model are completely known. 
Both the climate model and the economic growth model in CETA are very 
simple representations of extremely complex systems over a very long period 
of time; these simple representations necessarily omit many real world factors 
that bear on the warming problem. 
Second, our representation of uncertainty and learning is both limited 
and simplified. We limit the number of parameters that we treat as uncertain 
at  a given time, we limit the number of possible values that each may take, 
and we assume that these parameter values are either completely unknown 
or perfectly known. In addition, the possible values that parameters may 
take are in most cases just our own estimates of 5 and 95 percent probability 
points for these parameters. 
However, we have conducted a self-consistent exercise to  identify impor- 
tant driving variables and to estimate the value of information for a selected 
subset of these variables. Caveats notwithstanding, we believe that our re- 
sults support the following tentative conclusions: 
1. If an optimal policy is used under uncertainty, the value of information 
is large enough to justify current research efforts, and perhaps to  justify 
increased emphasis on research into the impacts of warming and cost of 
adaptation to warming. 
2. If an optimal policy is used under uncertainty, ample time is available 
t o  plan and execute a well-designed research program to  resolve uncer- 
tainties. 
3. However, if the political process will choose suboptimal policies and this 
choice could be prevented by early resolution of uncertainty, the urgency 
of resolving uncertainty is dramatically increased. 
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Abstract 
This paper concerns the optimal regulation of greenhouse gases that lead to 
global climate change. In particular, we focus on uncertainty and learning 
(which, over time, resolves uncertainty). We present an empirical stochastic 
model of climate-economy interactions and present results on the tension 
between postponing control until more is known vs. acting now before irre- 
versible climate change takes place. 
1. Introduction 
Uncertainty is a dominant characteristic of environmental externalities, in- 
cluding the accumulation of greenhouse gases leading to climate change. 
We understand well neither the effects of climate change nor the costs of 
controlling greenhouse gases. This is one reason considerable sums are ex- 
pended in trying to  better understand this problem. An additional factor 
frequently comes into play having to do with the cumulative or stock effects 
of greenhouse gases. It is not the emissions of greenhouse gases that directly 
cause adverse effects; rather it is the stock of these gases that may lead to 
climate change and these stocks change slowly with a great deal of momen- 
tum. These two aspects of the problem - stock effects and uncertainty - 
lead to a tension between instituting control and delaying control.' Some in 
society will desire control of greenhouse gases before climate change is well 
understood. Others in society may urge delaying control until the problem 
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'There are other examples with these basic characteristics: hazardous wastes and 
groundwater, acid rain, species extinction, pesticide accumulation, and the list could go 
on. 
is clearly delineated. If, ex post, the problem turns out to be less severe than 
expected then those urging delay will have been proved correct (ex post). If 
on the other hand, the problem turns out to be more severe than expected, 
then delay can be very costly indeed. 
This paper concerns one of the most fundamental questions in the cli- 
mate changelgreenhouse gas control policy arena: when and to  what extent 
to  regulate the generation of greenhouse gases when uncertainty exists and 
learning is taking place. Thus this paper seeks to determine how the fact 
that we are learning about climate change influences our actions today to  
control greenhouse gases.. In our application, there is uncertainty on the 
damage from climate change. While there has been some work related to  
this question (Manne and Richels, 1992; Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Nordhaus, 
1991a), explicit treatment of the learning process has yet to appear in the 
empirical literature on climate ~ h a n g e . ~  Our approach to  the problem is t o  
adapt a simple optimal growth economy-climate model (Nordhaus, 1992) to  
include uncertainty and learning. 
Two primary results emerge from our analysis. If emission control is 
perfectly reversible (no sunk capital), then the fact that one is learning does 
not appreciably affect today's emission control policies. This is because 
of the long lags in emissions contributing to temperature change. In the 
case where emission control investments, once made, become sunk costs, 
then rapid learning does tend to  modestly reduce optimal current period 
emissions. 
The next section of the paper reviews some important contributions to  
the theoretical literature on learning, as well as existing empirical analyses 
of climate change and learning. The subsequent section presents our model 
of optimal regulation. We examine the case of uncertainty in the disutility 
of pollution. We then consider results. 
2. Background 
Irreversibilities and Stock Externalities 
A major literature has developed in the area of investment under uncertainty 
in the presence of externalities. Arrow and Fisher (1974) initiated much of 
the work in this area by focusing on a two period model with uncertainty 
about the benefits of an environmental asset that is to be exploited (e.g., 
'See Kolstad (1992), and Cunha-e-sa and Kolstad (1992) for a discussion of theoretical 
issues surrounding learning and stock externalities. 
a canyon flooded t o  make electricity). With some uncertainty resolved be- 
tween the two periods and the impossibility of undoing development of the 
environmental asset, it turns out to  be optimal t o  bias development in favor 
of preservation of the environmental asset. Henry (1974a, 1974b) published 
similar results. In essence, taking an irreversible action has a cost in terms of 
reducing the value of information. Arrow and Fisher (1974) introduced the 
notion of quasi-option value, the value of the information gained by wait- 
ing before exploiting the environmental asset. Since then, there has been 
a considerable literature on irreversibilities and on quasi-option value (e.g., 
see Fisher and Hanemann, 1987, 1990; Freeman, 1984; Olson, 1990; Conrad 
1980; Miller and Lad, 1984). Of course there is also a large literature in 
finance on option value. In particular, a number of recent papers concern 
the optimal timing of capital investments (e.g., oil field development) when 
learning is taking place (e.g., oil field exploration); see Paddock et al., (1988). 
Another related literature, primarily from the early 1970s, concerns opti- 
mal growth in the presence of environmental externalities, particularly stock 
externalities. This was a natural extension of the optimal growth models 
that were popular in the 1960s and early 1970s. An important and charac- 
teristic paper in this genre is that of Keeler et al., (1971). In that  paper a 
simple optimal growth model is posited where utility is a function of con- 
sumption and a stock of pollution. Optimal paths for accumulation of capital 
and pollution are developed for several different types of pollution control. 
Other papers of this type include Plourde (1972), d'Arge and Kogiku (1973), 
Smith (1972), Plourde and Yeung (1989) and Forster (1973). Cropper (1976) 
also considers such a model of optimal growth, but focuses on catastrophic 
environmental effects - the ultimate in irreversibilities. 
Learning 
There are three basic types of learning which are potentially applicable to 
global warming. One is active learning whereby observations on the state 
of the economy/climate conveys information about uncertainty. Thus by 
perturbing emissions, one can obtain information about uncertain param- 
eters. A second type of learning is purchased learning whereby knowledge 
is purchased and the amount of knowledge purchased (R&D expenditures) 
depends on its cost and benefits. A third type of learning can be called 
autonomous learning where the mere passage of time reduces uncertainty. It 
is this third type of learning that we examine in this paper. 
1. Information Structures. The typical approach to including autonomous 
learning in models of irreversibility is to  posit a two or three period model 
where uncertainty changes from one period to the next. Miller and Lad 
(1984) use a two period model with an ex ante probability distribution on 
period i benefits (b;) of f(bl,b2). After observing period one benefits, the 
ex post marginal distribution is obtained: f(bl,b21bl). While this is clearly 
learning, we need a way to parameterize the mte of learning so that the 
effects of the rate of learning can be deduced. Jones and Ostroy (1984), 
Olson (1990), and Marshak and Miyasawa (1968) provide such a framework 
through the concept of an ordering on information structures. Starting with 
a set of states of nature and an informative message, an information struc- 
ture consists of a prior on the probabilities of receiving specific messages, 
along with a conditional probability on states of nature, given a specific 
message. Of two information structures with the same prior on states of 
nature, the one that has the greater variability in terms of possible posteri- 
ors is viewed as being "more informative." This is equivalent to the more 
informative structure yielding a higher attainable expected utility when the 
consumption bundle depends on the state of nature (Jones and Ostroy, 1984 
- more flexibility can only be advantageous). Thus if two learning processes 
yield two comparable information structures, then the structure that is more 
informative corresponds to  greater learning. 
To quantify this concept of learning further, suppose there is a set of 
possible states of nature, indexed by s= l ,  . . ., S. Furthermore, suppose 
there is a finite set, Y, of possible "messages" containing information on 
the state of nature. Suppose the prior on receiving particular messages is q 
(dimension equal to  the size of Y) and the conditional probability on states 
of nature (after the message ycY has been received) is ~ ( y ) .  We use the term 
"prior" to  refer to a probability distribution on states, before the message 
is received and posterior to refer to distributions assuming a message has 
been received. Let II be a matrix with columns consisting of x(y) with a 
different column for each y. Thus II has S rows and the same number of 
columns as members of Y. (II,q) is an information structure. A first goal is 
to develop an economically relevant ordering on information structures. A 
standard definition of the comparative value of information is provided by 
Jones and Ostroy (1984) (see also Laffont, 1989). 
2. A Special Pammeten'zation of Learning. We consider a special restriction 
on the set of comparable information structures. In particular, if there are S 
possible states of nature, we assume a message consists of a noisy signal as 
State 1 State 2 
Figure 1. Star-shaped spreading of beliefs from 7i. 
to the true state of nature and there are S possible noisy signals. Let Xc[0,1.] 
reflect the level of information in the signal with 0 being no information and 
1 being perfect information. Thus given a prior ii we define the star-shaped 
information structure (II,q) where q= ?i and the sth column of II is 
nS = (1 - X)n + Xe, 
where e, consists of all zeros except with a one in the sth position. Clearly 
nq=IIn = ii. Furthermore if X=O, each column of II is f and if X=l, II=I. 
As an example, suppose you can receive one of three messages indicating 
whether the state of nature is 1, 2 or 3. We thus assume that the number 
of possible messages equals the number of possible states-of-nature, which 
need not be the case. A message that conveyed the maximum amount of 
information would resolve all uncertainty on the state of nature. If the 
message is too noisy t o  contain any information, then the posterior on states 
of nature is the same as the prior. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the 
simplex of probabilities on states of nature is shown. The prior is ?i. The set 
of posteriors associated with a star-shaped spreading of beliefs, spread all 
the way out to  the vertices, is shown by the three lines radiating out from 
ii. Perfect learning would move you to  one of the three vertices following 
receipt of the message. Less perfect learning would move you to one of the 
three points marked with circles. Even less perfect learning would move you 
to one of the three points marked with x's after receiving the message. 
The advantage of representing learning by this star-shaped spreading of 
beliefs is that  the process can be parameterized by the X in equation (1). The 
disadvantage is that we have eliminated perfectly legitimate and orderable 
learning processes (emanating from ?i in Figure 1). 
Economy- Climate Models 
Economic models have played a critical role in the formulation of environ- 
mental policy in the US over the past three decades. The main function 
of these models has been t o  simulate the economy's response t o  particular 
environmental regulations. Before putting a regulation in place, Congress or 
regulatory bodies desire t o  estimate the economic effects as well as the en- 
vironmental effects of these regulations. That is precisely what an economic 
model can do, a t  least in theory. 
One of the first economics papers in the global warming area is by Nord- 
haus (1977) and one of the earliest models is due t o  Nordhaus and Yohe 
(1983). They utilize a highly aggregated model, specifying in a single equa- 
tion the relationship between world GNP and inputs of non-energy factors 
(such as labor), fossil fuels and nonfossil fuels. Technical change is explic- 
itly represented. Using this highly simplified representation of the world 
economy, the authors focus on the effect of uncertainty in the underlying 
parameters on levels of C 0 2  over the next 125 years. They are also able t o  
infer which aspects of their model most affect atmospheric C 0 2  levels. 
William Nordhaus' work has also evolved considerably since the early 
1980s. In a recent paper, Nordhaus (1992) augments his economic model 
by incorporating equations representing the evolution of the atmosphere in 
response to  greenhouse gas emissions. He has also conducted a useful and 
thorough review of the costs of control of greenhouse gas emissions (Nord- 
haus, 1991b). Also in the early 1980s a much more detailed model of the 
relationship between C 0 2  and world energy demand was developed a t  Oak 
Ridge Associated Universities (Edmonds and Reilly, 1983). The model di- 
vides the world into nine regions. In each region aggregate energy demand 
is a function of prices and income. Supply of energy is represented in some 
detail, with various technological options represented separately. Using the 
model, they demonstrate the effect of carbon taxes, either on a worldwide 
basis or just for the US. Thus they are able to  demonstrate the effect of reg- 
ulation as well as the difficulty in controlling the problem a t  the sub-global 
level. 
Edmonds and Reilly have developed their model further in recent years 
(Edmonds el al., 1986). In a recent paper (Darmstadter and Edmonds, 
1989), they demonstrate the dramatic effect uncertainty can have on future 
C 0 2  emissions. For example, they show that there is a 5% probability that 
COz emissions will actually be substantially lower in 2050 than at present, 
at least given the probability distributions they assume for their exogenous 
parameters. 
Recent entrants into the greenhouse gas analysis arena, though not new- 
comers to energy modeling, are Alan Manne and Richard Richels. They 
extend Manne's ETA-Macro model (Manne, 1981) to include the generation 
of greenhouse gases (Manne and Richels, 1990). The model is used to deter- 
mine the level of a carbon tax that would be necessary to support particular 
COP emission goals for the US. Related to this question, they have used 
their model to look at the value of R&D in climate change by looking at the 
payoff from resolving uncertainty (Manne and Richels, 1991b; 1992). 
The Manne and Richels framework has proved to be very popular in 
greenhouse policy circles. Peck and Teisberg (1992) have introduced a dam- 
age function into the Manne and Richels model to examine the influence 
of the curvature of the greenhouse gas damage function on optimal control 
policies. Manne and Richels (1991a) have substantially extended their model 
by considering several distinct regions of the world. This model they term 
the "Global 2100" model. 
There are several other models of the economics of COz generation that 
should be mentioned. Marks et al., and Dixon and Johnson have examined 
the effect of C 0 2  emission controls on the Australian economy using the 
ORANI general equilibrium model. Richard Kosobud has developed a series 
of models, sometimes alone or sometimes in conjunction with others, to 
examine specific greenhouse gas issues (Kosobud, 1989; 1990). 
3. A Stochastic Model with Learning 
In this section, we present a general model of the dynamic evolution of 
an economy, incorporating emission control, pollution accumulation, and 
pollution damage. To a large extent it is a standard optimal growth model, 
although some aspects having to do with the climate are nonstandard. It is 
based on the climate-economy model of Prof. William Nordhaus (Nordhaus, 
1992). His model is deterministic however, and our model is stochastic. 
The model is not regionally differentiated and involves the maximiza- 
tion of the net present value of expected utility. Utility is enhanced by 
consumption and depressed by pollution damage. Output can be channeled 
to consumption, emission control, or investment. Uncertainty enters in that 
several states of the world (s) are possible and one wishes to maximize ex- 
pected utility. The following represents such a model. The parameter ht can 
be ignored (assumed constant) for the time being; it will be used later when 
we consider learning. 
K(t + 1, ht+i) = (1 - S K ) K ( ~ ,  ht) + I( t ,  ht) ( 3 4  
O(t + 1, ht+l) = r[T(t,ht), O(t, ht)] (4'3) 
where 
I = investment (control) 
E = emissions of greenhouse gases (control) 
K = capital stock (state) 
M = stock of greenhouse gases (state) 
T = mean atmospheric temperature (state) 
0 = mean deep ocean temperature (state) 
c = per-capita consumption 
d = per-capita climate damage 
Y = gross output of goods and services 
p = discount factor 
hK = capital depreciation rate 
hM = greenhouse gas decay rate 
L = Population/labor supply 
t = time/technology 
s = state-of-the world 
,Ll = Greenhouse gas emission factor 
n, = Probability of state s: C n, = 1 
Equations (2-3) constitute the basic economic model and equations (4) 
describe the evolution of the climate. Equation (3c) indicates that the emis- 
sion ra.te of greenhouse gases is nondecreasing; i.e. investment in emission 
control is irreversible. The links between the economic model and the cli- 
mate are E and T. Emissions (E) increase C 0 2  levels (M) which increase 
temperature (T)  which causes damage (d) which yields disutility. The goal 
is to choose the investment path and emission path that maximize expected 
utility. 
Learning 
Introducing learning into this model involves introducing a second set of 
states corresponding to different messages that might be received (see dis- 
cussion of equation 1). Each message yields a different outcome of the learn- 
ing process where an outcome is a new probability on states of nature, n,(t). 
Let Yt be the set of possible single period outcomes of the learning process 
at time t. One can think of these as messages as was previously discussed 
(see also Laffont, 1989). For instance, Yt could contain three elements, Yt = 
{yl, y2, y3) where yl = learning which increases the likelihood that global 
warming is serious, yz = learning which indicates global warming is a modest 
problem. y3 = learning which indicates that global warming is not serious. 
Before learning occurs we do not know whether yl,  y2 or y3 will be realized 
although we do know the probabilities of elements of Yt occurring. 
While Yt indicates the possible outcomes of the learning process a t  
t ,  to know the current state of knowledge, it is also important to know 
the learning that has preceded t. We call this the history of learn- 
ing, Ht = {(y,, . . . , yt) ) yi € Yi V 0 L. i L. t) .  Notationally, Ht contains the 
learning that occurred in time period t. An element of Ht is a particular 
history. 
For instance, consider a ten period world in which learning can proceed 
in three directions (-1, 0, 1) at  any point in time. Figure 2 illustrates the 
history (0, 1, -1, -1, -1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0). If we partition any ht as (ht-l, yt), 
Figure 2. The learning history: (0,1,-1,-1,-1,1,0,1,1,0). 
then we define the "predecessor" and "most recent" functions, cp: Ht -, 
Ht-1 and .JI: Ht + Yt as cp(ht) = ht-1, cp(ht) = yt. The function II, 
indicates the most recent learning whereas cp indicates learning that occurred 
earlier. This allows one to functionally represent the learning path and to 
compute the probability vector on states of the world, ?r(ht, t ). Define the 
transition matrix IIt(ht) such that each column is a posterior probability 
vector corresponding to a different element of Yt+1. Thus ?r(ht,t) is the 
column of IIt-l(cp(ht)) corresponding to II,(ht). Furthermore if qt(ht) is the 
probability vector associated with different elements of Yt+l, then 
~ ( h t ,  t ) = IIt(ht)qt(ht). ( 5 )  
(IIt (ht ), qt(ht )) is a learning structure as described earlier. 
It is "easy" to modify model (2-4) to incorporate this learning. All of 
the variables in the model are already indexed by ht, we only need to define 
how ht evolves. 
(1 - X)7r(ht, t )  + Xe, if indicates s 
(1 - X)n(ht,t) otherwise ( 6 4  
where 
ht = cp(ht+l) (6b) 
where e, is a vector of 0's and 1's with a 1 in the sth position, 0's in the rest 
of the positions, and X is the rate of learning. We assume the message space 
is the same as the space of possible states of the world. Thus messages are 
noisy indications of the true state of the world. 
There are many ways uncertainty can enter a model such as this. We 
assume uncertainty in the damage from global warming. Specifically, we 
write utility as 
Evolution of Expected Variance 
Periods 
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Figure 3. Evolution of expected variance of A[no(A = 5) = .2; n,(A = 
0) = .8]. 
We further assume there are two states of the world, B and L, corre- 
sponding to global warming being a big problem (B) vs. global warming 
being a little problem (L). We assume rB(t=O) = .2 and rL(t=O) = .8 with 
A, = 5 and AL = 0. This is somewhat arbitrary but yields an expected 
value of A of 1 and reflects the fact that damage could be serious. The 
variance of A is 4. Figure 3 shows how the expected variance of A changes 
with learning at various learning rates. 
4. Results 
The model described by equations (2-7) has been implemented using time 
points at 10-year intervals beginning in 1965. See the appendix for details on 
Figure 4. Three-period learning. 
the implementation. The first three points (1965-1985) are used as calibra- 
tion and control of emissions is fixed a t  zero. Optimal emission control levels 
are computed beginning in 1995. Learning occurs in 1995-2005,2005-2015, 
and 2015-2025. No learning occurs thereafter. Learning can be of two types, 
B or L, corresponding to  suggesting global warming is a big problem (B) vs. 
suggesting global warming is a little problem (L). Figure 4 illustrates the 
possible paths learning can take. If the probability of B in 1965 is n(O), it 
will stay a t  that value through 1995. At that  point the probability change 
depends on how learning progresses. In 2025 and thereafter there will be 
eight possible values of this probability, depending on the learning history. 
All of the variables in the model must be indexed on the path learning takes. 
The model described in the previous section was an infinite horizon 
model. Such a model takes a fair amount of computer time t o  solve so we 
have chosen to  approximate this with a 20 period/200 year finite horizon 
model. Figure 5 shows, for the case of the deterministic model (2-4), the 
effect of the horizon on optimal emission control rates.3 Clearly the control 
level in 1995 is largely unaffected for horizons in excess of 20 periods. 
3The figure shows the solution to the deterministic model using equation (7) as an 
objective with As = 1 for S = B,L. This is the expected value (equation 3c removed) of 
A ,  and no learning occurs. 
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Figure 5. Optimal emission control rates. 
Model (2-7) was solved under two conditions. In one, emissions were 
allowed to take any positive value. In the other, the emission control rate 
was restricted to be monotonically non-decreasing (equation 3c included), 
reflecting the fact that emission control investments tend to  involve sunk 
costs: once a control level is implemented, it is unlikely to  be decreased at a 
later date. 
Focusing on the year 1995, with reversible emission control rates (i.e., 
equation 3c is omitted), we find that optimal control levels for greenhouse 
gases are virtually unaffected by the rate of learning. If one overcontrols 
today, then that error can be corrected in the future. Thus the fact that 
learning is taking place does not impact current decisions to control emission. 
It is for this reason that we focus on emission control rates that are 
monotonically non-decreasing. In this case, once an emission control level 
is implemented it cannot later be reduced, even if climate change turns out 
to be less significant. Figure 6 shows how the level of emission control in 
1995 is affected by the rate of learning, A. Recall that X = 0 corresponds 
1995 GHG Control Rates vs Learning Rate 
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0.075 
Figure 6. 1995 GHG control rates vs. learning rate. 
to no learning whereas X = 1 corresponds to resolution of all uncertainty 
in one period. Thus when learning is occurring rapidly, it pays to  reduce 
greenhouse gas control rates from approximately 7% t o  as low as 3%. More 
modest learning rates involve more modest reductions in control rates, but 
reductions nevertheless. 
The reason for lower emission control levels with more rapid learning is 
that it is better t o  defer irreversible control decisions until more is known. It 
is interesting that the irreversibility in control capital dominates the climate 
irreversibility. This is no doubt because of the long lags involved in climate 
change. Figure 7 shows, for X = 0.5, how atmospheric temperature increases 
vary with learning h i~ to r i e s .~  Atmospheric temperature changes come long 
after the emissions occur. This suggests the potential payoff from control 
measures that are reversible. 
'The learning histories are shown in the figure. The path BBL, for instance, corresponds 
to learning in the direction B in the first two periods, followed by learning in the direction 
L. 
Atmospheric Temperature Rise (OC) 
(Learning: num. Plr iod . :  L0mbdOl0.5) 
3 ,  
nm* 
Figure 7.  The evolution of atmospheric temperature. 
It is interesting to compare this result to that of Manne and Richels 
(1992). While their model is substantially different than ours, they show 
that immediate resolution of uncertainty (very rapid learning) results in 
lower emission control rates (higher emissions) than when uncertainty is not 
resolved. This is qualitatively the same as our result. 
Figure 8 shows how emission control evolves with learning over time 
for X = 0.5. In 1995, control goes to 5%, before learning occurs. In 2005 
one period of learning occurs. If that learning is B, control goes to 11%; 
otherwise it stays at 5%. After another period of learning, the range of 
control levels grows even further. 
Figure 9 shows the value of information as a function of A.  The ex- 
pected value of perfect information is the difference between the net present 
value of expected consumption less damage if emission control can be made 
completely contingent on the state of nature and the same figure with un- 
certainty and non-state-dependent controls. The expected value of perfect 
information (EVPI) shows what it could be worth to resolve all uncertainty 
instantaneously. Even modest learning rates substantially reduce the EVPI. 
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Figure 8. Emission control paths. 
This is somewhat consistent with Peck and Teisberg (1992) who show only 
modest value to resolving uncertainty. 
5. Policy Implications 
The results of this simple model do suggest that rapid learning biases cur- 
rent period C 0 2  control levels downward. Thus these results tend to support 
those who argue that policy-makers should take a wait-and-see approach to 
C 0 2  mitigation. There are two important qualifiers to this result, however. 
One is that learning only biases control downward and does not eliminate 
the desirability of some control. Secondly, the assumption of complete ir- 
reversibility of emission control investment may be extreme and certainty 
suggests the development of control strategies which are reversible; this is 
related to  but not quite the same as a no-regrets strategy. 
The most important caveat of all, of course, is that the model presented 
here is highly stylistic and is really only intended as an illustration or research 
tool; it is certainty not intended to  be used to develop policy. 
Expected Value of Perfect Information 
Figure 9. Expected value of perfect information. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented an empirical model of learning with uncer- 
tainty in the context of the control of greenhouse gases. We have demon- 
strated that  when irreversibilities exist in both climate change and emission 
control, emission control dominates. Thus accelerated learning tends to  re- 
duce current period optimal emissions. 
Appendix: Model Implementation 
In implementing the model (2-7), we have followed closely the deterministic 
DICE model (Nordhaus, 1992). Thus, suppressing ht for the moment, the 
functions f, g, s and r in equations (3) and (4) are defined as 
where p ( t ) = l - *  ( o < P < l )  
where 
where A(t) and a( t)  are exogenous technology change parameters. Parame- 
ter and starting values are documented in Nordhaus (1992). 
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Abstract 
The paper outlines order of magnitude estimates of the damage caused by a 
doubling of atmospheric COz concentration. Results are presented for five 
regions and the world as a whole. The estimates for industrialized countries 
confirm the Nordhaus damage range of 0.25 to 2% of GNP, although they 
tend towards the upper bound. The estimates for developing countries are 
about twice as high, confirming the view that  the poorest countries will suffer 
most, even if adequate protection measures are taken. Regional differences 
may, however, be considerable, as is exemplified by the estimates for the 
former Soviet Union and China. 
1. Introduction 
It has repeatedly been argued that  an efficient policy response to  global 
warming will have to  consider both the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas 
abatement. Evidently, the precondition for such an approach is a t  least a 
vague knowledge of the costs as well as the benefits of policy action. Several 
studies already exist on the costs of greenhouse gas control and the number 
is growing steadily (for a survey see e.g. Boero et al., 1991). This paper 
thus concentrates on the benefits - or, more correctly, the avoided damage 
- of abatement policies, an aspect which has gained less attention so far. 
Given the large amount of uncertainty which still dominates the impacts 
discussion, any attempt towards a monetary damage estimate can hardly 
'csERGE is a designated research center of the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC). Financial support by the Schweizerische Nationalfonds fiir Forschung 
und Wissenschaft is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to N.  Adger, R. Kay, S. 
Kverndokk, W. Nordhaus and D. W. Pearce for comments on an earlier draft of the 
paper. 
be more than a rough assessment of the order of magnitude. In addition, 
several simplifying assumptions had to be introduced to pursue the task. 
Most importantly, we do not aim to estimate a whole damage function, 
but only provide an estimate for one point in time. Specifically, we try to  
estimate the damage occurring with an atmospheric Con-concentration of 
twice the preindustrial level (2 x Con) .  Based on IPCC (1990a), 2 x C 0 2  is 
assumed to  lead to  an (equilibrium) increase in global mean temperature of 
2.5 OC. In a recent paper, Wigley and Raper (1992) estimate that this will be 
accompanied by a sea level rise of about 50 cm by the year 2100, considerably 
lower than IPCC's initial prediction of 66 cm. The following results will be 
based on this more optimistic estimate. In order to  avoid predictions of 
growth and future development, we choose the year 1988 as base period, 
i.e. we estimate the damage which 2 x C 0 2  would cause to  a world with 
the economic structure of 1988. Six different (partly overlapping) "regions" 
are considered: EC, USA, the countries of the former USSR, CHINA, the 
OECD nations (including EC and US), and the WORLD as a whole. In 
this respect the paper goes beyond the studies by Cline (1992), Nordhaus 
(1991a, 1991b), and Ayres and Walter (1991) which pursue a similar task, 
but are basically restricted to the United States. Like these studies, the 
paper neglects multiplier effects. That is, we will only estimate, for example, 
the impacts on forests and forestry (including price effects), but will ignore 
the effects this may have, say, on the furniture industry.2 
Climate change will affect a wide range of activities and sectors. An 
attempt at a classification is made in Figure 1. The paper follows this 
categorization and deals with each aspect in turn. Total damage is the sum 
of the costs in each sector. It is evaluated and discussed in the final section. 
The figures presented are based on Fankhauser (1992) of which the present 
paper is an extended ~ u m m a r y . ~  
2. Capital Loss 
The rise in sea level triggered by global warming threatens to inundate vast 
land areas along low lying coastlines. Not all threatened areas will necessarily 
be abandoned, however. It is quite likely that at  least the more valuable areas 
will be protected. Like Titus et al. (1991) and IPCC (1990c), we assume 
2For an assessment of this method compared to the "true" general equilibrium welfare 
costs, see Kokoski and Smith (1987). While the measure is inexact, the sign of the deviation 
is unclear. 
3The detailed paper Fankhauser (1992) is available from the author on request. 
Figure 1. Overview on global wa.rming impacts. 
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that  it will be cost efficient to  protect highly developed areas such as cities 
or tourist beaches, while undeveloped or sparsely populated regions will be 
abandoned (partial retreat ~ c e n a r i o ) . ~  This assumption, although certainly 
a reasonable one, is made not least for da ta  reasons. Instead of calculating 
the potential capital loss, we evaluate the costs of capital protection. The 
value of the unprotected areas lost will be considered in the following section. 
The estimates are based on a study by Delft Hydraulics, which calculates 
the worldwide costs of protecting beaches, cities, harbors, and densely pop- 
ulated coastlines against a sea level rise of one meter within 100 years (see 
IPCC, 1 9 9 0 ~ ) .  The measures considered include the building of seawalls. 
levees and dikes, beach nourishment, and the elevation of islands. They 
include protection as well as maintenance costs. 
The Delft figures are adjusted t o  our assumption of a 50 cm rise assuming 
an  exponential relationship between protection costs and sea level rise (Titus 
et al., 1991). The Titus et al. estimates imply a power factor of 1.28. For 
a 50 cm rise, the Delft figures thus had t o  be multiplied by a factor of 
= 0.41. In addition, as they are estimates of the undiscounted total 
costs of protection, the Delft estimates had t o  be translated into an annual 
expenditure stream (see Cline, 1992). The resulting estimates are shown in 
the first row of Table 1. 
4This assumption is probably too optimistic for poorer countries which will lack the 
funds to  protect their coasts sufficiently. Initiatives for insurance funds or technical aid 
are therefore not only desirable on equity grounds, but necessary conditions for the cost 
efficient response t o  become feasible. 
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Table 1. Damage due to 2 x C 0 2  (bn$). 
Former 
EC USA USSR 
Coastal defense 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Dryland loss 0.3 2.1 1.2 
Wetland loss 4.9 5.6 1.2 
Special loss 7.1 6.4 2.6 
Agriculture 9.7 7.4 6.2 
Forestry -4.1 -1.8 -2.9 
Fishery a - - - 
Energy - - - 
Water 14.1 13.7 3.0 
Other sectors ? ? ? 
Amenity 7.0 6.8 -0.7 
 ife elm orb id it^^ 22.0 16.6 3.9 
Air pollution 3.5 6.4 2.1 
Migration 1 .O 0.5 0.2 
Natural hazardsC 0.0 0.2 0.0 
CHINA OECD World 
Total (bn$) 65.6 64.1 16.8 21.6 182.1 285.2 
(% GNP, 1988) (1.5) (1.3) (0.7) (6.1) (1.4) (1.5) 
Note: Negative numbers denote benefits ("negative damage"). 
aFishery loss is included in wetland loss. 
'Mortality only. 
'Hurricane damage only. 
3. Dryland Loss 
As argued above, we presume that densely populated areas will be protected 
against the rising sea. The loss of dryland due to  climate change will there- 
fore be restricted t o  undeveloped and sparsely populated areas. 
The area affected was estimated using Rijsberman's (1991) estimates of 
sparsely populated, low lying coastlines, which was completed by our own 
calculations. To get an area estimate we assumed a loss of 0.46 km2 per 
kilometer of undeveloped coastline (based on the calculations of Titus et al., 
1991). The figures are shown in Table 2. 
Valuing coastal lands is rather difficult and figures differ by several orders 
of magnitude depending on use and location of the piece of land in question. 
For the OECD regions, we adopted the average value of 2 m$/km2 used in 
Titus et al. (1991) and Rijsberman (1991). For the former USSR, where the 
main area under threat is the almost uninhabited north coast, we used an 
arbitrarily chosen price of 0.5 m$/km2. For the world as a whole we assumed 
Table 2. Dry- and wetland loss due to 2 x C 0 2  (partial adjustment sce- 
nario). 
Former 
EC USA USSR China OECD World 
Wetland lossa 9,887 11,121 9,788 11,918 33,862 252,985 
(km2) 
Dryland loss 1,596 10,695 23,920 0 40,420 139,923 
(km2) 
Source: Compiled from Ftijsberman (1991) and Titus et al. (1991). See Sections 3 and 4. 
aOECD excluding Australia, Canada and New Zealand. World excluding some 60 coun- 
tries. 
1 m$/km2 as an average between the high price in the industrialized world 
and the lower prices in less developed c ~ u n t r i e s . ~  
Following Cline (1992) in assuming a 10% return on land per year, we 
can derive the  annual revenue losses reported in Table 1. 
4. Coastal Wetland Loss 
The amount of wetlands likely to  be lost through 2 x C 0 2  depends mainly 
on the possibility for the systems to migrate inland, and therefore on the 
amount of coastal protection measures taken. The more comprehensive the 
defense measures, the more difficult backward migration becomes and the 
more coastal wetlands will be lost. Titus et al. (1991) estimate that  for the 
United States about one third of all remaining wetlands would be lost under 
a partial protection scenario. We assumed this value t o  hold worldwide. The 
resulting area estimates are shown in Table 2. 
To achieve a monetary estimate, wetlands were valued a t  between 0.5 
m$/km2 (China) and 5 m$/km2 (OECD  region^).^ Again we assumed a 
return on land of 10%. 
5As an example for the land price in the less developed world, Ayres and Walter (1991) 
report a value of 0.3 m%/km2 for arable land in Bangladesh. However, also note their 
objection on using lower land values for poorer countries, a line which we do not follow in 
this study. 
'The figures denote the total value of wetlands, i.e., they also include the benefits to 
coastal fisheries. This fact will be of importance when discussing the impacts of fisheries 
in Section 7. 
5. Species and Ecosystems Loss 
Most studies on the impacts of global warming predict a decrease in bi- 
ological diversity. Specially threatened are, according to  IPCC (1990b), 
geographically localized and slowly reproducing species as well as poor dis- 
persers and species "at the edge of (or beyond) their optimal range" (p.10). 
In measuring the total value of a species or a sight, economists distin- 
guish between use, option and existence value. This latter has been esti- 
mated for various species and Pearce (1991) reports results from US-studies 
which yield a willingness to pay of 5-15 $(mid 1980's) per person and year 
for the preservation of animals ranging from the emerald shiner to the grizzly 
bear. Based on this, we assumed a willingness to pay in OECD countries 
of 10 $(1988) per person and year for the wider, although as yet unspec- 
ified, threats from global warming. Use values generally tend to be lower 
than the corresponding existence value, and as an average we worked with 
a figure of half the existence value. Again, we assumed lower values for 
non-industrialized countries. 
Existence values are more or less independent of geographical locations 
and were therefore distributed simply in proportion to population. Use and 
option values on the other hand depend on the geographical distribution of 
the losses. As an approximation, we used the number of threatened species 
in each region. This seems to be a reasonable index, given that already 
endangered species are particularly at risk (see above). 
6. Agriculture 
Together with the costs of sea level rise, the effects on agriculture are proba- 
bly the most studied aspect of global warming damage (see e.g. Parry, 1991 
and Parry et al., 1988). Most of this research concentrates on productivity or 
output aspects, however, and does not include the impact of changing prices. 
Price effects are crucial, though, for the economic valuation of agricultural 
damage. Most studies also neglect the - admittedly difficult to estimate - 
benefits from an adaptive adjustment of the production technology (e.g. by 
using different crops etc.) and are mere ceteris paribus exercises. 
Our estimates are based on a study by Kane et al. (1992) which includes 
price effects, but neglects managerial responses as well as the effect of C02-  
fertilization. Kane et al. work with two scenarios: An optimistic scenario A 
which assumes positive yield effects in most regions, and a more pessimistic 
scenario B which is roughly within the same range as Cline (1992). It as- 
sumes negative yield effects even for northern regions such as Canada and 
the former USSR. For the  estimates in Table 1, we took the average between 
the two. 
7. Forestry 
The extent t o  which the  forestry sector will be affected by climate change 
depends on various factors like, for example, the species and age of trees, 
possibilities for forests to  migrate, and the quality of forest management. 
The impact of global warming on wood production is therefore ambiguous. 
IPCC (1990b) assumes that ,  although stand growth rates may increase in 
some areas, the overall net increment (including mortality) will be negative. 
Regional impacts will be strongly influenced by the extent to  which forest 
zones can shift northwards. An analysis of the economic effects would also 
have to  include price changes, and one of the few studies doing that  is Binkley 
(1988). 
The study is restricted t o  boreal forests, the species probably most af- 
fected by global warming. Binkley is less pessimistic than IPCC and assumes 
that  climate change will be favorable for wood production in northern coun- 
tries. Consequently, income from timber sales will increase in these regions, 
while the induced fall in timber prices will lead to lower revenues in other 
countries. His estimates translate into an annual welfare gain of 10.8 bn$. 
The figure includes changes in both producer and consumer surplus, and 
it is reasonable to  assume that  the two categories are distributed differently 
between countries. We approximated the producer losses for each region 
by the change in income from timber sales, which has been estimated by 
Binkley. The annual loss in producer surplus amounts to 10.1 bn$ worldwide, 
and gains in consumer surplus are thus 20.9 bn$ per annum. They were 
distributed in proportion to  GNP. 
8. Fisheries 
As one of a few sectors, the fishing industry will be affected by both the 
rise in sea level and the changing climate itself. A large proportion of the 
coastal infrastructure threatened by sea level rise (see Section 2) can be 
associated t o  fisheries. Changing climate patterns will affect the location 
and quality of fish grounds, as species move t o  new grounds or, in the worst 
case, simply disappear. Of particular importance for the fishing industry 
Table 3. Reduction in fish harvests. 
Nominal catches Reduction 
(1988, 1000 t) (8%, 1000 t )  
EC 6,977 558 
USA 5,656 452 
Former USSR 10,171 814 
China 5,806 464 
OECD 31,288 2,503 
World 85,358 6,829 
Source: See Section 8; nominal catches from F A 0  (1991). 
could be the loss of coastal wetlands. Wetlands serve as habitat or breeding 
ground for various species, and changes in this area could easily spread 
through the food chain. Bigford (1991) estimates that  a 50% reduction in 
marsh productivity (for whatever reason) would lead to  a 15-20% loss in 
estuarine dependent fish harvests. Given an expected loss of about 33% 
of all coastal wetlands (see Section 3), we can expect a loss of 10-13% in 
estuarine dependent fish harvests. Bigford also estimates that  about 68% 
(by weight) of all commercially harvested species in the US are in some way 
estuarine dependent. This would imply a reduction in total catches of 7 t o  
9% in the US. Assuming that  this average holds worldwide we derived the 
reductions in annual catches shown in Table 3. 
Remember, however, that  the estimates for wetland loss in Section 3 
already include the damage to  commercial fisheries (see footnote 6). The 
figures of Table 3 are thus only for illustration. Including them in the total 
damage costs would lead to  double counting. 
9. Energy 
Both Cline (1992) and Nordhaus (1991a,b) have identified the energy sector 
as one of the most strongly affected by climate change. They argue that ,  
in addition to  being the target of most global warming prevention policies, 
the energy sector will face a significant shift in the demand for space heating 
and ~ o o l i n g . ~  The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, 
7There will also be effects on the energy supply, particularly through changes in the 
availability of fuelwood and water for hydropower generation. Unfortunately, an estimation 
of the former effect is not possible with the present data. The latter will be assessed in 
the broader context of Section 10 on water. 
estimates that the US-demand for electricity could increase by 1-1.5% per 
OC of warming (Smith and Tirpak, 1990; Cline, 1992). 
However, although we do not deny that such a shift will have an enor- 
mous impact on the energy sector, we are reluctant to subsume this under 
"damage to the energy sector". Rather, we see it as a second round effect, 
with the first round damage occurring to the public. 
To see this, remember that electricity consumption as such does not cre- 
ate utility. What enters the utility function is temperature (or climate), and 
heating or cooling expenditures are only made to adjust (inside) tempera- 
ture to a more favorable level. The situation is visualized in Figure 2. An 
increase in temperature, i.e., a shift in the endowment from E to E', makes 
people move from equilibrium 0 to 0'. In the new optimum O', an addi- 
tional amount of AB is spent on cooling and utility has decreased from U2 
to U3. It is this change in utility which has to be added to global warming 
damage, and it will be considered in Section 12 on human amenity. The 
move from A to B - which is what EPA has estimated - merely reflects a 
change in individuals' spending plans. Such second round effects, however, 
are by assumption not taken into account (see Section 1). 
10. Water 
Global warming will affect both the supply of and demand for freshwater. 
Higher temperatures are likely to cause an increase in water demand. At the 
same time, the supply of water will be affected mainly through the change in 
precipitation patterns and, in coastal areas, through the intrusion of saline 
water into freshwater reservoirs. 
The damage from salt water intrusion is largely unknown. A Dutch 
study quoted by Rijsberman (1991) estimates salinity damage for Holland 
at 6 m$ a year, but wider studies are not available. 
Abstracting from groundwater and other reservoirs, the amount of wa- 
ter available in a certain period of time is, roughly, the difference between 
precipitation and evapotranspiration in that period. Both factors will be 
influenced by global warming. Higher temperatures will lead to faster evap- 
oration, which in turn will cause more precipitation, as the capacity of the 
atmosphere to store water is only modest. Global estimates predict an in- 
crease in precipitation of 7-15% and one in evapotranspiration of 5-10%. 
The annual runoff would thus increase on average (see Schneider et al., 1990). 
The confidence in these estimates is, however, low. Further, seasonal and 
regional differences will be considerable and many regions will face a lower 
Figure 2. Global warming, energy demand and welfare. 
Note: Suppose individuals gain utility from twogoods, income Y and (inside) 
temperature T. The indifference curves are U-shaped, reflecting the fact 
that  there is an optimal temperature level, after which further temperature 
increases become a bad. Individuals are endowed with an initial income and 
temperature bundle E. Income can either be consumed or spent on heating 
and/or cooling. Heating corresponds t o  a move downwards-right ( a  warmer 
temperature is substituted for income) and cooling t o  one downwards-left. 
The shaded triangle thus represents the feasible set or budget constraint, 
with the  slopes of the right and left leg determined by the price of heating 
and cooling, respectively. The graph shows the  case of a temperature beyond 
the  optimal level, and the individual thus spends yA on cooling (optimal 
point 0, with utility level U2). Global warming leads t o  an increase in 
temperature, i.e. t o  a rightwards shift of E t o  the new endowment E'. In 
the new optimum 0' more money is spend on cooling and utility is a t  the  
lower level U3. Global warming has lead t o  a welfare loss of U2-U3, and an 
increase in cooling expenditure (energy demand) of AB. 
runoff during a t  least some parts of the year. According to Schneider e l  
al. these include the American Midwest, Mid Europe, South Canada, and 
probably also parts of Siberia and South China. 
Following Cline (1992), the welfare loss from a reduced water supply 
is approximated by the monetary value of the quantity decline. Based on 
an EPA study on Southern California, which predicts a 7-16% reduction in 
annual water resources, Cline assumes a 10% reduction in water availability 
for the United States as a whole. Bearing in mind that South California is 
part of a zone which will probably be hit above average, we prefer to  work 
with the lower bound value of 7% loss in each region. On the other hand, 
Cline's assumption of a water price of 8-20 cents/m3 seems t o  be far too 
modest compared t o  the figures from The Economist (1991). Based on this 
latter source, we used water prices of 42 cents/m3 (US) to  92 cents/m3 (EC) 
for the OECD regions. For middle and low income countries we assumed 12 
cents/m3 and 5 cents/m3, respectively. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the figures estimated in this 
manner are averages. For areas in which runoff will increase and for those 
with an abundant supply of water, the figures may be too high. For many 
arid and semi-arid zones, however, a further decrease in the supply of an 
already scarce commodity could be disastrous. In poor countries in particu- 
lar, a lack of safe drinking water could have devastating health impacts (see, 
e.g., WHO, 1990). The fact that areas of both types can be found in each of 
the regions considered gives some credibility to  our average values shown in 
Table 1. Note also, that services are not only taken from water withdrawals. 
Instream uses, e.g., from recreation or fishery, may also be significant, albeit 
difficult to  assess. 
11. Other Sectors 
Generally, every s e ~ t o r  which in some way depends on climate will be affected 
by global warming. Abstracting from impacts through second round effects 
(see Section I ) ,  the areas usually highlighted in addition to those already 
dealt with are construction, transport, and tourism. Unfortunately, data for 
a monetary valuation are not available for either sector. 
12. Human Amenity 
It is hardly disputed that  climate constitutes an important factor in the qual- 
ity of life. Global warming will therefore also affect human amenity. It has 
been claimed that  this effect could be beneficial, given that warmer weather 
is in general preferred to  cooler. However, warmer is not better throughout. 
Rather, there is an optimal temperature level beyond which further increases 
are detrimental. The overall effect of global warming on human amenity is 
thus ambiguous, the impact being positive in colder and negative in warmer 
regions. The case of a warmer area is depicted in Figure 2. 
To estimate the monetary value of a certain climate we are interested 
in people's willingness to  accept a change. In terms of Figure 2, we are in- 
terested in the distance y C, the income change required t o  make individuals 
the same off as without the change. Unfortunately, the monetary value of 
a benign climate is still largely unknown and hardly any studies exist. As 
a first approximation, we can work with the expected change in defense ex- 
penditures, i.e. with the change in money spent on space heating or cooling. 
This corresponds to the area AB in Figure 2.8 
Estimates of this value exist for the United States. Adjusted to  our 
assumption of 2.5 OC warming, they imply an increase in demand of about 
3.2% for 2 x COz. The regional differences are, however, considerable and 
transferring the US average to  other regions is therefore dangerous. Never- 
theless, on a rough and ready basis, it can be argued that the US climate 
mix may be roughly representative for at least the OECD, the EC, and to  
a lesser extent also for China and the world as a whole. It is clearly not 
applicable for the former USSR, though. For this region, we assume a value 
of -1% (i.e., a reduction in electricity demand), based on EPA's regional 
estimates for the US north and north east. 
The corresponding monetary values are shown in Table 1. The approach 
simplifies in a t  least three ways, though. First, as can be seen from Figure 2, 
the defense expenditures (AB) underestimate the true value (yC). Secondly, 
the EPA study is restricted to  electricity demand and neglects other forms 
of energy such as fossil fuels. For the US, it is assumed that the demand 
for non-electricity energy could fall (Nordhaus, 1991a, 1991b; Cline, 1992). 
The limitation t o  electricity demand may thus lead to an overestimation of 
the total expenditure increase. Thirdly, we assume constant prices. Thus, 
we neglect the capital costs and possible price rises which could occur if 
'Note that our estimate of the amenity impact is therefore calculated in the same way 
as Cline's (1992) and Nordhaus' (1991a,b) energy damage. We have argued earlier (see 
Section 9) that energy damage is mainly a second round effect and should not enter the 
analysis. However, as Cline and Nordhaus do not estimate the damage on human amenity, 
there is no double counting. The difference between their studies and the present one is 
merely labeling. What is called amenity damage here is called energy damage there. 
a capacity expansion becomes necessary. For the US, for example, Cline 
(1992) has estimated capital costs on the order of 500 m$ annually. 
13. Morbidity and Mortality 
Human beings are very capable of adjusting to  climatic variations, and, as 
opposed t o  most other species, can live in more or less every climate on 
earth. Nevertheless, climate change will have its impacts on human mor- 
bidity and mortality. The literature on the health effects of global warming 
(e.g., Haines and Fuchs, 1991; IPCC, 1990b; Weihe and Mertens, 1991; 
WHO, 1990) predicts an increase in climate related illnesses such as cardio- 
vascular, cerebrovascular, and respiratory diseases. Summer mortality from 
coronary heart disease and strokes may increase and is likely to offset the 
reduction in winter mortality. In addition to  these direct effects, there may 
be changes in the occurrence of communicable diseases and an aggravation 
of air pollution (see Section 14). The risk areas of communicable diseases 
like malaria or yellow fever may shift as their vectors adjust to  new climate 
conditions. Despite this qualitative knowledge, the available data is still not 
sufficient for a monetary assessment. 
Some, albeit controversial, estimates exist on the warming induced 
change in mortality. In a case study carried out for EPA, Kalkstein esti- 
mated the change in mortality in 15 American cities (see Smith and Tirpak, 
1990; Kalkstein, 1989). The figures strongly depend on the assumed de- 
gree of acclimatization, showing that cities already accustomed to  a warmer 
climate are far less affected by a further warming than cities with a mod- 
erate climate. Under full acclimatization, Kalkstein reports an increase in 
net mortality corresponding to  45 deathlmillion people. This figure - Kalk- 
stein's most optimistic result - was used for our calculations, although it may 
still be rather on the high side (see Fankhauser, 1992). 
Various methods and studies exist t o  estimate the value of a statistical 
life, see e.g., the survey tables in Pearce et al. (1991, 1992). The resulting 
values, all from studies for developed countries, range from about $ 200,000 
up t o  over 10 m$, with an average of around 3 m$. The results suggest 
that  a statistical life should plausibly be valued a t  a t  least 1.5 m$ (Pearce 
et al., 1991). This still fairly conservative value was adopted for developed 
regions. A low value was preferred to  counterbalance the rather high quantity 
estimate. Unfortunately, no study exists on the value of a statistical life 
outside the  developed world. We thus use an arbitrary value of $ 300,000 
for middle income and $ 150,000 for low income c o ~ n t r i e s . ~  
14. Air Pollution 
Given the wide concern about air quality and air pollution, i t  is surprising 
how little attention this aspect has gained in the context of climate change 
so far. Global warming will affect the quality of the air in two ways. 
Firstly, as long as there exist no economical C02-removal technologies, 
attempts to  limit C 0 2  emissions will - via a reduction of energy use - also 
lead t o  a reduction in the emission of major pollutants such as SO2, CO, and 
NO,. Initial estimates suggest that  this positive side effect - often termed the 
secondary benefits of greenhouse gas abatement - could be extremely large 
and may well exceed the primary benefits (Glomsrcad et al., 1992; Pearce, 
1992). Clearly, a careful cost-benefit analysis would have t o  take such effects 
into account. In the present context, however, they are of no relevance as 
they are related t o  abatement activities only and do not depend on 2 x C 0 2 .  
Many chemical reactions depend on temperature, and this is the sec- 
ond way in which global warming will affect air quality. Scientists predict a 
warming induced increase in the emissions of hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen 
oxides (NO,), and sulphur oxides (SO,). In addition, the formation of acidic 
materials could increase. The effect on acid depositions is nevertheless un- 
clear, because of changes in clouds, winds, and precipitation. More certain 
is an increase in the  tropospheric ozone level, brought about through the 
increase in NOx and HC emissions as well as through a higher reaction rate 
(see Smith and Tirpak, 1990). Based on two case studies carried out for 
EPA, we worked with an average increase of 5.5% in ozone concentration. 
For SO2 we assumed a raise in emissions of 2%. 
The monetary value of air pollution damage has been estimated by sev- 
eral authors, including the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics (199 I ) ,  
PACE (1990), and Pearce (1992) (based on Pearce et al., 1992). In these 
studies the damage from an increased O3 concentration is usually fully at- 
tributed to  NO,, and the estimates range from about 1.50 t o  15 $ of damage 
per kg emitted. The figure is exclusive the damage from acid rain, which 
was subtracted because its relationship to  global warming is as yet unclear.'' 
 his, of course, does not mean that the life of, say, a Chinese is worth less than that 
of an EC citizen. It merely reflects the fact that the willingness to pay for increased safety 
(a lower mortality risk) is higher in developed countries. 
''A clear separation of acid rain and pure NO, damage was not always possible, though. 
It should also be noted that the estimates are strongly site-dependent. 
The divergence in the figures mainly stems from differences in the assess- 
ment of health impacts, which account for most of the damage in the high 
Norwegian estimate, but are assumed zero in the figure by Pearce. We use 
an average of 5 $/kg for developed countries, 1 $/kg for middle income coun- 
tries, and 0.5 $/kg in LDCs. For SO2 we used an average value of 2.5 $/kg 
in OECD countries, again excluding acid deposition. For middle and low 
income countries, we assumed 0.5 $/kg and 0.25 $/kg, respectively. 
15. Migration 
Global warming could trigger a large migration stream away from the worst 
affected regions. Ayres and Walter (1991), for example, talk about 100 
million people going to  be displaced worldwide. However, such figures are 
usually based on a scenario in which no coastal protection measures are 
taken a t  all. The view in this study is that, as a cost efficient response 
t o  sea level rise, densely populated coastlines will be protected (see Section 
2). Under this assumption the number of people displaced will be consid- 
erably lower. Climate-induced migration may nevertheless still occur, e.g., 
away from unprotected coasts or from regions where climate became unfa- 
vorable for agriculture. The type of migration will range from voluntary 
resettlements t o  the occurrence of actual climate refugees, where the former 
group will cause the least (if any) costs and the latter probably the high- 
est, specially if non-economic disutilities (e.g., from stress and hardship) are 
included. 
Our estimates were derived from Cline (1992). His predictions corre- 
spond to  an increase in long-term immigration by 17%, and this average was 
assumed to  hold worldwide. 
The costs of increased migration are estimated in Cline (1992), and 
Ayres and Walter (1991). Despite using completely different methods, both 
studies come up with an estimate of roughly 4500 $/immigrant for the United 
States. Although neither method is fully convincing, this value was used t o  
estimate the immigration costs in OECD countries. For poorer countries, 
Ayres and Walter assume costs of 1000 $ per person. This value is deduced 
from the foregone output a person would have produced, had he or she not 
migrated. It was used for all immigrants to  non-OECD regions. 
To these costs would have t o  be added the costs of hardship and stress 
suffered by migrants. As Cline puts it, "peoples have often fought wars t o  
avoid being forced to  leave their homelands" (1992, p.119), and it is therefore 
quite likely that  these costs exceed the pure economic losses. Unfortunately, 
it seems almost impossible t o  assess them properly. 
16. Natural Disasters 
Under 2 x C 0 2 ,  extreme events like floods and droughts are likely to  become 
more frequent. IPCC (1990a) also predicts, albeit with only a low confidence, 
an increase in local rainstorms at  the expense of gentler but more persistent 
rainfalls. Tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons) may become more frequent 
and wider spread and could occur with increased intensity. Mid latitude 
winter storms may diminish, while the Asian summer monsoon could inten- 
sify. 
Due t o  lack of data, the analysis had to  be limited to  the damage from 
tropical cyclones. Our figures are thus likely to  underestimate the true 
damage." 
Cyclones can only form over warm oceans with sea surface temperatures 
above 26 OC. Consequently, they only occur in certain areas, the most im- 
portant being the South West Pacific, Eastern Asia and the Caribbean Sea. 
In an average year, about 70 to 80 tropical cyclones are recorded in these re- 
gions. Annual damages have been estimated a t  about 1.5 bn$, with a death 
toll of 15,000 t o  23,000 lifes (Smith, 1992; Bryant, 1991). Using the natural 
hazard map of the German reinsurance company Munchener Ruck (see Berz, 
1990 and Smith, 1992) we estimated that the United States are affected by 
about 6.6% of all cyclones. Some 7.2% affect China, and roughly 28.9% oc- 
cur in OECD nations (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US). 0.4% of 
all storms reach as far north as to  affect the former Soviet Union. Neglecting 
overseas dominions, tropical storms are unknown in EC countries. 
The impact of global warming on tropical storms has been analyzed by 
Emanuel (1987). He estimates that 2 x C 0 2  could lead t o  an increase in 
the destructive power of tropical storms of 40 t o  50 percent. Accepting the 
estimates by Smith and Bryant, this would imply an additional 700 m$ in 
damages and about 9000 more lives lost. In breaking down this estimate 
into regional impacts, we have to  remember that damages and casualties are 
not distributed in equal proportions. We assumed that the death toll per 
"Note, however, that some of the damage from increased sea-flooding is included in the 
protection cost estimate of Section 2. (Not included is the flooding of unprotected zones.) 
Also, it is not entirely clear as to how far the EPA study on California, on which the water 
damage estimate is based, includes droughts (see Section 10). 
event is ten times lower in OECD countries, which instead face a ten times 
higher destruction damage. 
17. Total Damage and Conclusions 
Results of the previous sections are summarized and added up in Table 1 
t o  obtain the total damage for each region. With the exception of China 
and the former USSR, total damage is on the order of about 1.3% to  1.5% 
of GNP. Our estimates are thus slightly higher than those by Cline (1992, 
for the US) and Nordhaus (1991a,b; US extended t o  the world), which both 
come up with a best guess of about 1% GNP. The figures are, of course, 
neither exact nor complete and one should allow for a range of error of a t  
least f 50%. Even so, the results are still roughly within the Nordhaus range 
of 0.25 to  2% of GNP. 
Despite the broad agreement in the overall result, the three studies con- 
siderably differ for the individual damage categories, as can be seen from the 
detailed comparison of the US results in Table 4. Agriculture and forestry, 
for example, which constitute the main damage in Cline (1992), are far less 
important in the present study - the impact on forestry even being positive. 
This discrepancy is primarily due to different predictions on the quantitative 
impacts of 2 x COz (yield effects, see Section 6), and thus mainly mirrors 
the scientific uncertainty still inherent in all impact forecasts. For other 
categories the estimated impacts roughly correspond quantitatively, but dif- 
ferences occur in the valuation of these effects. This is the case, for example, 
with the wetland loss and water estimates, and the life/morbidity figures. 
At first sight, the estimate of coastal defense costs and dryland loss is 
within the same order of magnitude as Cline's. It should be remembered, 
though, that with 50 cm we assume a lower rise than both Nordhaus and 
Cline. Under the one meter assumption adopted by Cline, for example, 
defense costs would rise by a factor of about 2.5 and the area of lost dry- 
and wetland would increase by about 50%. Worldwide damage would mount 
to  1.6% of Gross World Product. For the US, even a "worst case damage" - 
assuming a one meter rise in sea levels and taking for each category the most 
pessimistic prediction of Table 4 - is still below 2% of GNP. Albeit tending 
towards the upper bound, our results thus broadly support Nordhaus' range, 
a t  least for industrialized countries. 
In the developing world, on the other hand, the impacts are likely t o  be 
far more severe. Leaving the special case of the former Soviet Union aside, 
our results predict a damage of about 86 bn$ in the non-OECD regions. 
Table 4. US damage compared t o  Cline and Nordhaus (bn$ 1988). 
This Study Cline (1992)a Nordhaus (1991a.b)b 
Coastal defense 
Dryland loss 
Wetland loss 
Species loss 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Fishery 
Energy 
Water 
Other sectors 
Amenity 
Life/morbidity 
Air pollution 
Migration 
Natural hazards 
1 .o 
small 
small 
1 .o 
e 
Total (bn$) 64.1 53.5 48.6 
(% GNP, 1988) (1.3) (1.1) (1.0) 
aTransformed to 1988 values based on % GNP estimates. 
b ~ o t a l  land loss (dry- and wetlands). 
'See also footnote 8. 
d~ourism.  
'Not assessed categories, estimated at :% of GNP. 
Although this is less than a third of total worldwide damage, it corresponds 
to  about 2.8% of GNP in these regions, twice the OECD average. The main 
causes for this high estimate are health impacts and the high portion of 
wetlands found in developing countries. The situation could be further ag- 
gravated by a failure t o  implement the cost efficient precautionary responses 
(e.g. coastal protection), something which is quite likely t o  happen if the 
necessary funds are not made available. Although the data are weaker in the 
case of non-OECD countries, it seems fair t o  say that global warming will 
have its worst impacts in the developing world, with a damage of at least 
2.5% of GNP for 2 x COz. 
Regional differences can, however, be substantial, as is exemplified by 
the estimates for the former USSR and China. For the former Soviet Union, 
damage could be as low as 0.7% of GNP, about halve the world average. 
Even this low level may come as a surprise to  some people, however, as 
it has often been suggested that  northern regions may benefit from global 
warming. Clearly, such a hope is fallacious. In the case of the former Soviet 
Union, the positive impacts on forestry and human amenity are more than 
offset by the costs of sea level rise and the particularly high health costs. 
Similarly surprising may be the high agricultural damage, but even under 
the more favorable agriculture scenario A, which implies positive impacts on 
Soviet agriculture (see Section 6), 2 x C 0 2  will still be clearly harmful. 
The extremely high estimate for China is caused by two factors, agricul- 
tural loss and lifelmorbidity impacts. Especially the former is very volatile 
in the case of China, and the probability range of total damage is there- 
fore particularly wide for this country. For an agricultural damage based on 
the optimistic scenario A, for example, overall damage would fall to 2.6% 
of GNP, compared to 9.6% if scenario B was used. The example clearly 
underlines the sensitivity of the results. 
The emphasis in the damage discussion has so far been mainly on agri- 
culture and sea level rise. In the light of the present analysis it seems that, 
although both are indeed main sources of damage, this view tends to over- 
look aspects which could be as important, particularly the effects on the 
supply of water, on health and on human wellbeing in general. This bias, 
which has already been deplored by Ausubel (1991) may partly be explained 
by the fact that these latter aspects are far more difficult to predict. How- 
ever, while this is an explanation, it cannot be a justification and further 
research is thus needed, especially in these areas. 
A word of caution is needed with respect to the policy implications of 
our results. Although the figures indicate a rather low damage with which 
at  least the industrialized world should be able to cope, they do not nec- 
essarily imply that global warming is harmless. The figures analyze solely 
one point in time, i.e., shed light on the impacts of 2 x C 0 2  only. However, 
global warming will not stop there, and what happens afterwards is as yet 
unclear. Cline's work suggests that damage will increase exponentially with 
concentration (Cline, 1992). Scientists speculate about the existence of dis- 
continuities (see Nordhaus, 1991c) and crossing certain ecological thresholds 
may well lead to nasty surprises. Not least for these reasons global warming 
still deserves our attention. 
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1. Introduction 
An historic Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed by 154 
countries a t  the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop- 
ment (UNCED) in Brazil in June 1992. This Convention commits the sig- 
natory countries, upon ratification, t o  take measures to  reduce the adverse 
effects of climate change by mitigating its causes and adapting to its antici- 
pated effects. 
Considerable work has already been done to estimate the costs associ- 
ated with alternative mitigation strategies. Strategies to  reduce emissions of 
carbon dioxide (COz) from the burning of fossil fuels have received particular 
attention (see for example, Congressional Budget Office, 1990; Manne and 
Richels, 1990; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1992; Nordhaus, 1992; and Gaskins 
and Weyant, forthcoming). Significant work has also been done to  evalu- 
ate the potential physical effects associated with global climate change (US 
EPA, 1989; IPCC, 1990 and 1992). However, fewer efforts have been made t o  
asses the economic impacts of the potential physical effects of climate change 
(Adams, 1989; Linder and Inglis, 1989; Nordhaus, 1991a and 1991b; Peck 
and Teisberg, 1992; and Cline, 1992). Consequently, policy makers have 
a much more limited set of information on the potential economic benefits 
of avoiding or slowing climate change. This is especially troublesome given 
the requirement that  countries identify specific policy measures t o  reduce 
'This work was supported through funding from the Adaptation Branch in EPA's 
Climate Change Division, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation. The views expressed 
in this paper are the authors' own and do not represent official EPA policy. 
greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to  climate change in fulfillment of their 
obligations under the UNCED climate convention. 
One goal of our effort is to  gain additional insights about the sensitivity 
of US economic activity to  climate change. We diverge from previous work 
by employing a general equilibrium framework to  analyze selected impacts. 
The limited research that has been conducted on the economic impacts and 
valuation of the effects of climate change has employed partial equilibrium 
frameworks. Partial equilibrium frameworks neglect potentially important 
interdependencies among the many choices made by households and firms. 
We employ a general equilibrium framework to  explore the importance of 
these interdependencies. The general equilibrium framework allows us t o  
examine, for example, how the direct impacts of climate change on agricul- 
tural production costs affect agricultural prices, prices of goods and services 
that use agricultural commodities in their production, and how these price 
changes feed back to  the agricultural sector and agricultural prices. We can 
examine the substitutions made by firms in production processes, including 
changes in sectoral employment, and the substitutions made by households 
in consumption in response t o  the price changes. We can also examine how 
these substitutions influence the composition of output, savings and invest- 
ment, labor supply, households' lifetime earnings, aggregate output, and 
economic welfare. 
We present in this paper some preliminary results of our explorations on 
this topic. The results do not represent a comprehensive assessment of the 
potential impacts of climate change on economic activity. We have examined 
only three selected climate impacts: (i) a rise in agricultural production 
costs, (ii) a rise in electricity service costs, and (iii) a rise in expenditures to  
protect coastal lands from sea level rise. We also examine the combined effect 
of all three impacts. These scenarios are developed from research conducted 
by others on these impact categories. The scenarios assume a relatively 
severe projection of global warming in which mean annual temperature is 
assumed to  increase through time, rising 4.0°C globally and 5.1°C in the 
USA by the year 2060.~ 
This exercise is not intended to  forecast the future. Credible forecasts 
will not be possible until advances are made in the research community's un- 
derstanding of the linkages between anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases, changes in atmospheric concentrations of the gases, global and regional 
2The IPCC estimates mean global warming will fall roughly in the range 1.0 to 2.5OC 
by the year 2060. 
changes in climatic conditions (e.g., temperature, precipitation, evapotran- 
spiration), physical impacts, economic valuation of those impacts, and feed- 
backs from changes in environmental conditions to economic activity. Thus, 
we are trying instead to  bound the problem and gain a better sense of how 
important climate change may be in terms of macroeconomic impacts and 
changes in economic welfare. Also, our focus is on the magnitude of climate 
impacts that have market manifestations. However, considerable work still 
needs to  be done to investigate the potential non-market impacts of climate 
change. Until this is done, a complete picture of the benefits associated with 
avoiding anthropogenically-induced climate change will not be in hand. 
This paper reports on work in progress. Our preliminary results suggest 
that the combined effects of the three climate-induced impacts examined 
here are not large as a percentage of GNP. But price increases are pro- 
jected for all sectors, causing a reallocation of spending and changing the 
sectoral composition of output. Our results also suggest that there may exist 
significant distributional effects. However, additional research is needed to 
examine the welfare impacts by household type to explore the distributional 
impacts more fully. 
We have also gained useful modeling insights. This work has increased 
our awareness that existing state-of-the-art general equilibrium macroeco- 
nomic models do not contain important inputs to production that are di- 
rectly sensitive to climate change (e.g., water and land). These inputs may 
provide important linkages between sectors, result in significant indirect 
climate-induced effects on production and consumption, and influence eco- 
nomic welfare. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the macroe- 
conomic modeling approach and the particular scenarios used to conduct 
the analysis. Key policy-relevant insights are presented in Section 3, and 
insights for modelers are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we 
suggest implications of our results for the climate change research agenda. 
2. Macroeconomic Modeling Approach 
The Jorgenson-Wilcoxen macroeconomic model of the United States was 
chosen for this initial e f f ~ r t . ~  The Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model is a dynamic, 
3The Adaptation Branch of the EPA is also conducting a parallel effort using the Data 
Resources Inc. macroeconomic model of the USA to gain additional insights into this 
problem. 
general equilibrium model. There are two main reasons for choosing a dy- 
namic general equilibrium approach. The first is t o  capture both the direct 
and indirect effects of climate change on the US economy. The second is 
t o  capture the long-run dynamics of the adjustment of the economy. The 
general equilibrium framework enabled us to  assess fundamental shifts in 
economic activity between industries, including changes in distributions of 
labor, capital, and other production factors within the economy, and changes 
in the distribution of goods and services. 
The model is divided into four major sectors: domestic producers, house- 
holds, government, and the rest-of-the-world. The behavior of producers 
and households are derived from models of intertemporal optimization. The 
behavior of government and the rest-of-the-world are determined by exoge- 
nously specified constraints. The interactions among sectors determine, for 
each period, aggregate domestic output, capital accumulation, employment, 
the composition of output, the allocation of output across different household 
types, and other variables. The outcomes represent a general equilibrium in 
all markets in all time periods. 
Production is subdivided into 35 separate commodities produced by one 
or more of 35 industries (Table 1). Output supply and factor demands of 
each sector are modeled as the results of choices made by market value max- 
imizing, price taking firms which are subject to  technological constraints. 
Firms have perfect foresight of all future prices and interest rates. Factor 
inputs include capital services, labor, and the outputs of the 35 producing 
sectors. The production technology of each producing sector is represented 
by an econometrically estimated cost function that fully captures factor sub- 
stitution possibilities and industry-level biased technological change. These 
outputs serve as inputs t o  the production processes of the other industries, 
are used for investment, satisfy final demands by the household and govern- 
ment sectors, and are exported. 
Household consumption is modeled as a three-stage optimization pro- 
cess. In the first stage, lifetime wealth, which includes financial wealth, 
discounted future labor income, and the imputed value of leisure, is allo- 
cated to  full consumption in each time period to  maximize intertemporal 
utility. Households have perfect foresight of future prices and interest rates. 
In the second stage, the full consumption allocated to  each period in the 
first stage is allocated between goods and leisure to  maximize intratempo- 
ral utility. This allocation determines the labor supply. In the third and 
final stage, goods expenditures of each period are allocated among capital, 
labor, and the outputs of the 35 production sectors to  maximize a subutility 
function for goods consumption. Allocations at  each stage are based upon 
Table 1. Definitions of industries within the Jorgenson/Wilcoxen model. 
No. Description No. Description 
1 Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 19 Stone, clay, and glass products 
2 Metal mining 20 Primary metals 
3 Coal mining 21 Fabricated metal products 
4 Crude petroleum and natural gas 22 Machinery, except electrical 
5 Nonmetallic mineral mining 23 Electrical machinery 
6 Construction 24 Motor vehicles 
7 Food and kindred products 25 Other transportation equipment 
8 Tobacco manufacturers 26 Instruments 
9 Textile mill products 27 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
10 Apparel and other textile products 28 Transportation and warehousing 
11 Lumber and wood products 29 Communication 
12 Furniture and fixtures 30 Electric utilities 
13 Paper and allied products 31 Gas utilities 
14 Printing and publishing 32 Trade 
15 Chemicals and allied products 33 Finance, insurance, and real estate 
16 Petroleum refining 34 Other services 
17 Rubber and plastic products 35 Government enterprises 
18 Leather and leather products 
an econometrically estimated system of individual, demographically defined 
household demand functions. 
The behavior of government is constrained by exogenously specified t ax  
rates and budget deficit. Government revenues are determined by the spec- 
ified tax  rates and endogenous levels of economic activity. Government ex- 
penditures adjust to  satisfy the exogenous budget deficit constraint. 
The current account is specified exogenously. Imports are treated as im- 
perfect substitutes for similar domestic commodities and compete on price. 
Export demands are functions of foreign incomes and foreign prices of US 
exports. Import prices and foreign incomes are exogenously specified. For- 
eign prices of US exports are determined endogenously by domestic prices 
and the exchange rate. The exchange rate adjusts to  satisfy the exogenous 
constraint on the current account. 
2.1. The General Equilibrium 
The J W  framework contains intertemporal and intratemporal models (Jor- 
genson and Wilcoxen, 1990b). In any particular time period, all markets 
clear. This market clearing process occurs in response to  any changes in the 
levels of variables that are specified exogenously to the model. The interac- 
tions among sectors determine, for each period, aggregate domestic output, 
capital accumulation, employment, the composition of output, the allocation 
of output across different household types, and other variables. 
The model also produces an intertemporal equilibrium path from the 
initial conditions at  the start of the simulation to the stationary state. (A 
stationary solution for the model is obtained by merging the intertemporal 
and intratemporal models.) The dynamics of the JW model have two ele- 
ments. The model includes both an accumulation equation for capital, and 
a capital asset pricing equation. Changes in the levels of exogenous variables 
cause several adjustments to occur within the model. First, the single stock 
of capital is efficiently allocated among all sectors, including the household 
sector. Capital is assumed to be perfectly malleable and mobile among sec- 
tors, so that the price of capital services in each sector is proportional to  a 
single capital service price for the economy as a whole. The value of capital 
services is equal to  capital income. The supply of capital available in each 
period is the result of past investment. When a change in the level of an 
exogenous variable occurs, the capital stock is augmented by the amount of 
savings from the previous period (i.e., investment). Capital a t  the end of 
each period is a function of investment during the period and capital a t  the 
beginning of the period. This capital accumulation equation is backward- 
looking and captures the impact of investments in all past periods on the 
capital available in the current period. 
The capital asset pricing equation specifies the price of capital services 
in terms of the price of investment goods at  the beginning and end of each 
period, the rate of return to capital for the economy as a whole, the rate 
of depreciation, and variables describing the tax structure for income from 
capital. The current price of investment goods incorporates an assumption 
of perfect foresight or rational expectations. Under this assumption, the 
price of investment goods in every period is based on expectations of future 
capital service prices and discount rates that are fulfilled by the solution of 
the model. This equation for the investment goods price in each time period 
is forward-10oking.~ 
One way to characterize the JW model - or any other neoclassical growth 
model - is that the short-run supply of capital is perfectly inelastic, since 
'The price of capital assets is also equal to the cost of production, so that changes in 
the rate of capital accumulation result in an increase in the cost of producing investment 
goods. This has to be equilibrated with the discounted value of future rentals in order to 
produce an intertemporal equilibrium. The rising cost of producing investment is a cost 
of adjusting to a new intertemporal equilibrium path. 
it is completely determined by past investment. However, the supply of 
capital is perfectly elastic in the long run. The capital stock adjusts to the 
time endowment, while the rate of return depends only on the intertemporal 
preferences of the household sector. 
A predetermined amount of technical progress also takes place in re- 
sponse to changes in the prices of factors of production (Jorgenson and 
Fraumeni, 1981). This serves to lower the cost of sectoral production and 
causes changes in productivity. Finally, the quality of labor is enhanced, 
giving rise to higher productivity and lower costs of production. 
Given all of these changes, the model solves for a new price vector and 
attains a new general equilibrium. Across all time periods, the model solves 
for the time paths of the capital stock, household consumption, and prices. 
The outcomes represent a general equilibrium in all markets in all time 
periods. 
We use the model to evaluate the general equilibrium effects of selected 
impacts of climate change. A baseline projection of economic activity in 
the absence of any change in climate is made for the period 1993 to  2050. 
The climate impacts are then introduced to  the model as exogenous changes 
in the costs of producing goods or changes in government expenditures. 
In each case the shocks are anticipated with perfect foresight. The model 
solves for a new general equilibrium, reflecting the effects of the climate 
shocks on the economy over the 1993 to 2050 time horizon. The projections 
of economic activity for the climate change scenarios are compared to the 
baseline projection to identify the effects of the selected climate impacts. 
2.2. The Scenarios 
We examine the effects of three climate impact categories on the economy. 
The impacts are (i) changes in agricultural production costs, (ii) changes 
in electricity service costs, and (iii) changes in government expenditures to  
protect coastal areas from sea level rise. The scenarios are based upon a 
projection of climate change for the world and the USA for an equivalent 
doubling of carbon dioxide (C02)  concentration in the atmosphere above 
the preindustrial level. The climate projection selected for this exercise is 
from the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory's (GFDL) general circu- 
lation model. That model projects mean global warming of 4OC and mean 
warming for the USA of 5.1°C for a doubling of C02.  We assume that 
these temperature changes occur by the year 2060 and that temperatures 
rise gradually between the present and 2060. The assumed time path of 
mean annual warming for the USA is presented in Table 2. 
This is an extreme climate scenario in comparison to the range of warm- 
ing projected by the IPCC (1992). We selected an extreme case because part 
of our purpose is to  bound the range of plausible macroeconomic effects and 
impacts on economic growth that may result from the three climate-induced 
impacts considered here. We believe that out estimates represent reasonable 
upper bounds on the potential changes in macroeconomic activity that may 
result from the selected climate impacts over a time horizon extending to  
2060. They do not, however, represent an upper bound on the total effect of 
potential climate change on economic activity. The selected climate impacts 
represent only a subset of the potential climate impacts. The results of this 
exercise should also not be taken to  be central or best estimates of the effects 
of the selected climate impacts on economic activity. 
The damage functions developed for inputs to  the JW model were de- 
rived from static (single-period), partial equilibrium assessments of the ef- 
fects of global warming on particular sectors of the US economy. The pro- 
portionality of the damages to the degree of temperature rise was an as- 
sumption prompted by the complete absence of intertemporal information 
on how damages evolve as temperature rises. 
Estimates of the impacts of climate change on agricultural production 
costs are based upon the work of Adams (1989) and Adams et al. (1989). 
These studies incorporate the results of research on crop yield responses to 
changes in climate variables and C 0 2  concentration into a mathematical 
programming model of the agricultural sector of the USA. US agricultural 
production is disaggregated into 63 regions and 48 primary and secondary 
agricultural commodities. Total supply for each commodity is the sum of 
domestic production from all regions of the USA plus imports. Total de- 
mand is the sum of domestic demands for consumption, stocks, government 
programs, livestock feeding, and processing plus export demand. Prices 
and quantities of agricultural commodities are simulated by the model for 
selected climate scenarios. The simulations reflect estimated changes in do- 
mestic crop yields by region and crop in response to  projections of regional 
changes in temperature, precipitation, evapotranspiration, and water sup- 
ply and demand. The simulations do not reflect any changes in foreign 
demand or supply due to climate effects. Adaptations to  changes in climate 
are allowed for through substitutions among factor inputs to agricultural 
production and substitutions among crops. 
Simulations conducted by Adams for the GFDL scenario for a doubling 
of C 0 2  project aggregate price increases of 28% for field crops and 7% for 
livestock commodities. In our work, we further aggregate the price increases 
into a single price change for all agricultural output. We use the projected 
price change as an estimate of the impact of a doubled COz climate on the 
unit cost of agricultural production in the year 2060. The assumed rise 
in unit cost in 2060 is 16%. This change reflects the combined effects of 
regional changes in temperature, precipitation, and evapotranspiration, and 
the direct effect of raised C02.  
In addition to  the estimate of the impacts of climate change on agri- 
cultural costs in 2060, we also need estimates for the years 1993 to  2059 
for our analysis. To do this, we assume that the percentage change in unit 
cost is a linear function of the projected annual average temperature change 
in the USA. For each l.O°C temperature rise, agricultural unit cost is as- 
sumed to rise approximately 3% relative to the base case. The assumption 
is crude. But it permits us to examine the general equilibrium impacts of 
changes in agricultural costs that are roughly consistent with the GFDL pro- 
jection of equilibrium climate change for doubled C 0 2  and Adams' analyses 
of the impacts of this climate scenario on agricultural production.5 The unit 
cost changes are introduced to  the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model as exogenous 
shifts of the production technology for agriculture that increase the factor 
requirements for given output levels. The assumed time path of changes 
in agricultural unit costs as a percentage of baseline costs are presented in 
Table 2. 
Estimates of the impacts of climate change on the costs of electricity 
services is based upon the work of Linder and Inglis (1989). A rise in outdoor 
temperatures during the summer will raise the quantity of electricity needed 
to produce a unit of indoor cooling service. During winter months, a rise 
in outdoor temperature will reduce the quantity of electricity needed to 
produce a unit of heating service. Linder and Inglis (1989) find that the 
net effect of the summer and winter impacts is to  increase the quantity of 
'The assumption that percentage changes in unit costs for aggregate agriculture is a 
linear function of average annual temperature change across the USA is a substantial ab- 
straction from reality. Crop yields and agricultural costs are complex functions of spatial 
and intertemporal variations of climate variables including, but not limited to, tempera- 
ture. The crop yield models employed by Adams project substantial yield reductions in 
much of the USA for the regional changes in climate that are projected by the GFDL model 
for an equivalent doubling of CO2. The direct effect of CO2 on plant physiology, how- 
ever, raises crop yields, offsetting much of the negative impacts of the projected changes 
in climate variables. It is unlikely that a linear function of temperature will provide a 
reasonable approximation of these processes. We, nevertheless, adopt the assumption for 
expediency. Because of this, the links between our analysis and the GFDL climate scenario 
and the work of Adams are tenuous. Our results should therefore not be interpreted as an 
analysis of the agricultural impacts of the GFDL climate scenario. 
electricity demanded annually and peak electricity demand.6 Drawing on 
estimates of the impacts of weather variations on electricity demands from 
a set of case studies, Linder and Inglis estimate the effects of warming on 
peak and annual electricity demand in the USA and the costs of generating 
electric power. Using transient projections of regional temperature changes 
from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), they estimate that 
annual electricity demand would increase approximately 4% to 6% and peak 
demand would increase 13% to 20% in the year 2055 relative to their base 
case. 
We adopt Linder and Inglis' high estimate and treat the increase in an- 
nual electricity demand as an increase in the quantity of electricity needed 
to produce a unit of electricity services. A rise in the electricity input per 
unit of service causes an equal percentage rise in the unit cost of electric- 
ity services. Assuming a linear relationship between the percent change in 
electricity input per unit of service and the average temperature change for 
the USA, a 1°C rise in temperature will raise the cost of producing a unit 
of electricity services 1.5%.7 Thus, for a projection of 5.1°C warming in the 
USA for the year 2060, the unit cost of electricity services is raised 7.7%. 
The unit cost of electricity services is also changed by changes in the 
unit cost of generating electricity. Changes in the patterns of peak demand 
are estimated by Linder and Inglis to increase generating costs. Unit gen- 
erating costs increase by approximately 2% in 2010 and 5% in 2055 in their 
simulations. These estimates are used to generate a time path of percentage 
increases in unit generating costs. The combined effects of increases in elec- 
tricity input requirements for producing electricity services and increases in 
generating costs are shown in Table 2. These cost increases for electrical 
services are introduced into the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model as increases in 
the unit costs of output of the electric utility sector. 
'Although the net effect of climate change is to increase electricity demand, the net 
effect of warming on US energy use is ambiguous. For example, even though electricity 
demand is projected to rise by Linder and Inglis, there could be a decline in oil and natural 
gas use. We do not consider changes in energy demands other than electric energy. 
'The mean annual temperature increase in the USA for the year 2055 in the GISS 
transient climate projection is approximately 4.3OC. Our assumption that the percentage 
change in the electricity input per unit service is a linear function of average annual 
temperature change in the USA is a substantial simplification. For example, changes in 
electricity demand will depend upon regional and seasonal changes in weather. There 
are some significant differences in the projection of regional and seasonal climate changes 
between the GISS model and the GFDL model. These differences are ignored in our 
extrapolation of Linder and Inglis' estimates of changes in electricity demand for a climate 
scenario projected by the GISS model to a GFDL-based temperature scenario. 
Titus et al. (1991) estimated the costs of protecting developed coastal 
areas from sea level rise. For a 100 cm rise, they estimate the cost of coastal 
defenses to be $140 billion to $300 billion. We adopt the midpoint of this 
range as our estimate of the cost of coastal defenses and allocate the costs 
over the time horizon 1993 to 2060. In our allocation, annual costs increase 
roughly linearly. The cost allocation is shown in Table 2.8 
The costs of coastal defenses are incorporated into the Jorgenson- 
Wilcoxen model as increases in government purchases from the construction 
sector. The purchases are. financed by increases in the average tax on labor 
income, so that the government budget deficit is unchanged. 
3. Policy-Relevant Insights 
The long-term economic effects of the three selected climate impacts are pre- 
sented in Tables 3 and 4. The physical impacts induced by climate change 
lead to higher prices and costs. In turn, these reduce overall economic perfor- 
mance leading to a decline in the level of consumption. Government and net 
foreign purchases also decline as a consequence of higher costs. But invest- 
ment increases, financed by additional household savings. While more labor 
and capital are available for production, their impacts are more than offset 
by the declines in industry-level productivity that follow from higher prices. 
Structurally, the economy moves away from agricultural and consumption- 
related activities and toward investment and capital-related industries, in- 
cluding increased use of coal, oil, and gas. 
Several key policy-relevant insights emerge from these results (see Table 
5). First, the economic effects due to the rise in agriculture prices, the rise 
in electricity service costs, and the rise in expenditures to protect coastal 
lands from sea level rise, do not have a significant impact on aggregate 
economic growth. None of the effects is large. Indeed, they combine to yield 
a decline in economic growth that leaves GNP 0.8 percent lower in the year 
2050 (Figure I).' Of the three impacts examined, the rise in agricultural 
prices has the largest effect on GNP, accounting for 60 percent of the loss. 
The second largest impact is from changes in the cost of electricity services. 
'A rise in sea level of 100 cm by the year 2060 is much higher than most estimates of 
sea level rise. The IPCC (1992) estimates that sea level rise will be less than 30 cm by 
2100. 
'The term 'combinedn in Figure 1 refers to the fact that all three climate impacts 
were imposed simultaneously within the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model. It does not repre- 
sent a simple linear combination of the impact on GNP of all three scenarios imposed 
independently. 
Table 2. Summary of exogenously specified climate impact s~ena r io s .~  
Coast a1 Electr.  
T e m p e r a t u r e  Agriculture expend.  services 
Year  rise ("C) (% change) ($ bill.) (% change)  
1992 0 0 0 0 
2000 0.8 2.5 1.2 1.8 
2010 1.7 5.4 2.7 5.6 
2020 2.5 8.0 4.1 7.9 
2030 3.3 10.3 5.3 9.8 
2040 4.0 12.4 6.2 11.3 
2050 4.6 14.3 7.3 12.4 
2060 5.1 16.1 8.1 13.1 
aThe impact on agriculture is measured as the percentage increase in unit costs of pro- 
duction associated with agricultural output under the assumed climate change conditions. 
The  impact from rising sea levels is measured in billions of 1990 dollars. The  impact on 
electricity services is measured as the percentage increase in the effective unit cost of these 
services. 
Finally, expenditures to protect property from sea level rise has virtually no 
impact on overall economic growth. However, it does affect the structure of 
the economy slightly. 
It is important to  recognize that although the combined impacts of the 
three effects categories are not large as a percentage of GNP, the absolute 
dollar decline may be considered significant. As illustrated in Table 4, the 
present discounted value of the decline in real GNP from the combined im- 
pacts is $221 billion (in $1990). Further, it is also important to recognize 
that the estimated economic impacts are not insubstantial relative to the 
costs that have been estimated for all existing environmental regulations in 
the USA. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990a) estimate that the long-run cost 
of all existing environmental regulations in the USA is 2.6 percent of GNP.1° 
A second important insight is that consumption declines in 2050, al- 
though real investment rises." When agricultural yields decline as a result 
''Our "combinedn climate scenario results in a slow decline in G N P  until i t  falls to  
0.8 percent below baseline levels in the distant year 2050. The  JW estimate of a 2.6 
percent decline in G N P  from all existing environmental regulations is also a long-run 
effect. However, JW also show tha t  the economy follows the transition path t o  the new 
steady s tate  fairly rapidly in their assessment of the impacts of all existing environmental 
regulations. In particular, they show that  the capital stock changes rapidly, driven by 
large changes in the price of investment goods. T h e  quantity of full consumption changes 
a t  a similar rate, as does real GNP. 
"It is also interesting tha t  the fall in G N P  is larger than the  fall in consumption. This  
occurs because the trade balance is fixed in nominal terms and the exogenous shock due 
Impact on Real GNP 
Combined: % Change 
Real Gonsumption & Investment 
Combined: % Change in Constant $ 
- Consumption - Investment 
Figure 1. Impact on real GNP, consumption, and investment; combined 
case. 
Impact on Real GNP 
Agriculture: % Change 
Real Consumption & Investment 
Agriculture: % Change in Constant $ 
- Consumption - Investment 
Figure 2. Impact on real GNP, consumption, and investment; the case of 
agricultural yield decline. 
Table 3. Summary of long-term economic impacts (2050). 
Agriculture Sea level Electricity Combined 
Percentage change in  real magnitudes 
Real GNP -0.5 0.2 -0.3 -0.8 
Consumption 
Investment 
Government 
Net exports 
Real GNP 
Consumption 
Investment 
Government 
Net exports 
Contr ibut ion t o  percentage change in  real G N P  
-0.5 0.1 -0.3 
-0.4 0.0 -0.2 
0.1 0.0 0.0 
-0.1 0.1 0.0 
0.1 0.0 0.0 
of climate change, consumption declines by 0.6 percent (Figure 2). This 
reduction in consumption is 80 percent of the overall reduction in income 
and spending. In the case of increasing costs for electricity services, all cat- 
egories of final spending decline. The decline in consumption accounts for 
more than 60 percent of this reduction. In the case of sea level rise, the 
increased construction activities lead to a redirection of spending away from 
consumption toward public and private investment. However, this results in 
a trivial reduction in consumption. 
In addition to  analyzing the effects of selected climate impacts on ag- 
gregate measures of economic activity such as GNP, consumption, and in- 
vestment, the methodology also allows us to  examine changes in the sectoral 
composition of output. For example, in the input scenario of agricultural 
impacts, a projected decline in crop yields raises agricultural prices over 20 
percent in 2050. This raises the costs of agricultural inputs to  other sec- 
tors such as food processing, tobacco, and textiles, causing price increases 
in these and other sectors (Figure 3). 
Price increases are projected for all sectors, though in the majority of 
instances the price rises are slight. Not surprisingly, the largest price increase 
is for food products. Modest price increases are also projected for tobacco, 
lumber, and textiles.12 These price changes cause a reallocation of spending 
to climate change causes the exchange rate to devalue. This is more a consequence of the 
closure of the model than anything else. 
''The rise in lumber prices is a result of the aggregation of agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries into a single sector in the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model. This sector is modeled as 
if it produces a homogeneous product that is used as an input to the lumber and wood 
Supply Prices, 2050 
Agriculture: % C h a n g e  
Domestic Outpui, 2050 
Agriculture: % Change 
Figure 3. Impacts on supply prices and domestic outputs; the case of 
agricultural yield decline. 
Table 4. Summary of cumulative economic impacts, in billions of 1990 
dollars, 7% discount rate. 
Agriculture Seal level Electricity Combined 
Real GNP -144 36 -92 -22 1 
Real consumption 
Households -143 -7 -57 -20 1 
Households & government -166 28 -69 -228 
such that  food and tobacco output decline 10 percent and a handful of other 
sectors experience modest declines.I3 Increased spending is spread out in 
small increments to a large number of sectors. 
The projected rise in food prices as the primary impact suggests that the  
burden of climate change may be distributed regressively across households. 
Low income households spend a larger share of income on food and will 
be disproportionately impacted relative to  wealthier households by a rise 
in food prices. In future research, we will examine the welfare impacts by 
household type to  explore the distribution of burdens more fully. 
Once again, these economic impacts are not large as a percentage of 
GNP. But our results help to  illustrate that  the economic vulnerabilities t o  
climate change are not limited to those sectors that  are directly affected. 
From a policy perspective, such indirect effects on other sectors may be 
important, especially if they are concentrated in particular geographic areas. 
4. Modeling Insights 
As we conducted this exercise, several key insights for modelers of economic 
and environmental processes were gained (see Table 6). In particular, our 
results demonstrated the potential importance of accounting for the labor- 
leisure choice by households, the need t o  ensure that  appropriate measures 
of economic impacts are chosen, and increased our awareness that  state-of- 
the-art general equilibrium models do not contain important factor inputs 
that  are themselves sensitive to  climate change. 
products sector. Therefore, a rise in agricultural prices, which raises the price of the 
aggregated sector, is treated as an increase in the price of material inputs to the lumber 
and wood products sector. 
1 3 ~ g a i n ,  the change in the lumber and wood products sector is a spurious result of the 
model structure. 
Table 5. Key policy-relevant insights. 
a The economic effects due to the climate-induced rise in agricultural prices, rise 
in electricity service costs, and rise in expenditures to  protect coastal lands 
from sea level rise, do not have a significant impact on aggregate economic 
growth. 
a Although the combined impact is not large as a percentage of GNP, the impact 
is not insubstantial relative to the long-run costs of all existing environmental 
regulations in the USA. 
a There may exist significant distributional effects. 
a It is possible to identify sectors that are economically vulnerable to  climate 
change. These effects may be direct or indirect. 
a Structurally, the economy moves away from agricultural and consumption- 
related activities and toward investment and capital-related industries. 
4.1. The labor-leisure choice 
Our results suggest that  the labor-leisure choice is a potentially important 
response to climate impacts. More research is needed to  determine the  mag- 
nitude of this effect, and whether modelers need to  ensure that  this choice 
is accounted for in their frameworks. 
To illustrate this point, consider the changes in economic activity that  
occur as climate change leads to a reduction in crop yields in agriculture. Re- 
call tha t  the agricultural impacts reduce overall economic performance and 
lead t o  a 0.5 percent reduction in real GNP in 2050. Global climate change 
increases the relative costs of production in agriculture in the  USA.14 The 
higher costs result in higher prices for US food and food products that  are 
faced by consumers, governments, and foreign purchasers. Households view 
this as a permanent loss in real future earnings and reduce their spending 
on all goods and services. They also reduce their demand for leisure and 
offer additional labor services. This arises because the income effects of the 
decline in real earnings dominate the substitution effects of higher goods 
prices. The quantity purchases of governments fall in real terms as expendi- 
tures are constrained by the combined effects of higher prices, available tax 
"The results of our analysis of agricultural impacts must be carefully interpreted. We 
have not modeled the impact of climate change on agricultural production in the rest of 
the world. Recent work sponsored by the EPA (Rosenzweig et al., forthcoming; Fischer, 
1992) suggests that the global agricultural impacts may have important trade implications, 
but also suggests that US agricultural production and net exports of the grain sector may 
still decline even when global agricultural impacts are considered. 
revenues and limits on the overall deficit. Real exports fall and real imports 
rise as US production becomes less competitive. The drop in real consump- 
tion and the rise in income from the absorption of additional labor services 
by producers lead t o  a permanent boost in household saving. These funds 
flow to  increase private investment by households and businesses. The capi- 
tal stock increases, encouraged by the more favorable returns on saving and 
investment. As in the composite case, the economy structurally moves away 
from agricultural and consumption-related activities and toward investment 
and capital-related industries. 
4.2. Important climate-sensitive factors of product ion 
Today's state-of-the-art general equilibrium models do not contain important 
inputs that  are directly sensitive to  climate change. These inputs (e.g., water, 
land) may link sectors. 
Partial equilibrium models, such as those that  were used in this exercise 
t o  determine the exogenous inputs, may include such climate-sensitive in- 
puts. For example, the Adams agricultural model includes water supply as a 
factor of production. Within the context of these partial equilibrium models, 
changes in these inputs often lead to  small market impacts within the sector 
under consideration. However, because they are partial equilibrium models, 
they typically do not look a t  costs associated with intersectoral reallocations 
of the inputs. 
Whether or not the intersectoral flows of climate-sensitive inputs are 
significant is an empirical question. It is a question that still remains unan- 
swered. However, as these macroeconomic tools are used t o  evaluate climate 
change impacts and address other climate-related questions, they will have 
t o  be extended to  account for these additional factor inputs and resource 
f l 0 ~ s . l ~  
4.3. Appropriate measures of economic impacts 
Measuring changes in social welfare that  result from climate change impacts 
is difficult. Economic modelers often rely on Gross National Product and 
Gross Domestic Product as proxies or "indicators" of welfare changes, even 
though they are not themselves welfare measures. 
We suggest that  in the assessment of climate change impacts, it is es- 
sential that  measures other than GNP or GDP be used t o  evaluate welfare 
15Work is already underway to construct such frameworks. Of particular note is the 
"Second Generation Modeln being developed by Jae Edmonds. 
changes. In fact, focusing on changes in GNP may lead to  misleading con- 
clusions. 
Consider the case of increased expenditures t o  protect coastal areas 
against sea level rise. As in the composite case, households bear a sig- 
nificant share of the burden of adjustment to  the impacts of sea level rise 
(Figure 4). While the impacts are extremely small, the economy is affected 
nevertheless. The increase in government construction expenditures requires 
that resources be bid away from other production activities and redirected 
to  construction and its supplying sectors. This bids up the prices of all goods 
and services, including those facing consumers. As with agriculture, house- 
holds view this as a permanent reduction in real future earnings and reduce 
their consumption of goods, services, and leisure. The additional labor ser- 
vices offered by households are easily absorbed into the comparatively labor- 
intensive, construction-related industries. The drop in consumption and the 
rise in labor income lead to increases in household savings. In turn, these 
funds flow to  investment in plant and equipment by households and busi- 
nesses. In short, final demand is restructured away from consumer spending 
and toward public construction and private investment. The industrial mix 
of domestic output strongly reflects the consequences of this reconfiguration. 
A result of our analysis is that  GNP and consumption expenditures move 
i n  opposite directions over time. GNP increases until it is 0.1 percent higher 
in 2050. Consumption expenditures decline a small amount so that  they are 
below baseline levels in 2050. 
This result suggests that  GNP is not a reliable indicator of changes in 
economic welfare that  may arise from climate change. As a response to  
climate change, we can expect to  see a reallocation of expenditures, both 
intratemporally and intertemporally, and these reallocations will influence 
GNP and GNP growth. Whether these reallocations result in greater or 
lower economic welfare, cannot be proxied by changes in GNP. 
To evaluate economic welfare impacts of climate change, there are no 
good substitutes for equivalent and compensating variation measures of will- 
ingness to  pay by households. One of the great advantages of a general equi- 
librium model that  is grounded in consumer and producer theory is that  it 
can provide estimates of changes in willingness-to-pay to  evaluate welfare 
changes.16 In future work, we will carry our analysis through to  this last 
I6An important contribution in this area is Hazilla and Kopp (1990). They constructed 
an econometric general equilibrium model of the USA that estimates dynamic social costs 
derived from modern applied welfare economics. They also demonstrate that general 
equilibrium impacts of environmental quality regulations mandated by the Clean Air and 
Water Acts are significant and pervasive. 
Table 6. Modeling insights. 
The labor-leisure choice is a potentially important response to climate impacts. 
Today's state-of-the-art general equilibrium models do not contain important 
inputs that are directly sensitive to climate change. These inputs (e.g., water, 
land) may link sectors. 
Appropriate measures of economic impacts must be chosen. Alternatives in- 
clude GNP, household consumption, and equivalent and compensating varia- 
tion. 
If consumer surplus measures are desired, a general equilibrium modeling ap- 
proach is appropriate. 
stage to examine the welfare implications of the scenarios analyzed in this 
paper.17 
5.  Insights for the Research Agenda 
Our results suggest that macroeconomic models provide a useful tool for 
gaining valuable insights about the economic effects of climate change. But 
macro models, like many other types of models, are limited in that they 
only capture those effects that manifest themselves in the market (Scheraga 
et al., 1992). Conventional economic modeling lends itself to the assessment 
of costs and benefits that are manifested in the market. Macroeconomic 
modeling is particularly useful for programs that produce significant market 
interactions. Where conventional modeling fails us is in accounting for non- 
market costs and benefits (Table 7). These effects are important because 
they represent changes in social welfare which need to be considered by pol- 
icy makers. Estimation of these effects should be a major focus of ongoing 
economic research. 
A second focus for future research should be on the development of 
improved and more meaningful damage functions. Improved damage func- 
tions should be derived from a dynamic, general equilibrium assessment of 
the effects of global warming on the US economy, rather than on static, 
partial equilibrium assessments. Also, researchers should focus on deriving 
intertemporal information on how damages evolve as temperature (and other 
weather variables) change, so that the assumption about the proportional- 
ity of damages to  the degree of temperature rise can be relaxed. Improved 
damage functions should also permit the identification and assessment of 
17For related work, see Jorgenson, Slesnick, and Wilcoxen (1992). 
Impact on Real GNP 
Sea Level: % Change 
Real Consumption & Investment 
Sea Level: % Change in Constant $ 
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Figure 4. Impacts on real GNP, consumption, and investment; the case of 
sea level rise. 
Table 7. Assessment taxonomy. 
Benefits Costs 
Market 
manifestation 
Medical expenditures Compliance costs 
Agricultural yields General equilibrium 
Worker productivity effects 
No market Visibility aesthetics Pain & suffering due to job 
manifestation Pain & suffering loss, increased illness, and 
Existence value alcoholism resulting from 
Ecosystem damages environmental regulation 
(health-health effects) 
regional climate impacts. Finally, damage functions should be derived that 
will permit the identification of marginal benefits associated with alterna- 
tive policy actions. What we have done in our work is estimate credible up- 
per bounds for the impacts from three climate-induced effects on economic 
growth. However, these estimates cannot be used to justify any policy pack- 
age other than one which completely eliminates all of the relevant damages. 
In fact, for this type of analysis to be more useful to policy makers, marginal 
benefits estimates will need to be derived. 
Finally, as we have already discussed, existing macroeconomic models 
do not include key climate-sensitive factors of production, such as water and 
land. There is a need to broaden the scope of macroeconomic models so that 
they include these inputs. One alternative is to develop a new generation of 
macroeconomic models that incorporate all key inputs, as well as potential 
feedbacks from the environment to economic activity. Another alternative 
is to explore linkages between narrower, more detailed sectoral models and 
existing macroeconomic models. For example, we expect to investigate how 
one might measure directly the influences of climate on production deci- 
sions on a sector-by-sector basis, and then use the JW model as a platform 
for looking at  the general equilibrium effects. We also expect to examine 
how climate influences consumption decisions. Most economic analyses of 
climate change have focused on the impacts of climate on production. How- 
ever, virtually no work has been done to examine the value of climate as a 
consumption good, in and of itself. Future work should address this issue. 
6. Conclusions 
The goal of this project has been to assess the sensitivity of US economic ac- 
tivity to three particular climate-induced effects: (i) changes in agricultural 
Table 8. Insights for the research agenda. 
There is a need to: 
r Focus on non-market impacts. 
r Measure directly the influences of climate on production and consumption de- 
cisions. 
r Derive more meaningful damage functions that will permit: 
o Identification of the marginal benefits associated 
with any particular policy action 
o Assessment of regional damages due to climate change. 
Develop linkages between narrower sectoral models and macroeconomic models. 
production costs, (ii) changes in electricity service costs, and (iii) changes 
in government expenditures to protect coastal areas from sea level rise. We 
have discovered that the economic impacts attributable to these climate 
change effects are not large as a percentage of GNP. There is a decline in 
consumption, although real investment rises. We have said nothing about 
the distribution of the consumption decline across household types, but some 
of our results suggest that low-income households may be differentially af- 
fected. However, further analysis is required before any statments can be 
conclusively made about the distributional effects of climate. 
From a modeling perspective, we verified that climate change may lead 
to significant intersectoral flows of resources, which can only be adequately 
assessed with a general equilibrium framework. Yet, even state-of-the-art 
general equilibrium macroeconomic models are limited for climate change 
analyses because they do not contain important inputs that are directly 
sensitive to climate change. 
Finally, our focus has been on the magnitude of climate impacts that 
have market manifestations (see Table 8). However, considerable work still 
needs to be done to investigate the potential non-market impacts of climate 
change. The non-market impacts of climate change may be significant, and 
are of considerable concern to  decision makers concerned with the formula- 
tion of efficient and efficacious climate change policy. 
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1. Background 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the threat of a global climate change has 
caused concern and attracted much attention. Many climatologists predict 
significant global warming in the coming decades due to  increasing atmo- 
spheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other trace gases. As a con- 
sequence, major changes in hydrological regimes have also been forecast to  
occur. 
In 1989 the US Environmental Protection Agency commissioned a three- 
year study on the effects of climate change on world food supply. The study 
has been jointly managed by the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) 
and the Environmental Change Unit (ECU), University of Oxford, in col- 
laboration with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), and involved about fifty scientists worldwide. 
2. Study Approach 
Recent research has focused on regional and national assessment of the po- 
tential effects of climate change on agriculture. For the most part,  this has 
treated each region or nation in isolation, without relation to  changes in 
production in other places. The present study is a first attempt to arrive at 
an integrated global assessment of the potential effects of climate change on 
agriculture. The implementation of the study involved four elements: 
1. Selection of climate change scenarios. 
2. The estimation of site specific potential changes in crop yields. 
3. Aggregation of crop modeling results to estimates of potential na- 
tional/regional productivity changes. 
4. Dynamic simulation of climate change yield impacts on the world food 
system. 
2.1. Climate Change Scenarios 
Scenarios of climate change were developed in order to estimate their ef- 
fects on crop yields and food trade. A climate change scenario is defined as 
a consistent set of changes in meteorological variables, based on generally 
accepted projections of C 0 2  (and other trace gases) levels. The range of 
scenarios used is intended to capture the range of possible effects and set 
limits on the associated uncertainty. The scenarios for this study were cre- 
ated by changing observed data on current climate (1951-1980) according to 
the results of doubled C02  simulations of three general circulation models 
(GCM). The GCMs used are those from: 
GISS: Goddard Institute for Space Studies (Hansen et al., 1988) 
GFDL: Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (Manabe and Wether- 
ald, 1987). 
UKMO: United Kingdom Meteorological Office (Wilson and Mitchell, 
1987). 
Mean monthly changes in climate variables from the appropriate gridbox 
were applied to observed daily climate records to create climate change sce- 
narios for each site. Although GCMs currently provide the most advanced 
means of predicting the potential future climatic consequences of increas- 
ing radiatively active trace gases, their ability to reproduce current climate 
varies considerably from region to region (Houghton et al., 1990). They also 
cannot reliably project changes in climate variability, such as changes in the 
frequencies of droughts and storms. 
Rates of future emissions of trace gases, as well as when the full magni- 
tude of their effects will be realized, are not certain. Because other green- 
house gases besides COz, such as methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluo- 
rocarbons, are also increasing, an "effective C 0 2  doubling" has been defined 
as the combined radiative forcing of all greenhouse gases having the same 
forcing as doubled C 0 2 ,  usually defined as 600 ppm. For this study, C 0 2  
concentrations are estimated to be 555 ppm in 2060. If current emission 
trends continue, the effective C 0 2  doubling will occur around year 2030. 
The climate change caused by an effective doubling of C 0 2  may be delayed 
by 30 to  40 years or even longer, hence the projections to the year 2060 in 
this study. 
2.2. Estimation of Site Specific Potential Changes 
in Crop Yields 
Crop models and a decision support system developed by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development's International Benchmark Sites Network for 
Agrotechnology Transfer (IBSNAT, 1989) were used to  estimate how climate 
change and increasing levels of carbon dioxide may alter yields of major crops 
at  112 sites in 18 countries, representing both major production areas and 
vulnerable regions at low, mid, and high latitudes. The IBSNAT models 
simulate crop growth and yield formation as influenced by genetics, climate, 
soils, and management practices. Models used were for wheat (Ritchie and 
Otter, 1985; Godwin et al., 1989), maize (Jones and Kiniry, 1986; Ritchie et 
al., 1989), rice (Godwin et al., 1992), and soybean (Jones et al., 1989). 
The IBSNAT models were selected for use in this study because they 
have been validated over a wide range of environments and are not specific 
to any particular location or soil type. Furthermore, because management 
practices, such as the choice of crop varieties, planting date, fertilizer applica- 
tion, and irrigation, may be varied in the models, they permit experiments 
that simulate adjustments by farmers and agricultural systems to  climate 
change. 
The crop models used in this study account for the beneficial physiolog- 
ical effects of increased C 0 2  concentrations on crop growth and water use 
(Peart et al., 1989). Most plants growing in experimental environments with 
increased levels of atmospheric C 0 2  exhibit increased rates of net photosyn- 
thesis and reduced stomata1 openings, thereby reducing transpiration per 
unit leaf area while enhancing photosynthesis. Simulation experiments were 
conducted for baseline climate (1951-80) and GCM doubled C 0 2  climate 
change scenarios with and without the physiological effects of C02.  
The study also tested the efficacy of two levels of adaptation: Level 1 
implies little change to existing agricultural systems reflecting farmer re- 
sponse to a changing climate. Level 2 implies more substantial changes to 
agricultural systems possibly requiring resources beyond the farmer's means. 
It must be noted that costs of adaptation and future water availability for 
irrigation under the climate change scenarios could not be considered. 
2.3. Aggregation of Crop Modeling Results 
Data  on crop yield changes expected for different scenarios of climate change 
had to  be compiled for all the crop sectors and all the geographical groupings 
represented in the IIASAIFAP world food model, the Basic Linked System 
(BLS). Crop model results for wheat, rice, maize, and soybean, from 112 
sites in 18 countries, were aggregated by weighting regional yield changes, 
based on current production levels, to  estimate changes in national yields. 
The regional yield estimates represent the current mix of rainfed and ir- 
rigated production, the current crop varieties, nitrogen management, and 
soils. Production data  were gathered by scientists participating in the study 
and from the FAO, the USDA Crop Production Statistical Division, and the 
USDA International Service. 
Changes in national yields of other crops and commodity groups and 
regions not simulated with crop models, were estimated based on similari- 
ties to  modeled crops and growing conditions, and previous published and 
unpublished climate change impact studies. Estimates were made of yield 
changes for the three GCM scenarios with and without direct effects of COz. 
The yield changes with the direct effects of COz were based on the mean 
responses to  COz for different crops in the crop model simulations. 
2.4. Simulation of the World Food System 
The working name of the global general equilibrium model system developed 
by the Food and Agriculture Program (FAP) a t  IIASA is: Basic Linked Sys- 
tem of National Agricultural Policy Models (BLS). It currently consists of 
some thirty-five national and/or regional models: eighteen national models, 
two models for regions with close economic cooperation (EC and Eastern 
Europe and former USSR), fourteen aggregate models of country group- 
ings, and a small component that  accounts for statistical discrepancies and 
imbalances during the historical period. The individual models are linked 
together by means of a world market module. The system is of Walrasian 
general equilibrium type. There is no money illusion on the part of any 
economic agent. As a consequence of this, the outcome in terms of "realn 
variables is neutral with respect to  monetary changes. The system is recur- 
sively dynamic, working in annual steps, the outcome of each step affected 
by the outcomes of earlier ones. Each model covers the whole economy, for 
the purpose of international linkage aggregated to nine agricultural sectors 
and one non-agricultural sector. All accounts are closed and mutually con- 
sistent: the production, consumption and financial ones at  the national level, 
and the trade and financial flows at the global level. 
The concept of an economic agent who decides on production and dis- 
appearance is the basis on which the BLS is built. Producers maximize 
returns to  primary factors they are endowed with in their production ac- 
tivities. Consumers are assumed to maximize utility. Governments follow 
prescribed objectives in their policy setting within the constraints of bal- 
ancing expenditures with the revenues generated through taxes, tariffs or 
other means and international transfers. A detailed description of the entire 
system is provided in Fischer et al. (1988). 
The considerable length of the projection period, 1980 to 2060, makes 
it virtually impossible to  avoid judgment and speculation concerning some 
of the exogenous variables in the system. The reference scenario presented 
here, therefore, is born out of a mixture of statistically estimated relation- 
ships, expert judgment on some of the exogenous variables, and, perhaps, 
wishful thinking regarding the effectiveness of future economic development 
and policies. 
3. Dynamic Assessment of the World Food 
System under Alternative Climate Change 
Yield Impact Scenarios 
The evaluation of dynamic impacts of climate change on production and 
trade of agricultural commodities, in particular on food staples, is carried out 
by comparing the results of a number of suggested climate change scenarios 
to a reference scenario. The primary role of such a reference scenario is to  
serve as a "neutral" point of departure, from which climate change scenarios 
with their altered assumptions on crop productivity, sometimes combined 
with changes in policy settings, take off as variants, with the impact of 
climate change being seen in the deviation of these simulation runs from the 
reference scenario. 
We emphasize that the reference run itself is regarded a consistent pro- 
jection of the world food system into the future to  the year 2060, and not 
a forecast. This base scenario is essentially an extrapolation of the past 
into the future. Subject to  data availability, the BLS was estimated using 
observations from 1961 to 1986, and has been calibrated to  the more recent 
past. The system is simulated over the period from 1980 to 2060 to  generate 
the reference scenario. Simulation is done in one year increments. Scenarios 
about climate change impact start in 1990 and end in 2060. 
Yield variations caused by climate change were introduced into the yield 
response functions by means of a multiplicative factor impacting upon the 
relevant parameters in the mathematical representation. In particular, this 
implies that both average and marginal fertilizer productivity are affected 
by the imposed yield changes. Since no additional country and/or crop 
specific information was available to  suggest explicit modifications of crop 
acreage due to impacts of climate change, the acreage allocation was only 
indirectly influenced through the implied changes in overall performance of 
the agricultural sector as well as changing comparative advantage of the 
competing crop production activities. It should be noted, however, that 
the BLS is equipped to handle explicit acreage constraints in the resource 
allocation module of the agricultural production component. 
In the experiments presented here, climate change yield impacts have 
been phased in linearly, i.e., the yield change multiplier terms incorporated 
in the yield response functions are being built up gradually as a function of 
time so as to  reach the full impact in year 2060. More complex, nonlinear 
schemes are conceivable and were used for sensitivity testing. 
The climate change yield impact scenarios devised within this project 
involve a large number of experiments that relate to 
1. different GCM double C 0 2  simulations; 
2. different assumptions with regard to the impacts of climate change on 
plant growth and yield levels, such as direct physiological effects of 555 
ppm C02 ,  or time pace of impact; 
3. different assumptions regarding farm level adaptation to mitigate yield 
impacts; and 
4. policy changes to affect both the reference run and climate change ex- 
periments, e.g. population growth, trade policies, economic growth, and 
GHG policies, such as limitation of arable land expansion, rice acreage 
or use of chemical fertilizers. 
Altogether, well over fifty climate change and policy experiments were simu- 
lated. Results from twelve of these experiments are reported here. Estimates 
were made of yield changes for the three GCM scenarios, GISS, GFDL, and 
UKMO, with and without direct effects of C02 ,  and for different assump- 
tions regarding farm adaptation measures. 
The four sets of estimates described in this paper are: 
1. Simulations without the physiological effects of 555 ppm C 0 2  on crop 
yields. 
2. Simulations with the physiological effects of 555 ppm C 0 2  on crop yields. 
3. Simulations with the physiological effects of 555 ppm C 0 2  on crop growth 
and yield, and adaptations at  the farm level that would not involve 
any major changes in agricultural practices to mitigate negative yield 
impacts, Adaptation Level 1. 
4. Simulations with the physiological effects of 555 ppm C 0 2  on crop growth 
and yield, and adaptations at  the farm level that, in addition to the for- 
mer, would also involve major changes in agricultural practices, Adap- 
tation Level 2. 
In this way, data on crop yield changes estimated for twelve different 
scenarios of climate change were compiled for 34 countries or major regions 
of the world. The crop yield changes relate to  an equilibrium 2 x C 0 2  
climate, with the equivalent doubling of C 0 2  assumed to occur around 2030. 
The climate change caused by an effective doubling of C 0 2  may be delayed 
by 30 to  40 years or even longer, hence the projections to year 2060 in this 
study. 
The agricultural production components of the national models in the 
BLS were modified so as to accept the exogenously provided productivity 
changes in average national yields. In the scenarios reported here, no other 
additional constraints have been incorporated in comparison to the reference 
scenario. Exogenous variables, population growth and technical progress, 
are left at  the levels specified in the BLS reference scenario. No specific 
adjustment policies to  counteract altered performance of agriculture have 
been assumed beyond the farm adaptation specified above. 
The adjustment processes taking place in the different scenarios are the 
outcome of the imposed yield changes triggering changes in national pro- 
duction levels and costs, leading to changes of agricultural prices in the in- 
ternational market. They, in turn, are affecting investment allocations and 
sectoral labor migration as well as reallocation of resources within agricul- 
ture. Time is an important element in this assessment as the yield modifica- 
tions due to climate change are assumed to start occurring in 1990, reaching 
their full impact in 2060. Hence, this allows the economic actors in the na- 
tional and international food systems to  adjust their behavior over a 70-year 
period. 
3.1. Static Climate Change Yield Impact 
Before assessing the dynamic impacts of introducing a set of climate change 
induced yield modifications, we may ask what distortion such an exogenous 
change in agricultural productivity would imply in the world food system. 
This measure of distortion has been termed "static climate change yield 
impact", as it measures the hypothetical effect of yield changes, without 
adjustments of the economic system taking place over time. It refers to a 
state of the system that is not in equilibrium. As such, it is only of theoretical 
interest, but it helps to  understand the nature and magnitude of adjustments 
taking place. 
To obtain an estimate of the static climate change yield impact for any 
particular scenario, we apply the exogenously provided crop-wise percentage 
yield changes to  the yield and production levels in the year 2060 observed 
in the BLS reference scenario. These impacts can be added up without 
weighting for cereals. To arrive at static impact estimates for other groups 
of crops, world market prices of the year 2060 as simulated in the reference 
scenario are used. Table 1 shows the static climate change yield impact 
estimated for the global and regional level. 
The estimates of static climate change yield impacts without assuming 
direct physiological effects of increased (555 ppm) COz concentrations on 
crop growth and yields represent a fairly pessimistic outlook, with decreases 
in crop productivity on the order of 20 to 30 percent. It may be noted that 
such an assumption is not regarded as very probable. 
When direct physiological effects of COz on yields are included, the mag- 
nitude and even direction of the aggregate static impact at world level varies 
with GCM and assumptions regarding farm level adaptation. In all cases the 
most negative effects are obtained in scenarios using the UKMO GCM cli- 
mate change estimates. Scenarios derived from GISS GCM estimates show 
little negative effects or even gains at the global level. The static impacts 
are, however, quite unevenly distributed. Developed countries experience in 
all but the UKMO scenarios an increase in productivity, even to  the tune 
of more than ten percent in the GISS estimates. In contrast, developing 
regions suffer a loss in productivity in all estimates presented here. 
3.2. Dynamic Climate Change Yield Impact 
The calculations above paint an effect that would result if climate induced 
yield changes were to occur without adjustment, overnight so to say. In 
the BLS scenario assumptions, however, yield productivity changes are in- 
troduced gradually to reach their full impact only after a 70 year period, 
1990 to 2060. In scenarios with shortfalls in food production caused by cli- 
mate change yield impacts, market imbalances cause international prices to 
change upwards and provide incentives to reallocation of capital and human 
Table 1. Static climate change yield impact, in year 2060. 
GISS GFDL UKMO 
Cere- Other All Cere- Other All Cere- Other All 
als crops crops als crops crops als crops crops 
WORLD 
Without physio- 
logical effect -22.1 -21.8 -22.0 -25.4 -24.3 -25.0 -33.6 -33.4 -33.5 
With physiological 
effect of COz -5.1 3.1 -0.1 -9.0 0.5 -2.8 -18.2 -9.0 -12.2 
Adaptation level 1 -1.7 3.1 0.9 -5.5 0.6 -1.7 -12.9 -8.3 -10.1 
Adaptationlevel2 1.4 4.8 3.2 -1.1 2.5 1.0 -6.1 -3.2 -4.4 
DEVELOPED 
Without physio- 
logicaleffect -13.9 -6.6 -10.3 -21.3 -16.0 -18.6 -30.4 -28.9 -28.9 
With physiological 
effect of CO2 2.6 18.4 10.6 -5.2 9.2 2.1 -15.8 -5.2 -9.8 
Adaptation level 1 7.8 18.4 13.1 0.1 9.5 5.0 -6.7 -1.2 -3.6 
Adaptation level 2 7.8 18.4 13.1 3.3 9.5 6.4 -2.8 0.8 -0.8 
DEVELOPING 
Without physio- 
logical effect -28.5 -25.3 -26.5 -28.6 -26.3 -27.1 -36.2 -34.4 -35.1 
With physiological 
effect of CO2 -11.2 -0.5 -3.7 -12.0 -1.5 -4.5 -20.1 -9.9 -13.0 
Adaptation level 1 -9.2 -0.5 -3.2 -10.0 -1.5 -3.9 -17.8 -9.9 -12.3 
Adaptation level 2 -3.6 1.7 -0.1 -4.5 0.9 -0.8 -8.7 -4.2 -5.6 
resources. At the same time, consumers react to  price changes and adjust 
their patterns of consumption. 
Table 2 contains changes in world market prices, for cereals and overall 
crop prices, as observed in the respective climate change yield impact scenar- 
ios relative to the BLS standard reference scenario. When direct physiolog- 
ical effects of C 0 2  on plant growth and yields are not included, then major 
increases in world market prices - four to  nine fold increases of cereal prices 
depending on GCM scenario - would result. Note that such increases would 
call for strong public reactions and policy measures to mitigate the negative 
yield impacts. Hence, the outcome for scenarios without the physiological 
effects of C 0 2  on yields, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, should be interpreted 
with care, both for their agronomic as well as economic assumptions. 
When physiological effects of 555 ppm C 0 2  on crop growth and yields 
are included in the assessment, then cereal prices increase on the order of 
Table 2. Percent change in world market prices, year 2060. 
Cereals All crops 
Scenario GISS GFDL UKMO GISS GFDL UKMO 
Without phys. effect of CO2 306 356 818 234 270 592 
With phyi. effect of CO2 24 33 145 8 17 90 
Adaptation level 1 13 22 98 2 10 67 
Ada~tation level 2 -4 2 36 -8 -3 25 
24 t o  145 percent relative to  the BLS standard reference scenario. Over- 
all, crop prices increase by 8 to  90 percent, depending on the GCM climate 
change scenario. Price increases are further reduced when farm level adap- 
tation is considered in addition. With adaptation measures involving major 
changes in agricultural practices, adaptation level 2, prices would even fall 
below reference run levels in the GISS and GFDL scenarios. Note that  the  
assumptions underlying adaptation level 2 are hardly consistent with such 
an economic development, so that  the stipulated adaptations would often 
not be viable. 
Table 3 highlights the dynamic impacts of climate change on agriculture 
resulting after 70 years of simulations with the IIASA general equilibrium 
world model. According t o  these calculations, and with direct physiological 
effects of 555 ppm COz on crop yields, the impact on global agriculture GDP 
would be less than 2 percent in all but the UKMO scenarios where decreases 
range between -2 and -5 percent. Developed countries are even likely t o  
experience a fair increase in output. In contrast, developing countries are 
projected t o  suffer a production loss in all the analyzed scenarios. It is also 
important t o  note that  these changes in comparative advantages between 
developed and developing regions are likely to  amplify the size of the  impacts 
suggested by the static analysis. Figures 1 , 2  and 3 illustrate this observation, 
showing the  estimated static climate change yield impact on agriculture vis- 
a-vis the  simulated dynamic changes in GDP agriculture. Figure 4 shows the  
spatial distribution of changes in GDP of agriculture obtained for different 
GCMs assuming some adaptations a t  farm level (adaptation level 1). 
With less agricultural production in developing countries and higher 
prices on international markets, it does not come as a surprise that  the  
estimated number of people a t  risk of hunger1 is likely t o  increase. Table 4 
summarizes the simulated impacts. 
'In the BLS the number of people at risk of hunger in the developing world (excluding 
China) is estimated based on data and the methodology developed by FA0 (FAO, 1984 
and 1987). 
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Table 3. Dynamic impact of climate change, year 2060. 
Cereals production G D P  agriculture 
(% change) (% change) 
GISS GFDL UKMO GISS GFDL UKMO 
WORLD TOTAL 
Without phys. effect of CO2 -10.9 -12.1 -19.6 -10.2 -11.7 -16.4 
With phys. effect of CO2 -1.2 -2.8 -7.6 -0.4 -1.8 -5.4 
Adaptation level 1 0.0 -1.6 -5.2 0.2 -1.2 -4.4 
Adaptation level 2 1.1 -0.1 -2.4 1.0 0.0 -2.0 
DEVELOPED 
Without phys. effect of CO2 -3.9 -10.1 -23.9 1.1 -6.2 -12.5 
With phys. effect of CO2 11.3 5.2 -3.6 11.6 5.1 - 1.9 
Adaptation level 1 14.2 7.9 -3.8 13.3 6.5 1.8 
Adaptation level 2 11.0 3.0 1.8 11.8 6.5 1.3 
WORLD TOTAL 
Without phys. effect of C 0 2  -16.2 -13.7 -16.3 -13.9 -13.5 -17.7 
With phys. effect of COz -11.0 -9.2 -10.9 -4.4 -4.0 -6.6 
Adaptation level 1 -11.2 -9.2 -12.5 -4.1 -3.7 -6.4 
Adaptation level 2 -6.6 -5.6 -5.8 -2.6 -2.2 -3.1 
Table 4. Impact of climate change on people a t  risk of hunger, year 2060. 
Additional million people % change 
GISS GFDL UKMO GISS GFDL UKMO 
DEVELOPING (excl. China) 
Without phys. effect of C 0 2  721 801 1446 112 125 225 
With phys. effect of C 0 2  63 108 369 10 17 58 
Adaptation level 1 38 87 300 6 14 4 7 
Adaptation level 2 - 12 18 119 -2 3 19 
Net imports of cereals t o  developing countries increase under all scenar- 
ios. The change in cereal imports, relative t o  the standard reference sce- 
nario, is largely determined by the size of the estimated static yield change, 
the change in relative productivity in developing and developed regions, the 
change in world market prices, and changes in incomes of developing coun- 
tries. 
4. Conclusions 
The impact of climate change on agriculture and global food supply has 
been evaluated with a system of linked national models, called the Basic 
Linked System. Several scenarios of climate induced yield changes have 
been derived, based on a large number of site specific yield simulations with 
IBSNAT crop models. Considerable uncertainty still surrounds the magni- 
tude and spatial pattern of expected climate change and the resulting impact 
on crop yields. The effects of changes in climate on crop yields are likely 
to vary greatly from region t o  region across the globe. Under the climatic 
scenarios adopted in this study, the effects on crop yields in mid and high 
latitude regions appear to  be positive or less adverse than those in low lat- 
itude regions, provided the potentially beneficial direct physiological effects 
of increased COz concentrations on crop growth can be fully realized. 
Results of each simulated climate change yield impact scenario are com- 
pared to  a reference scenario. The latter is a projection of the world food 
and agriculture system till the year 2060. Under the assumptions of the BLS 
standard reference scenario, agriculture can satisfy effective demand for food 
a t  prices even lower than observed a t  present. However, this scenario also 
clearly shows that ,  unless the poor receive a higher income share, there will 
still be a substantial number of people a t  risk of hunger, increasing from an 
estimated 500 million people in 1980 to  some 600 million in year 2000 and 
reaching about 640 million in year 2060. 
The ability of the world food system to  dynamically absorb negative 
yield impacts decreases with the magnitude of the impact. Adaptation can 
largely compensate for moderate impacts of climate change such as under 
the GISS and GFDL scenarios but not greater ones like under the UKMO 
scenario. 
Relative productivity of agriculture in all climate change yield impact 
scenarios changes in favor of developed countries. Economic feedback mech- 
anisms are likely to  emphasize and accentuate the uneven distribution of cli- 
mate change impacts across the world, resulting in a net gain for developed 
countries in all but the UKMO scenarios and a noticeable loss to  developing 
countries. This loss of production in developing countries, together with ris- 
ing agricultural prices, is likely to  increase the number of people a t  risk of 
hunger, on the order of 5 t o  50 percent depending on the GCM scenario. 
It must be realized that the ability t o  estimate climate change yield 
impacts on world food supply, demand, and trade is severely limited by 
large uncertainties regarding important elements, such as the magnitude 
and spatial characteristics of climate change, the range and efficiency of 
adaptation possibilities, the long term aspects of technological change and 
agricultural productivity, and even future demographic trends. 
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Abstract 
The most widely quoted attempts to  quantify the impacts of climate change 
suggest that  the costs may be rather modest and insufficient t o  justify much 
abatement effort a t  present. However, these estimates suffer from five impor- 
tant limitations because they: do not reflect the probable dynamics of cli- 
mate change; make invalid extrapolations from industrialized to  developing 
countries; require largely subjective valuations of non-market impacts; ne- 
glect important issues raised by long-term and extreme atmospheric changes; 
and ignore the possibility of major and costly surprises arising from the sheer 
complexity of the global system. 
To provide an estimate of impact costs which is directly relevant t o  
policy formation, these components of the problem need either t o  be roughly 
quantified, or plausibly argued t o  involve negligible costs relative to  the 
quantified components. Until this is done, cost analyses need t o  acknowledge 
far wider uncertainties than is presently admitted, potentially with much 
higher costs, if they are to  be relevant as a guide to  policy. 
1. Introduction 
Proposals to limit the buildup of greenhouse gases reflect concerns about 
the potential costs associated with climatic change. Most of the proposed 
emission targets reflect implicit individual or collective judgments about the 
dangers and costs involved. Recently, a number of studies have used explicit 
estimates of the costs of climate change as a basis for calculating optimal 
policy responses. 
The first tentative numbers were those produced by Nordhaus (1991). 
Based on a detailed estimate of the possible impacts of climate change on the 
US economy, he suggested that a doubling of atmospheric COz levels might 
impose total annual costs of around one percent of GDP as a best guess, 
with 2 percent as an upper estimate. Applying these estimates first in a 
steady-state analysis and later in a dynamic framework (Nordhaus, 1992) 
he concluded that  relatively little abatement action is justified now. Peck 
and Teisberg (1992) have produced a number of cost-benefit studies which 
draw on Nordhaus' estimates of climatic damage, and point also towards 
very modest abatement efforts. Barrett (1992) has likewise used these num- 
bers, and Schlesinger (1992) has drawn upon them to  support his earlier 
conclusions that  the costs of delaying abatement action may be very small. 
Many costlbenefit discussions now seem t o  start from the proposition that  
the costs of adapting to  climate change will be modest. 
Given the increasing attention being devoted t o  such studies, we would 
be well advised to  ponder the numbers being used very carefully. This pa- 
per seeks t o  examine critically the extent to  which current estimates really 
capture the potentially important costs, and suggests a need to  think more 
carefully before we count. 
2. . . . But What was the Question? 
The scenarios painted by commentators on climate change, without mon- 
etary quantification, span an immense range. At one end there are quali- 
tative warnings of possible climatic disasters, with flooding, starvation and 
mass migration caused by sea level rises and changes in rainfall and storm 
patterns, extended further by warnings about possible global catastrophes 
(Leggett, 1990). At the opposite end, Idso (1991) and others have argued 
that  C02-induced climatic change would be beneficial, with reduced frost 
damage, longer growing seasons, and C02-induced fertilization of plants - a 
veritable "green paradise". 
The Impacts report of the IPCC 1990 assessment (IPCC, 1990) falls 
centrally between these two views, noting that  agricultural impacts could be 
considerable a t  the regional level, but "studies have not yet conclusively de- 
termined whether, on average, the global agricultural potential will increase 
or decrease", and that  water resources could be a particular concern because 
"relatively small climate changes can cause large water resource problems in 
many areas . . .changes in drought risk represent potentially the most seri- 
ous impact of climate change on agriculture". Such factors, combined with 
changes in disease patterns and the impact of sea level rise combined with 
storm surges, "could initiate large migrations of people". 
There have been a few attempts t o  put economic costs on potential cli- 
mate impacts and adaptation t o  them. The US EPA estimated the costs of 
C02-doubling on US agriculture as about $0.5f l0bn (EPA, 1989), although 
Cline (1992, Chapter 2) has noted that this study made excessive allowance 
for C 0 2  fertilization.' Nordhaus (1991) used these numbers as part of his 
broader study of potential impact costs in the US, extrapolated globally. 
His analysis also highlighted the fact that, outside agriculture, many sec- 
tors of the economy do not depend significantly on climatic conditions. His 
detailed estimates concluded that the impact on the formal economy of cli- 
matic changes predicted for a doubling of atmospheric C 0 2  might be just a 
quarter of one percent of the US GDP, and suggested an overall figure for 
global impacts of one percent of global GDP to allow for various factors not 
included in the analysis. 
Cline (1992, Chapter 3) has presented a more extensive critical analysis 
of the numbers involved, and suggested that  many of the specific numbers 
may be significantly larger than the Nordhaus estimates. Nevertheless, his 
own quantification suggests that a doubling of C02-equivalent may cost one 
t o  two percent of GDP, plus certain elements (such as human amenity and 
morbidity impacts) added separately as as-yet-unquantified elements. Ayres 
and Walter (1991) have suggested rather higher numbers, but their analysis 
has received less attention; the underlying argument that  much of the econ- 
omy is not vulnerable to  climatic change, and that therefore costs cannot 
be very high, is powerful and apparently backed by a number of studies to 
date. 
In short, these studies suggest that we know the answer: it is on the 
order of one percent of GDP. But concerning such numbers, the critical 
issue is: what was the question? 
The question for which we have an approzimate answer is: what are the 
likely economic impacts on developed economies of a relatively smooth tran- 
sition t o  a state with doubled atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations, as estimated 
by mid-range, equilibrium GCM (General Circulation Model) modeling stud- 
ies. 
The question to which we are seeking answers is: what may be the 
impact of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations on the overall welfare 
of future generations globally, expressed in terms of present-day monetary 
equivalence. 
'The EPA study analyzed climatic change and COz fertilization associated with a pure 
COz doubling. In practice, the contribution of other trace gases means that this degree of 
climatic change may be reached at considerably lower COz concentrations. Cline (1992, 
p. 94) estimates a corrected central figure for the US to be %13bn/yr, though this itself 
depends significantly upon the very uncertain CFC contribution (and other uncertainties). 
These are not the same questions. This paper highlights five issues which 
need t o  be addressed before we can claim to  have attempted a complete quan- 
tification. These underline the partial nature of most current estimates, and 
suggest that  the potential welfare impacts associated with rising greenhouse 
gas levels are much more uncertain - and potentially much higher - than 
suggested by most current costlbenefit studies. 
3. Dynamic and Marginal Patterns of Change 
Most impact costing studies focus on the costs of being in a warmer world 
(typically, a "doubled COz-equivalent" as analyzed in most climate modeling 
studies). This is not the same as the costs of adapting to  climate as it 
changes, which is more difficult to  assess. Ausubel(l991) and Cooper (1991) 
argue that  modern societies tend to  be increasingly insulated from climatic 
variations, and that  the strength of market economies is their ability t o  adapt 
t o  changes so that  steady climatic change will be lost in the noise of other 
societal changes. 
However, it seems improbable that  climatic changes will be smooth, or 
that  average conditions are an adequate indicator. The most important 
change may be the increased probability of extreme events, such as the US 
drought of 1988, the current Sahelian and Southern African droughts, and 
the flooding in Bangladesh and elsewhere. These have all imposed consid- 
erable human and financial costs which would be greatly amplified if such 
events occurred in groups. 
Furthermore, the  extent t o  which models predict more extreme weather 
in a warmer world is not the only relevant factor. Local weather patterns 
reflect chaotic variations within the bounds set by the large-scale regional 
conditions, and chaos theory suggests that  the transition from one state 
to  another may involve more extreme local variations than would occur in 
either stable state (Markowski, 1991).~ 
Assessment is further complicated by the possible human reactions t o  
such changes. Even when changes can be predicted in outline, adaptation 
may be severely constrained: for example, those in occupations or areas of 
greatest risk may be well advised to move, but in practice people may not 
want to, or may not be able to  (due t o  migration or other restrictions) until 
'Weather patterns reflect an essentially chaotic variation of sub-systems within ranges 
set by the general forcing conditions. Chaos theory appears to indicate that, in general, 
chaotic variations of sub-components become more extreme if the driving force is itself 
changing, i.e., that the transition between two average forcing conditions may be expected 
to involve greater local variability than in either equilibrium condition. 
the extremes strike - upon which even costly national or international relief 
efforts could not negate the suffering caused. To compound this, our ability 
to  predict the occurrence of more extreme events, such as the duration of 
drought patterns, may be very limited. 
Thus, the real-world costs may be much higher than suggested by mod- 
els which assume relatively smooth climatic changes, optimal adaptation, 
and/or adequate foresight. 
4. Extrapolation to Developing Countries 
Reference t o  Bangladesh and migration highlights the second critical issue. 
Nearly all the impact costing studies to  date have focused on the industrial- 
ized world or made extrapolations globally from the US analyses. But there 
is no way of extrapolating validly from a relatively robust and large industri- 
alized society to  one with very limited infrastructure in which many citizens 
may already be on the margins of existence. For example, the costing studies 
cited above all equate the welfare losses associated with agricultural changes 
as equivalent to  GNP impacts. Since agriculture only accounts for a few per 
cent of GNP, it follows that the costs cannot be very high. Noting that agri- 
culture is a higher percentage of GNP in developing countries, the impact 
costs have been scaled proportionately. 
Unfortunately, this reasoning requires that  money and food are glob- 
d y  interchangeable: that if climate change damages agriculture anywhere, 
that  additional resources can and would be put into agriculture t o  produce 
more food irrespective of geography. Reality appears different. At a time 
when many industrialized countries are seeking t o  cut back agriculture, in 
the developing world hundreds of millions of people are suffering from mal- 
nutrition, and hundreds of thousands are dying from starvation or directly 
related causes. Many climate models suggest that central Africa will get 
drier with increasing C 0 2  concentrations; the increases that have already 
occurred could have contributed to  the undisputed drying trend of the past 
twenty-five years which has claimed many millions of lives. Similar remarks 
apply t o  the Bangladesh floods. 
The real impact of climate change on the welfare of people may thus be a 
far cry from that reflected in extrapolations of GNP impacts on industrialized 
countries. Nor is it valid to  assume that such impacts can simply be avoided 
by migration; quite apart from the fact that migration itself involves a hefty 
human cost on the people involved, in practice it is increasingly restricted 
by most countries, because of the various costs and stresses imposed on the 
receiving country. 
5. Valuation of Non-market Impacts 
Both the above issues and many others come into sharp economic focus 
when attempts are made to value the non-market impacts of climate change. 
Despite attempts to inject objectivity through criteria such as Willingness to 
Pay, Willingness to  Accept, and various measures of revealed preference (for 
an overview see Pearce and Markandya, 1989) there remain large subjective 
elements in attempts to monetize many of the possible impacts of climate 
change. This applies equally to human and non-human impacts. 
For example, whilst it may well be possible to  keep managed ecosys- 
tems viable, ecologists express strong concerns about the possible impacts 
of climate change on unmanaged ecosystems, and (by implication) biodiver- 
sity. The literature on valuation indicates a wide range of possible values 
placed on species and habitats, varying with both the individuals making 
the assessment, and the subject, as indicated for example by the apparent 
willingness to  sacrifice up to $160m annually to preserve the spotted owl and 
its habitat in the US (Cline, 1992, p. 106). 
The contrast with the Dodo, almost unnoticed at  the time of extinction, 
further serves to  remind us how valuations can vary with time: we have 
little way of knowing how much future generations will value ecosystems 
and species such as those found in coral reefs, mangroves and boreal forests, 
which are amongst the ecosystems most likely to be diminished or lost to  
climatic change. This not only adds another layer of uncertainty; the value 
placed on such resources has tended to increase over time and with growing 
wealth, suggesting that our current valuations may be an underestimate of 
how future generations will value species and habitat losses. 
The other major aspect of valuation concerns more direct human im- 
pacts. At the more trivial level, there is the question of how people will 
value (for good or bad) hotter weather. More serious issues are raised by 
migration, health and survival impacts. One discussion asks, "how much 
does a refugee cost", and attempts an estimate based on one person-year of 
lost production (Ayres and Walter, 1991). People driven from their homes 
or countries by famine or flood might suggest a rather different value scale. 
Concerning health and possible loss of lives noted above, much depends upon 
how economics values this. Scaling impact costs according to  relative GDP 
implies valuation of human impacts based upon average earning power. In 
welfare economics this approach is contentious, in part because in fact many 
societies, directly or by implication, are clearly prepared to spend much more 
to  prevent death than the "foregone earnings" measure implies. Pearce and 
Markandya (1989) suggest a figure of about E2m per life. 
If estimates of possible greenhouse impacts are made with this figure 
applied equally to all human beings irrespective of their location, this might 
radically alter cost-benefit results. Lockwood (1992) cites an illustration 
that if climatic change causes one to ten million additional deaths annually, 
and a "cost of life" of between L l m  and LlOm is then applied, the potential 
monetized equivalent cost ranges from 5 percent to five times the projected 
global GNP - a rather different result from those cited above, and one which 
could justify quite drastic abatement action. 
There is of course a major problem with such an approach because the 
blunt fact is that societies clearly do not value human beings in other coun- 
tries equally. But if the above illustration is shaky in terms of consistent 
economics, the alternative assumption - that the human impacts of industri- 
alized country pollution are far less significant if it is poor people who suffer 
- itself involves highly contentious ethical assumptions. It is not something 
that can be passed off simply as inevitable economic logic. It should be 
recognized that global impact costing studies inherently involve contentious 
value judgments, concerning which differing assumptions may completely 
reverse the conclusions. 
6 .  Marginal and Very Long-term Changes 
A fourth major issue in assessing impact costs concerns the implicit or ex- 
plicit time horizon employed, and by implication, the assumed discount rate. 
Most published studies analyze the consequences of a doubling of C02-  
equivalent concentrations, or cut off around the middle of the next century 
(which is roughly equivalent). 
Even if we could plot out the possible pattern of regional climatic change 
on the way to a doubling of COz, and estimate the associated costs, this 
would be of limited value. The pressures upon global energy consumption, 
and the inertia in global energy systems, are such that even if moderately 
strong measures were initiated now it appears most improbable that we 
could prevent atmospheric changes equivalent to  doubling atmospheric C 0 2  
concentrations (Grubb, 1990). What we may be able to do is to  slow the rate 
of change, and prevent concentrations rising much above that level. What is 
relevant to  economic analysis is not the cost of a slow COz doubling, but the 
incremental costs of getting there faster, and potent idy going much further. 
Nordhaus (1992) adopts a marginal cost approach and extends his anal- 
ysis further, but this is on the basis of a simple quadratic extrapolation of 
cost vs. concentration which involved no analysis of what the greater at- 
mospheric changes would actually mean. Cline (1992) has emphasized the 
immense long-term changes that  would accrue from uncontrolled releases of 
fossil fuels - not a doubling of C 0 2  concentrations but increases of four, 
six or even eight times pre-industrial levels, with potential global average 
temperature changes of perhaps 10°C. 
It follows from the discussion above that  knowledge concerning the way 
in which costs may vary with the rate of change is rudimentary. Knowledge 
of potential very long-term impacts is still more sketchy, but a potential 
global average temperature increase of more than twice that  since the last 
ice age can hardly be regarded with equanimity. 
Such changes are far away - 150 years or more. Most economic studies t o  
date have consequently ignored the issue on the assumption that  discounting 
would render any such impacts irrelevant, if the discount rates applied are 
remotely related t o  market rates. The potential contradictions in using much 
lower rates for public decisions than apply in existing private markets are 
well known. However, literature on discounting for public policy has for 
some time argued that  the appropriate procedure is to discount using the 
social rate of time preference (which is generally much lower than the market 
interest or  discount rate), and use a "shadow cost of capital" which reflects 
directly the impact on private sector investments (Arrow, 1966; Feldstein, 
1972; Lind et al., 1982). This places a far greater weight upon longer term 
costs than traditional discounting procedures.3 
Howarth (1990) has also recently extended the debate about the eth- 
ical basis of market-related discounting between generations. Pearce and 
Markandya (1989) assume market-related rates, but in the environmental 
context note the potential for unsustainable outcomes, and thus suggest a 
separate "sustainability constraint" - a caveat which itself can destroy the 
validity of a discounted cost-benefit analysis if the policy implications of that  
analysis leads ultimately to  unsustainability. 
In short, focusing on a doubling of C 0 2  is wholly inadequate. What 
matters is the marginal cost going faster and further, and there can be no 
prior assumption that  very long term extreme impacts are not relevant t o  a 
3Cline (1992, Chapter 6) has invoked this literature, discussed briefly in Grubb (1990, 
Chapter 3). Many economists have questioned the utility of using a simple, market-related 
discount rate over such long time periods. 
costlbenefit analysis; as Cline has stressed, it is an issue of potentially great 
importance, which to  date has received far from adequate attention. 
7. Climatic Surprise, Risk-aversion, 
and the Planetary System 
A final issue is that  of possible climatic surprises, and of associated risk 
aversion. The impact studies to date have tended to  assume not only that 
climatic change is relatively smooth, but also that there are no surprises. 
But as noted above, there could be. Given current knowledge, perhaps the 
most credible "surprise" is that ocean current patterns will change, maybe 
rather suddenly. This could result in rapid regional temperature changes of 
well over 5OC (Dansgaard et al., 1989; Calvin, 1991); Europe for example 
could become largely icebound if the Gulf stream were to  switch, and icy 
regions elsewhere could melt with catastrophic subsidence and/or flooding. 
This could impose great costs, perhaps including starvation even in parts of 
the industrialized world as agriculture and infrastructure struggle to  adjust. 
Concerning other possible "surprises", disintegration of the West Antarc- 
tic Ice Sheet - raising sea levels by many meters - is almost certainly a slow 
phenomena taking many centuries . In principle the northern polar ice cap 
could change much faster, with little impact on sea levels but unknown 
implications for climatic patterns (Weiner, 1990). Another issue is how nat- 
ural greenhouse gas sources and sinks may respond; current evidence sug- 
gests that  these will respond to warming by amplifying the human-induced 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations (Hoffert, 1992), and some have 
painted scenarios of runaway feedbacks (Leggett, 1991). Overall, the nag- 
ging fear is that there might be surprises in store which have simply not yet 
been thought of. 
The underlying issue in all this is that humanity is interfering with im- 
mensely complex and interactive global systems that are far from adequately 
understood. Scientists and economists have sought to take a reductionist 
approach t o  climate change, modeling the components and trying to  esti- 
mate the impact of changes on each. However, as highlighted eloquently 
by Weiner (1990), the Earth is a fantastically complex system, with ma- 
jor and ill-understood interactions between the atmosphere, the aquasphere 
(oceans), the cryosphere (ice), the lithosphere (physical and chemical struc- 
ture of the surface), and the biosphere (life). Not only do these interact, 
but d are also affected directly by human activities, t o  varying degrees, 
and most are affected one way or another by the changing heat balance and 
chemical composition of the atmosphere. There is no way of tracing all the 
possible consequences. 
Whether or not one accepts Lovelock's full "Gaia hypothesis7' andogy of 
the Earth itself as a living organism, it is obvious that such a system has the 
potential for major surprises and highly non-linear responses to  planetary- 
scale perturbations. The fluctuations of the last twenty thousand years alone 
suggest a far from constant and stable system. Lovelock (1988) suggests salt 
in the human system as an analogy for COz in the planetary system, and 
considers that  "the carbon dioxide regulation system is nearing the end of 
its capacity."4 Given its role in fertilizing Cg plant growth, and generally 
speeding up both the carbon and water cycles, steroids might be an equally 
appropriate analogy. It still does not follow that ever more is benign. 
This seems an important complement t o  the reductionist approach be- 
cause it serves as a reminder that  the problem may not be just a matter 
of calculating the costs of raising sea walls and changing crops. In the fa- 
mous words of Revelle and Suess (1957), humanity is conducting a "grand 
geophysical experiment". 
Decision theory has of course long considered issues of decision-making 
under uncertainty, even very large uncertainties, generally within the frame- 
work of "subjective expected utility" (SEU) theory. One of the most basic 
outcomes is that  unlikely outcomes are not necessarily irrelevant; as Collard 
(1987) puts i t ,  "while it may or may not be possible t o  neglect tiny probabil- 
ities, it is not permissible t o  assume that they may be safely ignored". What 
matters is the relationship between the probability and cost of more extreme 
events. If the cost of successively more extreme outcomes rises more rapidly 
than the probability declines, the "cost benefit" analysis becomes dominated 
by the high cost, low-probability events. At present there is simply no way 
4Lovelock has been attacked by environmentalists for his suggestion that  ozone deple- 
tion is a minor problem in Gaian terms, and has been misinterpreted by others as arguing 
that  the earth has an immense natural capacity for automatically "healingn biotic damage. 
But concerning the CO2 problem, and observing the oscillations of the Ice Age, Lovelock 
(1989) writes that: 
"biota everywhere on the land and sea are acting t o  pump carbon dioxide from the 
air so that  the carbon dioxide which leaks into the atmosphere from volcanoes does 
not smother us . . . we cannot live without it  (C02) ,  but too much is a poison . . . 
Humans may have chosen a very inconvenient moment to add carbon dioxide to the 
air. I believe that  the carbon dioxide regulation system is nearing the end of its 
capacity." 
of knowing whether this is the case with climate change, but it certainly 
cannot be e x c l ~ d e d . ~  
The importance of ignorance and possible surprises is amplified by the 
inertia and irreversibility of many climate change impacts. Over and above 
SEU-based results, such circumstances call for a strong measure of risk- 
aversion. Meade (1973) noted with some irony that "my own hunch would 
be that the disutility of Doom to  future generations would be so great that ,  
even if we give it a low probability and even if we discount future utilities 
a t  a high rate . . .we would be wise to  be very prudent indeed in our present 
actions". 
8. Conclusions 
Estimating the potential costs associated with rising greenhouse gas levels 
is an important, but very ambitious and a t  present speculative task. If such 
estimates are t o  be more objective and useful than the collective judgments 
expressed in terms of (for example) negotiated emission targets, they will 
need t o  convince observers that the major issues have been taken into ac- 
count. Current estimates do not achieve this, and this paper has suggested 
five areas which require particular attention. 
(i) The potential local and regional dynamics of climate change, and its 
predictability, appear poorly understood. Do we expect climate change 
t o  proceed relatively smoothly towards a new state, or is greater and 
unpredictable variability likely during the transition? How robust are 
agricultural systems especially t o  such variability, and what costs may it 
impose? This issue appears t o  have received very little attention, in part 
because of the focus of most GCM modeling upon aggregate statistics, 
and equilibrium changes. 
(ii) The likely impacts on some developing countries appear much more se- 
vere than upon more robust developed economies. Some discussions 
paint scenarios of severe drought or flooding, with starvation, homeless- 
ness and forced migration. How likely are such outcomes? How should 
'It appears implausible that the (dis)utility of possible climate damages can be offset 
to zero by the possibility of beneficial outcomes. Even on an optimistic view of COz 
fertilization, etc., the probability seems low that adapting to changing conditions at the 
rate and degree implied by most forecasts would result in net benefits. Even on such an 
extremely optimistic view the possible scale of gains seems clearly limited (e.g., set by the 
limited scope for further reductions in agricultural costs) - limits which do not necessarily 
apply to ~ossible damages. The distribution of possible costs thus appears to be highly 
asymmetric. 
they be valued? What could be done to reduce such impacts, and insofar 
as this requires international transfers, how likely is it that such assis- 
tance will be forthcoming in an effective and timely way? Such questions 
have received some popular attention, but relatively little analysis, al- 
though this is beginning to change with the country studies of UNEP for 
the IPCC, and the national studies required for the climate convention. 
(iii) What might be the extent of non-market impacts, both in terms of 
direct human welfare (e.g., health and welfare losses and benefits associ- 
ated with warmer climates and precipitation change), and other impacts 
(e.g., on ecosystems and species loss)? This issue has been more widely 
recognized among economic studies, but is still far from being resolved, 
and obviously depends heavily upon resolution of the first two issues 
raised. 
(iv) What climatic and other changes might be implied by the very high 
COz concentrations projected for the very long term? What impacts 
might these have: to what extent could they be mitigated over the long 
timespan available, or might they threaten more fundamental losses (e.g., 
from extensive sea-level rise)? How should such very long-term impacts 
be valued? These issues have received very little attention, with the 
exception of the recent work by Cline (1992), and it is to be hoped that 
the challenge issued by his analysis will provoke more serious work in 
this area; as yet, hardly anything seems resolved. 
(v) What are the possible surprises in the system? Currently, a rapid change 
in ocean circulation patterns seems the most widely touted, despite 
which we have neither estimates of its probability, nor of the possible 
impacts if it should occur. Natural emission feedbacks and changing 
carbon fixation rates may amplify the growth in concentrations, and 
eventual disintegration of polar ice sheets seems likely, but the poten- 
tial for more rapid-than-expected change in either seems uncertain. Is 
our understanding sufficient to be relatively confident that we have not 
missed something important? What costs would be involved? And how 
should we weight issues which are judged to  be very low probability, but 
high cost? These issues are now beginning to receive more attention, 
but as yet we do not seem remotely close to answers. 
Given all these factors, the task facing those who seek to quantify the 
costs of climate change is either to make and justify rough estimates con- 
cerning each of these (as Cline has attempted for some non-market, and 
for long-term impacts), or to argue plausibly that each of the five factors is 
negligible compared with factors already quantified. 
This has not yet been done. Until this has been achieved, costlbenefit 
studies which focus upon quantifiable elements present a false sense of con- 
fidence and complacency. In such studies, it would be better to conduct 
analyses which recognize explicitly the wide range of uncertainties explicitly. 
For example, studies could examine the implications of: 
welfare losses of both one percent and 10 percent of global GDP associ- 
ated with the 50-year transition to  a doubled COz equivalent; 
both high and low rates of time preference; 
both weak (e.g., linear) and strong (e.g., cubic) functions relating the 
degree of damage to  the rate and/or degree of climatic change. 
More disaggregated studies could seek to  delineate the potential impor- 
tance of developing country impacts, non-market impacts, and/or climatic 
surprises. 
Such analyses would not provide simple policy answers, because none ex- 
ist. But they would improve our understanding of the relationship between 
different impact uncertainties and optimal policies, and highlight the impor- 
tant uncertainties, and thus help to focus the policy and research agendas 
associated with climate change. 
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Are we Underestimating, When Valuing the 
Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Reduction? 
Huib M.A. Jansen 
Institute for Environmental Studies, Free University Amsterdam 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
The environment has no price but it certainly has a value. Restoring the 
environment or preventing environmental damage does have a price, but is it 
worth the value? The question on the benefits of GHG reduction is a political 
question with respect to the trade-off between costs and benefits. However, 
the present state of the art of monetary valuation of environmental damage 
of climatic change is such, that  either the range of the  monetary estimation 
is extremely large, or the estimation is severely biased downward (or both), 
which prevents such a trade-off in most cases. A good survey of estimates 
of damage is given in, e.g., Cline (1992), and an attempt t o  trade-off can be 
found in, e.g., Ayres and Walter (1991). Both are essentially speculations. 
At the present state of the art ,  estimates of benefits of GHG reductions 
are, a t  most, wild guesses of the order of magnitude, that  do not allow a 
fine-tuned trade-off of policy alternatives. They can, perhaps, be used as 
circumstantial evidence t o  justify political choices, not more. In this paper 
some reasons are given why this is the case. 
The common use of the word "benefits" is somewhat euphemistic. Ben- 
efits of GHG reduction are prevented damages. As long as no reductions are 
being realized, it is more precise to  speak of damages. The two words will 
be used interchangeably in this paper. 
1. Subst it utability 
In economics, scarcity is measured in terms of utility, and the measuring 
unit is most often money. The aim of economics is t o  maximize utility. 
A basic, but not always evident, assumption behind the maximization of 
utility is that  various types of utility are substitutable. This substitutability 
is indeed guaranteed if markets exist where goods and services can be freely 
traded, and money is a good expedient t o  facilitate this trade. Climatic 
change and its effects cannot be traded in a market. When climatic change 
occurs there is no possibility to  undo it a t  the expense of other goods or 
services, money included. 
Although climatic conditions certainly have a utility, we cannot exchange 
it for other types of utility. This is not too bad, if at least we can compensate 
with other types of utility, so as to  feel equally well off. Even in the absence 
of an apple market, it is conceivable that a person feels equally well off with 
an ECU or a certain amount of apples. But the possession of an apple is 
not essential t o  well-being. Climatic change might well be. It is therefore 
questionable if we can measure the utility of climatic condition in the same 
terms as utility derived from apples, TV sets, cars, or other goods and 
services. 
The case is comparable to the valuation of human life. In various sectors 
(traffic, medicine, food, environment) a trade-off must be made between costs 
of measures and the resulting reduction of risk, and valuation of human life is 
helpful to  ensure efficiency within and between these various sectors. But for 
any individual, the question of value of his life is meaningless, as substitution 
is not possible. 
The discipline of economics is concerned with small changes in prices, 
quantities, and utility. When such small changes occur, it is indeed probable 
that  compensation or substitution is possible. But this basic assumption is 
not guaranteed when essential, irrevocable changes are involved. This makes 
monetary valuation questionable. 
2. Time Scale 
When choices are made with effects in time, a trade-off must be made be- 
tween present and future costs and benefits. A discount rate is used to  
compare future effects with present effects. For individuals and firms the 
discount rate can be related to  the interest rate of banks, which indeed pro- 
vide the substitutability between present expenditures or gains and future 
ones. But a person's or a firm's time preference can also be higher than the 
interest rate. 
Time preference of governments is generally lower than that of individ- 
uals; the official discount rate of the Dutch government is 5%, which means 
that the utility derived from Dfl 1 now is valued equal to the utility next 
in con- year derived from Dfl 0.95, or the utility after 10 years of Dfl 0.60 (' 
stant prices, so under the assumption of zero inflation). This implies that 
the value of Dfl 1 shrinks in a period of 50 years, roughly two generations, to  
less than Dfl 0.08, in the present valuation. One can indeed argue that, if a 
small amount of money is invested in the bank or in a good enterprise, it will 
make a much larger amount after 50 years. But environment and climatic 
conditions cannot be banked, neither can they be bought back after 50 years 
with money invested now. The substitutability between the present and the 
future is not guaranteed with goods and services that  cannot be traded in a 
market. 
This is not to  say that the concept of time preference is useless for 
environment. A trade-off has t o  be made in any case between present and 
future use of the environment. 
The Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) introduced the concept of 
sustainable development, which is "development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to  meet their 
own needs". This concept was officially accepted by many governments. The 
needs of present and future generations are put a t  the same level in the view 
of the Brundtland Commission. Discounting, when applied t o  essential living 
conditions that  cannot be bought back with money, is therefore not in line 
with sustainability. 
Although discounting is perfectly logical if applied t o  values that can 
be bought back, there is certainly a tension between discounting and sus- 
tainability when irreversible effects are concerned that are vital t o  meet the 
needs of future generations. And climatic change indeed bears the risk of 
compromising the ability of future generations t o  meet their needs, a t  least in 
some parts of the world. Thus, discounting and sustainability, both officially 
accepted concepts, are inconsistent. 
In practice, discounting is being applied in the comparison between costs 
and benefits of GHG reduction; otherwise both costs and benefits are infi- 
nite. If sustainable development is the point of view, discounting leads to  
underestimation of the benefits of GHG reduction. 
3. Cost-Benefit Approach 
Typically, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) approach is adopted when com- 
paring the pros and cons of GHG reductions (Jansen et al., 1991). It is 
well-known from theory that CBA is only applicable for marginal changes. 
If changes are more substantial, all kinds of adaptation and secondary effects 
will occur and CBA is no longer sufficient. But no models are available to  
reliably estimate the secondary effects of GHG reduction, in particular be- 
cause climatic change has very long-term effects. Thus, the CBA approach 
is used for lack of alternatives. 
Adaptation and secondary effects will generally diminish the primary 
effects of environmental changes, and thus the CBA approach tends to over- 
estimate, not underestimate, the benefits of GHG reduction. But this goes 
for the costs as well. 
In the comparison of costs and benefits of GHG reduction, which one 
of the two is more overestimated? We do not know, but one could guess 
that the possibilities for adaptation are larger on the cost side. Costs are 
financial and can therefore be compensated by other financial effects, such 
as economic growth. It was estimated (Steering Group, 1992) that  a 100% 
energy charge in the Netherlands would lower the GNP with 6 to 7%. That 
is the economic growth of a few years only. Benefits of GHG reduction, 
or damage of no reduction, may be measured in money terms, but are not 
financial, for most part. This may limit the possibilities of adaptation. It 
is questionable if the adaptation mechanisms of the economic system are 
working equally well a t  the benefits side as a t  the cost side. 
So although the CBA approach tends to overestimate both costs and 
benefits, it seems probable that the overestimation is larger on the cost side 
and, therefore, that the benefits are relatively underestimated. 
4. Comprehensiveness and Completeness 
Monetary estimates of benefits lack completeness and comprehensiveness 
(Kuik et al., 1991, 1992). An estimate of benefits is complete if it contains 
all types of benefits. And it is comprehensive if all value categories are 
included, i.e., also consumers' surplus, option value, existence value, and 
bequest value. Some types of benefits (or damages) are easy to estimate in 
monetary terms. For instance, sea level rise will lead t o  costs of construction 
of higher dikes in the Netherlands. This is a purely financial effect. But 
many other effects of climatic change are much more difficult t o  estimate in 
monetary terms, for instance loss of ecologically valuable wetlands, loss of 
human life, loss of quality of life of ecological refugees. If such intangible 
effects are to  be included in the monetary estimation, one has to  resort to  
valuation methods that  give results with very broad ranges of confidence, and 
even an indication of the order of magnitude may be unattainable. Value 
components such as consumers' surplus, option value, existence value, and 
bequest value are difficult to  estimate reliably; yet they may well be of great 
importance in the case of climatic change. 
To give an example: Ayres and Walter (1991) estimate the damage to  
one ecological refugee a t  $1,000. Perhaps this may be a sound estimate of 
the costs to  society of resettling, but clearly the suffering of the refugees is 
not included. 
An economist finds himself between Scylla and Charybdis: either he 
makes an accurate estimate by deleting types of damage and value compo- 
nents, or he makes a more complete and comprehensive estimate with such 
broad ranges that it is not useful for making a comparison with the more 
accurately measured costs. In practice, no estimate is fully complete and 
comprehensive, so each estimation is biased downward. Benefits are more 
underestimated to the extent that they are more accurate. 
5. Risk and Uncertainty 
Although often mentioned in one breath, risk and uncertainty are not the 
same. They may go together, but are different. 
Uncertainty is simply not knowing. The occurrence of climatic change, 
its extent, and its long-term effects are for a large part uncertain. Policy 
makers can take different attitudes to uncertainty. The attitude of the Dutch 
government - at  least in words, not so much yet in policy actions - seems to  
be that uncertainty with respect to irreversible effects urges to more caution. 
But the United States, a more important C 0 2  emitter, hold the view that 
as long as no more certainty is reached, no costly policy actions should be 
taken; clearly an attitude of underestimation of potential damages. 
Risk has to do with probability distributions. The risk of flooding and 
hurricanes may well increase as a result of climatic change. Most often, the 
valuation of risk events is made with the expected value, i.e., probability x 
monetary value of the event. In particular with low probability-high effect 
risk events, the expected value approach leads to underestimation. People in 
general are risk-averse for such extreme events with negative effects, and a 
risk aversion premium should be added. It is, however, difficult to estimate 
that premium accurately. 
6.  Climatic Change Compared to Other 
Environmental Problems 
None of the mentioned problems in benefit estimation is unique for climatic 
change. Benefit estimation of, for instance, SO2 reduction also suffers from 
the same problems. But in the estimation of benefits of GHG reduction, all 
problems come together, and each of them seems to be stronger than in the 
valuation of other types of pollution. As most of the mentioned problems 
give a tendency of underestimation of damage, it appears that in total there 
is a very strong tendency to underestimate. 
Are benefits of GHG reduction high? This question is meaningful only 
in relation to the costs of reduction. Compared to other environmental 
problems, climatic change is a young field of environmental policy. So far, 
almost no policy action aimed at GHG reduction have been introduced. 
This implies that nations are still at the lower end of the cost curve of 
reduction. Engineering studies indicate that significant COz reductions can 
be attained at zero costs (van der Burg et al., 1992). Macroeconomic studies 
indicate that major policy measures, such as unilaterally doubling energy 
prices overnight, lead to a fall in GNP of only a couple of years of economic 
growth (Steering Group, 1992). In this light, benefits are high indeed, if 
compared to the costs of the first, initial GHG reduction steps. 
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Abstract 
Because of the potential for global warming, there are widespread concerns 
about the impact of changing climate upon the productivity of land in farm- 
ing and other sectors. This paper develops a new approach for measuring 
the economic impact of environmental factors such as climate on production 
by examining the direct impact of the environmental factor on land produc- 
tivity as measured by land prices. This new method is applied to examine 
the effect of climate on agriculture using cross sectional farm data for almost 
3000 counties in the United States. It finds substantial impacts of climatic 
variation on both land values and farm revenues. Among the central findings 
are that higher temperatures in all seasons except autumn reduce average 
farm values in the United States. More precipitation in all seasons except 
autumn increases farm values. The relationships are, however, nonlinear and 
complex. 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, scientists have studied extensively the greenhouse ef- 
fect, which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide (COz) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) is expected to produce global warming and other 
significant climatic changes over the next century. Numerous studies in- 
dicate that there is the potential for major impacts on agriculture, espe- 
cially if there is significant midcontinental drying and warming in the U.S. 
heartland.' The greenhouse effect is but one of a number of major environ- 
mental consequences of human activities. 
'See particularly the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Houghton et al., 1990) and the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Greenhouse Warm- 
ing (NAS, 1991). 
There are two approaches to  valuing the impacts of environmental 
change. The traditional approach in the environmental valuation litera- 
ture focuses upon measuring direct impacts on consumers. An alternative 
approach reflects the likelihood that  a significant part of the damages from 
environmental changes come through impacts on production. For example, 
particulate emissions may increase the cost of operating processes which re- 
quire especially clean settings. Changes in climate will affect agriculture, 
outdoor construction, electricity generation, ski resorts, and other sectors 
which involve natural systems or outdoor activities. 
One issue addressed here is the development of a general theoretical ap- 
proach that  can be used directly t o  measure the impacts of environmental 
changes on production through their impact on land markets. This method- 
ology, which is developed in Section 2 of this paper, takes into account 
adjustments that  firms make in response t o  the environment. 
We then develop in Section 3 an application of this model t o  the specific 
question of climatic effects on agriculture. This issue is not new. Studies of 
the impact of climate on farming include scholarly studies such as Adams et 
al. (1988), Adams (1989), Adams et al. (1990), Callaway et al. (1982), Decker 
et al. (1986), and Rosenzweig (1986) as well as surveys in NRC (1983), EPA 
(1989), and NAS (1991). 
1.1. Ricardian vs. Production-Function Approaches 
The approach contained in the current literature on climate effects we label 
the production-function approach, to  distinguish it from the approach devel- 
oped here. Under the production-function approach, changes in yield are 
estimated directly from a production function. Frequently, all other inputs 
are frozen and only the variable of interest is permitted to  change. Stud- 
ies using the production-function approach all find that climate change can 
affect agriculture through the impact of precipitation, temperature, carbon 
dioxide levels, changes in pests, as well as by changing the costs of irriga- 
tion. Quantitative estimates have been generated (for example, see Adams 
et al., 1988; Adams, 1989; and Adams et al., 1990) from experimental or 
agronomical production models. Depending upon the atmospheric scenario 
and the model utilized, crop-yield models (CERES and SOYGRO) predict a 
10% increase or a 20% decrease in harvests, although some authors estimate 
a more substantial decline in yields (see Rind et al., 1990). 
While these studies provide a useful baseline for estimating the impacts 
of climate change on farming, they have an inherent bias that  will tend t o  
overestimate the impact. This bias arises because the production-function 
approach will omit many of the possible substitutions and adaptations that 
society can make to  changing environmental conditions. Most studies as- 
sume that there is no adaptation at all and simply calculate the impact of 
changing temperature on farm yields. Others allow some changes in fertil- 
izer application or irrigation or limited changes in the cultivars. None permit 
a detailed adjustment to changing environmental conditions by the farmer. 
Further, the literature does not consider the introduction of completely new 
crops (such as tropical crops in the south); technological change; changes 
in land use from farming to livestock, grassland, forestry; or conversion to 
cities, retirement homes, campsites, or the 1001 other productive uses of 
land in a modern post-industrial society. 
By not permitting a complete range of adjustments, previous studies 
have overestimated damages from environmental changes. Figure 1 shows 
the hypothetical values of output in four different sectors as a function of 
a single environmental variable, temperature, in order to illustrate the gen- 
eral nature of bias. In each case, we assume that the production-function 
approach yields an accurate assessment of the economic value of the activity 
as a function of temperature. The four functions are a simplified example 
of how the value of wheat, corn, grazing, and retirement homes might look 
as a function of the temperature. For example, the curve to the far left 
is a hypothetical "wheat production function," showing how the value of 
wheat varies with temperature, rising from cold temperatures such as point 
A, then peaking at point B, finally falling as temperatures rise too high. 
A production-function approach would estimate the value of wheat produc- 
tion at different temperatures along this curve. For example, point F would 
describe the effect of being at a high temperature. 
The production-function approach fails to take into account, however, 
that there will be economic substitution of alternative activities as the tem- 
perature changes. For example, when the temperature rises above point C, 
adaptive and profit-maximizing farmers will switch from wheat to corn. As 
temperature rises, the production-function approach would calculate that 
the yield has fallen to F in wheat, but wheat is in reality no longer pro- 
duced; the realized value is actually much higher, at  point D where corn 
is now produced. At a slightly higher temperature, the land is no longer 
optimally used for corn but switches to grazing, and production-function 
estimates that do not allow for this conversion will again overestimate the 
losses from climate change. Finally, at point E, even the best agricultural 
model will predict that the land is unsuitable for crops or even grazing and 
that the damage is severe. A more complete approach will find that the land 
Value of activity 
The best-use value function 
Retirement 
Temperature or other environmental variable 
Figure 1. Bias in production function studies. 
has been converted to  retirement villages, to which old folks flock so they 
can putter around in the warm winters and dry climates. 
All this is of course illustrative. But it makes the crucial point that  
the production-function approach will overestimate the damages from cli- 
mate change because it does not, and probably cannot, take into account 
the infinite variety of substitutions, adaptations, and old and new activities 
that may displace no-longer-advantageous activities as climate changes. Of 
course, there is no guarantee that the picture will look anything like Figure 
1. It might well be that  the values of wheat are much greater than other ac- 
tivities. But the direction of the bias from the production function approach 
is unambiguous. 
In this study, we develop a new technique that in principle can correct 
for the bias in the production-function technique by using economic data 
on the value of land. We call this the Ricardian approach, after the great 
English economist who explored the economic determination of land rents. 
Ln the Ricardian approach, instead of studying yields of specific crops un- 
der different controlled settings, we examine how climate in different places 
affects the rent or revenue from farm land. By directly measuring rents, we 
take into account direct impacts of climate on yields of different crops as 
well as the potential for substitution of different inputs, introduction of dif- 
ferent activities, and other potential adaptations t o  different climates. For 
example, by changing seed, irrigation, harvest length, or fertilizer, a farmer 
might adjust t o  changes in climate in ways that crop-yield models may fail 
to measure. If markets are functioning properly, the Ricardian approach will 
allow us to measure the economic value of different activities and therefore to 
verify whether the economic impacts implied by the crop yield experiments 
in the production-function approach are reproduced in the field. 
The results of the Ricardian approach can be seen in Figure 1. We 
assume that the "value" measured along the vertical axis is the net yield 
per acre of land; more precisely, it is the value of output less the value of 
all inputs (excluding land rents). Under competitive markets, the land rent 
will be equal to the net yield of the highest and best use of the land. This 
rent will in fact be equal 'to the heavy solid line in Figure 1. We label the 
solid line in Figure 1 the "best-use value function." 
In general, we do not observe market land rents, for most land is owner- 
occupied; moreover, the land rent is generally a small component of the total 
rent, which includes also the rent on capital items. We can, however, observe 
farm-land prices, which in competitive markets will be equal to the present 
value of the land rents. If the interest rate and rate of capital gains on the 
lands are equal for all parcels, then the land price will be proportional to 
the land rent. Therefore, by observing the relationship of land prices to 
climatic and other variables, we can infer the shape of the solid, best-use 
value function in Figure 1. 
The Ricardian approach used here is closely related to hedonic property 
and wage studies which attempt to measure the non-monetary components 
of market decisions such as purchases of houses and cars or choices of jobs. 
In hedonic wage studies, the non-monetary components are due to working 
conditions, risk, the quality of the location, and similar factors. Hedonic 
studies have been conducted for a number of different purposes. Nordhaus 
and Tobin (1972) applied the hedonic model to wages to estimate urban dis- 
amenities in their construction of the Measure of Economic Welfare. Thaler 
and Rosen (1975) applied the model to valuation on human life, while Roback 
(1982) applied this technique to detect regional wage effects. Cropper and 
Arriaga-Salinas (1980) and Blomquist et al. (1988) have recently used the 
model to develop measures of the quality of life. The approach has also been 
used with land values to estimate the value of environmental goods, such as 
the implicit value of air pollution for households. For a general discussion, 
see Freeman (1979) and Pearce and Markandya (1989). Finally, Brown and 
Mendelsohn (1984) and Englin and Mendelsohn (1991) use the approach on 
recreation trips to value the characteristics of public lands. 
This study measures the impact of environmental factors on production 
focusing upon the effect of climatic variables on agriculture. We examine 
both climatic data and a variety of fundamental geographical, geophysical, 
agricultural, economic, and demographic factors to determine the intrinsic 
value of climate on farming. The unit of observation is the U.S. county in 
the lower 48 states, and we are fortunate that there is a wealth of data a t  the 
county level in the U.S. We examine the effect of climatic variables as well 
as the non-climatic variables on both land values and on farm revenue, and 
the analysis includes a number of urban variables in order to measure the 
potential effect of development upon agriculture land values. The analysis 
suggests that  climate has a systematic impact on agricultural rents through 
temperature and precipitation. These effects tend to  be highly nonlinear 
and vary dramatically by season. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
optimal climates and the broader implications of the results. 
2. Measuring the Effect of Environment 
on Production 
This section develops the analytical apparatus that underlies the valuation 
of climate in this study. We postulate a set of consumers with well behaved 
utility functions and linear budget constraints. Assuming that  consumers 
maximize their utility functions across available purchases and aggregating 
leads to  a system of inverse demand functions for all goods and service: 
where P; and Q; are respectively the price and quantity of good i, i = 1, .., n, 
and Y is aggregate income. The Slutsky equation is assumed to  apply, so 
that  Equation (1) is integrable. 
We also assume that  a set of well-behaved production functions exist 
which link purchased inputs and environmental inputs into the production 
of outputs by a firm on a certain site: 
Qi = Q;(K;, E), i = 1, .., n . (2) 
In this equation, we use bold face t o  denote vectors or matrices. Q; is the 
output of good i, K;  = (K;I, .., K;j, .., K;j) where K;j is the purchased input 
j ( j  = 1 ,..., J) in the production of good i, and E = (El ,  .., El, .., EL)  where 
El is the exogenous environmental input 1 (1 = 1, ..., L) into the production of 
goods, e.g., climate, soil quality, air quality and water quality, which would 
be the same for different goods' production on a certain production site. 
Given a set of factor prices, Rj, for Kj , the exogenously determined level of 
environmental inputs, and the production function, cost minimization leads 
to a cost function: 
Here, C; is the cost of production of good i, R = (R1, ..., RJ), and C;(*) 
is the cost function. Firms are assumed to maximize profits given market 
prices: 
where P; is the price of good i. This maximization leads firms to equate 
prices and marginal cost. Differentiating Equation (4) with respect to any 
purchased factor and setting the result to zero also reveals the first-order 
conditions pertaining to each factor used in production: 
Next consider the impact of changes in the exogenous environmental 
variables. Assume that the environmental change is from initial point EA 
to new point EB. The change in value from changes in the environment are 
then given by: 
where J C is the line integral evaluated between the initial vector of quan- 
tities and the zero vector, QA = [QI(Kl, EA), .., Q; (K;, EA), .., Qn(Kn, 
EA)], QB = [QI (KI  ,EB),  . - 7  Qi(Ki, EB), .., Qn(Kn, EB)], Ci(Qi,R, EA)  = 
Ci(Qi(Ki, EA) ,  R ,  EA), and Ci(Qi, R ,  EB) = Ci(Qi(K;, EB), R ,  EB). It is 
necessary to take this line integral as long as the environmental change af- 
fects more than one output. If only one output is affected, then Equation 
(6) simplifies to the integral of the equations for a single good. Note that 
as long as the Slutsky equation is satisfied, the solution to Equation (6) is 
path-independent and unique. 
The damages in Equation (6) can be decomposed into two parts. On the 
one hand, costs have changed for the production of good i from C;(Q;, EA)  
Figure 2. The effects of an environmental change. 
to  C;(Qi, EB). Second, production has changed from QA to  Q B  . The value 
of the lost production is the difference between the consumer surplus under 
the demand function and the original cost of production (see Figure 2). 
The present study investigates the impact of environmental changes 
through their impact upon a particular factor, land. We now explicitly 
separate land out from the firm's profit function in Equation (4): 
where L; is the amount of land used t o  produce Q;, and PL E  is the annual 
rent per unit of land given the environment E. We assume that there is 
perfect competition for land, which implies that entry and exit will drive 
pure profits to  zero: 
If use i is the best use for the land given the environment E and factor 
prices R ,  the observed market rent on the land will be equal t o  the annual 
net profits from production of good i.2 
2With imperfect competition, it is possible that a farmer could pay only as much as 
the next highest bidder for land and that this land payment would then be less than the 
productivity in the best use of the land. In addition, if the land is not put to the best use, 
the land payment may exceed the net productivity of the land. 
Let us now reexamine the measure of environmental damages with this 
explicit land market. If we are examining changes in the environment which 
will leave market prices unchanged, then Equation (6) can be expressed: 
~ ( E A  - E B )  = P Q B - C C ~ ( Q ~ , R ,  E g )  -[PQA - C C i ( Q i , R ,  E l ) ]  (9) 
where P = (PI,  .., Pi, .., P,). Substituting Equation (8) into the above yields: 
~ ( E A  - EB)  = ~ ( P L E B  - PLEA)L~ 7 
1 
( 10) 
where PLEA is PLE at  EA and PLEB is PLE at  EB. Equation (10) is the 
definition of the Ricardian estimate of the value of environmental changes. 
Under the assumptions used here, the value of the change in the environ- 
mental value is captured exactly by the change in land rent. 
Note that all of the valuation expressions listed above implicitly assume 
that  firms adjust their market inputs in order t o  adapt to  the changing en- 
vironment. It is important t o  recognize, however, that  the measure of envi- 
ronmental damage incorporates this adaptive behavior. Rewriting Equation 
(9): 
As E deteriorates from EA t o  EB,  one would expect that farmers would 
adjust their purchases of K from KiA to KiB to reduce some of the losses, 
although the exact form of the adaptation will generally be extremely com- 
plex. If one fails t o  incorporate these adjustments by firms and instead 
assumes that K is fixed, then Equation (11) becomes: 
This latter measure uses changes in gross revenues as a measure of envi- 
ronmental damage; it is closely related to the pduction-function approach, 
in which limited or no adaptation occurs. Scientific experiments where all 
factors are tightly controlled except for an environmental change use measure 
[Equation (12)l. 
The Ricardian measure in Equation (lo),  which includes all optimizing 
adaptations, is superior t o  the gross revenue or production-function estimate 
in Equation (12) because the former includes all adaptations. An important 
result, however, is that the Ricardian measure in Equation (10) will always 
yield an estimate of environmental damage which is less than or equal to the 
estimate genemted by the production-function a p p m c h  in Equation (12). 
This result is easily seen. The profits from adjusting all inputs and outputs 
optimally are clearly at  least as great as the profits from not adjusting inputs 
or outputs at all or adjusting them incompletely. The former approach 
provides the estimate of the loss from the Ricardian approach while the 
later provides the loss from the production-function approach. 
The impact of an environmental change on decisions is easily seen when 
there is only one input K and one environmental factor E in the production 
function of one good, Q = (K, E). Fully differentiating the first-order con- 
dition of profit maximization [Equation ( 5 ) ]  with respect to  E and K and 
simplifying yields: 
The optimal response by the firm to improvements in E will be to in- 
crease K if Q K E  > 0 and Q K K  < 0. For example, if reduced concentrations 
of ozone make corn respond more positively to fertilizer Q K E  > 0, then 
farmers would increase fertilizer use with decreased ozone. If increased car- 
bon dioxide decreases a plant's need for water and the marginal productivity 
of water Q K E  < 0, then with more C 0 2  farmers will reduce irrigation. The 
profit function described by Equation (4) indicate adjustments of K with 
changes in E. If K is not permitted to  adjust, the resulting profits for each 
level of production must be lower so that net societal benefits must be lower. 
Estimates that do not allow for adjustments in purchases of market inputs, 
for example by measuring just changes in revenue, underestimate the value 
of environmental improvements (or overestimate the value of environmental 
damages). 
3. An Application of the Ricardian Technique 
to Agriculture 
In this section, we apply the Ricardian technique by estimating the value 
of climate in U.S. agriculture. Agriculture is the most appealing applica- 
tion of the technique both because of the significant impact of climate on 
agricultural productivity and because of the extensive county-level data on 
farm inputs and outputs. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a vast 
literature on the impact of climate and weather on agriculture. All studies 
we have uncovered use the production-function approach, in which the phys- 
ical impact of climate on crop yields is examined through statistical analysis 
or through experiments. Although this approach has great value for many 
purposes, it is unable to take account of the multitude of adaptations that 
individual farmers already make to different climates. As a complementary 
approach, we pursue the Ricardian approach outlined above as an indepen- 
dent way of investigating the impact of climate change. 
3.1. Sources and Methods3 
The basic hypothesis is that climate affects the production function for crops. 
Farmers on particular units of land must take environmental variables like 
climate as given and adjust their inputs and outputs accordingly. By ex- 
amining the rents that land earns across different environments, we can 
measure the direct effect of climate on rents. This approach makes a num- 
ber of simplifying assumptions. We assume that prices are fixed across the 
sample. Moreover, we assume perfect competition in both product and in- 
put markets, which is probably tenable here. Most important, we assume 
that the economy has completely adapted to the given climate; that is, we 
assume that the observed land prices have attained the long-run equilibrium 
that is associated with each county's climate. To the extent that there are 
short-run distortions, affecting either the discount rate on land rents or the 
relative prices within the agricultural sector or between agriculture and the 
rest of the economy, the observed rents and estimated climatic values may 
not accurately represent the longer-run values and impacts. 
We rely on data from the 1982 U.S. Census of Agriculture to obtain 
much of the data on farm characteristics in each county. For the most part, 
the data are actual county averages, so that there are no major geographic 
issues involved in obtaining information on these variables. The County and 
City Data Book, and the computer tapes of that data, are the source for 
much of the agricultural data used here, including values of farm products 
sold per acre, farm land and building  value^,^ and information on market 
inputs for farms in every county in the United States. In addition, in many 
of the equations, we include social, demographic, and economic data on each 
of the counties; these as well are drawn from the County and City Data Book. 
3Appendix A contains a complete description and definition of the variables used in 
this study. 
'The definition and source of the farm value variable is critical to this study and its 
derivation is described in Appendix B. 
The rest of the data required much more effort. Data about soils were 
extracted from the National Resource Inventory (NRI) with the kind assis- 
tance of Drs. Daniel Hellerstein and Noel Gollehon of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture. The NRI is an extensive survey of land characteristics in 
the United States. For each county, NRI has collected several soil samples, 
each providing a measure of salinity, clay content, sand content, flood prob- 
ability, soil erosion (K  factor), rain erosion (R factor), slope length, wind 
erosion, whether or not the land is a wetland, and numerous other variables 
that  are not used in this analysis. Each sample also contains an expansion 
factor, which is an estimate of the amount of land the sample represents in 
that  county. Using these expansion factors, we average this data to  yield an 
overall county estimate for each soil variable. 
Climatic data is available by station rather than by county, so it was 
necessary to  estimate county-average climates. To begin with, climate data  
was obtained from the National Climatic Data Center, which gathers data  
from 5511 meteorological stations throughout the United States. The data  
include information on precipitation and temperature for each month from 
1951 through 1980. Since the purpose of this study is t o  predict the im- 
pacts of climate changes on agriculture, we focus on the long-run impacts of 
precipitation and temperature on agriculture, not year-to-year variations in 
weather. We consequently examine the climatological normal variables - the 
30-year average of each climatic variable for every station. In this analysis, 
we collect data on normal daily mean temperatures and normal monthly 
precipitations for January, April, July, and October. We focus on these four 
months in order t o  capture seasonal effects of each variable. For example, 
cold January temperatures may be important as a control on insect pests, 
warm but not hot summers may be good for crop growth, and warm October 
temperatures may assist in crop harvesting. 
In order t o  link the agricultural data which is organized by county and 
the climate data which is organized by station, we conducted a spatial statis- 
tical analysis which examines the determinants of the climate of each county. 
Although the specific climatic variables we analyze in this study have been 
measured frequently, there are some counties with no weather stations and 
others with several. Some of the weather stations are not in representative 
locations, such as the station on the top of Mt. Washington. Furthermore, 
some counties are large enough or contain sufficient topographical complexity 
that  there is variation of climate within the county. We therefore proceeded 
by constructing an average climate for each county. 
First, we assume that all the weather stations within 500 miles of the 
geographic center of the county provide some useful climate information. 
The 500-mile circle invariably draws in many stations, so that  our measure 
does not depend too heavily on any one station. 
Second, we estimate a climate surface in the vicinity of the county by 
running a weighted regression across all weather stations within 500 miles. 
The weight is the inverse of the square root of a station's distance from 
the county center since we recognize that closer stations contain more in- 
formation about the climate of the center. We must estimate a separate 
regression for each county since the set of stations within 500 miles and the 
weights (distances) are unique for each county. The dependent variables 
are the monthly normal temperatures and precipitations for January, April, 
July, and October. The independent variables include latitude, longitude, 
altitude, and distance from closest shoreline. The regression fits a second- 
order polynomial over these four basic variables, including interactive terms, 
so that  there are 14 final variables in the regression, plus a constant term. 
Eight regressions (4 seasons times 2 measures) for each county given 3000 
counties leads to  over 24,000 estimated regressions. 
Third, we calculate the predicted value of each climatic variable for the 
geographic center of the county. The predicted values of normal precipitation 
and temperature from the climate regressions are the independent variables 
for climate in the property value regressions. This complicated procedure 
is intended t o  provide accurate estimates of the climatic variables for each 
county. 
3.2. Empirical Results 
We now discuss the empirical results of this analysis. We begin with the 
results for the climate parameters. Figure 3 shows the temperature stations 
while Figure 4 shows the precipitation stations used t o  construct the indi- 
vidual climates of each county. As can be seen, these form a dense set of 
stations for most regions of the United States with the exception of some of 
the desert Southwest. 
The estimates of the climate parameters for individual counties are too 
numerous to  present, but we show two selected counties in Tables 1 and 
2. These show the independent variables as well as the coefficients and 
summary regression statistics for Fresno, California and Des Moines, Iowa. 
Note that more coefficients are significant in the Fresno than the Des Moines 
regressions. There is more variation across the sample in F'resno because of 
the effects of the coast and nearby mountain ranges. Although there are 
more significant coefficients in the California regression, the Iowa regression 
has a better overall fit and smaller standard errors. In general, the fit east of 
Figure 3. Temperature stations. 
Figure 4. Precipitation stations. 
Table 1. Interpolating county climate measures (Fresno, CA). 
Temperature Precipitation 
April July October April July October 
Constant 131535 231764 124970 -58846 -184063* 16551 
Longitude 
Latitude 
Lat sq 
Long sq 
Long*lat 
Altitude 
Alt sq 
Lat*alt 
Longsalt 
Shore dist 
Sdist sq 
Sdisttlong 
Sdisttlat 
Sdist*alt 
Adj r2 
Std err 
0 bservations 
Notes: Variables marked with an asterisk are significant at the 5% level. Temperature is 
measured in Fahrenheit and precipitation in inches per month. 
100 degrees longitude (the east slope of the Rocky Mountains) was tighter 
than in the West. By and large the equations do very well in predicting 
monthly temperature and vary from precise t o  somewhat less satisfactory 
for the noisy precipitation variable. 
In order t o  gain some sense of the reliability of this geographic approx- 
imation method, we predicted the climate for each of the weather stations. 
Dropping the weather station itself, we predicted the climatic variables for 
the station from all stations within 500 miles in the manner explained above. 
Comparing these results with the actual measurements from each station re- 
veals that the approximation method predicts between 87% and 97% of the 
variation in precipitation in the continental United States and between 97% 
and 99% of the variation in temperature. It should be noted that, even in 
a statistically stationary environment, the observations of "climate" them- 
selves contain error because they contain only 30 observations. Depending 
upon the relative importance of idiosyncratic error in climate vs. misspecifi- 
cation error in our equation, it might well be that the predictions are actually 
Table 2. Interpolating county climate measures (Des Moines, Iowa). 
Temperature Precipitation 
April July October April July October 
Const ant 6425 5006 8967 -32243 77324* 41650 
Longitude -0.919 -1.12 -2.55 7.72 -15.8* -9.61 
Latitude -2.48 -0.829 -1.55 10.0 -32.9* -16.32 
Lat sq 2.53-4 2.03-5 3.23-5 -9.73-4 3.23-3* 1.6E-3 
Long sq 3.73-5 8.13-5 2.03-4 -4.93-4 6.83-4 5.93-4 
Long*lat 2.03-4 1.03-4 2.43-4 -9.9E-4 3.8E-3* 1.8E-3 
Altitude -0.13 0.046 0.34* 0.353 3.02* 2.09* 
Alt sq -1.23-6 -1.33-6* 1.63-6* l.lE-5* -1.53-6 2.1E-5* 
Latsalt 2.13-5 -1.63-5 -6.93-5* -1.23-4 -5.7E4* -2.83-4* 
Long*alt l . lE-5 -9.73-6 -4.93-5* -3.1E-5 -3.63-4* -3.2E-4* 
Shore dist 1.14 -1.17 -0.564 -0.150 26.8 18.6 
Sdist sq 1.83-4 -3.13-4 -1.93-4 5.83-4 -1.2E-3 1.4E-3 
Sdist*long -4.43-5 1.93-4 -1.2E-4 -4.13-4 -2.73-3 -1.93-3 
Sdist*lat -3.6E-4 2.23-4 9.03-5 4.23-4 -5.43-3* -3.83-3 
Sdist*alt -2.23-5 3.23-5 9.93-5* -1.73-4 6.9E-4* 3.63-4* 
Adj r2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.989 0.987 0.976 
Std err 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.15 
Observations 928 928 928 1477 1477 1477 
Notes: Variables marked with an asterisk are significant a t  the 5% level. Temperature is 
measured in Fahrenheit and precipitation in inches per month. 
a superior estimate of the local climate than are the recorded observations 
themselves. 
Combining the agricultural and climatic data, we wish to  predict agricul- 
tural land values. Land values are the present value of future expected rents. 
There is little reason for the riskless interest rate to  vary across counties in 
the U.S., but the risk and capital-gains components of land value might vary 
considerably. For example, California agricultural land near growing cities 
might well have a larger capital-gains component than would rural land far 
from cities in an economically stagnant coal-mining region of Appalachia. 
Moreover, there are major potential errors in measurement of land values 
since values are estimated by farmers, and such estimates are often unreli- 
able. However, there is no reason to  believe that the errors of measurement 
are correlated with independent data such as temperature or precipitation. 
The major effect of measurement errors will be imprecision of the econo- 
metric estimates rather than bias in the estimation of the coefficients or an 
ultimate bias in the estimate of the economic value of climate on agriculture. 
The next and crucial stage is to use the climate data  in the estimates of 
economic value. The geographic distribution of farm value per acre is shown 
in Figure 5 and of farm revenues per acre in Figure 6. Both variables are 
measured in 1982. The unit of observation is the county. We use estimated 
climatic variables along with soil variables and socioeconomic data  to  esti- 
mate the best-value function across different counties. Table 3 shows the 
crucial regressions for the second stage. There are 2933 observations. 
In order t o  give a sense of the importance of the non-farm variables 
in the model, we begin with a model which contains only climate variables. 
The first set of regressions in Table 3 is a quadratic model which includes the 
eight measures of climate (four months of precipitation and temperature). 
For each variable, a linear and quadratic term are included. This flexible 
functional form can reflect the nonlinearities that  are apparent from field 
studies; the nonlinear terms introduce an appreciably better set of estimates. 
In the second set of regressions, we add the balance of the urban, soil 
and other environmental variables to  include other factors influencing land 
values and farm revenues. In these equations, we attempt t o  control for the 
influence that  urban development and soils will have upon land values. As 
proxies for urban development, we include population density, net migration, 
and per capita income. Soil characteristics are measured using the percent 
of the land which is flood-prone, the percent of the land which is wetland, 
estimated potential for soil erosion, the salinity of the soils, whether soils are 
sandy or clay, and the slope length of the land. Other environmental factors 
included are solar energy, which is proxied by latitude, and altitude. 
The full regression controls for urban development and soils with the  
additional included variables. The full specification is therefore more ap- 
propriate for estimating the impact of climate on farming, particularly if 
the omitted variables are spuriously correlated with land values. On the 
other hand, the more limited quadratic regression may be doing a better 
job of capturing the entire spectrum of the land rent function by endoge- 
nously incorporating non-farm land uses and allowing for the  value of land 
in non-farm uses. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. The squared terms 
for most of the climate variables are significant implying the observed rela- 
tionships are nonlinear. However, the squared terms are not all negative as 
expected. Some of the squared terms are positive, especially for precipita- 
tion. The positive coefficient on the squared term implies that  the function 
has a minimum value from which it increases in both directions. The ex- 
pected negative coefficient implies that  there is an optimal value from which 
the value function decreases in both directions. 
igure 5. Total farm value in 1982. 
.gure 6. Farm revenue in 1982. 
Table 3. Regression models explaining farm values and revenue. 
Farm Revenue 
Farm Value ($/acre) ($/acre/year) 
Independent Quadratic Full Full Full Full 
variables 1982 1982 
Constant -18417 -2604.9 
(4.98) (0.79) 
January temp -36.9 -9.93 
(4.43) (1.19) 
Jan temp sq -0.31 -1.20 
(1.36) (5.72) 
April temp 662 427.9 
(7.94) (5.92) 
Apr temp sq -7.31 -3.83 
(9.41) (5.71) 
July temp 393.9 169.4 
(3.43) (1.76) 
July temp sq -3.71 -2.12 
(4.91) (3.33) 
October temp -425.9 -405.82 
(3.40) (3.74) 
Oct temp sq 6.82 5.02 
(6.28) (5.30) 
January rain 102.7 28.6 
(3.10) (0.88) 
Jan rain sq -5.68 4.13 
(1.86) (1.44) 
April rain 181.6 168.8 
(2.44) (2.59) 
Apr rain sq -10.7 -9.16 
(1.15) (1.11) 
July rain -167.7 -330.2 
(3.74) (7.42) 
July rain sq 19.5 45.6 
(3.43) (8.29) 
October rain 194.9 -51.1 
(2.25) (0.64) 
Table 3. Continued. 
Farm Revenue 
Farm Value ($/acre) ($/acre/year) 
Independent Quadratic Full Full Full Full 
Variables 1982 1982 1978 1982 1978 
Oct rain sq -39.6 -1.1 6.70 23.41 22.30 
(2.62) (0.08) (0.38) (6.89) (5.74) 
Income per capita 0.081 0.14 2.21E3 8.313-3 
(17.70) (20.45) (1.95) (5.38) 
Density 1.22 1.21 0.14 0.156 
(15.89) (12.30) (7.42) (7.19) 
Density sq -1.44E4 -9.53-5 1.323-5 7.49E6 
(4.36) (2.34) (1 5 0 )  (0.84) 
Latitude -58.8 -101.3 -12.82 -9.50 
(3.99) (5.35) (3.50) (2.28) 
Altitude -0.212 -0.277 -0.06 -0.061 
(7.76) (7.87) (8.92) (7.90) 
Migration 1.6E-3 ... 1.05E-3 . . . 
(1.8 1) (4.75) 
Salinity -523.9 -482.8 -72.82 -102.64 
(2.55) (1.84) (1.43) (1.77) 
Flood prone -284.2 -568.2 -13.65 0.32 
(5.90) (9.21) (1.14) (0.02) 
Irrigated 600.1 478.95 198.98 201.96 
(11.99) (7.43) (16.97) (14.22) 
Wetland -246.2 -249.05 7.24 32.77 
(2.02) (1.59) (0.24) (0.95) 
Soil erosion -797.2 -1293.9 -168.12 -123.75 
(4.24) (5.38) (3.60) (2.33) 
Slope length 15.7 26.79 -3.80 -2.69 
(2.64) (3.47) (2.56) (1.59) 
Sand -209.4 -127.22 16.49 27.87 
(4.17) (1.98) (1.32) (1.97) 
Clay 114.5 97.87 11.23 8.20 
(5.60) (3.72) (2.21) (1.41) 
Adj r2 0.671 0.782 0.779 0.539 0.504 
Observations 2933 2933 2939 2933 2939 
Notes: Observations weighted by percentage of county land covered by cropland. Values 
in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
Table 4. Marginal effects of climate on agriculture. 
Farm Value Farm Revenue 
Month 
January 
April 
July 
October 
Annual 
January 
April 
July 
October 
Annual 
Quadratic Full Full 
1982 1982 1978 
Temperature ($/degree Fahrenheit) 
-56.8 -85.50 -123.57 
(-6.19) (-9.64) (-10.88) 
-136.1 9.58 29.88 
(-10.75) (0.83) (2.04) 
-168.2 -151.38 -228.75 
(-13.12) (-14.19) (-16.73) 
350.6 165.42 217.82 
(19.32) (9.46) (9.68) 
-10.43 -61.87 -104.62 
(-3.38) (-2.46) (-3.25) 
Precipitation ($/monthly inch) 
72.9 50.25 32.11 
(3.17) (2.30) (1.15) 
111.3 108.51 187.35 
(4.06) (4.62) (6.23) 
-24.9 4.18 29.71 
(-1.81) (0.32) (1.76) 
-2.9 -56.63 -142.92 
(-0.12) (-2.54) (-4.99) 
39.10 26.58 26.56 
Full ~ u l l  
1982 1978 
(3.42) (2.58) (2.01) (-2.79) (-0.98) 
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at the U.S. mean climate. The annual effect assumes 
uniform changes across all four seasons. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
The marginal effect of changes in climate on agricultural values show 
the estimated impact on agricultural values of a one-degree or one-inch-per 
month increase in the climatic normals; those depend upon the season and 
the evaluating point. The marginal value for each variable evaluated at the 
- - 
national mean is presented in Table 4. For example, the full regression in 
Table 3 predicts that a one degree increase in monthly January temperature 
would reduce farm value by $86 per acre but a one degree increase in October 
- 
temperature would increase farm values by $165 per acre. 
In the quadratic model, warmer temperatures reduce farm values in 
aJl seasons except autumn. Wetter months increase farm values in winter 
and spring but not in summer and autumn. Adding the socioeconomic and 
environmental controls alters the seasonal patterns for farm values described 
above. Increasing temperatures in April are now beneficial and the benefits 
of warmer autumns are still present but reduced in half. Overall, annual 
increases in temperature are more harmful. The effect of precipitation on 
farm value changes so that summer rains are now unimportant and autumn 
rains are more harmful. The net effect of including controls is to  reduce the 
benefits of an increase in annual precipitation. 
Because marginal effects differ across seasons, overall annual effects will 
vary depending upon their seasonal distribution. One scenario is for a uni- 
form change across all seasons. In this case, with the quadratic model, a one 
degree F increase in temperature results in a $10 decrease in farm value per 
acre. With the full model, a one degree F warming lowers average farm val- 
ues by $62 per acre. An annual increase of one inch of precipitation spread 
uniformly across all seasons, according to the quadratic model, would in- 
crease property values by $39 per acre. Including control variables changes 
the net precipitation effect to  an increase of only $27 per acre. 
Without the full set of control variables, temperature changes have rel- 
atively little impact on farm value as compared to precipitation. When the 
non-farm controls are added, the losses from higher temperatures become 
from five to  seven times as large, whereas the gain from increased precipi- 
tation is reduced by almost a third. One interpretation of these results is 
that the control variables eliminate both the potential for non-farm adap- 
tation and the role of potentially spurious non-farm influences which are 
spatially correlated with climate. These non-farm influences place a higher 
value on warmer temperatures (the South) and wetter settings (the Coast), 
thus lowering the estimated damages from temperature but raising the gains 
from rains. By controlling these unwanted effects, the full model may more 
accurately describe the impacts on agriculture; a t  the same time, the equa- 
tions without controls may capture non-agricultural adjustments of the kind 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
The control variables in Table 3 provide a rich set of results in and of 
themselves. It is clear that economic variables play a role in determining 
both the value of farms and their current annual gross revenues. Farm val- 
ues are higher in denser, growing, and wealthier counties presumably because 
of higher local demand for food and the potential for conversion of land to 
non-farm uses. Farm values also respond as expected to other environmen- 
tal factors such as solar flux (latitude) and altitude. Salinity, likelihood of 
flooding, wetlands, and soil erosion all act negatively as expected. Irrigation 
increases the value of land by a substantial amount according to the model; 
this is not surprising given the importance of irrigation in many areas in the 
arid West. Slope length was slightly beneficial to  land values but reduced 
farm revenues; long gradual slopes apparently have mixed effects. 
Table 5 shows the estimated best and worst climate parameters accord- 
ing to  the full model in Table 3. In these, we simply solve for the extremum 
of the quadratic function in temperature and precipitation. These results 
have relatively low reliability because of a variety of specification errors and 
the potential for dependence of some of the independent variables (such as 
salinity) on climatic variables. Nevertheless, they provide some interesting 
information especially concerning January and October. The optimal Jan- 
uary temperature is colder than the average U.S. temperature by a significant 
margin, reflecting the value of cold weather in killing pests. Second, Jan- 
uary rain is clearly beneficial, perhaps because it contributes t o  soil moisture 
without requiring clouds during the growing season. The farm value column 
of Table 5 also reveals the value of a warm dry October, shown by the opti- 
mal precipitation being zero and the minimum temperature being a cool 40 
degrees. 
One hypothesis suggested in the theory section is that  the impacts of 
environmental effects would be exaggerated by a gross revenue model. We 
explore this hypothesis in Tables 3 and 4 by regressing the same climate 
and control variables on crop gross revenue. The marginal effects in Table 
3 for the farm revenue model suggest similar seasonal patterns as the farm 
value equation except that April rain and warmth is clearly bad in the gross 
revenue equation. The net effect of either an additional degree F or an 
additional inch of rain using the full model is $7/year of reduced revenue. 
Assuming a 5% real interest rate, these annual effects suggest a loss in present 
value of $140/acre. In contrast, the property value study suggests only a $62 
loss for warmer temperatures and a $27 gain for more precipitation. 
One concern with the Ricardian approach to  climate effects is that the 
results may not be robust over time but rather the result of a special condi- 
tion of the year estimated. We consequently estimate the model again using 
data from 1978. These values have been converted to  1982 dollars using 
the GNP deflator obtained from the 1991 Economic Report of the Presi- 
dent. The 1978 results are surprisingly similar t o  the findings using the 1982 
data. The control variables have similar impacts in both years. The climate 
coefficients also have similar signs in both 1978 and 1982. Evaluating the 
marginal effects of climate in 1978 a t  the national mean and comparing the 
results with 1982 shows that the climate variables for each season are larger 
in 1978 than in 1982. For example, October rains are more damaging and 
other season rains are more beneficial in 1978. These differences cancel out 
so that  the annual marginal precipitation effects are almost identical in 1978 
and 1982. The marginal temperature effects in each season are also larger 
in 1978 than in 1982 but, in this case, annual impacts are also larger in 
Table 5. Best and worst climates for agriculture. 
Best or (Worst) Tem~erature (Fahrenheit) 
p~ 
Farm Value Farm Revenue Actual 
Month 1982 1978 1982 1978 Temperature 
January -4.1 ' 5.86 -48.26 
April 55.8 57.17 46.03 
July 40.0 49.59 (139.78) 
October (40.4) (45.05) (-39.80) 
Best or (Worst) Precipitation (inches/month) 
Farm Value Farm Revenue Actual 
Month 1982 1978 1982 1978 Precipitation 
January (0) (0) 5.94 4.98 2.6 
April 9.21 (0) (5.98) (6.16) 3.3 
July (3.62) (3.23) (3.14) (3.01) 3.7 
October 0 (13.17) (3.27) (2.92) 2.5 
The actual temperature and precipitation measure the U.S. average value. Values in 
parentheses report worst levels. 
1978. The pattern of climate effects on agriculture is stable over time but 
apparently some factors can alter the magnitude of the effects from year t o  
year. 
The predicted overall effects from the existing climate across the United 
States are shown in Figures 7 through 10. Figures 7 and 8 are probably the 
most important summary of the results. These maps show the Ricardian 
values of climate by county in 1978 and 1982. To construct each map, we 
begin with the difference between the estimated climate for each county 
and the national average climate. We then multiply this climatic difference 
variable times the estimated coefficients for each climatic variables in Table 2. 
Figures 7 and 8 then show the estimated contribution of climate to the farm 
land value in each county. The results are both surprising and interesting. 
Beginning with the economic "hot spots," we see that are areas of high 
value along the northwestern coastal region - basically due t o  the moist 
and temperate climates in these regions. In addition, the grain belt west of 
Chicago shows up as a hot spot of high Ricardian climate values. The other 
area that stands out is the area of low climatic values along the southwest 
border regions. (Note that  these estimates use the national average irriga- 
tion rather than actual irrigation values.) For the most part these have little 
agriculture, although irrigation raises production and farm revenues consid- 
erably as can be seen in Figure 6. Figure 8 represents the identical map as 
Fig ure 7. Climatic effects on farm value in 1982. 
Fig ure 8. Climatic effects on farm value in 1978. 
Figure 7 except that  the analysis is based on 1978 data. Both models show 
almost identical geographic patterns. It would appear from this comparison 
that the results are quite stable. 
Figures 9 and 10 separate out the Ricardian values of precipitation and 
temperature on farm values for 1982. The precipitation effect is quite reveal- 
ing. There are significant positive effects of precipitation along the northwest 
coast and along the Gulf of Mexico coast. Negative effects are found roughly 
west of the 100th meridian and very strongly in the desert southwest. 
The temperature effect is strongly positive in the midwest, with its com- 
bination of warm but not hot summers and cold winters. Negative effects 
of hot temperature are not surprisingly found along the southern border re- 
gion, particularly in the southwest. Apparently, one must move significantly 
north into Canada before corresponding negative cold effects can be seen on 
the map. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the impact of climate on economic activity focusing 
on the agricultural sector. According to  economic theory, the economic value 
of site-specific characteristics will be reflected in the land rents and will be 
discounted in land values of the site. We denote the effects on land rents as 
being Ricardian to  capture the mechanism by which land markets capture 
the economic value of climate and other variables. More generally, in the 
presence of a competitive land market, differences in rents or land value 
across space and time can serve as an accurate measure of environmental 
impacts. 
The use of the Ricardian technique allows an entirely different approach 
to  the evaluation of the impact of climate and climate change from conven- 
tional techniques. Relying on land rents and values has the important ad- 
vantage of incorporating the effects of adaptation in the economy - changes 
in techniques of production or the output mix by firms. By contrast, con- 
ventional estimates that rely upon changes in yield or output - an approach 
we call the "production-function approach" - will tend to  overestimate en- 
vironmental damages. 
This new methodology is applied to measure the effect of climate on 
agriculture. Examining counties across the United States, the effects of 
temperature, precipitation, and other factors on farm value and farm revenue 
are estimated. Climate and especially temperature clearly affect agriculture 
revenues and land values. Warming is generally harmful t o  farm values 
Fig ure 9. Precipication effects on farm value in 1982. 
Fig ;ure 10. Temperature effects on farm value in 1982. 
except in the fall where it helps with drying and harvesting crops. However, 
this fall effect is quantitatively extremely large, so it may actually offset the 
damaging effects of warming in other seasons. Additional precipitation is 
generally beneficial to farms, again except in the fall and possibly in summer 
where it may be associated with low levels of sunshine. Interestingly, we find 
that precipitation in winter is just as valuable as the legendary spring rains. 
The study is of interest for understanding the impact of climate on 
agriculture as well as the extent to which different approaches can overstate 
the impacts of climate change or underestimate the force of adaptation. In 
addition, the analysis can provide alternative estimates of the impacts of 
global warming upon American agriculture. The precise impact of global 
warming on agriculture is a topic that will be pursued in detail in future 
research. 
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Appendix A. Definition of Major Variables Used in this Study 
Variable Definition 
Constant 
January temp 
Jan temp sq 
April temp 
Apr temp sq 
July temp 
July temp sq 
October temp 
Oct temp sq 
January rain 
Jan rain sq 
April rain 
Apr rain sq 
July rain 
July rain sq 
October rain 
Oct rain sq 
Income per capita 
Density 
Density sq 
Latitude 
Altitude 
Migration 
Salinity 
Flood prone 
Irrigated 
Wetland 
Soil erosion 
Slope length 
Wind erosion 
Farm value 
Farm revenue 
A term equal to one 
Normal daily mean temperature from 1951-1980 in the 
month of January, Fahrenheit 
January temp squared 
Normal daily mean temperature from 1951-1980 in the 
month of April, Fahrenheit 
April temp squared 
Normal daily mean temperature from 1951-1980 in the month 
of July, Fahrenheit 
July temp squared 
Normal daily mean temperature from 1951-1980 in the 
month of October, Fahrenheit 
October temp squared 
Normal precipitation from 1951-1980 in the month of 
January, inches 
January rain squared 
Normal precipitation from 1951-1980 in the month of 
April, inches 
April rain squared 
Normal precipitation from 1951-1980 in the month of 
July, inches 
July rain squared 
Normal precipitation from 1951-1980 in the month of 
October, inches 
October rain squared 
Annual personal income per person in the county, 1984 
Resident population per square mile, 1980 
Density squared 
Latitude measured in degrees from southern most point in U.S. 
Height from sea level in feet 
Net of incoming people minus outgoing people from 1980 
to 1986 for the county 
Percent of land which needs special treatment because of 
saltlalkaline in the soils 
Percent of land which is prone to flooding 
Percent of land where irrigation provides at least 50% 
of water needs 
Percent of land considered wetland 
K factor-soil erodibility factor in hundredths of inches 
Number of feet length of slope (not steepness) 
Measure of wind erosion in hundredths of inches 
Estimate of the current market value of farm land 
including buildings for the county expressed ii dollars per acre, 
1982 
Gross revenue from crops sold in 1982 for the county 
in dollars per acre 
Appendix B. Data on farms and value of land and buildings5 
The data  on farms and on farm land values is central to this study. This 
appendix describes the definition and sources of the data. The current defi- 
nition of a farm, first used for the 1974 Census of Agriculture final reports, 
is any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products were sold or 
normally would have been sold during the census year. 
Land in farms is an operating-unit concept and includes land owned 
and operated as well as land rented from others. The acreage designated 
as "land in farms" consists primarily of agricultural land used for crops, 
pasture, or grazing. It also includes woodland and wasteland not actually 
under cultivation or used for pasture or grazing, provided it was part of the 
farm operator's total operation. 
The land is defined to  lie in the operator's principal county, that  is, the 
county where the largest value of agricultural products was raised or pro- 
duced. Irrigated land includes land watered by any artificial or controlled 
means, such as sprinklers, furrows or ditches, and spreader dikes. Cropland 
includes land from which crops were harvested or hay was cut, land in or- 
chards, citrus groves, vineyards, nurseries, and greenhouses, land used only 
for pasture or grazing that could have been used for crops without additional 
improvement, and all land planted in crops that were grazed before the crops 
reached maturity. Also included were all cropland used for rotation pasture 
and land in government diversion programs that were pastured. 
Respondents were asked to report their estimate of the current market 
value of land and buildings owned, rented, or leased from others, and rented 
or leased to  others. Market value refers to  the respondent's estimate of what 
the land and buildings would sell for under current market conditions. If 
the value of land and buildings was not reported, it was estimated during 
processing by using the average value of land and buildings from a similar 
farm in the same geographic area. 
The value of products sold by farms represents the gross market value 
before taxes and production expenses of all agricultural products sold or 
removed from the place regardless of who received the payment. In addition, 
it includes the loan value received in 1982 for placing commodities in the 
Commodity Credit Corporation loan program. 
'This description is drawn from the City and County D a t a  Book, and the underlying 
data is from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Census of Agriculture. 

The Implications of Non-linearities in 
Global Warming Damage Costs 
Stephen C. Peck 
Electric Power Research Institute 
Palo Alto, CA, USA 
The possibility of global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions presents 
a difficult policy problem because of the tremendous uncertainties involved. 
Both the costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gases are uncertain. 
A model called Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment (CETA) has 
been constructed by Thomas Teisberg and Stephen Peck (Peck and Teisberg, 
1992). CETA is a world growth model representing energy technologies and 
resources, the conversion of capital, labor and energy inputs into output, 
the emissions and accumulation of greenhouse gases (particularly carbon 
dioxide), the increase in global temperature and the consequent warming 
damage and, finally, the optimal split of output (after subtracting energy 
and warming damage costs) into consumption and investment. 
The base case of CETA shows worldwide emissions of CO:! (measured as 
carbon) rising relatively slowly from today's level of 6 billion tons per year 
t o  12 billion tons annually in 2030, then declining somewhat as the oil and 
gas resource base is exhausted and as non-carbon based fuels replace carbon- 
based fuels in the electric sector. Between 2040 and 2100, carbon dioxide 
emissions accelerate as carbon intensive synthetic fuels replace oil and gas 
use in the non-electric sector. In 2100 carbon dioxide emissions are projected 
t o  be about 45 billion tons (as carbon) annually. Finally, emissions begin 
t o  decline after 2100 when the coal resource base starts to  be exhausted. 
Extensive sensitivity testing has shown that optimal emissions of carbon 
dioxide are remarkably insensitive to  changes in most parameter values up 
t o  2030, but quite sensitive t o  a subset of parameter variations in 2100 and 
beyond. 
One key uncertainty on the benefits side of CETA is the relationship 
between climate change and resulting damages (i.e., costs of impacts and 
of adaptations undertaken t o  reduce impacts). In particular we have found 
(Peck and Teisberg, 1993) that the optimal emissions policy is much more 
sensitive t o  the degree of non-linearity in damages than it is t o  the level 
of damages (at  a specified temperature increase). We interpret the non- 
linearity of the damage function t o  be related t o  the notion of a threshold 
for damages. 
We have made some simple value of information calculations designed 
t o  measure the benefits of accelerating the resolution of uncertainty by one 
hundred years. Given the sensitivity results reported above, it is not sur- 
prising that we found that the value of information about damage function 
non-linearity is about five times larger than the value of information about 
the damage function level. 
Finally, we have explored the implications of damage function non- 
linearity for the value of information about a key climate response parameter 
- the equilibrium temperature increase per C02 doubling or "warming raten. 
We valued information about the warming rate for three alternative main- 
tained assumptions about the warming damage function - that  it is linear, 
quadratic, or cubic. We found that the value of information about warm- 
ing rate is much higher if the damage function exhibits highly non-linear 
response to temperature change. Specifically, the value of information is 
about two orders of magnitude greater if the damage function is cubic than 
if it is linear. Thus the value of resolving other global warming uncertainties 
was shown to  be importantly affected by the degree of non-linearity in the 
damage function. 
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Part 3 
Costs: Global Estimates 

What Do Global Models Tell Us About the 
Carbon Taxes Required and the Economic Costs 
Entailed in Reducing C 0 2  Emissions? 
Andrew ~ e a n '  
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Paris, France 
1. Introduction 
Ever since global warming came to  the top of international agenda a few years 
ago, scientists have been intensively engaged in trying to establish the facts 
of climate change while economists have been trying t o  establish values fdr 
the damages that might be entailed and the costs for slowing climate change. 
The emphasis of the economic work has tended t o  be more on costs than on 
benefits (the damage avoided), perhaps because the costs of policies to  slow 
climate change have always looked easier to  gauge than the very uncertain 
costs t o  economic activity of changes in climate. In reality, both sides of the 
account are subject to  enormous margins of uncertainty, as the scientists 
make clear, but the economist typically takes short cuts in moving toward 
quantification. Typically, the economist will not be concerned with scientific 
uncertainties but will start his research with assumptions or model estimates 
of future greenhouse gas emissions and then set out his calculations on the 
basis of some notional reduction in emissions. There may be uncertainties 
concerning the carbon taxes required to  achieve these reductions, but these 
are easily identified in a modeling environment and can be examined by 
using sensitivity analysis. In general, the scientific uncertainties are ignored 
and the focus is put on modeling uncertainties. 
Differences between models arise from many different sources - model 
structures, calibration (parameter estimates), time horizons, degree of sec- 
toral disaggregation, key baseline assumptions, and types of reduction sce- 
narios. Because of these differences, it was usually not possible t o  compare 
like with like across the different studies. Following some initial survey work 
'The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the 
OECD. The author is grateful to Peter Hoeller, Jackie Gardel and other colleagues at 
OECD for their help in preparing this paper. Fuller detail on the results of the OECD 
model comparisons project are referenced in Dean and Hoeller (1992); OECD (1993). 
of the different estimates where such problems were immediately apparent,2 
two different projects were launched to  get some standardization of assump- 
tions and the type of reduction scenario in order t o  be able to make better 
comparisons of results. The first project was organized by the Energy Mod- 
elling Forum (EMF12) of Stanford Uni~ersity.~ They specified assumptions 
on growth rates, population, the resource base and oil prices. These as- 
sumptions were also used in the second project that was organized by the 
Economics Department at the OECD and reported here. The OECD project 
proceeded in close cooperation with the more comprehensive EMF12 exer- 
cise. While EMF12 included many U.S. national models and much energy 
detail, the OECD work focused more on global models and macroeconomic 
costs. The remainder of this paper reviews these global models and its 
 result^.^ 
2. An Overview of the Participating Models 
The major features of the six global models participating in the OECD 
project are given in Table 1. The differences in model type heavily influence 
the sort of comparisons that can be considered here and, in spite of the stan- 
dardization of baseline inputs and scenario design, limit the degree to which 
results are comparable. The various dimensions in which the comparisons 
are constrained is explored below by referring to some of the salient features 
of the models. 
Model type.  There is one comparative-static general equilibrium model, the 
Whalley-Wigle model (WW) which is used to  generate results for the pe- 
riod 1990-2100. It is in the nature of such models that they cannot give 
dynamic paths so that the results cannot therefore be presented alongside 
'Hoeller e t  al. (1991) which was first circulated in mid-1990, covered a wide range of 
both global and national models, comparing emission paths, taxes and costs. Since then, 
Barrett (1991), Boero et al. (1991), Cline (1991) and Nordhaus (1991) have provided 
surveys of the cost of reducing emissions. All these surveys are excellent overview papers 
which try to cover different topics: the paper by Cline (1991) explains five global models 
and results in detail; Boero et al. (1991) focus on differences in model outcomes and 
their causes; Barrett (1991) discusses the issues surrounding the potential use of economic 
instruments to respond to global warming; and Nordhaus (1991) reviews cost estimates 
for reducing COz and CFC emissions as well as the cost of reforestation. 
3See Energy Modelling Forum (1993) and also the paper by John Weyant presented at 
this meeting. 
'More detail is given in Dean and Hoeller (1992), while the full set of project papers 
can be found in OECD (1993). 
Table 1. Summary of participating modelsa. 
Model type Time horizon Regions Fuel sources Comment 
Rutherford recursive dynamic 2100 five seven including focus on impact of 
(CRTM) general equilibrium 
model, calibrated 
on Global 2100 
backstop technologies restrictions on 
international trade; 
tradable permits 
Edmonds-Reilly partial equilibrium 2095 nine six primary and four energy traded; includes 
(ERM) model with detailed secondary fuels other greenhouse gases; 
dynamic energy energy-economy links 
model simple 
GREEN recursive dynamic 2050 
general equilibrium 
model 
IEA econometricdy- 
estimated detailed 
energy model 
Manne-Richels dynamic intertemporal 2100 
(Global 2100) optimizing model with 
(MR) detailed energy model 
twelve three primary and two full trade links plus 
secondary fuels plus tradable permits; oil 
three backstop price endogeneous 
technologies 
ten 
five 
five with many much energy detail for 
product breakdowns OECD regions; no feed- 
back from the energy 
sector t o  the rest 
of the economy 
nine including backstop forward-looking inter- 
technologies temporal model; only 
oil trade is modeled; 
tradable permits 
Whalley- Wigle comparative static 1990-2100 six two 
( w w )  general equilibrium 
model 
trade links; focus on 
international incidence 
of carbon taxes 
"The table describes versions of the models as used for this project. A description of the models and their results is provided in the 
Working Papers written specifically for this project; see Barns et al. (1992), Manne (1992), Oliveira Martins et al. (1992), Rutherford 
(1992), Vouyoukas (1992), and Whalley and Wigle (1992). rn r 
Ln 
the time-paths of the results for the five other models. The IEA model is 
an econometrically-estimated partial equilibrium model of the energy sector 
but it takes no account of economic feedbacks from the energy sectors to  the 
aggregate economy; results can therefore only be given for carbon taxes and 
not for GDP effects. The remaining four models - Edmonds-Reilly (ERM), 
Global 2100 by Manne-Richels (MR), the Carbon Rights Trade Model by 
Rutherford (CRTM) and the OECD model (GREEN) -are all dynamic mod- 
els of a partial or general equilibrium type with differing degrees of sectoral 
and energy detail. 
Time horizon. Four of the models have a long-term horizon that extends to 
the end of the next century - CRTM, ERM, MR and WW - although results 
for the latter for the period 1990-2100 are given as 1990 discounted present 
values. The other models have shorter time horizons - 2050 for GREEN and 
2005 for the IEA. 
Regions. The regional breakdown of the different models does not always 
correspond to the breakdown specified for the project. The breakdown re- 
quested - United States, other OECD, China, the former Soviet Union and 
the Rest of the World (ROW) - is based on MR and is thus also available 
for CRTM. GREEN can also comply with the five-way breakdown. Regional 
comparisons are less valid for ERM and the IEA (which is also incomplete, 
excluding the non-OECD) and most problematic (in the context of this ex- 
ercise) for WW. 
Fuel sources. The GREEN and WW models have less energy detail than the 
other four models. However, WW is the most rudimentary, having only a 
composite fossil fuel and one non-fossil fuel. This means that inter-fossil fuel 
substitution - which is important in most models until well into the next 
century - is not feasible in WW, an important factor to  bear in mind when 
considering the costs of reducing C 0 2  emissions. For the other models, the 
substitution between fuels with different carbon intensities is an important 
part of both baseline emission paths and reduction scenarios. 
Backstop technologies. There are no backstop technologies in WW and ERM, 
an omission which is critical to  the results since there is no effective ceiling 
to  the carbon tax. The IEA model also has much technological detail, but 
backstops are much less important over the short time horizon up to  2005. In 
contrast, MR, CRTM and GREEN have backstop technologies which limit 
the carbon tax and hence the cost of emission reductions. 
Data sources. In addition to the above "structural" differences in the six 
models, there are also significant variations in base-year data. These arise 
from differences in data requirements for the different models, definitional 
differences, different starting points (involving different exchange rates, base- 
year prices and so on) and a significant amount of estimation to get a coher- 
ent 1990 starting point. The most important difference, because it influences 
the business-as-usual (BaU) emissions and the reduction scenario results, is 
the difference in baseline energy prices. Since substitution among fuels is 
largely price-induced, differences in relative energy prices can lead to  con- 
siderable differences in fuel composition, and hence emissions, in the BaU 
scenario. In the reduction scenarios, with carbon taxes being based on ab- 
solute amounts of dollars per unit of carbon embodied in different fuels, the 
relative energy price differences both within and across the models are even 
more important in leading to differences in results. Baseline price differ- 
ences are especially important for China and the former Soviet Union since 
the very large energy subsidies in these regions are not taken into account 
in all of the models. 
3. The Specification of the OECD 
Model Comparisons Project 
Standardization across models was carried out in two key ways; (i) speci- 
fying a few key economic assumptions for the baseline or BaU scenario of 
unconstrained COz emissions growth, and (ii) specifying a set of common 
simulations for reducing C02  emissions. 
Business-as-usual (Ba U )  emissions; key assumptions 
Modelers were asked to assume the growth paths for real GDP and popula- 
tion agreed for the parallel project of the Energy Modelling Forum at  Stan- 
ford University as well as a common resource base and oil price assumption. 
The key assumptions are: 
(i) population rises from 5.3 billion in 1990 to  9.5 billion in 2050 and to  10.4 
billion by 2100, by which time it is hardly growing at all (World Bank 
projections); nearly all of the growth is in China and other developing 
countries; 
(ii) output growth slows down throughout the next century - from 2.5 percent 
per annum in the 1990s in OECD countries to  only one percent by 2100, 
and from 4 percent to less than 3 percent in developing countries; 
(iii) oil prices are set exogenously at $26 per barrel in 1990 rising by $6 per 
decade in real terms to reach $50 in 2030, being unchanged thereafter. 
Reduction scenarios 
Three of the scenarios are specified in terms of reductions (from the BaU 
emission path) in the growth rate of emissions for each region - by 1, 2 and 
3 percentage points per annum, respectively. In this way, the amount of 
the reduction, in percentage terms, will be similar across models, although 
the starting points (baseline) and destination will vary. Using this method 
implies that most of the differences between models can be ascribed to model 
structures rather than being a hybrid, representing both different model 
structures and different degrees of reduction - as in target level exercises. 
The fourth scenario is a stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels in each 
region. This would be most stringent for those regions, such as China and 
ROW, where BaU emission growth is most rapid, and least stringent for the 
OECD. 
The emission reduction scenarios are applied to all regions, even though 
the baseline emission growth varies significantly. These reductions are in no 
way a recommendation or proposal. Uniform reductions in all regions have 
been suggested for purely expositional reasons and considerations of equity, 
and political feasibility have been ignored. Clearly, the 3 percent scenario 
would be regarded as extreme, although it is relatively close to the IPCC 
scenario for stabilizing concentrations by the middle of the next century. The 
one percent scenario would represent an approximate stabilization of OECD 
emissions and perhaps those in the former Soviet Union too - although this 
varies across the different baselines - while still permitting a relatively rapid 
growth of emissions elsewhere. The 2 percent scenario, on the other hand, 
would require absolute cuts in emissions in the OECD and the former Soviet 
Union and allow some continued, albeit very low growth elsewhere. The 
policy instrument used to  achieve these emission curbs is a carbon tax, i.e., 
a tax levied on the carbon content of primary energy sources. 
4. CCBusiness-as-Usual" Emission Paths 
Even with a standardization of assumptions on growth, population and re- 
sources, the BaU emission paths vary greatly across the models. World 
emissions grow more rapidly over the short to  medium-term in GREEN and 
IEA than in the other models (Figure 1 and Table 2). ERM shows the 
slowest emission growth. The emissions in GREEN are growing by up to 
one-half percent per annum faster than in ERM, despite the assumption 
of the same autonomous energy efficiency improvement of one percent per 
annum. Hence, a gap of over 1.5 billion tons of carbon opens up by 2020 
between the top and bottom of the range of models, the 10.8 billion tons of 
GREEN and the 8.2 billion tons of ERM (Table 2). 
The divergent emission paths for the earlier period open up much far- 
ther in later years, so that world emission projections for the year 2100 are 
almost a magnitude of two different (Figure 1). Of course what may look 
to  be relatively small differences in annual growth rates of COz emissions 
compound over a century into significant differences in terms of levels (Table 
2). The average growth rate of emissions over the entire period of 1990-2100 
is 1.3 percent in ERM, 1.6 percent in CRTM and 1.7 percent in MR. But the 
spread between the lowest and highest emissions in 2100 - 22.5 billion tons 
of carbon in ERM and 39.5 billion tons in MR - is quite startling. WW has a 
point estimate for 2100 of 65.5 billion tons (and an average growth through- 
out the period of 2.3 percent), but this seems to  reflect both an extremely 
pessimistic assessment of no autonomous energy efficiency improvements and 
the lack of substitution possibilities imposed by the two-fuel structure of the 
model. All of the model estimates are nevertheless above the new IPCC 
reference case (in the 1992 IPCC Supplement work) of 19.8 billion tons of 
carbon in 2100. However, five other scenarios are now given by the IPCC, 
ranging from 4.6 billion tons (a low population, lower growth, and low oil and 
gas availability scenario) to 34.9 billion tons (with more rapid improvement 
of GNP per capita, a nuclear phase-out and plentiful fossil resources). 
The importance of the autonomous energy efficiency parameter (AEEI) 
in contributing to  the large differences in emissions has been revealed by some 
sensitivity testing (as shown in Table 2). In an alternative BaU scenario, 
using ERM but reducing AEEI from one percent per annum to one-half per 
cent in all regions (roughly the MR assumption), world emissions rise from 
the previous 22.5 billion tons to  around 42 billion tons by the end of the next 
century, much in line with the MR results (although there are some offsetting 
factors that lie behind these rather close results). A similar exercise with 
MR, this time increasing its AEEI to one percent per annum in all regions, 
leads to  emissions in 2100 of 26 billion tons, much closer to the standard 
ERM result of 22.5 billion tons. 
The wide range of estimates for BaU emissions through the end of the 
next century contrasts rather starkly with the precise numbers set out in the 
1990 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
However, the IPCC now presents a variety of scenarios with a very wide 
range of 2100 emissions (IPCC 1992 Supplement). Clearly, a high degree of 
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Table 2. World BaU COz  emissions. 
CRTM ERM(1) ERM(2) GREEN(1) GREEN(2) IEAa MR(1) MR(2) W W  
1990 6.003 5.767 5.767 5.815 5.815 5.919 6.003 6.003 [av . 
2000 6.931 ... . . . 7.071 7.41 8 7.316 6.970 6.74 8 1990 
2005 ... 6.709 7.856 7.704 8.250 7.932 ... ... t o  
2010 8.031 . . . . . . 8.705 9.452 . . .  8.153 7.581 2100 
2020 9.327 8.180 10.505 10.806 11.938 . . . 9.520 8.681 is 
2050 11.337 11.838 17.606 18.998 21.769 . . . 14.992 11.356 25.21 
2080 23.519 18.099 32.185 . . . . . .  . .. 26.945 18.701 
2100 35.863 2 2 . ~ 7 9 ~  4 1 . 5 9 4 ~  . . . ... . . . 39.636 26.039 65.5 
IEA model projections in this table have been adjusted t o  exclude non-fossil solid fuels, bunkers, non-energy use of fossil fuels 
and petrochemical feedstocks. These categories, included in the standard IEA model output,  have not been excluded from the tables 
in the Appendix or from the results reported in the IEA paper and add around 900 million tons to  the 1990 global figure of carbon 
emissions. 
b2095. 
Note: In the three cases (ERM, MR, GREEN) where two emission paths are indicated, the first column denotes the standard model 
and the italicized second column shows the sensitivity t o  a different assumption on the autonomous energy efficiency improvement 
(AEEI). ERM(l) ,  GREEN(1) and MR(2) have an AEEI of 1 percent per annum while ERM(2), GREEN(2) and MR(1) have an AEEI 
CRTM = Carbon Rights Trade Model (see Rutherford, 1992). 
ERM = Edmonds-Reilly Model (see Barns et  al., 1992). 
GREEN = OECD Model (see Oliveira Martins et  al., 1992). 
of one-half percent per annum. IEA = International Energy Agency Model (see Vouyoukas, 1992). 
MR = Manne-Richels Global 2100 Model (see Manne, 1992). 
WW = Whalley-Wigle Model (see Whalley and Wigle, 1992). 
uncertainty attaches to  all of these numbers and this of course complicates 
the task of looking a t  the cost of reaching specific targets set in terms of C 0 2  
emission levels. This is one reason why the current comparisons project has 
been focused mostly on reductions in the growth rates of emissions rather 
than on target levels. 
5.  Analysis of the Reduction Scenarios 
What are the carbon taxes required? 
The carbon taxes required to reduce world C 0 2  emissions to  certain levels 
in terms of billions of tons of carbon are set out in Figure 2 in a series of 
marginal tax  curves for the years 2000,2020,2050 and 2100. Each curve plots 
out for each model the results of cutting the growth rate of C 0 2  emissions in 
each region by 1 , 2  and 3 percentage points plus the scenario for stabilization 
of emissions a t  1990 levels (about 6 billion tons). These global tax curves 
are an emission-weighted average of regional tax curves. Note that  the BaU 
starting points, i.e., the emissions a t  a zero carbon tax  (along the horizontal 
axis), vary significantly by the later periods, as discussed in the previous 
section. The main conclusions stemming from the tax curves shown in Figure 
2 are the following: 
The curvature indicates the need for increasing marginal tax increments 
per unit of reduction in carbon emitted. There are diminishing marginal 
returns to  the tax as cheaper options to reduce emissions are taken first, 
but it becomes increasingly more difficult t o  substitute for or economize 
on fossil fuels. Furthermore, squeezing out the very last units of carbon 
would entail very high carbon taxes, the world average tax being more 
than $500 per ton (equivalent t o  $60 on a barrel of oil) in both 2050 and 
2100. 
Ln the earlier periods (2000 and 2020) the model results for the world 
t ax  curves line up reasonably together, but this is no longer the case 
(noting also the change in scales in Figure 2) once deep cuts are being 
made in the later years (2050 and 2100). This is because there are no 
backstop technologies (unlimited supplies of new, but more expensive, 
carbon-free fuels) in ERM so that there is no limit to the rise in the tax. 
Hence, already by 2050, ERM has taxes which rise beyond $1,000 a ton, 
and these taxes rise to  above $2,000 a ton by 2100. The backstops act 
to limit the rise in the required tax  in CRTM, MR and GREEN because 
switching to  new technologies is induced by higher carbon taxes.5 
What are the costs involved? 
The average economic costs for reducing emissions are closely related to  
the level of carbon taxes required t o  ensure the reductions, although there 
is no simple one-to-one link as many factors come into play. The best cost 
measure to  focus on would be some measure of economic welfare: such as the 
Hicksiail equivalent variation7 that  is computed by GREEN and WW. This 
is not, however, available for any other models which give results only for 
production-side measures such as GDP. Although GDP is a familiar measure 
of output, it is only a partial indicator of welfare, failing to  take into account, 
inter alia, changes in the terms of trade (which can be especially important 
for oil-producing countries) and the consumption losses due to  the tax. The 
GDP losses across models are shown in a series of abatement cost curves 
in Figure 3, with world losses being plotted against reductions in terms of 
billions of tons of carbon for four snapshot years, in the same way as with 
the  corresponding tax curves in Figure 2. 
The  initial GDP costs in 2000 lie between one and 3 percent of GDP 
in the  case of the fastest cut in emissions (3 percentage points per annum) 
while the costs in the 2 percent case are perhaps half or  less. This reflects 
the upward curvature of the tax curves, indicating again that  the speed of 
adjustment is itself important. By 2020 the range of GDP losses for the 
largest cuts (3 percent reduction case) is from 3 to  6 per cent of GDP and 
by 2100 the range is 4 to  8 percent. The greatest loss is shown by ERM, 
51n CRTM and MR, backstop technologies restrict the tax t o  just over $200 per ton in 
all regions except for the former Soviet Union, the latter exception means that  the  average 
world tax in these models is still rising steeply in 2100 for continuing emission cuts. In 
GREEN, the tax level a t  which the switch t o  backstop technologies occurs depends on the 
initial starting point for the prices of different fuels. This is particularly important for the 
non-OECD regions because initial energy prices are often far below world prices, so tha t  
much higher taxes than in the OECD regions are needed before the backstop technologies 
become competitive. 
'In the context of this modeling project, which focuses on the costs of policies t o  slow 
climate change and ignores the benefits (the damage avoided), the welfare being measured 
refers only t o  the cost side; if, in addition, one took into account the benefits, then one 
would have an overall measure of the welfare effects of policy change and could then judge 
the optimal level of abatement. 
7The Hicksian equivalent variation is the increase in income tha t  a consumer would 
need before the imposition of a carbon tax t o  allow him to reach the welfare level actually 
attained after the change in policy. 
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reflecting both the highest tax (Figure 2) and also a fairly rigid link between 
energy prices and GDP that even the authors tend to  doubt (Barns et al., 
1992). 
6. Stabilization of Emissions 
The stabilization scenario has an entirely different character from the other 
reduction scenarios. Stabilization of emissions a t  1990 levels is an abso- 
lute target and hence the required carbon taxes and its associated costs are 
strongly dependent on the BaU emissions. In principle the results could 
indeed be inferred from the analysis of the BaU scenarios in Section 4 and 
from the reduction scenarios given above, with large reductions (similar to  
the 2 or 3 percent case) being required in most models for China and ROW in 
order to  stabilize emissions and smaller reductions (similar to the 1 percent 
case) being required for the OECD regions and the former Soviet Union. As 
can be seen from the BaU scenarios (Figure 1) the size of cuts to  achieve 
stabilization will have to  be greatest for W W  and then for GREEN and the 
IEA while the smallest cuts will be for ERM. In comparing the models, it is 
necessary to  consider the different BaU paths and hence the size of the cuts. 
The interest of the stabilization scenario is that the climate change con- 
vention signed in Rio in June 1992 incorporated the goal for developed coun- 
tries in stabilizing all greenhouse gas emissions a t  1990 levels. This was not a 
firm undertaking, but much of the discussions in international negotiations 
preceding the signing revolved around a stabilization objective. It is not 
clear, however, that the degree of uncertainty over both the BaU emission 
paths themselves and the costs involved in reining COz emissions to  1990 
levels has been fully recognized. 
The main results for these scenarios are presented in Figures 4 and 5. 
Several general features stand out, as follows: 
(i) The carbon tax for the OECD regions is highest in the IEA model and 
lowest for GREEN from 2010 onwards. The IEA result is as expected; 
baseline emission growth is relatively fast and the reduction scenarios 
indicate higher taxes than elsewhere for any particular reduction. The 
ERM result, in the middle of the pack, is also not surprising; the required 
tax was higher in the out years than for others, but baseline emission 
growth is much slower. The relatively low tax in GREEN is related t o  
two factors: first, BaU emission growth for the OECD regions in GREEN 
is relatively low, even though world emissions are growing much faster 
than in the other models and, second, backstop technologies start to  
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become important in GREEN as from 2010, given both the assumptions 
on cost and the differences in base year relative energy prices across 
OECD countries. The CRTM and MR results lie between the extremes 
but are rather volatile before settling down at  the backstop-related tax 
($208 per ton) in the second half of the next century. 
(ii) For non-OECD regions, a major feature is the erratic tax paths, espe- 
cially for CRTM and MR in the case of the former Soviet Union and, to  
a lesser extent, for China. For the former Soviet Union, this is related t o  
the slowing and then absolute fall in BaU emissions growth in the first 
half of the next century; for China it is related t o  backstop prices and 
the move to  an equilibrium tax of $208 per ton of carbon by 2080. The 
GREEN and ERM tax curves are rather smoother and indeed rather 
close in the case of China, though the ERM tax climbs steeply in typical 
fashion. 
(iii) The GDP costs associated with the stabilization scenario are relatively 
small in the case of the OECD regions and the former Soviet Union but 
very large in the case of China and ROW. These costs in general mirror 
rather closely the required tax rates. The taxes and costs are so much 
higher for China and ROW because the BaU emissions growth is so rapid 
and therefore the necessary cut-backs so large. The political reality, of 
course, is that these regions would not accept a stabilization target, a t  
least not without massive compensating transfers from other countries. 
(iv) Backstop technologies, in CRTM, GREEN and MR, put a limit on the 
carbon tax and GDP losses incurred in stabilizing emissions, although 
not for the former Soviet Union where emissions growth is anyway rather 
modest. 
7. Cost-Effective Reductions in Emissions 
The range of taxes and abatement costs across regions in the different reduc- 
tion scenarios suggests the potential for savings in the global cost of reducing 
emissions. If, a t  the margin, it is more expensive (as reflected in the carbon 
tax rates) for one region to  achieve the reduction objective than another, then 
it is in principle possible t o  achieve a mutually-beneficial redistribution of 
the emission reductions between regions. To achieve a globally cost-effective 
reduction in emissions, the marginal costs of abatement, as reflected in the 
regional carbon taxes, should be equated across regions. All the models in- 
dicate that  equi-proportionate cuts in emissions are incompatible with this 
condition. A system of emission trading between countries or regions or a 
global carbon tax would allow cuts in emissions to be concentrated where 
abatement is cheapest. Emissions trading, for instance, if feasible, would 
allow for a more efficient distribution of emission reductions across region by 
letting the countries trade emission rights to the point where carbon taxes 
were the same in all countries. A global carbon tax would also lead to the 
marginal cost for reducing emissions being equal for all countries. 
Three of the models in the comparison project (ERM, GREEN and MR) 
have carried out an emissions-trading scenario. The results for emissions 
trading for 2020, 2050 and 2100 in the case of the 2 percent scenario are 
shown in Table 3. The largest gain is for GREEN; with larger cuts in the 
regions where abatement is cheapest and smaller reductions elsewhere, the 
global output loss halves from 2 percent to one percent of GDP in 2020. 
All of the models point t o  gains from this type of emissions trading (Table 
3). However, the gains are less in the models with a smaller dispersion in 
carbon taxes in the no-trade case, for instance ERM and MR. Furthermore, 
the dispersion of taxes narrows with time as backstop technologies come into 
play so that the gains from emissions trading diminish correspondingly. This 
can be seen from the GREEN results for 2050 where the gain from trading 
is less than in 2020. The sums involved in emissions trading are significant. 
In 2050, they range from $200 billion in GREEN to  over $400 billion in MR, 
but the revenues fall off thereafter in MR as the backstops reduce the tax 
dispersion and hence the potential gains from trade. This underlines again 
the critical importance of the assumptions on backstop technologies for all 
aspects in assessing taxes and costs, including the gains from cost-effective 
agreements. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
The major findings of the project are as follows: 
1. There is a wide range of "business-as-usual" emission paths with world- 
wide carbon emissions in 2100 lying between 224 billion tons and 40 
billion tons; these numbers are all above the IPCC's 1992 reference case 
(20 billion tons in 2100), although the IPCC also gives a wide spread for 
alternative scenarios. 
2. Such a wide range of emissions, even with standardization of population 
and output assumptions, points to  a considerable unresolved uncertainty 
about future emissions. 
3. A factor identified as being particularly important in determining emis- 
sions is the rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement which 
Table 3. Cost differences for emission trading. Numbers refer to  a 2 per- 
centage point reduction in emissions from the baseline and are global aggre- 
gates. 
ERMa GREEN MR 
Tax GDP Tax GDP Tax GDP 
($/tC) loss (%) ($/tC) loss (%) ($/tC) lossb 
2020 No trade 283 1.9 149 1.9 325 . . . 
Trade 238 1.6 106 1 .O 308 . . .  
2050 No trade 680 3.7 230 2.6 448 . . .  
Trade 498 3.3 182 1.9 374 . . .  
2100 No trade 1,304 5.7 . . .  . . .  242 8.0 
Trade 919 5.1 . . . . . . 208 7.5 
aEnd-year is 2095 for ERM. 
bConsumption losses through 2100 -discounted to 1990 at 5 percent per year - in trillions 
of 1990 dollars. 
ranges from zero t o  1 percent per annum in the models surveyed; a dif- 
ference of 0.5 percent in this parameter, given compounding, can lead 
t o  an outcome in 2100 which is as much as 20 billion tons different. Un- 
certainty about the size of this parameter is likely to remain large as it 
depends on future technical progress. 
4. There are especially large differences in the projections of emissions for 
China; one particularly important factor seems to  be the prices of fossil 
fuels used in the different models, with the fastest growth in emissions 
being projected by the GREEN model which takes account of the  exist- 
ing distortions in energy prices, hence building in relatively low prices. 
5. Carbon taxes vary greatly across regions and across models. In most 
of the models there are rising tax curves, indicating that  successive re- 
ductions in emissions can only be achieved by ever-larger increases in 
carbon taxes. The  early cuts would be relatively cheap but substantial 
cuts would require very high taxes. For instance, cutting emissions in 
the United States in 2020 by 45 percent from baseline (as in the 2 per- 
cent reduction scenario) would require carbon taxes ranging from $200 
t o  $350 per ton, compared with current energy taxes in the United States 
which are the equivalent of about $30 per ton of carbon. But deeper cuts 
would see taxes in both the United States and other regions rise towards 
$1,000 or more. An important exception is provided by the MR, GREEN 
and CRTM models which incorporate carbon-free backstop technologies. 
As soon as large supplies of newly-developed carbon-free fuels become 
available, their price puts a ceiling on the required carbon tax. More 
information on the likely costs and speed of diffusion of such backstop 
technologies is needed. 
6. The economic costs, measured here as GDP losses, also vary greatly 
across models and regions. The GDP loss is generally rather high for 
the Rest of the  World region which includes the major oil-producing 
developing countries, but for the other regions the losses are less and 
there are different regional rankings of abatement costs across models. 
In the  case of the 2 percent reduction scenario, the GDP loss in 2020 
ranges from one-half to  2 percent of GDP in the OECD regions and 
from roughly one-half t o  3 percent of GDP in China and the former 
Soviet Union. In the case of a stabilization scenario (keeping emissions 
a t  1990 levels), the GDP loss in the year 2020 ranges between about 
zero and 2 percent of GDP for the OECD regions and the former Soviet 
Union, but is more likely t o  be 3 to  3.5 percent of GDP for China, 
where the cuts needed t o  stabilize emissions would be greatest. As with 
regard t o  tax curves, the GDP losses tend t o  rise more steeply as the 
degree of reduction increases, except when backstop technologies limit 
the tax, even though it is assumed that  carbon taxes are offset by tax  
cuts elsewhere and are hence revenue-neut ral. 
7. Emissions trading has the potential t o  greatly reduce both the global and 
regional cost of emission reductions because there is a wide dispersion of 
carbon taxes and abatement costs across regions. The abatement costs 
are almost halved in the GREEN model, but the gains in two other 
models (ERM and MR) are less significant. 
A word of caution is necessary regarding the nature of model compar- 
isons in this paper. None of the scenarios presented here are in any way 
a policy prescription. The scenarios have been used as an expositional de- 
vice t o  illustrate technical differences in the models. There are important 
policy messages from this work but none of the scenarios is being actively 
proposed in the current negotiations. Stabilization of emissions, however, 
has been adopted as a goal in the draft framework agreement but only for 
the developed countries. Furthermore, the costs of reducing energy-related 
C 0 2  emissions are only one part of a complex problem which must take into 
account other sources and sinks of C 0 2 ,  other greenhouse gases, and the 
uncertain estimates of the impact of climate change. 
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Tentative Conclusions from Energy Modeling 
Forum Study Number 12 on Controlling 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions* 
Dan'us W .  Gaskins, Jr. 
High Street Associates, Boston, MA, USA 
John P. Weyant 
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA 
Concern about the extent of global climate change and its potential conse- 
quences has increased dramatically in recent years. Many believe that un- 
precedented climate changes are - or soon will be - occurring as the result of 
man-made emissions of greenhouse gases. There remain large uncertainties, 
however, about the relationship between emissions of greenhouse gases and 
their atmospheric concentrations, about the link between atmospheric con- 
centrations and global climate change, about whether extraordinary changes 
in climate are actually occurring, and about the impacts of climate changes 
on people and ecosystems. 
The largest man-made source of greenhouse gases is carbon dioxide pro- 
duced by the combustion of fossil fuels in utility and industrial boilers, and in 
internal combustion engines. Thus, any effort t o  reduce greenhouse gas emis- 
sions will start with efforts to  restrict these activities. Therefore, it seems 
essential to  develop a range of projections of the likely costs of alternative 
levels of control of carbon emissions from the energy sector. 
A fundamental challenge facing policy makers is the need for all or most 
of the world's large countries to  co-operate in restricting greenhouse gas emis- 
sions; greenhouse gas emissions anywhere affect atmospheric concentrations 
(and climate) everywhere. The 24 developed countries that  are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) cur- 
rently produce slightly less than half of the world's carbon dioxide emissions, 
and that  percentage, even in the absence of emissions controls, is projected 
t o  decrease dramatically by the middle of the next century (to one third or so 
*D.W. Gaskins was Chairman of the EMF 12 Working Group, and J.P. Weyant is Director 
of the Energy Modeling Forum. The full EMF 12 working group report is to be published 
as  a book entitled Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions; Costs and Policy Options in late 
1993. The contributions of the almost one hundred individuals who contributed to the 
EMF 12 study are acknowledged there. The conclusions reported here have been reviewed 
by the working group several times, but have not yet been finalized. 
of the world total). Thus, if only the OECD countries control emissions, that 
may have only a very minor impact on world emissions and world climate. 
If only part of the OECD participates the impact would be even less. 
The twelfth Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) working group met five 
times from September 1990 to May 1992 to compare alternative projections 
of the impacts of a number of greenhouse gas emission control scenarios. The 
working group specified thirteen standardized scenarios reflecting a range of 
carbon emission control levels, as well as sensitivities on key standardized 
inputs. These scenarios were ultimately implemented by fourteen modeling 
teams employing a wide variety of techno-economic models (see Appendix), 
although not every model could implement every scenario. In addition to 
these model comparisons, ten study groups were formed to analyze issues 
not being addressed by the fourteen models and thirteen scenarios. These 
groups used additional models and methods to analyze issues not addressed 
in the thirteen original scenarios. 
1. Basic Control Scenarios 
Six of the thirteen EMF 12 scenarios employed the same GDP, population, 
resource availability, and technology assumptions, but consider different lev- 
els and rates of C 0 2  emissions control. 
1. Reference - no control; 
2. 20% Reduction - a 20% reduction in C 0 2  emissions in the developed 
countries and no more than a 50% increase in the developing countries 
relative to 1990 levels by 2010; 
3 .  50% Reduction - the same as (2), but with an additional reduction in 
C 0 2  emissions in the developed countries to 50% below their 1990 levels 
by 2050; 
4. Stabilization - hold C 0 2  emissions in the developed countries to  their 
1990 levels by the year 2000, with the developing countries again con- 
strained to no more than 50% above their 1990 levels; 
5. a Phased-In Carbon Tax that escalates from $15 per ton in 1990 at  5% 
real per year; and 
6. a 2% Points Per Year Reduction in emissions relative to  the Reference 
case. 
In implementing these scenarios, the modeling teams generally used 
taxes based on the carbon content of fossil fuels to achieve the emissions 
reductions (except for the government revenues a carbon tax would pro- 
duce, this formulation is equivalent to  a system of carbon emissions permit 
trading). These carbon tax projections provide us with a rough estimate of 
the degree of market intervention that will be required t o  achieve the car- 
bon emission reductions. Most of the models included anticipated results 
from new technology development and conservation programs in the Ref- 
erence case. However, in these models there is no explicit consideration of 
market imperfections that  may be causing current energy consumption pat- 
terns to  differ from what perfectly functioning competitive markets would 
produce. More efficient, but more expensive, technologies are generally se- 
lected in the control scenarios, but no additional technology development is 
generally assumed t o  occur. Only one model adds additional conservation 
programs explicitly in those scenarios, and only one other model includes en- 
dogenously determined rates of technological change. Finally, in their initial 
implementation of these scenarios the modeling teams assumed no interna- 
tional emissions trading, lump sum rebate of any tax revenues collected, and 
no carbon offsets, such as those that might result from tree planting. A num- 
ber of general points can be made from examining cost of control projections 
for these scenarios. 
The impact of these control options on global climate change over the 
next twenty years may be quite limited. Even in the most tightly controlled 
scenarios, the reduction in cumulative COz emissions over this period are 
projected to  be no more than 25% relative t o  the Reference case. The impact 
of the control programs on atmospheric concentrations of C 0 2  and climate 
change over that time period would be even less. By 2050, however, the 50% 
Reduction scenario results in cumulative emissions that  are as much as 100% 
below those projected in the Reference case. 
Despite the inclusion of improved technologies and improved energy ef- 
ficiencies in the Reference case, all models project that market intervention 
will be required t o  achieve each of the emissions targets in all regions. When 
the more stringent carbon limits are considered, many models project the 
intervention required would be equivalent to  carbon taxes of hundreds of 
dollars per metric ton. For example, the projections of the average carbon 
tax required during 2000 t o  2020 to  reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 2010 
by 20% with respect t o  their 1990 level range from $50 t o  $330 dollars per 
metric ton. The projections of the average carbon tax required during 2000 
t o  2020 t o  limit carbon emissions in China to  no more than 50% more than 
1990 emissions range from $25 to  $200 per metric ton. 
These carbon taxes would generate substantial tax revenues that could 
be used for a number of purposes including reducing other taxes, deficit re- 
duction, and additional government spending. For example, the projections 
of the average annual tax revenues raised in the U.S. from 2000 t o  2020 t o  
achieve the 20% reduction in C 0 2  emissions range from $65 Billion to  $300 
Billion. Projections of average annual tax  revenues raised in China from 
2000 to  2020 t o  limit emissions to  50% above 1990 levels range from $20 
Billion to  almost $200 Billion. 
The impact of a carbon tax on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures 
its costs to the economy in terms of lost output resulting from the increase 
in the price of goods requiring carbon emissions; those goods must either be 
produced with less carbon or by more expensive processes. The GDP loss 
also includes the impact of the carbon tax on capital stock accumulation and 
technological progress although not all models capture these phenomena. 
The models initially assumed lump-sum redistribution of tax revenues; that  
is, tax  revenues are used to reduce total tax  payments by individuals and 
corporations without affecting marginal tax  rates (for example, by reducing 
the standard deduction). The GDP losses calculated in this manner measure 
the cost of the distortions to the economy caused by the imposition of the 
carbon tax  without either adding a credit or subtracting a penalty for the  
way the revenues are used. Under this assumption, and assuming no adverse 
trade effects, the model projections of the cost of stabilizing C 0 2  emissions 
a t  today's levels range from . l% t o  .5% of GDP in 2000 for the U.S. and the 
cost of achieving a 20% reduction in C 0 2  emissions relative t o  today's level 
range from .9% t o  1.7% of U.S. GDP in 2010. Although 1.7% of U.S. GDP 
in 2010 amounts t o  about $130 Billion 1990 dollars, the reduction in the 
GDP growth rate between 1990 and 2010 would only be reduced form about 
2.3% per year t o  2.25% per year. Thus, it is possible t o  reduce emissions 
significantly from their non-controlled level without eliminating the growth 
of the economy. 
The way in which carbon tax revenues are used has an important impact 
on the GDP loss. The projected GDP losses could be reduced substantially 
(relative t o  those calculated for the lump-sum recycling case) by using the  
carbon tax revenues t o  reduce existing taxes that  discourage economic ac- 
tivity, particularly capital formation. Simulations with 4 models of t he U.S. 
economy indicate that  from 35% to  more than 100% of the GDP losses could 
ultimately be offset by recycling revenues through cuts in existing taxes. 
Regardless of where a model ranks in terms of the cost for a particular 
level of control in a particular year, there is a great deal of similarity in 
how the models project costs will vary over time for a particular level of 
control, and with respect to  the level of control in any particular year. First, 
the cost of a particular level of control generally increases over time as the 
reference level of emissions grows and more adjustments must be made t o  
reach a fixed level of emissions. For example, assuming lump-sum recycling 
of carbon tax revenues, projections of the cost of stabilizing emissions in 
the U.S. range from .l% to .5% of GDP in 2000 and from .2% to 1.0% of 
GDP in 2010. In the longer term, say by 2050 or 2060, low-cost oil and gas 
reserves are near depletion and the cost of reducing emissions depends on 
the difference between the cost of carbon-free sources, like solar cells and 
advanced technology nuclear reactors, and carbon-based sources of energy, 
like synthetic oil and gas made from coal or advanced coal-fired power plants. 
Second, the cost of control appears to be non-linear with respect to the 
level of control in any given year, especially up to about 2040 before old 
fossil-fuel based energy producing and consuming equipment can be fully 
retired and new carbon-free technologies can be fully introduced. That is, 
incremental reductions in allowable emissions cost more as the absolute level 
of allowed emissions in any particular year is reduced. For example, the cost 
of stabilizing emissions in the U.S. range from .2% to 1.0% of GDP in 2010, 
while the cost of reducing emissions by 20% in that year range from .9% 
to 1.7% of GDP. In fact, during the period up to 2040 sharply increasing 
costs for the more extreme control levels in any one year can even offset the 
tendency of the costs of controlling to any level to increase over time. 
If the OECD, or any other group of countries unilaterally implements a 
carbon reduction program, resulting changes in international energy prices 
will cause carbon emissions in other countries to increase relative to refer- 
ence case levels. Increased carbon emissions by non-participating regions 
occur both as a result of increased energy intensity of economic activity and 
through the migration of energy-intensive production into unconstrained re- 
gions. Carbon restrictions place countries who control a t  a competitive dis- 
advantage in energy-intensive industries. Thus, the cost to countries who 
control increases with the level of cutback, but the impact on global emis- 
sions may drop off sharply if large groups of countries fail to co-operate in 
controlling emissions. 
The non-linearity of year by year costs of control, the tendency of this 
non-linearity to  decrease over time as new technologies can be more fully 
phased in, as well as potential problems with recycling large amounts of tax 
revenues and dealing with large international trade shifts suggest that there 
is a tradeoff between the cost of meeting an annual emissions target and the 
emissions generated before the target is reached. Moreover, the cumulative 
cost of meeting any cumulative emissions reduction target can be reduced 
if it is phased in over a longer period of time. If a fixed annual emissions 
rate target is specified, cumulative costs can be reduced with some increase 
in short-term emissions if: (a) more time is allowed for reaching the target, 
and (b) the instrument(s) used to achieve it - say a carbon tax - is phased 
in gradually rather than abruptly. The cost reduction can be particularly 
significant if the target date and rate of implementation are set to  allow new 
carbon-free technologies to  be phased in smoothly. If discounting of future 
costs is included in the calculation (as some would argue is required to  insure 
an  optimal allocation of society's resources over time), the reduction in costs 
resulting from a slower phase-in of controls is even greater. 
More greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may impose additional costs 
on society, though, so it may not be optimal to delay the imposition of 
constraints indefinitely. These costs depend on atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases which depend on cumulative emissions over time rather 
than a single year's emissions rate. The 20% Reduction scenario leads to  high 
short run adjustment costs according to  the models included in this study. 
They project that  almost the same reduction in cumulative COz emissions 
reductions (and no more than a 20% increase in cumulative carbon emissions) 
can be achieved with the Phased-in Tax by the middle of the next century 
with a 30-40% reduction in cumulative costs (even without discounting of 
future costs). 
The models display a wide range of cost projections for the scenarios 
considered depending on both the features the modelers have incorporated 
in their models and the way they have implemented the scenarios. The 
cost of control projections are also sensitive to  variations in standardized 
input assumptions. We begin by discussing the results for alternative policy 
scenarios. 
2. Additional Policy Options 
A combination of policies imposed on each of the major greenhouse gases 
and implemented in a way that allows new technologies t o  be developed and 
implemented in a smooth manner, will be much less costly than aggressive 
pursuit of a single policy option. 
In the EMF 12 Emissions Tmding scenario, a common carbon tax  is 
imposed in all regions until the same amount of global emissions allowed in 
the 20% Reduction scenario is achieved. In the near term, there is a moderate 
amount of emissions trading from the developing countries t o  the developed 
countries, resulting in a 30-60% reduction in the GDP loss that  results 
from the 20% Reduction scenario. However, by 2040 or so, the developing 
countries are assumed to  have deployed the same large-scale technologies as 
the developed countries, so there are no additional gains t o  emissions trading 
beyond that  point. 
Both carbon and Btu taxes have a bigger impact on COz emissions 
when imposed a t  the primary energy production level, e.g., a t  the point 
of extraction, rather than a t  the wholesale or retail level, whereas an ad 
valorem tax has the largest impact when imposed at  the end-use level. In 
addition, stabilization of COz emissions can be achieved a t  lower costs when 
imposed a t  the primary energy level than at  the wholesale or retail level. 
Also, it is difficult to insure that any emissions target will actually be met 
if a permit trading system is implemented a t  the wholesale or retail level, 
because unintended shifts in upstream fuel choices may result. 
The Energy Security study group examined the energy security implica- 
tions of the alternative emissions control scenarios and concluded that they 
would have only a minor impact on energy security. The main short-run im- 
pact of the control scenarios is t o  substitute gas, conservation and alternative 
sources for coal, leaving oil use relatively unaffected. 
A gradually phased in carbon tax with the tax revenues recycled pro- 
portionally does not appear to result in major impacts on the distribution 
of income by income level. With the exception of the coal industry, which 
would experience a significant contraction over the next twenty years, the 
impact on individual industries is also likely to be small. 
3. Sensitivity Analyses 
The cost of carbon constraints also depends significantly on the assumptions 
made about the cost of carbon free technologies relative to  the cost of carbon 
emitting ones. To explore this sensitivity the group examined an Accelerated 
Technology scenario in which the cost of non-carbon energy supply tech- 
nologies (e.g., solar or advanced nuclear) in the 20% Reduction scenario are 
assumed to be reduced to  the cost of carbon based ones (synfuels and coal- 
fired electric generation) by 2010. According to  all the models, this scenario 
reduces the annual cost of achieving the carbon constraint to  zero by the lat- 
ter part of the 21st century. The costs of the constraint during the early part 
of the next century are not nearly as significantly reduced (only 10-30%), 
however, because conventional fossil fuel technologies are still being used and 
because of constraints on the introduction of the new carbon-free technolo- 
gies that  cause additional costs to be incurred until large scale introduction 
of the new technologies can be completed. This latter effect re-enforces the 
large cost-of-adjustment effect observed above. Up until about 2040 the re- 
quired carbon tax exceeds by a substantial margin the zero difference in the 
costs of carbon-based and carbon-free backstop technologies. 
The study design includes a 2.2% growth rate in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) for the U.S. over the next thirty years. Two of the models included 
in the study produced independent GDP projections of 2.0% and 1.4% per 
year over that  time frame. This results in lower carbon taxes being required 
t o  meet any particular emissions target. Interestingly, though, the computed 
GDP losses are not significantly less than in the other models because high 
energy prices are projected to  diminish productivity growth. The lower GDP 
growth rate was adopted for a Low GDP Growth Sensitivity scenario. This 
scenario does lead t o  a significant reduction in the cost of control because 
it directly reduces the reference level of emissions projected by each model. 
In addition, when all the models are run with the low GDP growth rate 
assumptions, they produce carbon taxes that are more closely consistent 
with those projected by the lower growth models. 
The cost of the transition to the non-carbon based energy technologies 
can be significantly affected by the availability of natural gas resources. Since 
gas has a lower carbon emissions rate than oil or coal, more fossil energy can 
be consumed within any emissions constraint if the use of natural gas can be 
increased. The High Natural Gas Resources scenario postulates a quadru- 
pling of natural gas resources in each region in the 20% Emissions Reduction 
case. Although a number of analysts would now argue for more gas reserves 
than assumed in the EMF 12 study design, the quadrupling assumption is 
probably quite a bit more optimistic than anyone currently projects. This 
assumption does lead to  a 30 t o  40% reduction in the discounted cost of 
satisfying the emissions constraint over the next twenty years. 
4. Differences in Model Projections 
Estimates of the cost of achieving an emissions target relative to  the 1990 
level of COz emissions by some future date are sensitive to the reference case 
emissions trajectory projected by the model. A model with a higher reference 
case projection of total emissions will require more adjustments t o  reach the 
fixed target than one with a lower reference case emissions projection. 
Even when GDP growth rates are standardized, a very wide range of 
reference case emissions projections are produced by the models included 
in the study. By the year 2100, projections of COz emissions range all 
the way from a 20% to  a 200% increase over 1990 levels. Relatively small 
differences in model parameters lead to  large differences when their effects 
are compounded over the study's 110 year time horizon. For example, much 
of the difference in projections from the models for 2100 can be explained 
by differences in the assumed rate of decrease in energy use per unit of 
economic output independent of energy price changes. The Global 2100 
model uses a value of .5% per year for this parameter, while the Edmonds- 
Reilly model employs 1.0% per year assumption. The more disaggregate 
assumptions made in the Global Macro model implies about a 1.25% rate. 
When compounded over 110 years, these differences can explain aggregate 
energy use and emissions projections that  differ by a factor of two or more. 
Estimates of this aggregate parameter based on historical da ta  range from 
a rate of decrease of about .5% per year t o  an increase a t  about that  rate. 
Researchers who have attempted to  extrapolate the types and efficiencies of 
energy using equipment into the future have argued that  the potential exists 
for a rate of decrease in energy use per unit of economic output from 1% per 
year t o  over 2% per year. 
In the Reference scenario, all models project steady improvements 
(about one percent per year in the U.S.) in energy intensity over the study's 
time horizon, but no strong movement towards or away from non-carbon fu- 
els. Increases in energy intensity and switching to  less carbon intensive fuels 
are the major means of satisfying the requirements of the 20% Reduction 
scenario, with the fuel switching response being greater in the models with 
more end-use technology detail. 
5. Directions for Future Research 
Additional research in several areas could significantly improve the estima- 
tion of the costs of greenhouse gas emission control strategies and the eval- 
uation of alternative policy options. 
This study has identified the amount of energy intensity changes that  will 
take place independent of changes in energy prices over the coming decades 
as a major determinant of reference case emissions, a major source of differ- 
ences between the models, and a major determinant of the cost of achieving 
any emissions target. Yet, information about the potential for improved effi- 
ciency energy technologies is incomplete and often inconsistent and there is 
little conclusive analysis regarding their likely rate of adoption. Particularly 
important here are assessments of market imperfections or distortions that  
impede the introduction of more efficient technologies. For example, energy 
pricing in the developing countries and the former Soviet Union has been far 
below world market levels. 
The projections of baseline emissions also depend significantly on long- 
run GDP and population projections for the main regions of the world. 
Although some excellent analyses of the outlook for economic growth in the 
United States are available, more work would help resolve the remaining 
differences, which are considerable. In addition, very little is known about 
likely economic and population growth in the future in such important and 
diverse countries as China, India, Brazil, and the independent states of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The adjustment costs that  result from any control strategy depend on 
the availability and cost of non-carbon emitting renewable energy sources, 
especially before they emerge as mature technologies. The models included 
in this study all represent these adjustment costs in one way or another, 
but the different approaches can lead to  markedly different results. This 
suggests the value of additional work on data and models of new technology 
availability dates and introduction rates, as well as of technology transfer to  
the developing countries. 
It is important to  assess the potential of offsets to carbon emissions, like 
tree planting or slowing de-forestation, and of reducing other greenhouse 
gas emissions like methane from natural gas system leaks, coal bed seams, 
or  ruminants, as these can be as effective as carbon emissions reductions 
in slowing climate change. In addition, carbon sequestration and removal 
technologies, while not now economic, could easily become competitive in 
the future especially if carbon taxes reach $100 per metric ton or more. 
This study suggests the value of additional work on the linkages between 
energy and the environment, between environmental policies and world en- 
ergy markets, and between environmental policies and trade in non-energy 
goods. 
The design of an  appropriate control strategy depends on the benefits as 
well as the costs of control. Although a great deal of work has been completed 
on the translation of C 0 2  emissions into concentrations, on the dependence 
of climate on atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations, and on the impacts of cli- 
mate change on people, plants, and ecosystems, great uncertainties remain. 
Research on evaluating the impacts in economic terms has just begun. 
Appendix. The Core Models of EMF 12. 
Model name(s) Author(s) Model type Distinguishing characteristics 
MARKAL Samuel Morris (BNL) Optimization Model-wide objective function 
(MARKet ALlocation model) (linear Minimize total energy sector costs of meeting 
program) exogenously-given energy service demands 
No economic effects outside energy sector 
No effects of higher cost of energy except 
introduction of more energy-efficient technologies 
EDS Lakis Vouyoukis, Generalized 
(Energy Demand System) Niko Kouvaritakis (IEA) equilibrium 
ERM Jae Edmonds 
(Edmonds-Reilly Model) David Barns 
FOSSIL2 Sharon Belanger, Roger 
Naill (AES) 
GEMINI Dave Cohan, Adriana Diener 
(DFI), Joel Scheraga (EPA) 
GLOBAL MACRO-ENERGY Bill Pepper (ICF) 
Equilibrium in energy sector's markets: primary, 
secondary, electric, etc. 
No markets for capital, labor, or other nonenergy 
goods 
Reference G D P  and/or energy service demand 
exogenously-given 
Price and/or G D P  effects on demand through 
aggregate "feedback equationsn 
Appendix. Continued. 
Model name(s) Author(s) Model type Distinguishing characteristics 
T-GAS Bob Kaufmann Regression Exogenous inputs of prices, GDP, population, etc. 
(Trace Gas Accounting Energy intensity by sector determined from 
System) regression equation and given inputs 
Some user control over parameters in iunctions 
CETA Stephen Peck Optimal Maximizes discounted consumer satisfaction 
(Carbon Emissions Trajectory Thomas Teisberg growth subject to resource and technology constraints 
Assessment) Consumer determines labor supply, consumption, 
GLOBAL 2100 Alan Manne and investment 
Rich Richels GDP produced from aggregate production function 
Moderate detail in energy sector 
CRTM 
(Carbon Rights Trade Model) 
DGEM 
(Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model) 
GOULDER 
GREEN 
(GeneRal Equilibrium 
ENvironmental) 
Thomas Rutherford General Market equilibria for all goods: capital, labor, 
equilibrium materials, other goods 
Dale Jorgenson Consumers choose savings/investment levels 
Peter Wilcoxen GDP, energy intensity changes determined by 
interactions throughout the economy 
Larry Goulder Less detail in energy sector 
John Martin 
Jean-Marc Burniaux 
[OECD) 
Source: R. Beaver, A Structural Comparison of Models Used in EMF 12 to Analyze the Costs of Policies for Reducing Energy-Sector 
C 0 2  Emissions. Draft paper, Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 
The Global Consequences of Regional 
Environmental Policies: An Integrated 
Macroeconomic, Mult i-sect oral Approach1 
Warwick J .  McKibbin 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA 
Peter J. Wilcoxen 
University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore the link between environmental policies and inter- 
national trade using a multisector, multiregion model with a fully integrated 
and rigorous treatment of international flows of financial assets. We focus 
on two questions. First, how do unilateral environmental regulations affect 
a country's real exchange rate, its trade accounts, and the domestic output 
of its industries? Second, do changes in trade patterns vitiate unilateral at-  
tempts t o  reduce global externalities such as carbon dioxide emissions? We 
investigate both questions by using the model t o  compare two carbon dioxide 
control policies: a unilateral carbon tax  imposed by the  United States, and a 
multilateral tax  imposed throughout the OECD. We find that  international 
flows of capital can overwhelm price-induced effects and lead t o  improve- 
ments in a country's trade balance when an analysis ignoring capital flows 
would predict a deterioration. We also find that  a unilateral carbon dioxide 
control policy would be unlikely t o  be vitiated by changes in trade patterns. 
'This paper is part of a project on "The Global Costs of Policies to  Reduce Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions" being undertaken a t  the Brookings Institution under an Assistance with 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (CR 818579-01-0). The  authors thank Philip 
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discussions with colleagues a t  the Brookings Institution, in particular Ralph Bryant; and 
Robert Shackleton and Michael Shelby a t  the EPA. The  views expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the trustees, 
officers or other staff of the Brookings Institution, the Environmental Protection Agency 
or the University of Texas a t  Austin. 
1. Introduction 
Because environmental regulations differ across countries, environmental 
protection and international trade are inextricably linked. A country adopt- 
ing relatively strict environmental standards will increase the costs of its 
domestic firms and may harm their ability to compete with overseas rivals. 
One effect of this may be t o  cause dirty industries to  migrate to  countries 
with the least environmental regulation. In fact, Kalt (1985) has argued that  
standard trade theory predicts this result because international differences in 
regulation can be thought of as differences in endowments of environmental 
cleanliness. On the other hand, strict regulations per se do not necessarily 
harm a country's competitiveness as long as its major trading partners have 
similar standards (Congressional Budget Office, 1985). 
This issue is particularly important in the debate over policies to control 
global warming. Schelling (1992) has argued that developed and developing 
countries differ in their incentives to  control greenhouse gas emissions and 
are unlikely to  agree on a single international standard. Furthermore, Hoe1 
(1991) has shown that  a partial standard, adopted by developed but not 
developing countries, could actually raise world emissions by shifting pro- 
duction to  countries with less efficient energy sectors. Felder and Ruther- 
ford (1992) have also examined the possibility that a geographically-limited 
greenhouse gas policy could be vitiated by changes in trade flows. They point 
out that  policies adopted to control carbon dioxide emissions in developed 
countries could reduce world oil demand and lower oil prices enough t o  stim- 
ulate a substantial increase in oil consumption by developing nations. This 
would lead t o  increased emissions by developing countries, thus offsetting 
the emissions reduction in the developed world. 
Although these studies show that changes in trade flows might, in theory, 
offset a limited global warming policy, they do not provide much guidance 
on the empirical question of whether the effect is large or s m d .  Addressing 
this question requires an empirical model with three specific features: the 
model must have multiple regions linked by trade flows; each region must 
have multiple industries so that  changes in the pattern of production can be 
detected; and d trade imbalances must be matched by corresponding flows 
of assets which should, in turn, affect the exchange rate. 
None of the existing models used to  study global warming have d of 
these features. Some, such as Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1991a; 1991b) and 
Goulder (1991), focus only on a single country. Others, such as Edmonds 
and Reilly (1983), Barnes et al. (1992), Cline (1989), and Manne and Richels 
(1990; 1992) have multiple regions but are highly aggregated with each re- 
gion. Those models which do have multiple regions and multiple sectors, 
such as Whalley and Wigle (1990), Rutherford (1992), Felder and Ruther- 
ford (1992), and Burniaux et al. (1991a; 1991b), lack a complete integration 
of international asset flows and exchange rate determination. 
In this paper we describe G-Cubed, a new model specifically designed to 
explore the link between environmental policy and trade flows. It is based on 
and substantially extends two existing models: the global dynamic general 
equilibrium modeling framework (the MSG model) developed by McKibbin 
and Sachs (1991) and the detailed, econometrically-estimated intertemporal 
general equilibrium model of the United States developed by Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1990). Like the McKibbin-Sachs model, G-Cubed is geographi- 
cally disaggregated: the world economy is divided into six independent re- 
gions linked by trade and financial markets. Like the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen 
model, within each region production is disaggregated: each of G-Cubed's re- 
gions contains twelve production sectors. An important feature of G-Cubed 
which sets it apart from other models is that all intertemporal budget con- 
straints on households, governments and nations (the latter through accu- 
mulations of foreign debt) are imposed. Thus, any agent who borrows will 
have to service the ensuing debt as long as it is outstanding. A more detailed 
description of the model can be found in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992). 
In the remainder of this paper we summarize the theoretical structure 
of G-Cubed and compare the results for two simulations illustrating the link 
between environmental policy and international trade: a unilateral carbon 
tax imposed in the United States, and a multilateral carbon tax imposed in 
all OECD countries. 
2. The Theoretical Structure of G-Cubed 
G-Cubed's six regions can be divided into two groups: three industrial re- 
gions - the United States, Japan and the rest of the OECD - and three others 
- oil exporting developing countries (OPEC), Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union (EFSU), and all other developing countries (LDCs). For the 
industrial economies, the internal macroeconomic structure as well as the 
external trade and financial linkages are completely specified in the model. 
We begin by presenting the structure of a particular one of these economies: 
the United States. The other industrial countries have similar structure and 
differ only in the values of behavioral parameters. To keep our notation as 
simple as possible we have not subscripted each variable by country except 
where necessary for clarity. 
Each industrial economy or region in the model consists of several eco- 
nomic agents: households, the government, the financial sector and 12 pro- 
duction sectors: electric utilities, natural gas utilities, petroleum refining, 
coal mining, and crude oil and gas extraction, nonfuel mining, agriculture, 
forestry and wood products, durable manufacturing, non-durable manufac- 
turing, transportation and services. We now present an overview of the 
theoretical structure of the model by describing the decisions facing these 
 agent^.^ For convenience we have normalized all quantity variables by the 
economy's endowment of effective labor units. This means that in the steady 
state all real variables are constant in these units although the actual levels of 
the variables will be growing at  the underlying rate of growth of population 
plus productivity (we denote this rate by "n"). 
A. Firms 
Each of the twelve sectors is represented by a single firm in each sector which 
chooses its inputs and its level of investment in order to maximize its stock 
market value subject to its production function and a vector of prices it 
takes to be exogenous. For each sector h, output (Qh) is a constant elas- 
ticity of substitution (CES) functions of inputs of capital (Kh), labor (Lh),  
energy (Eh), materials (Mh) and a sector-specific resource (Rh).3 Energy 
and materials, in turn, are CES aggregates of inputs of intermediate goods. 
The nature of the sector specific resource varies across sectors. In the coal 
industry, for example, it is reserves of coal while in agriculture and wood 
products it is land which can be transferred between these two  sector^.^ 
The goods actually purchased by firms and households are a mixture of 
imported and domestic commodities which we take to be imperfect substi- 
tutes. Due to data limitations, we assume that all agents in the economy have 
identical preferences over foreign and domestic varieties of each commodity. 
We represent these preferences by defining twelve composite commodities 
2The reader is referred to McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992) for more detail. A complete 
listing of the equations in the model, the parameters and data sources are contained in an 
Appendix to that paper. 
3The model's database is still under development. For the simulations presented in this 
paper we have had to constrain all elasticities of substitution to be unity so the production 
functions collapse to Cobb-Douglas. In future work, this restriction will be eliminated. 
'In the version of the model in this draft, we have assumed an infinite supply of these 
resources, but future work will explore the implications of exhaustible resources and se- 
questration of land for tree planting, etc. 
that are produced from imported and domestic goods according to a set of 
CES production functions. For example, the petroleum products purchased 
by agents are a CES composite of imported and domestic petroleum. Each 
imported good entering this function is itself a CES composite of imports 
from different sources. By constraining all agents in the model to  have the 
same preferences over the origin of goods we require that, for example, the 
agricultural and service sectors have the identical preferences over domestic 
oil and oil imported from the Middle East.5 
A by-product of this approach is that it is straightforward for us to model 
several emissions permit schemes. In particular, we impose that domestic 
and imported inputs to the composite commodity be combined in fixed ra- 
tios with emissions permits. We include separate permits for domestic and 
imported inputs in order to be able to simulate either consumption-based 
permit systems, in which permits would be required for either input, or 
production-based systems in which permits are required only for domes- 
tic inputs. We assume the permits are initially owned by households, so the 
market value of the permits is included in the definition of household wealth. 
The permits introduce a potential cap on the use of each input in production 
of the composite good. For the simulations reported in this paper, however, 
we allow the supply of permits to be infinite so they have zero value and no 
effect on the use of cornmoditie~.~ 
Figure 1 summarizes the supply side of the economy by showing the 
relationship between inputs, domestic production, imports and emissions 
permits for an arbitrary commodity. 
In each sector the capital stock (Kh) changes according to  the following 
relation between the rate of fixed capital formation (Jh) and the rate of 
geometric depreciation (6h): 
Following the cost of adjustment models of Lucas (1967) and Treadway 
(1969), we assume that investment is subject to  rising marginal costs of in- 
stallation, with total real investment expenditures in sector h (Ih) equal to  
the value of direct purchases of investment goods (Jh)  plus per unit instal- 
lation costs. Installation costs, in turn, are assumed to be a linear function 
5This does not require that both sectors purchase the same amount of oil, or even that 
they purchase oil at all; only that they both feel the same way about about the origins of 
oil they buy. 
'Future papers will explore marketable permit systems for various types of emissions 
across sectors, both within and between regions. 
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Figure 1. Production nesting. 
of the rate of investment (Jh/Kh) so that adjustment costs can be repre- 
sented by Jh [(4h/2)(Jh/Kh)]. Total investment expenditure in sector h (of 
a particular country) is therefore: 
where q5 is the parameter for adjustment costs (a high value implies large 
adjustment costs). One advantage of using an adjustment cost approach 
is that we can vary the adjustment cost parameter for different sectors to 
capture the degree to which capital is sector specific. 
The goal of each firm is to choose investment and inputs of labor (Lh), 
energy (Eh), materials (Mh), and resources (Rh) to maximize intertemporal 
net-of-tax profits. For analytical tractability, we assume that this problem 
is deter minis ti^.^ Thus, the firm will m a ~ i m i z e : ~  
where: 
1 Tds = - 
s - t  
/ TudU 
t 
is the long-term interest rate, and P is the price of domestic output, Q is the 
output of the domestic good, W is the nominal wage, and T, is the real inter- 
est rate on government bonds in period v, subject to its production function 
and equations (1) and (2). The three taxes included in this specification are 
corporate income tax (r2), taxes on inputs that are proportional to output, 
such as carbon emissions, (r3)' and an investment tax credit (r4). All real 
variable are normalized by the economy's endowment of effective labor units, 
so profits are discounted adjusting for the rate of growth of population plus 
productivity growth (n). Solving the optimization problem facing this rep- 
resentative firm, we find the usual marginal product conditions for inputs 
'In other words, the firm believes its estimates of future variables with subjective 
certainty. 
'The rate of growth of the economy's endowment of effective labor units, n, appears in 
the discount factor because the quantity and value variables in the model have been scaled 
by the number of effective labor units. These variables must be multiplied by exp(nt) to  
convert them back t o  their unscaled form. 
'In the case of a carbon tax, r3, would be the ad  valorem tax multiplied by the emission 
of carbon per unit of output of sector h. We assume that this tax is levied on only two 
sectors: Coal, and natural gas and oil extraction with different emission coefficients in 
each these sectors. This is discussed further in the section on results from a carbon tax. 
of labor, intermediate goods and resources, plus the two conditions shown 
below: 
where Ah is the shadow value of an additional unit of investment in industry 
h (again, in a particular country). 
The marginal product equations are used to  solve for the demand for 
variable factors of production. We assume that labor is mobile between 
sectors in each region, but is immobile between regions. Thus, within each 
region wages will be equal across sectors.1° The wage is assumed to adjust 
according to an overlapping contracts model where nominal wages are set 
based on current and expected inflation and on labor demand relative to  
labor supply. In the long run employment is equal the supply of labor 
which grows at  the exogenous rate of population growth. In the short run, 
employment is equal to  the labor demanded at the given nominal wage. 
Equations (6) and (7) can be interpreted as follows. Integrating (7) 
along the optimum path of capital accumulation (Jh, Kh) gives: 
00 
Aht = l ( 1  - ~ 2 )  [dQ;,ldKi3 + ah31 e-(rdh+6h)(s-t)ds (8) 
t 
where: 
a s h  = 0.50h(l - T~)(J~*,/K;,)~P,' / (P3 - ~ 3 )  (9) 
and where dQ;l/dK; (the marginal product of capital in production), J;, 
and K;l are all evaluated along the optimal path. ah is the marginal product 
of capital in reducing adjustment costs in investment in sector h. Thus, Ah is 
the increment to  the value of the firm in sector h from a unit increase in its 
investment. It is related to  qh, the marginal version of "Tobin's Q" (Abel, 
1979) for sector h,  as follows: 
''In the short run, this will overstate labor mobility between sectors. One solution would 
be to introduce an adjustment cost model of labor demand. 
Thus we can rewrite (6) as: 
Following Hayashi (1979), however, we modify the investment function 
in equation (11) t o  allow Jh t o  be a function not only of qh, but also of the 
level of flow capital income a t  time t: 
This improves the empirical behavior of the specification and is con- 
sistent with the existence of firms that are unable t o  borrow and therefore 
invest purely out of retained earnings. 
So far we have described the demand for new investment goods by each 
sector. We next assume that investment goods are supplied by a firm facing 
an optimization problem similar t o  those of the twelve industries described 
above (and not repeated here). Like the other industries, the investment 
sector demands labor and capital services as well as intermediate inputs. 
The only difference is that we assume there is no sector-specific resource (R) 
for the investment sector. The investment column in the input-output table 
is used to  parameterize the investment sector's production function. As with 
the derivation above, there is a shadow "q" associated with investment in 
the investment goods sector. 
B. Households 
We assume that household behavior can be modeled by a representative 
agent with an intertemporal utility function of the form: 
(log C, + log ~ , ) e - ' ( ~ - ~ ) d s  (13) 
t 
where C, is the household's aggregate consumption of goods a t  time s, G, 
is government consumption a t  s, which we take to  be a measure of public 
goods, and t9 is the rate of time preference.ll The household maximizes (13) 
subject t o  the constraint that the present value of consumption be equal to  
human wealth (H) plus initial financial assets (F),  all defined in real terms:12 
"This specification imposes the restriction that household decisions on the allocations 
of expenditure among different goods at different points in time be separable. 
12As before, n appears in (14) because the model's scaled variables must be converted 
back to their unscaled basis. 
J (p:/p,)~,~-(rds-n)(3-t) ds = (Ht + Ft) 
Human wealth in real terms (that is, deflated by the price of aggregate 
output) is defined as the  expected present value of future stream of after tax  
labor income of households: 
where T R  is the level of government transfers, labor used directly by fi- 
nal consumption is LC7 labor used in producing the investment good is LT7 
government employment is LG, and employment in sector h is given by Lh. 
Financial wealth is the sum of real money balance (MON/P), real govern- 
ment bonds in the hand of the public (B), net holding of claims against 
foreign residents (A),  the value of outstanding emissions permits (EP) ,  and 
the  value of capital in each sector: 
where is Tobin's Q for the investment good in period s, and is Tobin's Q 
for the consumption of household capital in period s. Solving the  household 
problem produces the familiar result that  aggregate consumption is equal to  
a constant proportion of private wealth, where private wealth is defined as  
financial wealth plus human wealth. 
However, based on the evidence cited by Campbell and Mankiw (1987) 
and Hayashi (1982) we assume that only a portion of consumption is de- 
termined by these intertemporally-optimizing consumers and that  the re- 
mainder is determined by after tax  current income (INC). This can be in- 
terpreted as liquidity constrained behavior or a permanent income model in 
which household expectations regarding income are backward-looking. Ei- 
ther way we assume that  total consumption is a weighted average of the 
forward looking consumption and backward-looking consumption: 
where as is the marginal propensity to save for the liquidity-constrained or 
backward-looking households. 
Once the level of overall consumption has been determined, spending is 
allocated among goods and services. Households demand each of the model's 
12 commodities and also demand labor and capital services. Household cap- 
ital services consist of the service flows of consumer durables plus residential 
housing. We assume that the household's preferences can be represented by 
a nested CES utility function.13 At the top tier of the utility function, total 
consumption is allocated between capital and labor services, a basket of en- 
ergy goods and a basket of non-energy goods. At the second tier, spending 
on energy and materials are disaggregated into demands for individual com- 
modities according t o  CES functions. The result is a system of household 
demand equations which depend on the level of aggregate consumption and 
the price of the individual goods relative to  the price of the consumption 
basket. 
The supply of household capital services is determined by consumers 
themselves who invest in household capital, KF in order t o  generate a desired 
flow of capital services, CP according t o  the following production function: 
where (Y is a parameter for the rate of flow of services from existing capital. 
Accumulation of household capital is subject to  the accumulation equation 
below: 
We assume that  changing the household capital stock is subject t o  ad- 
justment costs so household spending on investment, I', is related t o  JF 
by : 
13This has the undesirable effect of imposing unitary income elasticities, a restriction 
usually rejected by data. Moreover, in the preliminary version of the model presented 
here, the elasticities of substitution have been constrained to be unity. We are in the 
process of estimating the elasticities econometrically using a long time series of input- 
output data. In future work we plan to replace this specification with one derived from 
the linear expenditure system to allow income elasticities to differ from one. 
Thus the household's investment decision is to choose 1' to  maximize: 
t 
subject to equations (19) through (21). 
Solving this problem yields results similar to  those discussed for firms 
above. However, since no variable factors are used in producing capital ser- 
vices, the first order conditions for the problem give investment as a function 
of the shadow price of capital: 
and an equation for the shadow price of capital itself, where we have intro- 
duced qC = Xpck/pl: 
where: 
Thus, the treatment of household capital is very similar to  that used for 
producing sectors. 
C. Government 
We assume that the government in each country divides spending among 
final goods, services and labor according to  the proportions in the input- 
output tables for 1987. The real value of this expenditure is assumed to be 
exogenous and constant in the future. The government finances this spending 
(plus interest payments on its debt and transfers to  households) by levying 
sales, corporate and personal income taxes, and by issuing government debt. 
In addition, there can be taxes on carbon output and an investment tax 
credit. The government budget constraint can be written: 
where the budget deficit (DEF) is defined in real terms and adjusted for in- 
flation. The deficit is a function of interest payments (rB), total government 
spending on goods and labor (G), transfer payments to  households(TR) and 
total tax collections from households and firms (T): 
Assuming that agents will not hold government bonds unless they expect 
the bonds to be paid off eventually, we impose the following transversality 
condition: 
3 
- S( t , -n )dv  
Bt = lim B,e 
S-+W 
If the government is fully leveraged, this allows equation (37) to be 
integrated and written as: 
Thus, the current level of debt will be equal to the present value of future 
primary budget surp l~ses . '~  
The implication of (29) is that a government running a budget deficit 
today must run an appropriate budget surplus at some point in the future. 
Otherwise, the government will be unable to pay interest on the debt and 
agents will not be willing to hold it. To ensure that (29) holds at all points 
in time we impose the following constraint: at  every instant in time each 
government must levy an endogenously-determined lump sum tax equal to 
the value of interest payments on the outstanding debt.15 In effect, therefore, 
any increase in government debt is financed by consols and future taxes 
are raised enough to accommodate the increased interest costs. Thus, any 
increase in the debt will be matched by an equal present value increase 
in future budget surpluses. Other fiscal closure rules are possible, such as 
always returning to the original ratio of government debt to  GDP. These 
closures have interesting implications but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
"Strictly speaking, debt must be less than or equal to the present value of future budget 
surpluses. For tractability we assume that the government is initially fully leveraged so 
that this constraint holds with equality. 
151n the model the tax is actually levied on the difference between interest payments 
on the debt and what interest payments would have been if the debt had remained at  its 
base case level. The remainder, interest payments on the base case debt, is financed by 
ordinary taxes. 
D. Financial Markets and the Balance of Payments 
The six regions in the model are linked by flows of goods and assets. Flows 
of goods are determined by the import demands described above. These 
demands can be summarized to result in a set of bilateral trade matrices 
which give the flows of each good between exporting and importing countries. 
Thus, there is one 6 by 6 trade matrix for each of the twelve sectors. 
Flows of financial assets are more complicated. The first difficulty is 
specifying the role of money in the model. It is a common dilemma in 
general equilibrium models to  explain why agents hold money. A demand 
for money can only be derived from optimization if one of the following is 
true: money gives direct utility; money is a factor of production; or money 
must be used to  conduct transactions. Following the approach taken in the 
MSG2 model,16 we assume money enters via a constraint on transactions. 
This gives a money demand function in which the demand for real money 
balances is a function of GDP and short term nominal interest rates: 
where ag is the income elasticity of money demand, a4 is the interest rate 
elasticity of money demand, i, is the nominal interest on government debt 
in period v. The supply of money is determined by the balance sheet of the 
central bank and is exogenous. 
We assume asset markets are perfectly integrated across the OECD re- 
gions. With free mobility of capital, expected returns on loans denominated 
in the currencies of the various regions must be equalized period to  period 
according to a set of interest arbitrage relations of the following form: 
where E R ~ ,  is the exchange rate between currencies of countries k and j. 
There is no allowance for risk premia on the assets of alternative curren- 
cies. The assumption of perfect capital mobility and zero risk premia for the 
major economies is chosen in light of the failure of the empirical exchange 
rate literature to  demonstrate the existence of stable risk premia across in- 
ternational currencies. In the simulations of the model, this is equivalent to  
assuming that any risk premia are independent of both the shocks imposed 
on the model and of the subsequent adjustment of any endogenous variables. 
Any trade imbalances are financed by flows of assets between countries. 
To determine net asset positions we make several simplifying assumptions. 
''See McKibbin and Sachs (1991) for more detail. 
Some external financing will be exogenously determined by creditors. The 
remaining will be private capital for either portfolio or direct investment. 
Because all domestic assets are assumed perfect substitutes, the returns to 
these activities will be equalized. This implies that the composition of cap- 
ital flows can be assumed to be in fixed proportions of portfolio investment, 
direct investment, and other capital flows. These proportions can be ob- 
tained from the allocation of assets in the model's base year dataset. All 
other net capital flows are restricted to be consistent by imposing the con- 
straint that current account balances and trade account balances sum to 
zero for the world as a whole. For the major industrialized economies, the 
current account is determined under the assumption that domestic agents 
have free un-rationed access to international borrowing and lending at the 
international interest rate. For simplicity we assume that all international 
borrowing and lending takes place in the currency in which debt is denomi- 
nated in the MSG database. 
For the three non-OECD countries it is not reasonable to assume that 
exchange rates are free to float or that capital is freely mobile both within 
the regions and between the regions and the rest of the world. Instead we 
assume that these three regions peg their exchange rates to the US dollar. 
In addition, we assume that OPEC chooses its foreign lending in order to 
maintain a desired ratio of income to wealth. The EFSU and LDC regions 
are assumed to be constrained in what they can borrow from the rest of the 
world. Given their exogenously determined borrowing and endogenously 
determined exports and debt servicing costs, these regions then allocate any 
remaining funds to imports. 
3. Data, Parameterization and Model Solution 
The data used in G-Cubed comes from a number of sources which are listed 
in a technical Appendix available on request from the authors. The produc- 
tion and consumption parameters are still under development but are cur- 
rently established by assuming unitary price elasticities and obtaining share 
parameters from a 1987 U.S. input-output table prepared by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. In lieu of obtaining input-output tables from Japan and the 
ROECD region, we currently create the tables for these regions based on the 
U.S. table and adjusted for actual final demand components from non-U.S. 
data. In effect, we are assuming that all industrial countries share the same 
production technology but differ in their endowments of primary factors and 
patterns of final demands. This assumption is a temporary necessity while 
we complete the model's database. 
Next we assume the underlying long run rate of population growth plus 
productivity growth in 2.5 percent per annum. We also assume that  the long 
run real interest rate is 4.5 percent in the baseline. 
Trade shares are based on the United Nations SITC (Standard Industry 
Trade Classification) data  for 1987 with sectors aggregated from 4 digit levels 
t o  map as closely as possible to the US Standard Industry Classification 
(S1C).17 Trade price elasticities will be estimated in future work. 
The parameters on shares of optimizing versus backward looking behav- 
ior are taken from the MSG model. These are based on a range of empirical 
estimates as well as a tracking exercise used to  calibrate the MSG model to  
the experience of the 1980s. 
G-Cubed is solved using software developed by McKibbin (1992) for 
solving large models with rational expectations on a personal computer.18 
The model has approximately 2100 equations in its current form with 47 
costate (jumping or forward looking) variables. The first step in the solution 
algorithm is to  use numerical differentiation to linearize the model around 
its 1987 database. Following this, linear algebra is used to  transform the 
model into its minimal state-space representation. The eigenvalues of this 
reduced model are then calculated to  ensure that  the condition for saddle- 
point stability is satisfied (that is, that  the number of eigenvalues outside the 
unit circle are equal to  the number of costate variables). The algorithm then 
searches for the stable manifold which gives the adjustment of the costate 
variables in response to  all inherited variables in the model. Once this is 
found the model can simulate various shocks. 
4. Two Represent at ive Simulations 
We now present results from two simulations designed to  investigate the link 
between trade flows and environmental policy. In each simulation an unex- 
pected permanent carbon tax of $15 per ton of carbon is levied in the United 
States beginning in 1992. In one simulation, however, the US introduces the 
''A full mapping of SITC and SIC codes is contained in a technical appendix available 
from the authors by request. 
''The software developed for solving this model has been written in the GAUSS pro- 
gramming language. See GAUSS (1992). 
tax  unilaterally while in the other simulation the tax is introduced simulta- 
neously in all OECD countries.lg In both cases we assume that  carbon tax 
revenues are used t o  lower the budget deficit in the levying country. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the macroeconomic effects of the two simula- 
tions on the United States over the next one hundred years.20 Figure 2 
presents results for GDP, the balance of trade, the fiscal deficit and the cur- 
rent a c ~ o u n t . ' ~  The change in GDP is expressed as a percentage deviation 
from the base case while changes in the remaining variables are shown as 
percentages of base case GDP. Figure 3 presents changes in short and long 
run interest rates (both real and nominal), changes in the nominal exchange 
rate relative to  the Yen and the ECU, and changes in the rate of inflation. 
Changes in the exchange rate are expressed as percentage deviations from 
the base case while changes in the other variables are given in percentage 
points. 
As an example of how the graphs may be interpreted, consider the upper 
left panel of Figure 2. That panel presents the results for U.S. real GDP as 
percentage deviations from the baseline. For the unilateral tax, real GDP 
falls by 0.4 percent a t  the announcement of the policy in 1991. By the year 
2000 GDP has recovered slightly but is still below the value it would have 
had in the base case in 2000. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of the unilateral US tax  on US prices, output, 
employment, and capital stocks. Each variable is shown as its percentage 
deviation from the base case. Sectors are indicated by the fourth character 
of each variable name (e.g., OUP5UUNC is output in sector 5 in the US) 
and are numbered from 1 through 9 and then A to  C, as shown in Table 1. 
At the industry level, the unilateral and multilateral taxes are very similar, 
so we have omitted the corresponding graphs for the multilateral case. 
Our discussion of these results will first focus on the unilateral tax and 
will then move on to  a comparison of the two simulations. 
A .  The E8ects of a Unilateral Carbon Tax 
The  first panel of Figure 2 shows result familiar from other studies of carbon 
taxes: the t ax  reduces GDP by a small percentage, in this case by 0.55 
"A wider range of simulations are considered in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992). 
''All figures have been drawn using the cellvision software program developed by Tomas 
Bok (1992). 
"In each figure the key indicating the variable plotted refers to the variable name as it 
appears in the model. Definitions of these variables are given in the technical Appendix 
available from the authors. 
Figure 2. Permanent $15 per ton carbon tax. 
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Table 1. Definition of sectors. 
1 Electric Utilities 
2 Gas Utilities 
3 Petroleum Refining 
4 Coal Mining 
5 Crude Oil and Gas Extraction 
6 Nonfuel Mining 
7 Agriculture, Fishing and Hunting 
8 Forestry and Wood Products 
9 Durable ~ a n u f a c t u r i n ~  
A Nondurable Manufacturing 
B Transportation 
C Services 
percent by 1994. After this, however, GDP recovers slightly. This recovery 
is due to  a fall in real wages in response to the rise in unemployment, and as 
a consequence of lower real interest rates reflecting a decline in the marginal 
product of capital. Revenue from the tax is close t o  $26 billion (1992) dollars 
in 1992 and this revenue grows a t  the real growth rate of the economy. The 
fall in output reduces other tax revenue and despite the carbon tax, the 
deficit rises slightly for the first decade. 
The fall in real interest rates in the United States leads to  a capital 
outflow which has a counterpart in the improvement in the trade balance of 
0.3 percent of GDP in 1992 (or close to $18 billion in 1992 dollars). This 
result is an  important implication of our macroeconomic framework which 
explicitly incorporates international capital flows, and is strikingly different 
from the results of other studies in which capital flows are ignored. Other 
studies typically find that a carbon tax causes the U.S. balance of trade t o  
deteriorate as U.S. exports become less competitive. In contrast, we find 
that  in the short t o  medium term, the movement of capital in response 
to changes in real interest rates determines the effect on the overall trade 
balance. Substitution away from carbon intensive U.S. goods does occur 
but is overwhelmed by the capital flow effect. The fall in interest rates 
also depreciates the U.S. dollar by close to  4 percent. In addition there is 
a decline in U.S. domestic demand. Both factors enable the emergence of 
a trade balance surplus which is consistent with the capital outflow. The 
capital outflow also serves to lower world interest rates, stimulating real 
capital accumulation and lowering the foreign marginal product of capital. 
The industry-level effects shown in Figure 4 make it clear that the coal 
industry (sector 4) will be the most strongly affected by the tax. The price 
of coal rises by 35 percent in 1992 and as the industry's capital stock falls the 
price rises even further, to over 50 percent above baseline by 2010. Natural 
gas prices rise by 10 percent and refined petroleum by 5 percent on impact. 
This result is similar to  that found by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1991a). 
These price increases translate directly into falls in output. Coal output 
falls by 35 percent when the tax is imposed in 1992 and then continues to  
decline as the industry's capital stock falls. By 2010, output is 50 percent 
below the baseline. The employment consequences of the tax are similar t o  
the effects on output, but more severe in the short run (since capital is fixed). 
Employment in the coal industry declines by 37 percent. In the natural gas 
and crude oil extraction sectors employment falls by close to  15 percent. 
Despite the rise in the relative price of carbon intensive goods in the 
U.S. the substitution into imported carbon-intensive goods is not sufficient 
t o  greatly offset the fall in global carbon emissions. The impact of the U.S. 
carbon tax on carbon emissions in the United States is to  reduce these emis- 
sion by 29.7 million tons in 1992. These emissions fall by 50.3 million tons 
relative t o  base by the year 2000. Using the same emission coefficients for the 
world as for the United States, global emissions fall by 32.6 million tons in 
1992 reflecting the global fall in economic activity. By 2000 global emissions 
are down by 53.9 billion tons. These estimates of global emission proba- 
bly overstate the decline because non-OECD production is likely t o  have a 
higher carbon output per unit of production than the U.S. production which 
is being reduced. However, the results strongly suggests that the impact 
effect of the U.S. tax would be t o  reduce global carbon dioxide emissions. 
B. The Efects of a Multilateral Tax Imposed in all OECD Economies 
The first difference between this simulation and the unilateral tax is sur- 
prising: the initial fall in U.S. GDP is larger for the OECD carbon tax - 
approximately 0.5 percent in 1992, a value not reached until 1994 under the 
unilateral tax. This comes about because the multilateral tax reduces global 
aggregate demand and hence the demand for U.S. exports. In the long run, 
however, the drop in U.S. GDP is smaller in the case of the OECD carbon 
tax: 0.3 percent by 2010 for the global tax versus nearly 0.4 percent for 
the unilateral U.S. tax. This occurs for two reasons. The first is that  U.S. 
and foreign consumers and firms do not substitute away from high carbon 
U.S. goods to  high carbon ROECD goods because both rise in price in the 
case of the multilateral tax. Secondly, the fiscal implications of the tax a t  
the OECD level are larger for the OECD policy. Real interest rates fall by 
twice the  amount they do when the United States acts alone. The fall in 
real interest rates of 80 basis points stimulates demand and offsets some of 
the contractionary effect of the carbon tax. 
The unilateral and multilateral taxes also affect the U.S. trade account 
much differently: the multilateral tax essentially leaves the  trade balance 
and the current account unaffected. This occurs because the multilateral 
regime eliminates most of the incentives for changes in the pattern of capital 
and goods flows. Under the multilateral tax, both U.S. and overseas rates of 
return on capital fall, so there is little change in the pattern of capital flows. 
At the same time, both U.S. goods and imports become more expensive, 
so there is little change in the pattern of goods flows. Thus, under the 
unilateral tax this improves the U.S. current account by over 0.3 percent of 
GDP in 1992, while under the multilateral tax, the improvement virtually 
disappears. 
It is important t o  note that  the accumulation of foreign assets plays 
an important role in the long run. This can be seen by comparing the 
paths for GDP and private consumption. In the case of the multilateral 
carbon tax, GDP fluctuates and then stabilizes about 0.35 percent below 
the baseline. Under the unilateral tax, however, GDP fluctuates but then 
gradually rises. This occurs because under the unilateral case, the U.S. trade 
balance improves, reducing the rate a t  which the U.S. borrows from abroad. 
This reduction in net foreign debt lowers future interest payments overseas, 
leading t o  a stronger long run real exchange rate, falling import prices and 
gradually rising output. By 2100 this effect has almost balanced the loss 
(measured in terms of GDP) between the unilateral and multilateral carbon 
taxes. 
Calculating the impact of the OECD tax on carbon dioxide emissions 
produces several interesting results. The OECD-wide carbon tax reduces 
U.S. emissions by 29 million tons in 1992. This is 0.7 million tons less than 
for the U.S. only tax. Global carbon emissions fall by 92.3 million tons 
in 1992. By 2000 the global emission of carbon dioxide is reduced by 152 
million tons. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented the structure of G-Cubed, a model designed 
t o  explore the  links between environmental policy and international trade. 
We have also presented results for two simulations in which this link is appar- 
ent: a unilateral carbon tax imposed in the U.S. and a multilateral tax levied 
throughout the OECD. These results are still preliminary but clearly show 
both the feasibility and the importance of integrating macroeconomic and 
computable general equilibrium models into a consistent empirical frame- 
work for analyzing these kinds of policies. 
A number of areas of the model need further work. The model's pa- 
rameterization is preliminary and econometric work is currently underway 
to  improve it substantially. In addition, more data is needed to parameter- 
ize the non-U.S. economies, which are now based on U.S. data. A further 
area where more work on the model's data set is needed is the treatment of 
trade in services. Data on trade in services is often unavailable so we are in 
the process of constructing a matrix of inferred bilateral trade in services by 
using information we currently have on individual country aggregate export 
and imports of services. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Community has committed itself t o  the stabilization of its 
aggregate C 0 2  emissions by the year 2000 at  the 1990 level. The Commission 
of the European Communities has recently proposed a strategy for reaching 
this objective. This strategy consists of three main components: 
First, a set on regulatory, voluntary and research, development and 
demonstration measures. The main focus of these measures is on improv- 
ing the rational use of energy, the diffusion of low-carbon technologies 
and the promotion of renewable energy sources. 
Second, a new combined carbonlenergy tax t o  be gradually phased-in, 
reaching a level of US$ 10 per barrel of oil equivalent (ECU 0.7 per 
Giga-Joule and ECU 35 per ton of carbon) by the year 2000. 
Third, national programmes containing those C 0 2  emission limitation 
measures which do not require Community involvement, but which can 
be taken independently a t  the national or even sub-national level. 
All three components taken together are considered sufficient t o  al- 
low the Community's carbon dioxide emission stabilization objective t o  be 
reached. Thus, although the proposed carbon/energy taz is only one part of 
a comprehensive strategy, it has nevertheless attracted by far the greatest 
attention in the media. 
In this paper, a brief summary is provided of the analysis that has 
- - 
been undertaken concerning the likely economic impact of the proposed car- 
bonlenergy tax. In this analysis, the main emphasis is on the initial impact 
'This paper draws on uThe Climate Challenge - Economic Aspects of the Community's 
Strategy for Limiting COz Emissionsn, European Economy 51, May 1992. Views expressed 
in this paper represent the positions of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to 
those of the Commission of the European Communities. 
of the tax. Although to  some extent the analysis has a crude "back-of- the- 
envelope" character, it nevertheless allows a first assessment of the likely 
economic impact of the proposed tax  to be made. Detailed results, as well 
as a discussion of the  economic philosophy of the strategy, of alternative 
approaches and of the issues of practical implementation, can be found in 
two volumes of "European Economy" (Commission of the European Com- 
munities, 1992a; 1992b). 
2. The Macroeconomic Effects 
With respect to the macroeconomic effects, it is important to distinguish 
between the short or  medium-term effects (up to  seven years, say) and the 
long-term impacts (beyond seven years). Here, the focus is mainly on the 
short and medium-term effects, a choice that  has also been partly determined 
by the  analytical tools available. 
Generally, three key factors are involved in determining the macroeco- 
nomic impact: 
First, the type of carbonlenergy tax  revenue use. A prion', there are two 
main options: either the tax  revenues are used for improving the budget 
balance or adjustments are made to  other parts of the budget so as to  
keep the budget balance unchanged. The latter could be done by using 
the carbonlenergy tax revenues either for financing higher expenditures 
(budget balance neutral) or for cutting other taxes (revenue neutral). 
Without such a "recycling" of the tax  revenues back into the economy, 
the  introduction of the tax would tend to  both raise the general price 
level and t o  slow down economic growth, a t  least in the short run.' Rev- 
enue neutrality, on the other hand, tends t o  restore aggregate demand 
even in the short run (as does budget neutrality), without necessarily 
reducing aggregate supply. It is therefore likely to  be a particularly 
attractive option concerning the use of carbonlenergy tax  revenues. 
The second key factor is that ,  although adjustment will be necessary and 
entail some costs, these costs will be low if markets are flexible and the 
tax  is phased in gradually and p red i~ tab ly .~  Of particular importance is 
'In the long run, the picture may be different as an increase in national savings may 
lead to an acceleration in investment and eventually to an increase in GDP [see, e.g., U.S. 
Department of Energy (1991, Chapter 911. 
3The importance of the predictability aspect is clearly highlighted by Dale Jorgenson's 
and Peter Wilcoxen's conclusion that approximately 213 of the GDP losses attributed to 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s are due to the surprise element and not to the 
price increase in itself [see Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990)l. 
the avoidance of a tax-induced wage-price spiral by orienting wage claims 
at  real after-tax incomes rather than at gross wages. Thus, a societal 
consensus concerning the pursuit of such an environmental policy may 
significantly contribute to limiting its macroeconomic costs. 
Third, even when abstracting from the environmental benefits, the in- 
troduction of such a tax could also have a positive impact on economic 
welfare if the tax revenues were to be used for increasing the econ- 
omy's structural adjustment potential and for lowering existing, strongly 
distortionary taxes. While for the United States some models suggest 
the existence of such positive welfare effects [see, e.g., Shackleton et al. 
(1992)], no such analysis has been undertaken for the European Commu- 
nity to  date. Thus, more analysis is required for assessing quantitatively 
such a potential for welfare gains in the Community. 
Although the illustrative macroeconomic simulation results presented in 
Table 1 allow a preliminary assessment, they nevertheless illustrate that the 
specific type of tax revenue redistribution has a significant influence on the 
macroeconomic impact of the carbonlenergy While, for example, a 
revenue redistribution in the form of a reduction in income taxes tends to  
restore disposable income and thereby private consumption, the compara- 
tively strong inflationary effect of the tax-induced increase in the general 
price level tends to lead to a noticeable slow-down in economic activity. A 
compensatory reduction in employers' social security contributions, on the 
other hand, reduces this price and cost increase and consequently favors pri- 
vate investment. Using the carbonlenergy tax revenues for reducing value 
added taxes may lead to  even more favorable effects. 
The preliminary evidence emerging from the available simulation studies 
points to the conclusion that in some econometric models (for example, 
the QUEST model used here), economic activity is relatively sensitive to 
inflationary shocks. In these cases, a carbonlenergy tax revenue "recycling" 
via a reduction in other indirect taxes (social security contributions or value 
added tax) tends to  lead to significantly lower GDP losses (or even GDP 
gains) compared to  alternative tax revenue redistribution schemes, at least 
in the short and medium-term. 
Thus, according to  the macroeconometric models used in this report, in 
the short to medium-term, a loss of GDP of the order of 0.5-1.0% compared 
to  the reference scenario would appear the most likely scenario in the case of 
'This result is also confirmed by simulations undertaken with a different (macro- 
sectoral) model for the four largest Member States of the European Community [see 
Standaert (1992)l. 
Table 1. Economic effects of a C02/energy tax of approximately 10$ per 
barrel of oil equivalent: Aggregate QUEST model results for all Member 
 state^.^ 
Scenario 
Redistribution 
Without Redistribution via employers' 
revenue via personal social security Redistribution 
redistributionb income taxesC contributionsC via VATC 
Volumes 
private consumption -1.9 -1.0 -0.7 0.4 
private investment -2.2 -2.0 -1.9 0.7 
exports -2.0 -2.2 - 1.4 -2.5 
imports -2.9 -2.1 -1.6 -2.3 
GDP -1.2 -1.1 -0.7 -0.1 
employment -0.4 -0.3 -0.0 0.1 
Prices 
CPI 3.8 3.5 2.5 0.9 
export deflator 3.2 2.8 1.8 3.0 
import deflator 3.2 2.1 1 .O 2.9 
real unit labor costs -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 
~ a t i o s ~  
budget balance 0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
current balance 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 
DAll variables, unless otherwise stated, in percentage change in the level after 5 years, 
compared to the reference case. All scenarios have been computed in linked mode. 
b ~ n  these scenarios, the policy is pursued by all EC Member States, the USA and Japan. 
'In these scenarios, the policy is pursued by all Member States. 
dDifferences in % of GDP. 
Source: Commission Services. 
a revenue neutral carbonlenergy tax of approximately 10 US$ per barrel of 
oil equivalent. However, other models, in particular those assuming a higher 
degree of flexibility, may show smaller GDP losses. Thus, simulations of the 
proposed EC tax using the OECD Secretariat's GREEN model only result 
in GDP losses of 0.2% by the year 2000 (rising to 0.5 by the year 2050). 
Over the long run, both types of models tend to  arrive at  similar results. 
The macroeconomic effects of the tax depend not only on the type of rev- 
enue "recycling", but also on the country concerned. Thus, as illustrated in 
Table 2, there are likely to be significant differences in the macroeconomic 
impact of the proposed tax on different Member States of the European 
Community. However, the evidence given by different econometric models 
is, at this stage, conflicting and therefore does not allow any firm conclu- 
sions to  be drawn. This is illustrated, for example, by a comparison of the 
QUEST simulation results with the results of a simulation with the DRI 
econometric model (see Table 2). Although the definition of the scenarios 
differs somewhat between the two simulation exercises5, it is nevertheless 
apparent that for some countries there are significant differences between 
both types of models, while the aggregate result for the Community as a 
whole is of the same order of magnitude. At the same time (but not shown 
here), the QUEST simulation results also indicate that a country's aggregate 
energy intensity (which tends to be higher in the less prosperous Member 
States of the Community) is a poor guide for assessing the likely macroeco- 
nomic effects, in particular in the case of a revenue neutral introduction of 
a carbonlenergy tax. 
3. The Sectoral Effects 
As far as the sectoral effects are concerned, the analysis reveals that the 
likely impact on different industrial sectors depends not only on the spe- 
cific type of tax revenue redistribution and the energy intensity of output 
of different sectors, but also on a whole chain of other determinants such as 
the magnitude of the effect on output prices, the intensity of international 
trade and the demand response to higher output prices. From this anal- 
ysis it becomes clear that, in the short-term, the impact strongly depends 
on the initial sectoral cost structure, which in turn reflects the sectoral en- 
ergy intensity as well as the existing level of energy prices. In the medium 
and long run, substitution possibilities are likely to change the picture to a 
considerable extent. 
The sectoral impact of the tax can also be shown to depend strongly on 
the structure of the energy system, the size of existing tax rates on energy 
products and the modalities of the tax. The importance of differences in the 
national fuel mix is clearly illustrated in Figure 1, showing the carbon in- 
tensity of electricity generation in different Member States. As a result, the 
analysis reveals that a pure carbon tax would tend to  imply larger differences 
as regards the sectoral impact than a pure energy tax. Similarly, it appears 
that in the case of a tax on final energy consumption, inter-country differ- 
ences in the impact of the tax on energy prices generally tend to  be smaller 
'The DRI scenario is a "mixed" scenario where the tax revenues are redistributed 
through a variety of tax cuts. Moreover, the DRI simulation also contains a series of 
non-fiscal energy saving measures. 
Table 2. Impacts on Member States' GDP in various COz/energy tax cum 
"revenue recycling" scenarios with the DRI and QUEST Models. 
 QUEST"?^ 
Social Security 
Personal contributions 
DRI" income tax of employers VAT 
package scenario scenario scenario 
B -1.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 
DK - 1.3 -1.1 -0.4 - 1.2 
D -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.0 
GR -0.5 - 1.8 -1.5 - 1.3 
E -0.4 -1.2 -0.7 0.1 
F -0.6 -1.1 -1.3 -0.4 
IRL -0.8 - 1.8 -0.6 -0.7 
I -0.9 -1.3 -1.0 -0.1 
L n.a. -0.7 -0,2 -0.6 
NL -1.0 -1.6 -1.0 -0.3 
P -1,5 -1,6 -1,4 0.0 
UK - 1.2 -0.7 $0.1 0.5 
EC -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 
aThe aggregate results of these scenarios are presented in Table 1.  
*change in the level of GDP in the fifth year the - one shot - introduction of the 
COzfenergy tax compared to the reference case. 
'Change in the level of GDP in the fifth year in which the tax is fully in situ compared to 
the reference case. 
Source: DRI and Commission Services. 
than for a tax on the production or import of primary energy. This points to  
the fact that conversion losses also differ markedly between Member States. 
A careful analysis of the present situation in manufacturing industry in 
those five Member States for which detailed statistics are available (Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, Denmark and United Kingdom) reveals that although there 
is a small group of potentially sensitive branches, most sectors have a low 
share of direct energy costs in total production costs. Thus, for the great ma- 
jority of manufacturing industry, direct energy costs only represent between 
0% and 5% of total production value (see Figure 2). According to  the avail- 
able - admittedly incomplete - data, these sectors represent approximately 
85% of industrial employment. The average direct energy cost share for the 
manufacturing sector varies between 2.5% and 4%, respectively, according 
to  the country considered. 
Although there are a small number of energy intensive sectors which 
cluster around an average energy cost share of between 10% and 20%, these 
Tonnes of CO2/TJ of electricity 
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Figure 1. COz emission intensity of electricity generation. Source: Com- 
mission Services. 
%-intervals of energy cost shares 
0 5 0 100 150 200 
Observed cases in EC-5 sample 
Figure 2. Sectoral energy cost shares. Frequency distribution of NACE 3 
digit sectors over %-intervals of energy cost shares in industrial production. 
Note: The numbers of 1988 energy cost shares in total production cost of 
manufacturing industry in 5 EC countries (B, D, F, E, P) have been plotted 
over intervals of energy cost shares. Source: Commission Services, National 
Statistical Offices. 
are only eight out of a total of 130 sectors. Moreover, some of these sectors 
cannot be classified as being exposed to strong international competition 
(e.g., heat generation and distribution, see below). On the basis of the 
available data, it appears that the branches with a share of energy costs 
in total costs of more than 10% ("potentially sensitive sectors") represent 
approximately 6% of industrial employment. 
In a second group of (approximately twelve) branches, the energy cost 
shares lie between 5% and lo%, so that these sectors can be considered as 
being potentially moderately sensitive to energy cost increases. In terms of 
employment, these sectors represent approximately between 5% and 6% of 
industrial employment. Even if the available evidence is only sketchy, there 
is nevertheless the impression that, in these moderately sensitive sectors, the 
direct energy cost shares appear to  be higher in Southern Member States 
compared to  Northern Member States. Such differences do not appear to  
reflect differences in pre-COz/energy tax prices, but rather seem to be largely 
attributable t o  differences in production technologies. 
It is interesting to  note that  for most industrial branches with a high 
energy cost share, exports represent a smaller share of production than on 
average in the manufacturing industry. This point is illustrated for the case 
of extra-EC exports in Figure 3. Only a few branches appear to  be both 
energy and import intensive. For extra-EC imports, a similar observation 
holds. However, for an in-depth assessment it would be necessary t o  go 
beyond this static analysis and t o  also look a t  the degree of competition and 
the size of price elasticities on the respective markets. 
Direct energy costs only represent part of the energy costs borne by 
companies. In order t o  investigate the total incidence of the introduction 
of carbonlenergy taxes, an  input-output analysis has been undertaken for a 
few selected Member States for which the necessary statistical information 
is available [France, Germany, Denmark and Italy; see also Martin and Ve- 
lazquez (1992) for an  application t o  Spain]. Although such an analysis has 
the disadvantage of implying a higher degree of sectoral aggregation (ap- 
proximately 40 sectors compared t o  130), it has the advantage of allowing 
an assessment t o  be made of the impact of energy costs embedded in compa- 
nies' intermediate inputs and of the importance of the product structure of 
energy consumption for the overall tax  incidence. For analytical purposes, 
the analysis - both for the case of a tax  on primary energy and for a tax  
on final energy consumption - has assumed that  no sector is exempted from 
the tax. Moreover, no macroeconomic feedbacks are taken into account. 
It emerges from this input-output analysis that  although for a signifi- 
cant number of energy price sensitive sectors the conclusions are, for most 
countries, quite similar when looking a t  total cost shares compared t o  only 
direct cost shares (e.g., cement, iron and steel), for others the picture may 
differ significantly (e.g., glass, hard coal extraction). Assuming that  the in- 
crease in input costs would be fully passed through to  output (production) 
prices - which, in turn,  will have an effect on competitiveness - the follow- 
ing assessment can be made (see Table 3). Only iron and steel, special steel 
production and cement industries would experience production price rises of 
between 5% and 10%. For the other energy intensive branches, this increase 
would lie between 2% and 4%. A large number of - in economic terms very 
large - service branches would only experience price increases of significantly 
less than 1%. The analysis also showed that ,  in view of the strong differ- 
ences in the fuel-mix used in electricity generation already referred t o  above, 
the precise impact of a carbonlenergy tax may differ significantly among 
Member States, depending on the precise type of the tax. 
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a x t r a ~ ~  axport ahara W anarpy coat ahara 
NACE sector 
Sacbra NACE 111. 163. 239. not indudad 
161 Power generation 
221 Iron 6 steel 
241 Clay products 
242 Cement 
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 6 10 16 20 25 
(In U) (in U\ 
b) Potentially moderately sensit.sectors 
a x t r a ~ c  arport ahara anarpy coat ahara 
NACE sector 
170 Water supply 
231 Extr. build. mat 
245 Work. of stone 
248 Caramlcs 
251 Basic chemlcals 
260 Man-made flbrar 
311 Foundrler 
418 Starch 
462 Semi-fln. wood 
471 Pulp,papar 
26 20 16 10 6 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
(in U\ (In U\ 
Figure 3. Share of extra EC exports in gross production (1987/1989) and 
energy cost shares - EUR5. Note: Sample includes Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom. Source: Commission Services. 
Table 3. Producer price increases in selected non-energy branches due to 
the introduction of a 10$ per barrel of oil equivalent COz tax, estimates for 
1990. 
% Producer price changes 
Branch Denmark Germany Spain France Italy 
Iron and steel 6.1 11.5 6.8 9.6 6.2 
Special steel products - 6.4 5.7 5.8 4.2 
Non-ferrous metals 1.7 6.2 3.6 2.2 2.9 
Cement, plaster 10.4 6.6 8.9 8.3 9.7 
Glass 2.2 3.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 
Clay and ceramics 4.5 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 
Other minerals 3.0 3.8 2.6 1.3 1.8 
Chemical 2.7 4.9 2.7 3.5 3.5 
Metal products 1.8 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.8 
Machines 1.1 1.3 1.3 1 .O 1.1 
Paper 4.8 5.3 2.5 2.0 3.2 
Printed matter 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.7 1.2 
Rubber, plastics 2.0 2.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 
Other industry 1.1 1.8 1.2 0.7 1.7 
Construction 
Reparation 
Trade 
Railways 3.6 3.3 2.4 1.1 3.5 
Road transport 2.1 1.5 2.0 1.6 2.1 
Inland shipping - 5.4 - 2.1 - 
Maritime transport 5.2 7.3 2.7 6.8 6.5 
Air transport 6.7 3.3 3.5 4.6 3.8 
Other market services 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Non-market services 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of Eurostat If0 tables for Denmark, Germany, 
France and Italy, and on Martin and Velasquez (1992) for Spain. 
In the longer run, dynamic adjustment and substitution effects are likely 
to change the initial sectoral picture considerably. Moreover, the sectoral ef- 
fects will also depend on the type of revenue "recycling". Generally, the total 
effect of the revenue-neutral introduction of a COz/energy tax is likely to be 
a relatively strong output price increase for energy intensive branches (un- 
less, of course, these branches are partially or totally exempted in exchange 
for voluntary agreements), very moderate increases or even decreases for 
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4. The Effects in Terms of Household 
Income Distribution 
Finally, as to  the distributional impact of the introduction of a C02/energy 
tax  on private households, several factors have to  be taken into account [see 
Smith (1992) for more a detailed analysis]: 
Firstly, it has to  be stressed that the overall impact of the additional 
carbonlenergy tax payments on energy products on total household ex- 
penditures would only be modest. This direct impact would only repre- 
sent between 0.5% and 1.3% of total household expenditure, depending 
on the Member State (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 5. Budget shares for household expenditure on motor fuels in six EC 
countries by quartile groups of gross household income. Source: Eurostat 
(1990). 
Secondly, based on data from EC household expenditure surveys for six 
Member States (Germany, France, Spain, Ireland, Italy and the Nether- 
lands), the evidence indicates that the poorest 25% of households tend 
to spend a relatively higher share of their expenditure on the direct pur- 
chase of domestic energy compared to the other three household quar- 
tiles. With the exception of Italy, the budget share of expenditure on 
domestic fuels declines steadily (see Figure 5). There is also a tendency 
for domestic fuel budget shares to  be smaller in Southern Member States, 
which might be due t o  climatic circumstances. 
Thirdly, this contrasts with a lower budget share of expenditure on motor 
fuels for poorer households in comparison to  richer ones. Thus, taxation 
of transport fuels would in fact be progressive in terms of household 
income classes (see Figure 6). 
Fourthly, as a result of these two opposing trends, and assuming un- 
changed spending patterns (i.e., a static analysis), a COz/energy tax is 
only slightly regressive in most Member States. However, there is some 
initial evidence pointing towards a more pronounced regressivity in some 
Northern Member States, in particular Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 6. Carbon and energy tax payment as % of household total expen- 
diture (all households). Source: Smith (1992). 
It is interesting to  note that  the inter-country differences appear to  be 
larger in the case of a pure carbon tax in comparison with a pure energy 
tax. 
r Fifthly, over the medium and long run: households (and producers) will 
substitute away from highly taxed products. The short-run, static tax 
incidence may therefore be different from the long-run dynamic incidence 
due to  a change in household spending patterns. 
Finally, the overall impact of a C02/energy tax on different household 
classes depends not only on this tax, but also on the incidence of the 
compensatory reduction in other taxes and charges implied by the rev- 
enue neutral introduction of a carbonlenergy tax and on the incidence 
of the environmental benefits of such a tax, both of which are difficult 
t o  assess a t  this stage. 
5. The International Dimension 
Clearly, man-induced climate change being a global phenomenon, the policy 
response should preferably also be a global one. Acting alone, the Commu- 
nity with its 13% share in worldwide C 0 2  emissions will only have a negli- 
gible impact on the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. Never- 
theless, both ethical and economic arguments would indicate that  industri- 
alized countries should take the lead. Not only do these countries have the  
resources as well as the technology to  implement effective emission limitation 
policies, but they are also responsible for the overwhelming majority of the  
anthropogenic increase in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
In this context, it is sometimes argued that the Community's exposure 
t o  international competition would imply high costs of European leadership 
in terms of C 0 2  emission limitation. However, the analysis and evidence 
available t o  date do not support this view [see also Burniaux et al. (1992)l. 
Although any unilateral emission limitation policy implies some additional 
microeconomic costs compared to  a global emission limitation policy, such a 
unilateral emission limitation by the European Community does not neces- 
sarily have to lead t o  major macroeconomic costs. This can be ascribed t o  
three main factors: 
Firstly, Member States' involvement in eztm-EC tmde of energy inten- 
sive products is relatively small. On average, approximately 60% of each 
individual Member State's total trade is with other Member States. This 
trade would only be very moderately affected by the introduction of a 
Community-wide carbonlenergy tax. Extra-EC exports of goods and 
services only contribute approximately 10% to  the Community's GDP. 
Taking into account that other European OECD countries either have 
already introduced similar taxes or a t  least have announced their in- 
tention of doing so, one can conclude that trade with countries which 
have not taken (or are presently not willing to  take) comparable action 
probably represents less than 8% of the Community's economic activity. 
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Figure 7. Importance of potentially sensitive and moderately sensitive sec- 
tors in extra EC exports in relation to  GDP. Source: Commission Services. 
Moreover, only a fraction of this trade consists of trade in energy inten- 
sive products. Thus, the channel through which a loss in international 
competitiveness caused by unilateral emission reduction could affect the 
Community's GDP is relatively small. 
Combining information on the weight of energy intensive sectors in 
extra-EC exports with data  on the relative importance of extra-EC ex- 
ports in GDP, Figure 7 clearly demonstrates the limited macroecononlic 
importance (between 0.5% and 2% of GDP, depending on the country) 
of those sectors which could be considered as being potentially vulner- 
able to  a unilateral increase in energy costs. For extra-EC imports, the 
picture is broadly similar. This is not to deny, of course, that individ- 
ual companies or even branches might be significantly affected and that  
accompanying policies might, therefore, be required. 
Secondly, there are two main mechanisms through which external trade 
is affected by unilateral emission limitation policies: the Community's 
price competitiveness and the foreign trading partners' economic activ- 
ity. As to price competitiveness, a certain deterioration might be difficult 
to  avoid. However, a revenue-neutral introduction of a C02/energy tax 
would ensure that  any losses in aggregate competitiveness would be lim- 
ited, as the average tax burden in the economy would not increase. For 
avoiding a significant deterioration in international competitiveness it 
would, however, be necessary t o  ensure that  no wage-price spiral is set 
in motion. On the other hand, the Community's exports are not only 
determined by export prices, but also by the volume of economic activity 
in the countries of destination. If, as indicated above, a C 0 2  limitation 
policy may have a modest negative impact on economic activity a t  least 
in the short run, then the Community's exports could actually be higher 
if third countries did not embark on emission limitation policies than if 
they did. Thus, the total effect on Community exports is the combina- 
tion of two opposing trends. Both the sign and the size of the net impact 
are difficult to  predict. 
Thirdly, over the longer term, there may even be advantages in moving 
first. Although the empirical evidence on this issue is only sketchy [see 
e.g., Gerstenberger (1992)], the impression nevertheless emerges that  
there could by a positive feed-back from higher energy prices t o  energy 
efficiency-related innovation activity and trade performance in the field 
of energy technologies. However, further research is required t o  investi- 
gate this aspect. 
In addition t o  these macroeconomic aspects, it is of course necessary t o  
look a t  the broader welfare implications of such a policy. The analysis here 
has only focused on the environmental benefits in terms of C 0 2  emission 
limitation (without even attempting t o  monetarize these benefits). There 
are, however, indications pointing towards the possibility that  the  secondary 
benefits of greenhouse gas emission control may exceed the direct benefits 
by between 8 t o  30 times [see Pearce (1992)l. These benefits should be taken 
into account when making a comprehensive costlbenefit assessment of the 
Community's C 0 2  emission limitation policy. 
Of course, these arguments should not be misinterpreted in the sense 
of implying that  it would make no difference whether other countries follow 
the Community in limiting their C 0 2  emissions or not. On the contrary, as 
an  isolated EC emission limitation policy will not be effective in noticeably 
slowing down climate change, the full benefits of such a policy can only be 
reaped in the context of a broader international agreement. This is even more 
so as emission reduction in only one world region may, due to  dislocation 
and oil price feedback effects, even partly be compensated by an increase 
in COz emissions e l s e~here .~  However, the important point to retain is 
that there are both costs and benefits of leadership and it may well be of 
economic advantage to start embarking on such a policy path, provided that 
such leadership improves the chance of success of a broader international 
agreement. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the potential regional costs and benefits of participation 
in a set of hypothetical protocols to stabilize fossil fuel carbon emissions. 
This work is prompted by the observation that the particular construct of a 
stabilization agreement can greatly influence the potential acceptability and 
stability of that agreement. 
The principal conclusion of this work is: 
Any agreement to control fossil fuel carbon emissions, no matter how 
skillfully cmfted, will require a pmcess of constant revision in  the terms 
of participation, because the economic needs of its participants will be 
evolving. 
Additional conclusions are: 
1. Costs of individual national emissions targets leading to a stabilization 
of global emissions will be much higher than the costs of efficient in- 
struments such as a carbon tax or tradable permits. Overall costs of 
individual national targets were approximately double those of an effi- 
ciently administered global target in the reference case, although costs 
t o  developed nations were actually lower. 
'This paper is based on work that was undertaken for the United States Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment (OTA) and the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) Global Studies 
Program (GSP), and which is forthcoming in reports to these organizations: Edmonds, J., 
Barns, D., and Ton, M., 1992, Carbon Coalitions: The Cost and Eflectiveness of Energy 
Agreements to  Alter Trajectories of Atmospheric Carbon Diozide Emissions, Draft pa- 
per prepared for the United States Office of Technology Assessment and the PNL Global 
Studies Program. We draw upon that work and summarize its key findings in the present 
paper. 
'Pacific Northwest Laboratory is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Bat- 
telle Memorial Institute under contract DEAC06-76RLO. 
2. Conventional "equity-based" principles, such as equal per capita emis- 
sions rights, for allocating tradable permits may either 
(a) transfer too little wealth to  developing nations, leading to a 
"dropout" problem, or 
(b) raise costs to developed nation participants to unacceptable levels. 
3. Full participation by the world's nations may not be necessary to achieve 
most of the results of full participation. Perhaps as few as a dozen 
nations may be able to control atmospheric carbon concentrations. 
4. Accelerated technology development and deployment to developing na- 
tions may greatly reduce costs. 
5. Short delays, on the order of 10-15 years, in establishing an agreement 
may yield only small differences in long-term atmospheric concentra- 
tions. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will briefly describe the approach 
taken to develop the assessment of the regional costs and benefits of par- 
ticipation in the alternative protocols, describe the hypothetical protocols 
examined, and finally discuss briefly each of the principal results. 
While this paper uses a scenario approach to examine protocols, it should 
be noted that we do not predict the future. Results developed in  this paper 
should be taken as indicative of the type of phenomena that may be encoun- 
tered in  the process of developing protocols for fossil fuel carbon emissions 
reductions. Results should not be taken literally. Furthermore, no attempt 
has been made to assess the net benefits of emissions reductions through 
changes in  the expected rate of climate change. Only the net costs of emis- 
sions reductions within a hypothetical protocol structure are considered. 
2. Approach 
This paper examines both the rate of fossil fuel carbon emission and the con- 
sequent accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere. Two basic tools are used 
to address the issue of cost and effectiveness of potential future agreements 
to reduce fossil fuel carbon accumulation in the atmosphere: an energy-C02 
emissions model and a carbon cycle model. Knowledge of both the processes 
that lead to fossil fuel carbon emissions and the processes that remove car- 
bon from the atmosphere is surrounded by considerable uncertainty. This 
paper reports on only one emissions trajectory, Case A, and uses only one 
carbon cycle model, IPCC (1990). 
We have used the Edmonds-Reilly-Barns Model (ERB), Version 4.01, 
modified for use in this exercise, to examine potential future fossil fuel carbon 
emissions. The ERB is a well-documented, frequently-used, long-term model 
of glohal energy and fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions. The model consists 
of four parts: supply, demand, energy balance, and greenhouse gas emissions. 
The first two modules determine the supply of and demand for each of six 
major primary energy categories in each of nine global regions. For the 
purposes of this exercise, results from the nine regions have been aggregated 
to  five regions: 
No. Region 
1 United States (US) 
2 Other OECD (OECD) 
3 Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU) 
4 China and other Asian centrally planned economies (CHINA) 
5 Rest of the World (ROW) 
The energy balance module ensures model equilibrium in each global 
fuel market. (Primary electricity is assumed to  be untraded; thus supply 
and demand balance in each region.) The greenhouse gas emissions module 
is a set of three post-processors that calculate the energy-related emissions 
of C02 ,  CH4, and N20. The original version of the model is documented in 
Edmonds and Reilly (1985), while major revisions are discussed in Edmonds 
et al. (1986). The model is currently configured to develop scenarios for 
seven benchmark years: 2005,2020, 2035, 2050,2065, 2080, and 2095. 
The carbon cycle model is a simple, single equation model of net ocean 
carbon uptake, taken from IPCC (1990). This model contains no process 
detail, but mimics the behavior of more sophisticated process models. 
The ERB accommodates carbon taxes. Tax rates that achieve the goal 
of stabilizing fossil fuel carbon emissions are obtained. The total cost of 
an emissions reduction is computed using procedures described in Edmonds 
and Barns (1992). The total cost and the GNP loss will be the same under 
appropriate  circumstance^.^ These procedures presume that there are no 
substantial market imperfections in the system. 
3The conditions considered in Edmonds and Barns (1992) include: a single homoge- 
neous good used for both production and final consumption; a single fossil fuel and a single 
non-fossil fuel; a single and a closed economy, which is the case for the global economic 
system, but not for individual nations; and a system is in static equilibrium. 
Table 1. Global population assumptions 1990 
through 2095. 
Population 
Year (Millions) 
1990 5,306 
Table 2. Labor productivity growth rate assumptions (in % /yr). 
Region 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
OECDa 1.62 1.62 1.36 1.36 1.08 0.98 0.98 
EEFSU 1.45 1.45 1.17 1.17 0.97 0.93 0.93 
CHINA 2.86 2.86 2.81 2.81 2.68 2.85 2.85 
ROW 1.64 1.64 1.74 1.74 1.87 2.20 2.20 
OUnited States included in OECD. 
3. A Reference Case 
While three cases were developed in the original analysis, we discuss only the 
central case in this paper. The ERB employs more than a thousand param- 
eters to generate scenarios. Some of these parameters are more important 
than others. We have focused on a subset of parameters to build a reference 
case, Case A. Key parameters include: population, labor productivity, the 
rate of exogenous end-use energy efficiency improvement, the fossil fuel re- 
source base, and the non-greenhouse environmental cost of fuels. Reference 
case population assumptions follow IPCC (1989). Global populations are 
given below in Table 1. 
Labor productivity assumptions are given in Table 2. 
Other assumptions are given in Table 3. 
The consequent non-protocol reference case fossil fuel carbon emissions 
for the period 1975 through 2095 are shown in Figure 1. 
Table 3. Other parameter assumptions, all cases. 
Parameter Value Units Notes 
Exogeneous end-use energy intensity 1.0 % / ~ r  Applied to all regions and all sectors. 
Improvement rate 
Fossil fuel resource base 
Oil 
Gas 
Coal 
Solar /fusion cost 
Total available resource from discovered and 
16,511 E j undiscovered including those producible with current 
17,451 Ej  techniques and those which require advanced 
217,000 E j technologies. 
$40.21 1990 US Ultimate cost of delivered electricity with costs 
$/GJ declining t o  this level by. 2035. 
Utility response t o  price change -3.0 none Logit elasticity parameter; value of 0.0 indicates no 
response in fuel share t o  cost; value of minus infinity 
indicates least cost option captures 100% of the market. 
Income elasticity of demand for energy % change in energy demand for each % change in 
OECD 1.00 none income; values for non-OECD regions gradually 
EEFSU 1.25 reduced to those of the OECD by 2095. 
ROW 1.40 
Price elasticity of demand for energy -0.7 none % change in energy demand for each % change in 
the price of aggregate energy. This input is used t o  
calibrate the price elasticity of demand for energy 
services in the model. 
Non-greenhouse environmental cost Increased non-greenhouse environmental cost, over 
Oil $0.00 $/Gj and above those in existence in 1975, in constant 
Gas $0.00 $/Gj 1990 U.S. dollars. These costs reflect both explicit 
Coal $1.70 $/GJ and implicit costs. 
Nuclear $10.65 $/Gj 
Biomass energy resource base 
Minimum price 
474 E j / ~ r  Maximum potential supply of biomass from energy 
$1.70 $/GJ farms; minimum price is the minimum cost of solid 
Maximum price $9.75 $/Gj energy needed t o  obtain any production; maximum CD u 
price yields full utilization of the resource base. cn 
poc/v 
30 
2 5 AFRICA i 
JANZ 1 
CAN&WEUR 
Figure 1. Non-protocol (reference) fossil fuel carbon emissions by region: 
1975-2095. 
4. Hypothetical Protocols 
It has long been recognized that the reduction of global greenhouse-gas- 
related emissions requires international cooperation. No single country con- 
trols a sufficient share of global fossil fuel use to  control total global carbon 
e m i s ~ i o n s . ~  The United States is responsible for the largest sha,re of fossil 
fuel carbon emissions t o  the atmosphere, approximately 23% (Bradley et a.l., 
1991). Yet this share is anticipated to  decline with time (Swart et al. 1991; 
Manne and Richels, 1990; IPCC, 1989; Lashof and Tirpak, 1989; Rotmans 
et al., 1989; Edmonds and Reilly, 1983; Hafele. 1981). 
While it is clear that  some kind of protocol would be needed to establish 
control over anthropogenic greenhouse-gas-related emissions, governments 
have yet to  agree on the nature, timing, or conditions of such an agreement.5 
Consideration nevertheless is being given to  principles that  might guide the 
development of a protocol and to  broad potential terms and conditions that  
might be included in agreements (Ghosh, 1991; Griibler and Fujii, 1991; 
Barrett, 1990; Morrisette and Plantinga, 1990; Morrisette et al., 1990; Sebe- 
nius, 1990; Grubb, 1989). Issues that need to  be addressed in thinking about 
'By any measures, fossil fuel emissions are the single most important contributor to 
potential global climate change (Reilly, 1992; Wuebbles and Edmonds, 1991; Rotmans and 
den Elzen, 1991; IPCC, 1990; Nordhaus, 1990a; Lashof and Ahuja, 1990). 
5The 1992 Rio Climate Convention does offer initial guidance, but contains no enforce- 
ment provisions. 
emissions protocols include target levels, methods for achieving these levels, 
and the extent and timing of participation. 
Targets: We have focused on fossil fuel carbon emissions rather than at- 
mospheric concentrations. While it would be relatively simple to monitor 
the atmospheric concentration of COz, it would be extremely difficult to  at- 
tribute changes in that concentration to individual counties. Furthermore, 
while it is possible to use carbon cycle models to  infer required global emis- 
sions consistent with any desired annually and globally averaged atmospheric 
C 0 2  concentration, the inferred emission requirement, for example to sta- 
bilize present concentrations, varies depending upon the particular carbon 
cycle model employed. Additional uncertainty is introduced by virtue of the 
fact the most desirable atmospheric concentration or rate of change of that 
concentration is unclear. Researchers including Nordhaus (1990b; 1990c), 
Peck and Teisberg (1991; 1992), and Cline (1990; 1991) have explored eco- 
nomically optimal strategies and have found dramatically different optimal 
paths under alternative assumed conditions. 
There are a multitude of ways to specify global and national goals. For 
the purposes of providing a simple point of departure, we focus initially on 
the goal of stabilizing emissions. While this particular goal is arbitrary, it 
does appear as a voluntary objective of the Rio Climate Convention. 
Implementation: Three alternative mechanisms of protocol implementation 
will be examined. 
1. Uniform taxes: Each participant in the protocol is assumed to  adopt 
a uniform set of taxes on carbon emissions to  stabilize the combined 
emissions of all participants; 
2. Tradable permits: The targets of participating nations are combined. 
Each participant is given an emission allowance. Allowances total to  
equal the participants' combined emissions target. Each participant 
must cover emissions with allowances. If a participant's emissions are 
less than the allowance the participant may sell excess emissions al- 
lowances. If a participant's emissions are greater than the allowance, 
then additional allowances must be obtained from other participants. A 
market is assumed to form in which allowances are traded in a manner 
similar to  stocks, bonds, and international currencies. 
3. Individual targets: Each participating region is assumed to  be required 
to  meet its own emission reduction target without being able to  trade 
emissions allowances. 
When tradable permits are examined, an issue arises as to  the allocation 
of emissions allowances. As noted in the preceding discussion, much work 
has gone into the issue of allocating these allowances. Because tradable 
permits create a market for emissions rights, with a single price faced by all 
participants, they have efficient properties similar to a common tax. They 
also have income redistribution properties. Because considerable income 
can be redistributed, the distribution of emissions rights has substantial 
implications for the global income distribution. Of the great many options 
that have been suggested, we examine emissions allocations based on the 
following principles: 
1. "Grandfathered Emissions" Principle: Emissions are allocated on the 
basis of rates at  the time of joining the protocol; 
2.  Equal Per Capita Emissions Principle: Emissions are allocated on the 
basis of adult population, which we take to be the population 15 years 
prior to  the allocation date; 
3. "No Harm to Developing Nations" Principle: Developing nations receive 
sufficient emissions rights to cover their own emissions and to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the economic cost of participation in the pro- 
tocol; 
4. "No Harm to Non-OECD Nations" Principle: Non-OECD nations re- 
ceive sufficient emissions rights to cover their own emissions and to gen- 
erate sufficient revenue to  cover the economic cost of participation in the 
protocol. 
Principle 1 is simple and needs no further explanations. Principle 2 
uses lagged or adult population, rather than total population, to  remove 
any incentive for nations to engage in programs to increase population in 
order to  secure greater emissions rights. Furthermore, reliable same year 
population estimated are not presently possible. Some time is needed to 
build reliable population estimates. 
Principles 3 and 4 are not intended to  be pragmatically observable or 
calculatable allocation criteria. Such criteria can be examined with a model, 
however, and can be instructive with regard to potential negotiating posi- 
tions that may be encountered. We calculate the implied distribution of 
emissions allowances that would leave developing and non-OECD nation 
participants no worse off in terms of GNP than had they not participated 
in the agreement. This calculation provides some guidance for comparison 
of other metrics in achieving this end. We have chosen not to examine an 
allocation of permits based on either GDP or per capita GDP. We consider 
the measurement of GDP to be too difficult at this time for such schemes to 
be a near-term possibility. 
In our analysis, tradable permit rights are assumed to  be usable only in 
the year in which they are issued. They cannot be saved and used later. Na- 
tions cannot borrow against expected future emissions. It is imaginable that 
an international system could accommodate saved emissions rights. During 
periods in which the real value of the emissions rights increase faster than 
the real interest rate, there would a tendency for emissions rights to  be saved 
for use in the future. This intertemporal trading would tend to  limit the rate 
of growth of the price of carbon emissions rights to the interest rate. It is 
more difficult to  imagine a system in which it was possible to borrow against 
future emissions rights. As rights are accumulated annually with no end to  
the process, there is a potentially infinite store of rights against which to  bor- 
row. Borrowing could be restricted; that is, a nation could never be allowed 
to  borrow more than a fixed number of years' emissions into the future. If 
borrowing could occur across more than a few years into the future, there 
would always be the danger that a participating nation might join, borrow 
against the future t o  finance current expenditures, and when the borrowing 
limit was reached, simply drop out of the process. 
5.  Results 
Individual Targets: The simplest mechanism for stabilizing future fossil fuel 
carbon emissions - the mechanism espoused by the Rio Climate Convention 
would be for all nations to  each agree to  stabilize their respective emissions. 
This scheme is not without its own problems. First, individual targets shift 
the cost burden of emissions reductions away from developed nations and 
toward developing nations. By the year 2020, more than 80% of total global 
costs are borne by non-OECD regions. 
Second, individual targets more than double the total global cost of emis- 
sions reductions, relative to the case in which a globally administered carbon 
tax is put into effect. (See Figure 2 which displays results for the reference 
emissions trajectory.) Ironically, costs are lower in the OECD region after 
the year 2005 than in the common tax case. This irony is the result of the 
fact that stabilizing individual emissions provides a non-tradable "grand- 
fathered" emissions right to participants. Thus, there is no room for the 
increased emissions that would be expected to  accompany the development 
process for currently developing nations. Under these circumstances, it is 
hard to  imagine developing nations being attracted by such proposals. 
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Figure 2. Percentage change in total cost of fossil fuel carbon emissions 
stabilization by individual region relative to  the total cost of global fossil 
fuel carbon emissions with a common global tax, by region and by year (%). 
Tradable Permits: An alternative mechanism for stabilizing global emissions 
is to create and distribute a tradable emissions permit. Like taxes, tradable 
permits can be shown to be economically efficient tools for reducing fossil 
fuel carbon emissions; that is, both provide identical incentives to  emitters to 
reduce emissions. In the case of the common tax, all emitters see a common 
marginal cost of emissions reductions. Since the marginal costs of emissions 
reductions are identical across all human activities, there is no way to change 
the pattern of emissions slightly and reduce total emissions costs. Tradable 
permits have similar properties. A market is assumed to form, and permits 
are assumed to  trade at  a common market price. This price adds the same 
amount to the cost of using a fossil fuel as would a tax. To the user of the 
fossil fuel, there is no difference. 
Other characteristics of the two systems are very different. In a tradable 
permit system, permits to  release emissions into the atmosphere are owned 
as a property right. Ownership may be by the government or private parties. 
The emission right has value to  an individual party. That value depends on 
the amount of emissions allowed to all parties and the amount allocated to  
the individual party. 
In exploring the implication of tradable permit schemes, we examine the 
four very different rules for allocation of permits discussed above: 
1 .  " Gmndfathered Emissions" Principle, 
2.  Equal Per Capita Emissions Principle, 
3. "No Harm to Developing Nations" Principle, 
4 .  "No Harm to Non-OECD Nations" Principle. 
Figure 3. Common global carbon tax to  stabilize emissions beginning in 
1990: Total cost of emissions reductions relative to  GDP by region and by 
year (Yo). 
Tradable permits are assumed stabilize emissions. The principal issues 
are the associated distribution of costs and income transfers. The costs 
associated with a globally administered carbon tax are shown in Figure 3. 
This distribution of costs is taken t o  be the same as the case in which each 
region is allocated a share of emissions sufficient to cover its own emissions 
with no net trade. 
The regional net costs, expressed as a fraction of GDP, for the Grandfa- 
thered Emissions case are given in Figure 4. Under this allocation of tradable 
permits, developing nations transfer wealth to the developed nations. 
The regional net costs, expressed as a percentage of GDP, for the Equal 
per Capita Emissions allocation of permits is given in Figure 5. Here, wealth 
Figure 4. Total cost of emissions reductions relative to  GDP plus net, 
transfers of wealth from sale of excess emissions rights by region and by 
year: Tradable permits, "Grandfathered Emissions" Principle (%). 
transfers flow from the developed regions to the developing regions. Inter- 
estingly, however, the particular set of assumptions examined in this ca,se 
put China in a position where the value of its emissions allocation leaves 
insufficient excess rights to  cover its costs after the first 15 years. This is 
surprising because of the large Chinese population. This result occurs be- 
cause the assumed rate of growth of Chinese population is low, and the rate 
of labor productivity growth is high; that  is, China is assumed to  be success- 
ful in its development program. The irony is that  this same success makes it 
unattractive to continue to  participate in tradable emissions permit program 
after a short period of time. Of course, this scenario is not a forecast. China 
may fare perfectly well throughout the next century under a tradable permit 
system in which permits were distributed on the basis of population. The 
important lesson here is rather that  this type of circumstance may emerge 
Figure 5 .  Total cost of emissions reductions relative to  GDP plus net 
transfers of wealth from sale of excess emissions rights by region and by 
year: Tradable permits and "Equal per Capita Emissions" Principle (%). 
for some important nation or nations. More generally, there is no particular 
reason to  believe that  the transfer of wealth via a tradable permit scheme 
based on equal per capita income will result in a permanent incentive for 
non-OECD nations to  participate. Rather, it is likely that  no matter how 
skillfully crafted initially, any agreement will require a long-term process of 
review and revision. 
For contrast, we construct a case in which we compute the allocation 
of permits to  developing nations necessary to leave developing regions just 
indifferent about participating or not participating in the protocol. The re- 
gional net costs, in terms of foregone GDP, associated with this case are 
displayed in Figure 6. We note that  this case matches neither the Grand- 
fathered Emissions permit allocation nor the Equal per Capita Emissions 
permit allocation. It is more similar to  the former in the first period and 
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Figure 6. Total cost of emissions reductions relative to  GDP plus net 
transfers of wealth from sale of excess emissions rights by region and by 
year: Tradable permits, "No Harm to  Developing Nations" Principle ( 'ro ). 
ultimately more similar to  the latter in later periods, but the match is not 
a good one. 
For completeness, we have also constructed a case in which we compute 
the allocation of permits to  non-OECD regions necessary to leave non-OECD 
regions just indifferent about participating or not participating in the proto- 
col. The regional net costs, in terms of foregone GDP, associated with this 
case are displayed in Figure 7. 
The Role of the "Big Three": The rapid acceleration of emissions of carbon 
into the atmosphere in the middle and latter half of the twenty-first century is 
the consequence of an  accelerated use of coal resulting from the combination 
of continued rapid economic growth, particularly in the developing nations 
of the world, and limits to  inexpensive conventional oil and gas resources. 
The world distribution of coal resources (not to  be confused with reserves) 
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Figure 7. Total cost of enlissiorls reductions relative to C;DP plus net 
transfers of wealth from sale of excess emissions rights by region a ~ l d  by 
year: Tradable permits, "No Harm to Non-OECD Nations" Principle (5%). 
Table 4. Distributio~l of global coal resources. Source: Edruoilds ei (11. 
( 1986), Appendix -4. 
Resource Base 
Region (ej ( % I  
OECD 107,158 40 
EEFSlT 114,328 42 
CHINA 38,742 14 
ROW 10,772 4 
TOTAL 271,000 100 
is not uniform. Table 4 sllows the distribution of resources among world 
regions. 
To explore the importance of particiption by the Big Three regions - 
OECD, EEFSU, and China - we have constructed a scenario in which these 
regions engage in a coalition to stabilize combined emissions, but the rest of 
the world does not. 
We have assumed that the Big Three institute a common two-part car- 
bon tax with equal tax levels on production and consumption activities. In 
the analysis of a common global carbon tax, we found the issue of point 
of taxation (severance versus consumption tax) to be an unimportant issue. 
When some regions participate and others do not, the matter become im- 
portant. If only consumption is taxed and production goes untaxed, then 
a protocol participant may simultaneously reduce its own emissions while 
supplying fossil fuels to the rest of the world and facilitating additional 
emissions by the rest of the world. On the other hand, when only a subset of 
nations participate and a severance tax is used without a consumption tax, 
the opposite propensity emerges; that is, there is a tendency for fossil fuel 
production to be reduced, but no direct incentive for the use of fossil fuels 
to be diminished. 
Coupling production and consumption taxes is intended to address the 
problem of significant non-participating regions. The consumption compo- 
nent of the two-part tax directly stimulates reductions in the use of fossil 
fuels. The production tax component not only reduces domestic production 
of fossil fuels, but also affects the world price of coal to the rest of the world. 
It is not entirely clear how to report the two-part carbon tax. We have cho- 
sen to report the carbon tax rate as the simple sum of the production and 
consumption components. In the case in which a region is effectively closed, 
carbon would in fact be taxed twice. For economies that are dominated by 
either production or consumption, carbon could actually be taxed only once 
under such a scheme. 
Big Three regional emissions are assumed to stabilize at  1990 levels 
throughout the period of analysis. Global fossil fuel carbon emissions grow 
through the year 2080, peaking at approximately 44% above 1990 levels. 
They decline sharply in 2095 (Figure 8). Within the region Chinese emis- 
sions grow to more than half of the regional total, while OECD and EEFSU 
emissions decline. 
The "offshore" effect in the Big Three case is interesting. While this 
effect is generally thought to make global emission reductions relative to the 
reference case smaller than emissions reductions in participating regions, 
the Big Three case is more complex. In 2005, 2020, 2080, and 2095, the 
"offshore" effect actually leads to unintended emissions reductions by non- 
participants. This is effected by significant increases in energy prices. During 
the middle period, years 2050 and 2065, non-participants' emissions cause 
global emissions reductions relative to the reference case to be lower than 
Figure 8. "Big 3" Protocol: Global fossil fuel C 0 2  emissiolls by region and 
by year. 
Table 5. Definition of delayed protocol cases. 
Protocol la:  Initiation Date: 1990. 
Participation: All nations initiate participation in 1990. 
Protocol lb :  Initiation Date: 1990. 
Participation: Participation by the EEFSU is delayed until 
the year 2005, participation by CHINA to 
the year 2020, and ROW to the year 2035. 
Protocol 2a: Initiation Date: 2005. 
Participation: All nations initiate participation in 2005 
Protocol 2b: Initiation Date: 2005. 
Participation: Participation by the EEFSU is delayed until 
the year 2020, and participation by CHINA 
to the year 2035, and ROW to the year 2050. 
Protocol 3: Initiation Date: 2020. 
Participation: No protocol is signed until the year 2020 and 
participation by non-OECD member states 
lags. The EEFSU joins in 2035, China joins 
in 2050, and the ROW joins in 2065. 
emissions reductions by the Big Three. The unintended emissions reductions 
by non-participating regions were not expected. 
The Consequence of Delayed Participation: We have examined a series of 
cases in which the initiation of the protocol and dates of entrance of par- 
ticipants are varied. The protocol under consideration is one in which par- 
ticipants agree to stabilize emissions at  then-current levels using a common 
carbon tax. The variety of possible dates of protocol initiation and initial 
participation by various regional groups are defined in Table 5. 
Short delays in reaching a meaningful agreement or staggered participa- 
tion in a protocol that begins immediately with initial OECD stabilization 
of current emissions levels cause long-term (year 2095) concentrations of 
atmospheric C 0 2  to  be only slightly higher than is the case with immedi- 
ate participation (Figure 9). Further delays in completion of an agreement 
exhibit increasingly higher long-term concentrations of atmospheric C02 .  
These higher concentrations of atmospheric C 0 2  trade against lower eco- 
nomic costs. The reduced economic costs appear to  be generally disbursed 
among both immediate and delayed participants. We make no attempt in 
this paper to  assess the benefits of emissions reductions and are therefore 
able only to  describe the relationship between cost and atmospheric concen- 
tration. We are unable to  provide a full economic assessment. 
Figure 9. Atmospheric C 0 2  concentration under alternative assumptions 
of initial dates and dates of individual regional participation. 
Reference Case A 
Figure 10. Total cost of stabilizing fossil fule C 0 2  emissions a t  1990 
levels under Protocol la for reference and advanced technologies Case A 
($ x 109/yr). 
Advanced Technology Development and Deployment: To explore the opti- 
mistic outlook for technology development, we assume that  solar electric 
power becomes competitive ($0.05/kWh) with fossil sources shortly after 
the turn of the century. Moreover, coal and gas have been assigned elec- 
trical generating efficiencies of 55% by the year 2020. This scenario change 
results in a 25% reduction in emissions in the final year, brought about by 
a 20% reduction in primary energy demand coupled with a growth in solar 
energy equal t o  nearly 2.5 times the growth projected in the reference case. 
At the same time, because of lower energy prices, secondary energy demand 
actually increases very slightly, accompanied by a substantial shift toward 
the  electric mode. 
Stabilization of fossil fuel carbon emissions a t  the 1990 level is corre- 
spondingly easier with taxes a bit more than one-half those in the standard 
scenario. In this exercise, primary energy demand is reduced still further, 
while the use of solar electric, now even more favorably priced compared t o  
fossil fuels, nearly doubles again. The total costs t o  stabilize emissions, are 
reduced substantially, as seen in Figure 10. Total cost reductions under a 
globally common tax  rate, range from $14 x 109/yr in 2005 t o  more than 
1.4 x 1012/yr in the year 2095. The implied atmospheric concentration of 
C 0 2  is the same in this case as in all other emissions stabilization cases. 
6. Conclusion 
The principal conclusion of the work reported here is that any agreement 
to control fossil fuel carbon emissions, no matter how skillfully crafted, will 
require a process of constant revision in the terms of participation, because 
the economic needs of its participants will be evolving. The examination of 
alternative protocol options here suggests that there will likely be a signifi- 
cant misalignment between the needs of the world's regions and nations and 
the two protocols examined here. 
The notion that all nations will stabilize emissions independently looks 
to  be costly, particularly for developing nations. Tradable permits and global 
uniform taxes can provide a significant reduction in global costs. The dis- 
tribution of net costs depends only on the mechanism used to  distribute 
emissions rights. Neither the allocation of rights on the basis of historical 
emissions nor allocation on the basis of population match the computed No 
Harm to  Developing Nations case. 
These conclusions notwithstanding, there is some hope for an agreement 
capable of making a significant impact on emissions and concentrations of 
atmospheric C 0 2 .  Not all regions need to  participate; a strategically chosen 
set of national actors, using appropriately chosen policy instruments, could 
jointly achieve global emissions reductions almost as great as a protocol with 
universal participation. There appears to be some time in which to craft an 
initial protocol and to  bring members under the agreement. Long delays 
have significant implications for atmospheric concentrations of C 0 2 .  
Finally, there appears to  be very significant potential for reducing overall 
costs of emissions reductions available from the accelerated development and 
deployment of technologies. 
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Abstract 
This paper employs a five-region intertemporal model to examine three issues 
related to carbon emission restrictions. First, we investigate the possible 
impact of such limits upon future oil prices. We show that carbon limits are 
likely to differ in their near- and long-term impact. Second, we analyze the 
problem of "leakage" which could arise if the OECD countries were to adopt 
unilateral limits upon carbon emissions. Third, we quantify some of the gains 
from trade in carbon emission rights. Each of these issues have been studied 
before, but to our knowledge this is the first study based on a multi-regional, 
forward-looking model. We show that sequential joint maximization can be 
an effective way to  compute equilibria for intertemporal general equilibrium 
models of international trade. 
Keywords: carbon emission limits, international trade, intertemporal 
general equilibrium 
1. Introduction 
This paper concerns three issues related to carbon dioxide emission emis- 
sions. First, we examine the possible impact of emission limits upon future 
oil prices. We show that carbon limits are likely to  differ in their near- and 
long-term effects. Second, we analyze the problem of "leakage" which could 
arise if the OECD countries were to  adopt unilateral limits upon carbon 
emissions. Third, we quantify some of the gains from trade in carbon emis- 
sion rights. We do our analysis in the context of a five-region forward-looking 
*@I993 by the International Association for Energy Economics. This paper will be pub- 
lished in a forthcoming issue of The Energy Journal. Permission from IAEE to reproduce 
the paper here is gratefully acknowledged. 
model. These three issues (oil price effects, free-riding and gains from trade 
in emission rights) have been explored in several earlier papers. All three 
issues are addressed by Burniaux et al. (1992) in the context of a recursively 
dynamic multi-region model. Perroni and Rutherford (1991) and Pezzey 
(1992) consider the "leakage" issue in a static multi-region context, while 
Felder and Rutherford (1992) explore the same question using a recursively 
dynamic model. Both Kverndokk (1992) and Manne and Richels (1992) are 
concerned with the issue of trade in emission rights. 
The present study is based on a model which has disaggregated intertem- 
poral, interregional and technological dimensions. The time dimension is 
crucial for representing forward-looking exhaustible resource allocation de- 
cisions for oil and gas, and for the introduction of new energy technolo- 
gies. Interregional disaggregation is crucial for determining the effects of 
carbon-dioxide restrictions on trade flows and terms of trade. Both of these 
dimensions are present in previous studies, but not together. The recursive- 
dynamic studies (Burniaux et al., 1992, and Felder and Rutherford, 1992) 
are well-suited for investigating international trade issues, but the oil- and 
gas-extraction profiles in these models are based on the somewhat dubious as- 
sumption that production and reserve additions depend only on current but 
not future prices. Earlier versions of Global 2100 involved multiple regions 
with forward-looking agents, but the assumption of a fixed international oil 
price is clearly suspect in the face of dramatic reductions in carbon-based 
fuel consumption. 
The present model leaves much room for improvement. For example, 
it would be useful to  incorporate interindustry and regional details which 
are covered by Burniax et al. (1992). It would also be useful to  address 
these issues in a multi-regional framework using a decision-making under 
uncertainty approach. We leave these extensions for future research. 
The next section describes a range of issues related to  the formulation 
and solution of intertemporal equilibrium models of international trade. We 
provide some motivation for the sequential joint maximization algorithm 
which turns out to be an effecitve technique for solving large-scale models. 
For the sake of brevity, we describe only those modifications needed to  
convert the Global 2100 model structure and input data into a general equi- 
librium format. The remaining sections of the paper present our findings. 
The results are based on comparisons of alternative scenarios: business-as- 
usual and three proposals for carbon emission limitations. Because of the 
uncertainties connected with the numerical input parameters, the absolute 
levels of the solution values should not be taken too literally. We are con- 
cerned primarily with the insights that can be obtained by comparing the 
scenarios with each other. 
2. Model Formulation 
2.1. Dynamic General Equilibrium models 
In AGE (applied general equilibrium) models of international trade, it is 
customary to employ a static framework. One may then ask questions of the 
following type: Suppose that regions A and B agree to lower their barriers 
to trade. What then will be the consequences to different sectors within 
each of these countries? Intertemporal equilibrium involves the simultane- 
ous determination of prices and quantities during a sequence of time periods. 
This is a convenient fiction, but it is a debatable idea. Aside from finan- 
cial instruments, there are no actual markets for purchases and sales in the 
distant future. There is a further difficulty with numerical models involving 
intertemporal equilibrium. This type of formulation can greatly increase the 
difficulties of computation. 
Why not solve multi-period trade models recursively? This is the ap- 
proach taken, for example, by Burniaux et a/. (1992) and Felder and Ruther- 
ford (1992). Both of these models solve for an international equilibrium in 
year t ,  update the "stock" variables such as capital and exhaustible resources, 
then solve for a new equilibrium in year t + l .  Rutherford (1992a) reports, 
however, that his recursive trade model can be ill-behaved when it is based 
upon an activity analysis description of production and there is a rapidly 
changing world. 
For additional examples of these difficulties, see the numerical solutions 
obtained through "systems dynamics", e.g., Meadows et al. (1972). Typ- 
ically, such models have a tendency toward overshoot and collapse. We 
have found that many of these inconsistencies can be overcome through an 
intertemporal approach. Clairvoyance is an implausible assumption, but 
myopia seems even worse. 
In the present study, we project international trade flows through a five- 
region intertemporal equilibrium model. Each region is viewed as though 
it were a single consumer and producer with an infinite planning horizon. 
The regional, intertemporal and energy-environment features are based upon 
those employed in Global 2100. See Manne and Richels (1992). They em- 
ployed an informal decomposition procedure to examine interregional trade 
linkages. Here we report on a formal AGE (applied general equilibrium) 
solution method. In addition to trade in oil, gas and carbon emission rights, 
there is international trade in a numeraire good. 
2.2. Issues in model solution 
With an intertemporal formulation, there is a date attached to  each com- 
modity. When such a model is solved simultaneously, it therefore has much 
higher dimensions than a static trade model. The equilibrium computations 
reported here are based upon Negishi weights and sequential joint maximiza- 
tion (SJM). For the general theory underlying this approach, see Negishi 
(1972). Dixon (1975) and Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (1981) have shown 
that trial-and-error (tatonnement) techniques are effective ways to solve for 
these weights in medium-sized models of international trade. We are doubt- 
ful, however, that such an approach would be practical in this extension of 
Global 2100 where we are solving simultaneously for about 2300 prices and 
3100 activity levels. 
In our model, there are five endowment-holding agents, one in each re- 
gion. The SJM procedure operates through solving a sequence of constrained 
nonlinear optimization problems. In this iterative process, successive prob- 
lems differ only in the numerical values of the weights attached to the utility 
functions of the various agents. Between iterations, the weights are revised 
so as t o  bring each region's consumption expenditures into balance with the 
value of its endowment. The SJM method is based upon an aggregate welfare 
function which controls the shares of expenditures allocated to  each region. 
This is possible when: (i) individual utility functions are linearly homoge- 
neous, and (ii) the aggregate welfare function is expressed as a weighted sum 
of the logarithms of the individual utility indices. For technical details, see 
Rutherford (1992b). To our knowledge, Rutherford was the first to propose 
the specific procedure, and this paper represents its initial large-scale appli- 
cation. For a small-scale application, see Manne and Rut herford (1992). 
2.3. Capital flows 
Capital flows are endogenous in a fully intertemporal trade model. When 
embedding a single sector within a model of the economy as a whole, it is 
customary to analyze the sector in considerable detail, and to  describe the 
balance of the economy in terms of a single numeraire good, e.g., dollars 
of constant purchasing power. Real prices, e.g., those of oil or wheat, may 
then be expressed in terms of dollars per ton. A similar convention is often 
adopted when there is international trade. With either static or recursive 
models, this form of aggregation seems appropriate. However, with intertem- 
poral AGE models, difficulties are encountered unless the rate of return is 
identical in all regions. When there are differences in the rates of return, 
capital movements and arbitrage would tend to  reduce them to  zero. 
To illustrate the problem, assume that there are two regions called North 
and South (abbreviated N and S, respectively). Let prt be the present-value 
price of the numeraire good in region r during period t ,  and let the initial 
period's prices p ~ 1  = psl = 1. If, for example, the marginal productivity of 
capital in both regions were 5% per year, the present value price of both 
regions' output in the following year would be .95. Alternatively, if the 
rate of return on capital were higher in the South than in the North, then 
PN2 > p.9. The terms of trade have moved in favour of the North and against 
the South. The converse would hold if p ~ 2  < ps2. There is no way to  define 
an international numeraire unless we assume that the returns on capital are 
identical in all regions. 
In their parallel five-region computations (hereafter abbreviated 5R), 
Manne and Richels benchmarked the production function parameters so that  
if all other prices remain constant, the real rates of return are uniformly 5% 
in all regions. In our AGE extension of Global 2100, the same approach 
was adopted. With this convention, there is no incentive for significant 
interregional capital flows. 
2.4. A summary of model structure 
An algebraic formulation of Global 2100 is presented in Manne and Richels 
(1992) (Chapter 7). This section presents a general overview of the AGE 
extension of this model, but omits many of the details from the original 5R 
formulation. In Global 2100, the world is divided into five major geopo- 
litical regions: the United States, other OECD nations, the former USSR, 
China, and the rest of the world. These are abbreviated, respectively, USA, 
OOECD, USSR, China and ROW. The model is benchmarked for a base 
year of 1990, and the projections cover ten-year time intervals extending 
from 2000 through 2100. 
Supplies and demands are equilibrated within each individual period. 
Since this is an intertemporal equilibrium model, there are "look-ahead" 
features t o  allow for consistent expectations of changes in relative prices. 
Price changes may be particularly important if one is modeling a future in 
which there are increasingly tight constraints on the emissions of carbon 
dioxide, conventional hydrocarbon resources are subject t o  depletion, and 
there are costly options for accelerating the introduction of new technologies. 
In the AGE extension of Global 2100, there is a single representative 
producer-consumer within each of the five regions. Savings decisions are 
modeled by choosing each region's consumption sequence so as t o  maximize 
a linearly homogeneous function: the sum of the discounted logarithms of 
consumption. Capital is fully mobile between regions. Although there are 
interregional capital flows, they have a negligible overall impact. This is a 
direct result of benchmarking the model so that the rates of return on capital 
are approximately equal between regions. 
Labor is immobile between regions. To allow for increases in produc- 
tivity, the labor force is measured in "efficiency units". For shorthand, the 
growth of the labor force is described as an index of potential GDP. Tech- 
nical progress is introduced into the macroeconomic production function in 
a Harrod-neutral form. At constant prices for capital, labor and energy, 
these assumptions determine the rate of GDP growth. Depending upon the 
pattern of changing relative prices, there are general equilibrium feedback 
effects. The realized growth may therefore exceed or fall short of the poten- 
tial. 
The potential GDP growth rates constitute some of the key numerical in- 
puts. Through 2050, these values are significantly different between regions, 
and they are identical t o  those used in the original 5R model. Thereafter, in 
order to  reduce horizon effects within the AGE framework, we have lowered 
the growth rates in China and ROW so that they converge t o  the same rate 
as in the industrialized regions: the USA, OOECD and former USSR. This 
type of simplification was not needed for the parallel analyses conducted 
within the 5R framework. 
Global 2100 allows for energy efficiency gains, some that are autonomous 
and others that  are price-induced. There is a nested CES (constant elasticity 
of substitution) functional form that provides for long-run substitutability 
between the inputs of labor, capital, electric and nonelectric energy. There 
are short-run rigidities, and adjustment costs are modeled through a "putty- 
clay" form of this production function. 
2.5. Parameterization 
In this study, we have tried t o  employ as many parameters as possible from 
the Global 2100 dataset. Certain changes were made to  improve the repre- 
sentation of the international markets for oil and gas during the era preceding 
the transition t o  backstop technologies. Except for these modifications, the 
AGE version employs the same structure and numerical parameters as 5R: 
(i) We have eliminated the arbitrary quantity limits previously imposed 
upon the import and export of crude oil. International oil prices are 
projected endogenously rather than taken as an exogenous assumption. 
The model now has the capability of exploring the impact of carbon 
emission limits upon both the international oil price and also the quan- 
tities traded a t  these prices. No specific allowance is made for OPEC. In 
effect, we assume a competitive international oil market. Our approach 
is consistent with the conclusions of Griffin (1992). For the cartel's 
"core" members, he shows that the optimal long-term pricing strategy 
is much closer t o  a competitive outcome than t o  that of a monolithic 
cartel. 
(ii) We have allowed for the endogenous determination of natural gas prices 
and the quantities traded via pipelines between the former USSR and 
the OOECD region. This change has led us t o  introduce representative 
transport cost coefficients: $2/GJ for natural gas and $2 per barrel for 
crude oil shipments between regions. We do not analyze interregional 
coal trade. 
(iii) The five regions differ with respect to  existing taxes and subsidies on 
petroleum consumption. See Hoeller and Coppel (1992). In 1990, the 
USA's prices were close t o  international levels. Within the OOECD, 
there were substantial existing taxes on petroleum (here taken t o  be 
$3/GJ), and these will make it increasingly expensive t o  impose addi- 
tional taxes on carbon emissions. Conversely, within the former USSR, 
China and the ROW there were substantial subsidies. The elimina- 
tion of these subsidies could improve economic efficiency, and could also 
have a major impact upon global carbon emissions (see Burniax et al. 
(1992)). For purposes of the AGE model, we assume that the existing 
OOECD petroleum taxes will remain in effect, but that  the subsidies 
will be eliminated rapidly in the other three regions. It is straightfor- 
ward to  incorporate this type of tax-subsidy analysis within the SJM 
framework - provided that  we assume lump-sum recycling of revenues 
and expenditures for the representative agent within each region. 
(iv) Under assumptions (i)-(iii), the former USSR has the potential t o  be- 
come a major exporter of oil and gas. To avoid excessive optimism on 
this score, we have lowered the region's resource depletion factor (RDF) 
while retaining the same assumptions regarding the magnitude of oil and 
gas resources and reserves. The RDF represents the maximum fraction 
of the remaining undiscovered oil and gas resources that may be con- 
verted into proven reserves during any one year. The RDF has also been 
lowered for the ROW region. 
(v) There are two new classes of constraints. The first is a remedy for a log- 
ical defect in the original formulation of 5R. This is a condition ensuring 
that each region's oil exports cannot exceed its domestic production. 
Within each region, there are then separate markets for oil and natu- 
ral gas with endogenous prices for each of these fuels. As non-electric 
energy sources, oil and gas are perfect substitutes except that we spec- 
ify limits upon interfuel substitution. Natural gas can no longer supply 
more than 50% of any region's nonelectric energy. Together, these two 
modifications have the direct or indirect effect of imposing more realistic 
limits upon international oil trade than those employed previously. 
2.6. Details of implementation and solution 
Both the 5R and the AGE versions of Global 2100 are solved as nonlinear 
optimizations written in GAMS (a  generalized algebraic modeling system). 
See Brooke et al. (1988). In order to convert 5R into its AGE counterpart, 
we took advantage of modularity and inserted regional subscripts into the 
unknowns and constraints for each of the five regions. These regional blocks 
are semi-autonomous systems, and each consists of about 450 linear and 
nonlinear constraints. The five blocks are linked to each other through just 
44 coupling equations. There is one for each of the 11 projection periods 
(2000,2010, . . . ,2100) and for each of the four tradeable commodities: crude 
oil, natural gas, carbon emission rights and the numeraire good. 
The reader should be alerted to a technical difficulty relating to the 
post-2050 backstop phase whenever there are carbon emission constraints 
and there is free trade in carbon emission rights. In Global 2100, it is 
assumed that a carbon-free nonelectric backstop is more expensive than one 
that is carbon-emitting. Moreover, there are no interregional differences 
between the costs of these two backstops. These assumptions did not affect 
5R because the informal decomposition procedure was not extended beyond 
2050. 
Within the AGE version of Global 2100, there are difficulties created by 
these backstop assumptions. Although the equilibrium price of carbon emis- 
sion rights is determined uniquely, there is non-uniqueness in the backstop 
quantities produced within each region. The location of backstop production 
is indeterminate, and the regional shares may fluctuate erratically over time. 
These difficulties can be overcome in a reasonably straightforward way. It 
requires only a small amount of judicious experimentation to identify those 
years and regions for which it is redundant to allow for international trade in 
carbon emission rights. We then assign a zero value to the level of the carbon 
trade activities 
what arbitrary, 
phase - that is, 
for these years and regions. Because the procedure is some- 
this paper reports annual results only during the transition 
through 2050. 
3. Scenarios for Business-As-Usual and Carbon 
Emission Limits 
In this and the following sections, the AGE model will be employed to  com- 
pare four alternative scenarios. These are abbreviated and identified as 
follows: 
BAU: business-as-usual; 
CLM: carbon emission limits designed to achieve global stabilization; by 
2010, a 20% cutback from 1990 levels in the USA, OOECD and 
former USSR; increase not to exceed 50% in China and the ROW 
regions; 
UNL: unilateral 20% emission cutbacks within the USA and OOECD; no 
limits upon the former USSR, China and ROW; 
NCT: no carbon emission rights trading; otherwise same as CLM. 
For the regional distribution of carbon emissions under BAU, see Figure 
1. Note that the currently industrialized nations (USA, OOECD and USSR) 
account for most of the world's carbon emissions in 1990, but that their share 
is projected to  drop to less than 50% by 2050. This is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that the developing nations are likely to  account for 
much of the world's increase in carbon emissions over the next half century. 
Our BAU projections for the former USSR are less conventional. In view 
of the dramatic changes in this region's political structure since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, there is a realistic potential for "no regrets" energy 
and environmental policies. With the elimination of constraints on inter- 
national trade in oil and gas, there is a dramatic increase in the domestic 
price of energy. Even if economic growth is maintained a t  roughly the same 
percentage rates as in the USA and OOECD, price-induced energy conser- 
vation (together with a shift toward natural gas) could lead to  the virtual 
stabilization of carbon emissions from the former USSR through 2050. 
Next we compare BAU with the CLM scenario which involves a global 
agreement on carbon limits and international trade in emission rights. Figure 
2 shows the regional distribution of percentage GDP losses. With interna- 
tional carbon emission quotas based largely upon 1990 levels, the biggest 
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Figure 2. Cost of carbon constraints: CLM vs. BAU scenario. 
losers are the rapidly growing regions: China and the ROW. The percentage 
losses in the USA and OOECD regions are roughly comparable with each 
other. The USA remains more carbon-intensive than the OOECD, but it has 
the advantage of lower preexisting taxes on nonelectric energy. The smallest 
loser is the former USSR. This is the region whose emissions remain nearly 
constant under BAU. 
Two caveats related to  these estimates of GDP losses: (1) Global 2100 
measures only the costs of emissions abatement. It does not measure any of 
the benefits that might accrue from reducing the atmospheric accumulation 
of carbon dioxide. (2) Because of endogenous changes in the international 
prices of oil, gas and carbon emission rights, the AGE model leads to  a 
somewhat different regional incidence of gains and losses than the original 
5R. Some of these changes are attributable t o  changes in numerical values 
of the input parameters, and others can be traced to  differences in model 
structure. 
With trade, there is an  internationally uniform carbon tax and an ef- 
ficient allocation of carbon rights between regions. According t o  Figure 3, 
the tax  begins a t  a relatively low level in 2000 (about $50 per ton). During 
the first two decades of the 21st century, it is optimal t o  delay the exercise 
of emission rights. This is why the tax rises a t  a real rate of 5% annually, 
following the rate of return on the international numeraire good. It is not 
until 2030 that  electric backstop technologies become widely available, and 
there is a temporary drop in the value of emission rights. Thereafter, there is 
a transition away from conventional oil and gas toward backstop nonelectric 
technologies. From 2050 onward, the carbon tax stabilizes a t  just over $200 
per ton. This is the rate required in order t o  make the carbon-free backstop 
competitive with coal- or shale-based synthetic fuels. 
Under the CLM scenario, there is a significant volume of international 
trade in carbon emission rights. This could lead to  strains within the do- 
mestic political coalitions that  support emission limits. During the entire 
transition period through 2050, the OECD nations are net importers of car- 
bon rights from China and the ROW. The financial transfers are $20 billions 
in 2000, and would range between $50 and $80 billions annually thereafter. 
According t o  our model, the dollar value of interregional oil trade is likely 
t o  be far higher than that  of natural gas and carbon emission rights. Oil 
exports originate primarily in the ROW region (which includes OPEC),  but 
there is a growing share provided by the former USSR. There are systematic 
differences between the export quantities under BAU and CLM. Under BAU, 
the ROW exports more oil during the first two decades of the 21st century 
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Figure 3. International price of carbon emission rights: CLM scenario. 
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Figure 4. Oil exports from ROW and former USSR. 
but less thereafter than under CLM. Under BAU, the former USSR exports 
less oil a t  almost all points in time. See Figure 4. 
4. Unilateral OECD Carbon Emission Cutbacks 
Because of the difficulties of inducing China and the ROW to reduce their 
carbon emissions, it has been proposed that the OECD nations take the 
first step toward global reductions. The UNL scenario (a  unilateral 20% 
OECD emissions cutback) could be effective for a few decades, but probably 
not beyond. Figure 5 provides a three-way comparison between BAU, CLM 
and UNL. From 2020 onward, there is no way to  stabilize global emissions 
unless the developing nations are somehow induced to  join an international 
agreement. Their growth is too important to be ignored. 
There is a further difficulty. Because of international trade links, a one 
ton unilateral OECD reduction will not be translated automatically into 
a one ton reduction in global emissions. Carbon emissions may increase 
elsewhere. To quantify this idea, we calculate the average "leakage rate" as 
the ratio of carbon emission increases outside the OECD to carbon emission 
cutbacks within the OECD, in each future year measuring increases and 
cutbacks relative to  the BAU scenario. (See Felder and Rutherford, 1992.) 
So long as the leakage rate is less than loo%, unilateral action produces a 
decrease in global emissions. According to Figure 6, the leakage rates would 
be low initially, but could reach over 30% during the transition period away 
from oil and gas. 
In order to  understand why this might occur, see Figure 7. There are 
interactions between international oil prices, the quantities traded and the 
presence or absence of carbon emission limits. Through 2010, either an inter- 
national or a unilateral carbon limitation agreement would put downward 
pressure on the international price of oil. This has the perverse effect of 
stimulating oil consumption - particularly within China and the ROW in 
the UNL scenario. 
Over the long term, conventional hydrocarbons become exhausted, and 
oil prices increase toward their backstop level. Under BAU, oil prices are 
capped by coal-based synthetic fuels, and it is assumed that these cost $50 
per barrel of oil equivalent. With CLM, oil enjoys a premium relative to  
coal-based synthetic fuels. Since oil's carbon emissions coefficient is half that 
of synthetic fuels, its international price eventually reaches $75 per barrel 
halfway between the cost of synthetic fuels and the carbon-free backstop. 
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With the unilateral reductions scenario, there are incentives for locating 
synthetic fuels production outside the OECD region during the period of 
transition away from exhaustible resources. At that time, China and the 
ROW could supply much of their domestic nonelectric energy needs through 
synthetic fuels, and they would compete to export their oil production to the 
OECD countries. This keeps the international price of a barrel of oil down 
to the $50 backstop level, but it leads to the high leakage rates that have 
already been noted. Overall, these calculations suggest the implausibility of 
a unilateral OECD emissions cutback as a viable long-term global option. 
Our leakage analysis leads to different results than those reported by 
others. We believe that many of these differences can be traced to the 
handling of dynamic linkages. Perroni and Rutherford (1992) and Pezzey 
(1992) employ static general equilibrium frameworks. Felder and Rutherford 
(1992) use a recursively dynamic model. Both of these approaches miss out 
on the role of price expectations in the determination of short-run supplies 
and demands for energy. 
5.  The Gains From International Trade 
in Carbon Emission Rights 
International trade would lead to an economically efficient allocation of car- 
bon emission rights, and it would help to separate efficiency issues from 
those of equity. This type of trade would, however, require a totally new set 
of institutions. There could be futures as well as spot markets. Some sort 
of banking system might have to evolve in order to monitor international 
transactions in these rights. Because of the difficulties in setting up these 
institutional arrangements, it is instructive to see what might happen if the 
same region-by-region limitations were imposed as in CLM, but there is no 
carbon trade. This scenario is abbreviated NCT. 
Figure 8 compares the price paths of carbon emission rights. Under 
CLM there is a uniform international price, but with NCT there is a separate 
price in each region. Through 2020, the value of carbon is much higher in the 
USA and OOECD region than elsewhere. NCT provides a strong incentive 
for carbon trade either directly or indirectly. After 2020, there are four 
regions in which the value of carbon rights tends to converge toward the 
identical backstop price. The only exception is the former USSR. Because 
of its huge natural gas resources, it is in a rather different position than the 
other regions. See the cross-scenario comparison of its gas exports to the 
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Figure 8. Price of carbon emission rights: NCT vs. CLM scenario. 
OOECD (Figure 9). Note that these exports represent quantities over and 
above the relatively small amount of actual shipments (2 exajoules) in 1990. 
Through 2020, when there is trade in carbon emission rights, the 
OOECD region finds it profitable to import these rights rather than to  pay 
the $2/GJ costs required to transport gas from the former USSR. Both un- 
der the BAU and CLM scenarios, large-scale gas trade does not begin until 
2030. With NCT, the starting date is 2010. Natural gas has a carbon emis- 
sions coefficient 30% below that  of oil and 66% below that  of synthetic fuels. 
This provides a strong incentive for gas trade to  serve as a substitute for 
trade in emission rights. Even with high exports, the former USSR does not 
exhaust its gas resources during the 21st century. Its allocation of emission 
rights is too small for it t o  be economical to  produce synthetic fuels. Natural 
gas is the best domestic alternative to  the high-cost, carbon-free nonelectric 
backstop. This means that  the marginal value of carbon emission rights is 
lower than in other regions through 2050. Thereafter, it rises sharply be- 
cause of competition between natural gas and the carbon-free backstop. The 
gas resources of the former USSR do not become exhausted until after 2100. 
We are now in a position t o  estimate the gains from trade in carbon 
emission rights. Perhaps the simplest summary measure is t o  compare the 
losses from carbon restrictions both with and without trade. For this pur- 
pose, we employ a 5% real discount rate and cumulate the macroeconomic 
consumption losses through 2100. The region-by-region results are shown in 
Figure 10. All regions gain from trade. There would have been still greater 
gains from trade if the regional distribution of carbon allocations had been 
based upon an egalitarian criterion such as 1990 population rather than a 
status quo criterion such as 1990 emissions. 
According t o  Figure 10, four of the five regions incur losses from carbon 
restrictions, but the former USSR is an exception t o  this pattern. Because 
of the net effect of changes in the international prices and the quantities 
traded, it is a s m d  gainer from carbon restrictions. 
6.  Conclusions and Suggest ions for 
Further Research 
This AGE extension of Global 2100 provides insight into a number of policy 
issues. First, our model shows how carbon emission restrictions might af- 
fect crude oil prices and the quantities traded. Carbon restrictions tend t o  
depress oil prices in the near term, but to  increase them in the long term. 
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Figure 10. Cumulative consumption losses through 2100, discounted to  
1990 at  5%. 
Oil is less carbon-intensive than coal-based synthetic fuels, hence oil enjoys 
a premium in periods when carbon taxes are high. 
Second, we find that carbon limits affect the prospects for pipeline trade 
in natural gas between the former USSR and Western Europe. This could 
be particularly important in scenarios when there is no trade in emission 
rights. In these cases, natural gas trade would provide a direct substitute 
for trade in emission permits. 
Third, our estimates of the costs of carbon restrictions are roughly com- 
parable with those of Manne and Richels (1992). Unlike their heuristic 
decomposition procedure based upon parallel single region projections, our 
algorithm is fully automatic. 
Finally, we find that the free-rider problem limits the effectiveness of 
unilateral carbon reductions by the OECD nations. From 2020 onward, 
there is no way to  stabilize global emissions unless the developing nations 
are somehow induced t o  join an international agreement. There are further 
difficulties with a unilateral approach. A 20% unilateral cutback would lead 
t o  average leakage rates of the order of 10-20% through 2030. Thereafter, 
the leakage rates would rise even higher with the emergence of coal-based 
synthetic fuels. 
This study provides an important lesson in AGE methodology, partic- 
ularly for activity analysis models that incorporate inequalities and point- 
to-set mappings. Our experience indicates that the sequential joint maxi- 
mization procedure can process a problem which would have involved about 
5300 inequality constraints if it had been formulated as a complementarity 
problem. SJM provides us with the ability t o  deal with five t o  ten times 
as many constraints as those that  can be handled reliably by Newton-based 
methods such as the SLCP algorithm of Mathiesen (1985). 
There are a number of directions for further research. First, the present 
model might be extended to  distinguish additional regions. This would make 
the model more useful in assessing the negotiating positions of various coun- 
tries in their bargaining over a comprehensive global agreement. 
A second type of extension would be to  disaggregate non-energy trade- 
able commodities. In their recursively dynamic model, Felder and Ruther- 
ford (1992) estimate that  about half the total leakage arises from the impact 
of unilateral OECD emissions constraints upon the international oil market, 
and that  another half can be traced to  changes in the location of produc- 
tion of energy-intensive commodities. It would be useful t o  evaluate whether 
this estimate would remain valid with the intertemporal framework adopted 
here. 
Perhaps the  most challenging direction for future work would be an  
explicit analysis of decisions under uncertainty. I t  is easy enough t o  trace 
out various futuristic scenarios, but i t  is more relevant t o  see how these might 
affect today's policy decisions. To analyze hedging strategies in a rigorous 
way, we will need t o  specify dates for the resolution of uncertainties, and 
t o  assign numerical probabilities t o  various future states-of-the-world. In 
principle, i t  is straightforward t o  do  this type of analysis, but these ideas 
have just begun t o  emerge within the greenhouse policy debate. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a simulation study on the feasibility of global C 0 2  
emission control through international trading in emission permits, which 
is theoretically expected to be an institutional scheme for achieving globally 
efficient C 0 2  control while maintaining a fair sharing of the burden among 
regions. The "Edmonds-Reilly Model" is used for simulations, with some 
modifications such as the introduction of an international market for emis- 
sion permits, regional C 0 2  taxation, and regional C 0 2  absorption options. 
Simulation results illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed global system 
for C 0 2  reduction. 
Key words: global warming, tradable C 0 2  emission permit, C 0 2  tax, 
world energy model 
1. Introduction 
Global environmental problems, particularly global warming caused by 
greenhouse gases, have attracted considerable attention lately in interna- 
tional energy policy studies. Carbon dioxide is responsible for about half 
of the total contribution of greenhouse gases to  global warming. However, 
reducing C 0 2  emissions will be extremely difficult because C 0 2  emissions 
occur mainly as a result of burning fossil fuels which supply almost 90 per- 
cent of world energy requirements. World energy systems should change 
significantly to cope with the global warming problem. It is required that 
the socioeconomic impacts caused by the introduction of policy measures to 
reduce C 0 2  emissions are assessed in advance of their implementation. 
A variety of economic measures to reduce C 0 2  emissions can be classified 
into C 0 2  taxation and emission permit trade. The C 0 2  taxation introduces 
a penalty in the market optimization process, while the emission permit 
trade forms an optimization process itself with an explicit constraint on 
C 0 2  emissions. 
To achieve globally efficient control while maintaining fair burden shar- 
ing among regions, a scheme of global C02  emission control through inter- 
national trading in emission permits has been proposed. In this scheme, the 
total world emission limit determined by scientific knowledge is allocated 
to each of the members which represent each region in the world under a 
certain rule. Then the allocated emission permits are traded through an 
international market. When the member's C 0 2  emission in a region ex- 
ceeds the initial docation of its emission permit, then the member must 
reduce its emission by regional measures or buy emission permits through 
the international market. 
This paper proposes a global COz emission control scheme with a com- 
bination of international emission permit trade and regional measures which 
consist of regional C 0 2  taxation and regional C 0 2  absorption by afforesta- 
tion. The effectiveness of the proposed global C02  emission control scheme 
is illustrated by simulations. 
2. Global Energy Model 
A computer model which is utilized in this simulation is based on the 
IEA/ORAU long-term global energy mode, namely the "Edmonds-Reilly 
Model" (Edmonds and Reilly, 1983). This model is a mathematical model 
which integrates economic, demographic and technological factors to make 
long-term projections of global energy and C02  emissions. 
The model divides the world into 9 regions as shown in Figure 1 and can 
assess alternative energy strategies up until the year 2100 with an interval 
of 25 years. The model computes energy demands for 6 major primary 
energy sources (1 = oil; 2 = gas; 3 = solids, e.g., coal and biomass; 4 
= resource-constrained renewable, i.e., hydroelectric power; 5 = nuclear, 
6 = solar). Energy demand is a function of population, labor productivity, 
economic activity, technological changes, energy prices, and energy taxes and 
tariffs in each region. Energy supply is dependent upon resource constraints, 
technological progress, and energy prices for the various regions. The prices 
and quantities of three fossil fuels are determined at an equilibrium point of 
world energy markets. After a world energy balance has been reached, C 0 2  
emission associated with the consumption of fossil fuels is evaluated with 
appropriate carbon emission coefficients. 
.- 
1. USA 
2. OECD Europe 
3. OECD Pac i f i c 
4. USSR & Eastern Europe 
5. Centrally Planned Asia 
6. Middle East 
7. Africa 
8. Latin America 
9. South-East Asia 
Figure 1. The nine regions in the Edmonds-Reilly Model. 
3. Modeling of Absorption Options 
It is difficult to  estimate the exact amount of land available for afforestation. 
Matthews estimated that 702 million hectares of forest land had been lost 
by human activity as of 1980 (Matthews, 1983). Williams estimated that a 
total of 806 million hectares of forest plus woodland had been converted to  
other uses by 1978 (Pitelka, 1990; Marland, 1988). In this study, we assume 
that the maximum amount of land available for afforestation is equal to the 
amount of forest destroyed by past human activities. Thus, a world maxi- 
mum potential is set at approximately 800 million hectares based on these 
reports. A geographical breakdown of this maximum potential is reproduced 
in Table 1. 
There are also limits for the annual rate of afforestation reflecting the 
constraints of manpower and related facilities. For example, the average 
worldwide annual afforestation of land in 1980 is about 15 million hectares 
which is 1.86 percent of the maximum potential. In this study, it is assumed 
that the limit of annual afforestation of land is 1 percent of the maximum 
potential. 
The rate of COz  absorption by afforestation is different for kinds of 
vegetation. In this study we assumed an average annual rate of carbon 
absorption in each region as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Regional maximum potential for afforestation and rate of COz  
absorption. 
Max. potential Rate of COz absorption 
Region (Mha) (t-C/ha/year) 
USA 45 5.9 
OECD Europe 104 3.3 
OECD Pacific 53 5.9 
USSR & Eastern Europe 122 3.6 
Centrally Planned Asia 86 5.9 
Middle East 3 5.4 
Africa 76 9.9 
Latin America 121 9.9 
Southeast Asia 197 9.9 
Table 2. Regional afforestation cost functions. 
Region 
USA 
OECD Europe 
OECD Pacific 
USSR & Eastern Europe 
Centrally Planned Asia 
Middle East 
Africa 
Latin America 
Southeast Asia 
Area (Mha) 
0 -  11.3- 45.0 
0 - 26.0 - 104.0 
0 - 13.3 - 53.0 
0 - 30.5 - 122.0 
0 - 21.5 - 86.0 
0 - 0.8 - 3.0 
0 - 19.0 - 76.0 
0 - 30.2 - 121.0 
0 - 49.2 - 197.0 
Cost ($It-C) 
9.3 - 92.9 - 594.7 
15.2 - 152.3 - 974.7 
9.3 - 92.9 - 594.7 
15.2 - 152.3 - 974.7 
7.1 - 71.3 - 456.5 
10.1 - 101.5 - 649.8 
4.2 - 42.5 - 272.0 
4.2 - 42.5 - 272.0 
4.2 - 42.5 - 272.0 
For the cost function of afforestation in each region, we assumed a two- 
part, linear cost curve which increases slowly up to a quarter of the maximum 
potential and then increases sharply in the latter part (see Table 2). 
4. Modeling of International Market for COz 
Emission Permits 
4.1. Initial allocation of C o n  emission permits 
In this paper it is assumed that an initial permit is allocated in proportion 
to  the population of each region in the year 2000 as follows: 
where CQ is a given world COz emission limit, CQ, is an initial C 0 2  
emission permit for region m, and 2, is the population of region m in the 
year 2000. 
4.2. Coordination of tradable emission permits, C 0 2  
taxation and afforestation 
For a particular region, where C 0 2  emissions are larger than the region's 
initial permit, the C 0 2  emissions must be reduced either by purchasing a 
permit from an international permit market or by a regional strategy such as 
C02  taxation and absorption. Here, we assume that such a region is called 
a "permit import region". In permit import region m, the following regional 
constraint must be satisfied: 
CEm(tm) = CQ, + CP, + CW, 
where CE,(t,) is the C02  emission (Mt-C) under a C02  tax oft, ($It- 
C). CP, is the purchased permit (Mt-C) from the market. CW, is C 0 2  
absorption by afforestation ( Mt-C). 
On the other hand, a region which has an initial permit larger than its 
C 0 2  emissions is called a "permit export region". These regions supply C 0 2  
emission permits to the international market. 
We assume that in the permit import region, the cost of purchasing 
permits and afforestation is covered by the revenue of C 0 2  taxation. The 
following cost constraint is given: 
where P is the price of a C 0 2  emission permit in the international market 
($It-C) and PWm is the unit cost of afforestation in region m ($It-C). 
If a permit export region introduces afforestation, the cost of afforesta- 
tion is covered by the revenue of selling C02  permits in the international 
permit market. Thus, it must satisfy the following cost constraint: 
Figure 2 shows the framework of our simulation model. As described in 
Figure 2, the GNP of a permit export region is increased by the amount of 
net revenue (permit sales minus afforestation cost). 
Figure 2. Flow-chart of C 0 2  permit trade simulation with the Edmonds- 
Reilly Model. 
4.3. Supply-demand equilibrium in the permit market 
The C 0 2  emission permits are traded in the international market. In this 
permit market, a balance of permit supply and demand must be satisfied. In 
the case of the introduction of afforestation, the following constraint on the 
permit market should be kept between the demand of permit import regions 
and the supply of permit export regions: 
Emission Permit[Mt-C] 
Figure 3. Demand-supply curves in the international C 0 2  emission permit 
market with an absorption option (world C 0 2  emission limit of 6Gt-C in the 
year 2000). 
(total demand) = (total supply) ( 5 )  
where L is the total number of regions and n is the number of permit import 
regions. 
Figure 3 shows the demand-supply curve of C 0 2  emission permits in 
the international market with the absorption option. In this figure, curve A 
is the total permit demand of import regions (USA, OECD Pacific, OECD 
Europe, Middle East, Centrally Planned Europe), and curve B is the total 
supply of export regions (Centrally Planned Asia, Latin America, Africa, 
Southeast Asia). Curve AW is the total C 0 2  absorption by afforestation in 
all import regions and curve BW is the total absorption in export regions. 
Afforestation in permit export regions is introduced even when the market 
price of permits is low because of low afforestation costs in these regions. 
Where the permit price is higher, the rate of afforestation is limited by the 
annual afforestation constraint. The demand and supply of permits are in 
equilibrium a t  point C. 
Table 3. Simulation cases. 
Case name COz taxation Tradable permit Absorption option 
( 1 )  Reference - - - 
(2) Taxation Available - - 
(3) Equilibrium Available Available - 
(4) Absorption option Available Available Available 
5. Simulation Results and Discussions 
5.1. Simulation cases 
Table 3 shows simulation cases which are selected from different combina- 
tions of C 0 2  control strategies. In all cases, the original database of the 
Edmonds-Reilly Model (NIEA.DAT dated 22 August 1989) was used. 
The case with no C 0 2  limit and no specific C 0 2  control measures is 
the reference case of the simulation study. In the taxation case, import 
regions have to  reduce their C 0 2  emissions to the level of the initial permits 
allocated only by regional C 0 2  taxation strategy. In the permit equilibrium 
case, the international emission permit trade and regional C 0 2  taxation are 
introduced to  keep within the world C 0 2  limit. In the absorption option case, 
regional afforestation is added to  the permit equilibrium case. Simulation 
was carried out up to  the year 2025. 
5.2. Simulation results 
Figure 4 shows C 0 2  emissions for 1975-2025 in the reference case. World 
C 0 2  emissions increase from 3.8 Gt-C in 1975 to  9.9 Gt-C in 2025. In 
1975, industrialized regions including the USSR and Eastern Europe pro- 
duced more than half of the world C 0 2  emissions. In 2025, however, due t o  
population growth and economic growth, the share of the developing regions 
becomes higher than that of industrialized regions. 
Figure 5 shows the flows of tradable permits a t  an equilibrium point 
under a world C 0 2  emission limit of 5 Gt-C in the year 2000 in the permit 
equilibrium case. Five permit import regions (USA, OECD Pacific, OECD 
Europe, USSR and Eastern Europe, and Middle East) purchase emission 
permits from the market. Tradable permits are provided from four per- 
mit export regions (Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Centrally 
Planned Asia). Southeast Asia supplies 80 percent of the total tradable 
permits (967 Mt-C), and the USA purchase about 40 percent of the total 
permits provided. 
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Figure 4. C 0 2  emissions by each region (1975-2025) in the reference case. 
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Figure 5. Flows of permits a t  an equilibrium point in the permit equilibrium 
case (world C 0 2  emission limit of 5Gt-C in the year 2000). 
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Figure 6. C 0 2  tax rates of each permit import region and permit prices a t  
equilibrium points of the market in the year 2000. 
Figure 6 shows C 0 2  tax rates in each permit import region and permit 
prices a t  equilibrium points in the market for a world C 0 2  limit of 4, 5, and 
6 Gt-C in the year 2000, respectively. The lower the world emission limit, 
the higher C 0 2  tax rates and permit prices. Regional COz tax rates in the 
permit equilibrium case can be reduced to  one-tenth to one-fifth of those in 
the taxation case. 
Figure 7 shows the flows of tradable permits a t  an equilibrium point 
under a world C 0 2  emission limit of 5 Gt-C in the year 2000 in the absorption 
option case. In this case, the equilibrium permit price in the market is 25.2 
US$(1975)/t-C. The total amount of C 0 2  absorption by afforestation is 1131 
(Mt-C). The permit price is substantively lower than that in the permit 
equilibrium case. Also, the total number of traded permits in the market is 
larger than that  in the permit equilibrium case because of the large amount 
of regional afforestation. 
Figure 8 shows the control of C 0 2  emissions and absorptions, respec- 
tively, in the permit import regions and in the permit export regions for 
the reference case, the permit equilibrium case, and the absorption option 
case. The C 0 2  reduction caused by regional taxation decreases when the 
USSR 8 Easlern OECD pacific USA 
Europe < 3 0 >  < 2 5 >  
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Figure 7. Flows of permits at an equilibrium point in the permit absorption 
option case (world C 0 2  emission limit of 5Gt-C in the year 2000). 
Table 4. Permit prices at the equilibrium point in the market for 2025. 
Unit: US$(1975)/t-C. 
COa Year 2000 Year 2025 
limit Equilibrium Absorption Equilibrium Absorption 
(Gt-C) case case case case 
"In this case there are no permit export regions, thus all regions must reduce their CO2 
emissions to the level of the permit allocated initially by employing CO2 taxation. 
number of tradable permits in the market increases as a result of regional 
afforestation. 
Table 4 shows permit prices at equilibrium points in the market for each 
world C 0 2  limit in 2000 and 2025. In the absorption case, permit markets 
exist under all world C 0 2  limits, even in 2025. However, in the case without 
an absorption option, there exists no permit export region for a world C 0 2  
limit of less than 5 Gt-C in 2025. 
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Figure 8. C 0 2  emissions in the permit export regions for the reference 
case, the permit equilibrium case, and the absorption option case (world 
C 0 2  emission limit of 5Gt-C in the year 2000). 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Feasibility of an international market for COz emission permits combined 
with regional C 0 2  taxation and regional afforestation options is demon- 
strated numerically through simulations. Major findings are summarized as 
follows: 
1. Equilibrium points exist in the international market for C 0 2  emission 
permits for most cases examined in the study. 
2. Through the international permit market, a significant amount of money, 
more that 100 billion dollars per year in some cases, is transferred from 
developed regions to  developing regions. 
3. Levels of regional C 0 2  tax rates and associated GNP losses are signif- 
icantly reduced by the introduction of an international permit trade, 
compared with the case in which each region independently achieves its 
C 0 2  limit by having a regional C 0 2  tax. 
4. The introduction of COz absorption options (afforestation) reduces levels 
of regional C 0 2  tax rates and associated GNP losses even further by 
increasing permit supply in the market; but, on the other hand, the 
equilibrium permit price is also lowered significantly and reduces the 
total revenue of developing countries. 
As to  future work concerning modeling, the following are identified: ex- 
plicit modeling of optimization processes in each region, and incorporation 
of other inter-regional interaction schemes such as technology transfer. 
We should take care in deriving practical implications from the simula- 
tion results. One of the most controversial points is related t o  the initial al- 
location of emission permits. There are many arguments, particularly about 
the fairness of initial allocation. While fairness is a very attractive criterion 
in the appropriate allocation of emission quotas, which can be achieved by 
the appropriate allocation of emission quota, most schemes for initial permit 
allocation which have been proposed t o  keep fairness seem infeasible under 
the reality of present international politics. There are also many other ob- 
stacles in the implementation of tradable permits; for example, monitoring 
of and accounting for regional C 0 2  emission/absorption, sanctions for non- 
participants, software for adjusting prices and quantities of traded permits, 
etc. Along with studies on the performance of tradable permits, we should 
also explore more practical institutional schemes which have similar effects 
to  those of a permit market. 
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A Systems Engineer's View 
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1. Introduction 
Top-down macroeconomic and bottom-up engineering descriptions of the 
energy system tend to give different estimates of future energy demands and 
effects of efforts to increase energy efficiency. For similar macroeconomic 
activities, the two approaches may provide widely different cost estimates to 
control C o n  emissions from the energy system [see, e.g., Manne and Richels 
(1990); Williams (1990)l. 
The top-down/bottom-up controversy is not uncommon in the world of 
science. Blatt and Weisskopf (1952) commented on the relative success of 
two nuclear models which seemed to hold two mutually exclusive pictures of 
the nucleus: "We are facing here one of the fundamental problems of nuclear 
structure which has not yet been solved." Eventually, both the Top Down 
Liquid Drop and the Bottom Up Independent Particle models of the nucleus 
have been proven to be consistent with basic principles [see, for instance, 
Gomes et al. (1957); Bohr and Mottelson (1969)l. The liquid drop model 
describes the global properties of the nucleus while the independent particle 
model is necessary to understand local structures. A marriage between the 
two approaches can be achieved by a renormalization procedure whereby 
the bottom-up model is calibrated to reproduce the average behavior of the 
top-down model. For an example of the procedures for investigating nuclear 
fission, see Strutinsky (1968). 
The example from nuclear physics indicates that bottom-up models have 
to be constrained by information available from top-down analysis in order 
to be able to reproduce the properties of higher lying systems. This should 
not come as a surprise to the system scientist. The system paradigm as- 
sumes an hierarchical structure where new properties emerge as one passes 
on to higher lying systems. The properties of the system elements determine 
which configurations are possible. The higher lying system controls which 
of the possible configurations of the system elements will be realized [see, 
for instance, the discussion about hierarchy, communication and control in 
Checkland (1981)l. Ashby's law of requisite variety also provides a rationale 
for a coordinated top-down/bottom-up approach (Ashby, 1964). The regu- 
lator here is the scientific community and the system to be regulated is the 
body of scientific knowledge. 
An earlier effort integrating the top-down and bottom-up analysis in 
energy economics was made by Hoffman and Jorgenson (1977). As a working 
hypotheses for our purposes, one could assume that the top-down models 
are better tools for understanding average trends in the demands for useful 
and primary energy, and the coupling of these demands to  macroeconomic 
activities. This is consistent with the assumption that the general economy 
controls the energy system through the shape of demand curves for different 
energy services and through the total amount of resources it is willing to 
spend in order t o  secure these services. But the bottom-up engineering 
models are necessary to  understand how new technology, and ultimately 
technological R&D, affects the productivity of the energy system, including 
the ability to control the emissions of potentially harmful substances. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a top-down/bottom-up 
approach can give insights into the coupling between technological R&D 
and demands for energy carriers. 
The following section indicates how engineering data on technological 
R&D can be used to  understand the results from top-down econometric 
analysis. The bottom-up field data are sparse and lie within one sector of 
industrial energy usage. However, the engineering analysis provides use- 
ful insights into how technological R&D set long range conditions for the 
demand of electricity and fuels. 
One prerequisite for an integrated bottom up-top down modeling sys- 
tem is a renormalization prescription. Following the earlier work by Manne 
(1981) and Manne and Richels (1992), Manne and Wene (1992) linked a 
systems engineering model to a macroeconomic growth model. The sys- 
tems engineering model, MARKAL, is a dynamic and technology-rich model 
(Fishbone et al., 1983). The macroeconomic growth model, MACRO, was 
earlier used in conjunction with Energy Technology Assessment (ETA), a 
highly aggregated model. MARKAL-MACRO are linked together formally 
and solved as one model by a non-linear optimizing algorithm. One advan- 
tage of the hardlinking is that there is no external renormalization needed 
in order to  compare the two models. The effect of the built-in renormaliza- 
tion on the demands in MARKAL is illustrated in Manne and Wene (1992). 
The user has one parameter available to simulate the effects of the satu- 
ration of old demands and the emergence of new demands. In Section 3, 
MARKAL-MACRO is used to study the interplay between technology and 
demands. 
2. Bias for Electricity Use in 
Technological R&D 
An analysis of fuel and electricity use for the Swedish industry between 1980- 
1988 shows that the electricity to fuel ratio has increased by 25%, in spite of 
the fact that the ratio between the price for electricity and a weighted fuel 
price has doubled during the same period. To the best of my knowledge, 
there is no econometric analysis available in Sweden to give a macroeconomic 
explanation of these trends. In Norway, however, such analysis has been 
made within the framework of the SAMMEN project (Mysen, 1991). The 
analysis shows the same trends in all of the investigated industrial sectors: 
increasing electricity to oil ratio between 1980-1988, in spite of the fact that 
price ratio between electricity and oil also increased during the same period. 
The data are estimated with models that assume non-homeothetisity and 
non-neutral technical change. In all industrial sectors, the best fits were 
obtained with a model with non-neutral technical change. For the public 
sector, the non-homeothetic models were preferred. 
I would want to argue that technological R&D is an important driving 
force behind the non-neutral technical change. I cannot provide a complete 
analysis, but I will present some technical evidence to  support my case. 
R&D results usually have long lead times. If the electricity to fuel ratio 
in the 1980s was driven by R&D, then we should look for actions taken in 
the 1970s. 
In Sweden during the 1970s, the occupational hazards and workplace 
safety were important issues requiring special efforts to develop safe and 
clean industrial technologies and technical systems. Special funding was 
provided to support this development. The R&D activities were carried out 
by universities and branch institutes but also at selected enterprises that 
acted as front runners. 
Some form of ventilation is included in all available options to reduce 
the risk for harmful airborne pollutants to enter the respiratory tract. Ven- 
tilation is one of the most energy-intensive measures used to control occu- 
pational hazards. About 10-15% of all electricity consumed in the Swedish 
industry is used for ventilation. The air flows created by ventilation can, 
however, be used in a more or less efficient manner. 
Figure 1 shows the air flow and use of electricity for ventilation in one 
of the selected enterprises acting as front runners (Wene, 1976; 1977). This 
enterprise had been the focus for several technological development projects 
over the years; it was pointed out to  the investigator by several independent 
actors within the field that it represented the state-of-the-art. It was a small 
factory, employing about 100 workers. The factory produced details for con- 
sumer capital goods in polystyrene. The airborne pollutants consisted of 
plastic particulates and styrene. Styrene has later been shown to be carcino- 
genic. During the time period covered by the investigation, the enterprise 
had reduced the concentration of harmful pollutants in the respired air by 
one order of magnitude. 
It is interesting to compare the effects of the technology development 
on the demand for electricity and fuels. The demand for electricity per 
worker increases by 150%. But the total flow of air to the workplace remains 
constant; the change in air flow over the period is due to business cycle and 
not to changing technology. Low temperature heat is needed to  heat the air. 
If all the heat is directly supplied by burning fuels, the demand for fuels will 
remain constant. However, there are many options to reduce the demand 
for fuels such as recuperation or using waste heat from industrial processes. 
Figure 2 indicates why concentrations of airborne pollutants can be re- 
duced by increasing electricity use and keeping fuel use constant. The initial 
control technology in A is based on dilution. Outside air is heated and forced 
into the workplace, exchanging old air which is vented through fans placed 
in the walls or in the roof. This is not a very efficient way of controlling air 
streams or airborne pollutants. Figure 2B indicates the development that 
was done. Small ventilation gears, individually adapted to  each workplace, 
were placed very close to the source, K,  of the pollution. The small jet- 
stream from the ventilation gear worked as a vacuum cleaner controlling the 
pollution at  the source. The technique does not need any extra air supply. 
The described technical solution has two properties. Firstly, it must be 
individually developed for each type of workplace. This indicates substantial 
lead times. Secondly, although the technique does not demand any increased 
air flow, it demands a substantial amount of extra electricity (see Figure 1). 
The reason for this is the large pressure differential needed to sustain the 
jetstream. 
Wene (1976) made a survey of the Swedish industry, identifying emerging 
techniques to control workplace airborne pollution. The survey indicated 
that tailor-made ventilation gear, controlling the pollution at  the source, 
provided the most efficient solution. By Bernouillis law, this would demand 
larger pressure differentials and thus more motive power. An estimate was 
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Figure 1. Air flows and demand of electricity for ventilation in the factory 
for hard plastics, Trelleborgplast, Ljungby, Sweden. Time period 1967- 
1975. 
Figure 2. Schematic drawing of two alternatives for ventilation in a closed 
space with one source of airborne pollution, K. The numbers refer to  the 
airflow measured in m3/hour. 
made for the whole Swedish industry based on the experience by factories 
using state-of-the-art technology such as described above. The estimate 
showed that ,  over a 10-year period, controlling airborne pollution a t  the 
workplace would lead t o  an increased demand for electricity in industry 
by 3-5 TWh/year. The fuel demand could probably be reduced. Later 
information has supported this estimate. The total demand for electricity in 
the Swedish industry was 39 TWh/year in 1977 and 50 TWh/year in 1987. 
Obviously, the measures t o  reduce airborne pollution in the Swedish 
industrial workplace explain neither all the Norwegian results nor all the 
concordant Swedish data. However, they explain a substantial part of the 
increase for electricity demand in the Swedish industry. Most important, 
however, they provide a bottom-up example of non-neutral technological 
development, with the properties seen in the top-down Norwegian model. 
The relative prices of fuels and electricity do not influence the choice between 
the two energy carriers. The new technology is based on motive power and 
electricity provides the most efficient and trouble-free means t o  obtain motive 
power in industry. 
It is easy t o  find other examples of industrial R&D where electricity 
provides the key to a smarter solution. The example above is interesting, 
because it shows the effect of a generic technology that  runs through the 
whole industry. 
3. MARKAL-MACRO: Technologies 
and Demands 
MARKAL (Fishbone et al., 1983), EFOM (van der Voort et al., 1984) and 
Message (Agnew et al., 1979) are examples of systems engineering models. 
They are based on extensive data bases for new and existing energy tech- 
nologies. The da ta  bases contain forecasts for improvements in the existing 
technologies and for costs and efficiencies of the emerging new technologies. 
If there are no new constraints on the energy system, such as emissions caps, 
the average costs and prices for energy services in the future will be deter- 
mined by technology development and prices for the primary energy carriers 
supplied t o  the  system. Engineering forecasts usually show improved effi- 
ciencies and reduced costs for energy technologies, while prices for energy 
carriers increase. In the simplified model world, the average costs and prices 
for energy services decrease or increase depending on whether or not the 
rate of technological improvement is higher than the rate of price increase 
for primary energy carriers. 
What can we learn about the effect of technological improvements on 
fuel demands from coupling the systems engineering model t o  a top-down 
macroeconomic model? E.g., what is the total effect on demand for a case 
where improvements in efficiency lead to reduced prices and reduced av- 
erage cost? Or, when expected improvements in a key technology do not 
materialize? 
The MARKAL-MACRO provides one framework for discussing such 
questions. Figure 3 demonstrates the demand for primary energy in two 
extreme cases. The MARKAL database is the same restricted U.S. database 
used in Manne and Wene (1992) with some changes made in the description 
of new automobiles and of windpower potential and cost. The two cases 
differ in the assumptions made about autonomous improvements in energy 
efficiency (AEET). For the  case "AEEI=OV, it is assumed that  AEEI=O for 
each of the 13 energy demand categories in the model (see caption t o  Figure 
5 for a listing of these demand categories). For the other case, AEEI=2.5% 
per annum for each category. For both cases, the potential GDP growth is 
2% annually and the elasticity of substitution (ESUB) is assumed t o  be 0.5. 
The price of imported oil is assumed t o  grow by 3%/year. 
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Figure 3. Demand for primary energy. 
Without any changes in energy technology and in the price of primary 
energy carriers, the Primary Energy Demand (PED) in "AEEI=OV should 
grow a t  the same rate as GDP. Figure 3 shows that  with the changes in GDP, 
prices and technology result in a PED growth of only 0.7%/year during the 
first 20 years, and 1.9%/year in the last 10-year period. Renewable and 
nuclear energies are accounted for through their fossil equivalence. 
PED is the total energy supplied t o  the technical energy system. This 
system uses energy technology to  convert the primary energy in one or more 
steps into useful energy for distribution to  the consumer. Figure 4A com- 
pares the rates of growth in GDP, total Useful Energy Demand (UED) and 
total Primary Energy Demand (PED) for the "AEEI=On case. The total 
UED is the sum of the UED for the thirteen demand categories which are 
very different from each other. The total UED is an  indicator of the energy 
services provided by the technical energy system to  the rest of the economy. 
For the first 10 years i t  grows by 1.3%/year. But for the period 2000-2020 
the growth rate of the total UED is closer to  the GDP growth rate. 
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Figure 4. Growth of total useful energy demand and primary energy de- 
mand for "AEEI=On and "AEEI=2.5". The line marked "GDP" indicates 
what the  primary energy demand would be if it grew a t  an  annual rate 
identical t o  the rate of GDP. 
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Figure 5 explains the behavior of UED growth rates. During the first 
part of the 30-year period, most prices increase. As more new technology 
becomes available, the  prices are reduced. Note, however, that  the technical 
energy system quite generally is a good "buffer" against increases in fuel 
prices; category "IH", hydrocarbons for non-energy use, is the only end 
user which experience the full 3% annual rise in the price of imported oil. 
As ESUB=0.5, the average annual increase in demand for hydrocarbons for 
non-energy use is roughly 1.02* 1.03-'-~= 1.005 or 0.5%. In the category "T4" 
(automobile), technical development offsets most of the increase in fuel price. 
The average annual increase in UED for automobiles is 1.9%. 
Price-induced conservation in UED explains part of the slow rise in PED. 
The rest is explained by the introduction of more energy-efficient technolo- 
gies in the technical energy system. Changes in the ratio UED/PED can be 
used as an  indicator for improving the total energy efficiency of the energy 
system. In the example studied here, the ratio increases from 0.68 in 1990 
to  0.82 in 2020, or by 20%. During the same time the fossil fuel content of 
the total PED has been reduced from 0.85 to  0.75. 
"AEEI=2.5" represents a case with considerable amount of autonomous 
conservation. However, Figure 4B indicates that  the total effect on UED 
and PED is a reduction in growth rates of 0.7-1.0%. One reason for this is 
that  the  released resources are used in other parts of the economy, leading t o  
a slightly higher economic growth. But there is also a "take-back effect" due 
t o  the reaction in the  technical energy system. Prices are reduced because 
the most expensive marginal technologies can be avoided, and expansion 
investments can be postponed until more efficient technologies are available. 
The increase in UED/PED ratio is the same as in the "AEEI=OV case. 
Increased prices for primary energy carriers and new technology leads 
t o  a reduction in PED. In the example presented here, this reduction is of 
the same order of magnitude as the reduction expected from an across-the- 
board annual increase in autonomous energy efficiency increase of 2.5% in 
all demand categories. 
Figure 6 compares the C02-emissions from the energy system. The 
reduction in emissions is the same as the reduction in PED between the two 
cases; there is no preference for fossil or non-fossil technologies. 
With the MARKAL-MACRO tool, it is possible t o  identify cost-efficient 
technologies t o  satisfy each type of demand, and follow energy flow paths 
through the  conversion and distribution network to find the resulting effect 
on PED and C 0 2  emissions. The restricted U.S. data base is not rich enough 
in technologies t o  provide results beyond the obvious. Figure 7 is included 
only t o  demonstrate the type of possible analysis. The example is taken from 
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Figure 5. Prices in 1990,2000,2010 and 2020 for the 13 demand categories. 
Case "AEEI=O". 
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Figure 6. C02-emissions for "AEEI=O" and "AEEI=2.5". 
the transport sector and shows the effect on fuel demand for automobiles if 
a key technology fails. 
The purpose of the discussion in this section is to  show the use of an 
integrated model to understand the effect of specific energy technology de- 
velopment on demands and emissions. There are two important caveats: one 
regarding the data base and another on market penetration. 
Without a validated, goal-oriented database, a systems engineering 
model provides limited insights for the strategic or policy level. The reason 
is that the generic or data-independent information in the model is rather 
small. There are balance equations for fuels which take the shape of an- 
nual averages and seasonal/diurnal averages for electricity, gas, and district 
heating. There are also theoretical considerations about the periodicity of 
investments, fuel cycles, maintenance, and the shape of physical constraints. 
The restricted data base used here is appropriate for demonstration pur- 
poses, but more details are needed for the systems engineering approach to  
prove its value. The validation of a technology-rich data base is, however, 
a large task for which methodologies need to be developed. A problem area 
may be the cost estimates for new technologies versus existing technolo- 
gies. Developers of new technologies have the best information. However, 
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Figure 7.  Growth in person-kilometers (A) and demand for fuels (B) for 
automobiles with and without improved Otto-engine. The improved Otto- 
engine increases the mileage by 100% by 2010 for an extra investment cost 
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they are also stakeholders and their cost estimates may be biased, with or 
without intention. This is not a major problem in a stand-alone systems 
engineering model which is used to rank technologies; the ranking between 
different new technologies may be correct although total cost may be un- 
derestimated. However, in a linked energy-economic model, the growth of 
GDP and demands depend on intertemporal comparisons of costs and prices. 
Cost estimates must therefore be internally consistent, not only within one 
time period but from the first through the last period. For instance, the 
previous discussion about demands is meaningful only if cost estimates in 
the restricted data base are consistent over time. 
The model runs presented here use the original MARKAL options to  
constrain the rate of market penetration of a new technology. These consist 
of maximum growth rates or upper limits on the total capacity or invest- 
ments. Manne and Richels (1992) introduces a penalty for above-normal 
expansion activities, connecting the high rates of implementation with an 
extra cost. This is an attractive option which also makes it possible to  avoid 
spurious large swings in the prices for UED. 
Work is underway a t  Brookhaven National Laboratory and Stanford 
University t o  improve the U.S. data base and the description of market pen- 
etration in MARKAL-MACRO. This work will also increase the availability 
of the model (Hamilton et al., 1992). 
4. Conclusion 
The systems paradigm embraces the top-down/bottom-up approach; both as 
an efficient way of gaining knowledge about the system and as a description 
of the way the system organizes itself. In the present context, the systems 
engineer approach represents the bottom-up direction and the economist 
approach represents the top-down direction. The existing energy system and 
technological R&D provide a wide range of options. Through demand and 
resource allocation, the economic system controls the realization of different 
options. 
The coupling between R&D and demands has been discussed in two 
cases. 
In the case of airborne pollutants, the technology R&D did not provide 
the economic system with a real choice between electricity and fuels. The 
demand for electricity in the emerging technical solution was controlled by 
an over-riding system, "the laws of physics". For the economic system to  
regain control, the price advantage of fuels must be large enough t o  make 
local production of motive power by heat engines an attractive option. In 
this case, the top-down analysis isolated the symptoms, but the bottom-up 
analysis provided a diagnosis. 
Linking systems engineering and economic models provides a framework 
for more systematic studies of technology development, emissions control, 
demand, and costs. MARKAL-MACRO is used in this paper to give a 
bird's-eye view of the interaction between technology development and de- 
mand. But much more details are expected from the systems engineers 
analysis. For such analysis, a technology-rich data base is necessary together 
with a more realistic description of the market penetration of new technolo- 
gies. The validation of the data base is a challenging task that still needs 
methodological development. Recent developments in computer hardware 
and software facilitate the design of PC-based integrated energy-economic 
models with the potential to handle detailed technological information. 
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Abstract 
To evaluate the policy options for preventing global climate change, it is 
necessary t o  develop models that estimate global greenhouse gas emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations, and temperature rise. For this purpose, we are 
developing the Asian-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) for assessing options 
in policy making to  cope with global climate change. 
With this model, we estimate C 0 2  emissions based on future predictions 
of socioeconomic and natural factors. The results show that C 0 2  emissions 
in 2025 would be 1.4 to  2.4 times as large as those in 1990, and C 0 2  emissions 
in 2100 would be 2 t o  7 times as large. To stabilize C 0 2  emissions a t  the 1990 
level by introducing a carbon tax, it is estimated that  the required carbon 
tax would be 180 t o  440 1990US$/t-C in 2025 and 310 to  1,250 1990US$/t-C 
in 2100. The decrease in world GNP caused by the carbon tax is estimated 
t o  be 1.5% to  2.8% in 2025 and 2.8% to  7.3% in 2100. 
1. Introduction 
In estimating global warming effects, there are so many problems left un- 
solved. The difficulties come from the uncertainty of natural factors such as 
carbon circulation, effects of clouds, and ocean heat uptake, as well as that  
of socioeconomic factors such as population growth, economic growth, and 
improvement of energy efficiency. To evaluate policy options for stabilizing 
global climate, it is necessary t o  estimate global warming responses based 
on future scenarios. 
The purpose of this study is to  develop computer simulation models 
for estimating greenhouse gas emissions, their atmospheric concentrations, 
and the rise in temperature with several scenarios (Matsuoka, 1992; Morita, 
1991a). We have designed the total system, implemented the basic programs, 
and simulated some effects of the countermeasures. 
2. Structure of the Asian-Pacific Integrated 
Model (AIM) 
The purpose of AIM is to estimate greenhouse gas emissions in the Asian- 
Pacific region, to evaluate their socioeconomic impacts, and to assess options 
in policy making (Morita, 1991b). It consists of the World Model and models 
for each individual country in this region. The World Model is based on the 
Atmospheric Stabilization Framework (ASF) designed by ICF Incorporated 
for the US Environmental Protection Agency, and is modified to be linked 
to  the models of each country. 
The structure of AIM is outlined in Figure 1. There are three main 
submodels: the Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Model, the Nat- 
ural Source Model, and the Global Greenhouse Gas Composition/Uptake 
Model. The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emission Model is composed 
of submodels, such as the Energy Economic Model, the Land Use Model, 
the Agricultural Demand Model, the Waste Production Model, and the Ce- 
ment Production Model, and estimates greenhouse gas emissions from socio- 
economic activities. The World Energy Economic Model is based on the 
Edmonds-Reilly Model (Edmonds and Reilly, 1983) and was modified to  
analyze the effects of various countermeasures as shown in Figure 2. 
3. Main Scenarios for Predictions 
Global climate change based on future predictions of socioeconomic factors 
and natural factors are estimated. First, greenhouse gas emissions are esti- 
mated based on the following scenarios. 
Figure 3 shows the recent results of world population estimations. In 
this figure, the dotted lines show high population estimates and solid lines 
show low ones. The world population is estimated to be about 5 billion 
in 1990 and to  range from 3.6 billion (World 3) to 109.4 billion (UN1990) 
in 2100. The high estimation by the United Nations (1992) is calculated 
assuming constant total fertility rate. The high estimate by Mesarovic is 
calculated assuming the population growth rate to  be constant. The low 
estimation with World 3 is calculated assuming that the death rate will 
increase because of environmental pollution. We excluded these extreme 
cases and used the projection by the World Bank (1991), 11.3 billion, as the 
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Figure 3. Estimation of world population. 
lower limit of the world population in 2100 and that  by the US Bureau of 
the Census (1987), 13.5 billion, as the upper limit. 
Figure 4 shows the recent results for GDP per capita. In this figure, 
the dotted lines show the estimates in OECD countries and the solid lines 
show those in Southeast Asian countries excluding Japan. The "9OBAU" 
line shows the  results by IPCC in 1990 (RSWG, 1990) assuming "Business 
as Usual". The line marked "IRS91" also shows the results by IPCC in 
1991 which predicts that  the growth rate of GDP per capita would be 2.5% 
per annum in OECD countries, 4.1% in developing countries, and a world 
average of 2.9% by the early part of the 21st century, and would decrease 
0.8 t o  1.4% after that .  The dotted area shows f 20% around "IRS9la" and 
is used in our simulation study. 
As for the  improvements in energy efficiency, we use the end-use energy 
based on the rapid change scenario as the lower limit and that  based on 
the slow change scenario as the upper limit (Lashof and Tirpak, 1990). The 
end-use energy demand for the  developed countries is estimated by Mintzer 
(1988) and that  for the developing countries is estimated by Sathaye et al. 
(1987). 
Emissions of CFCs are estimated based on the  Montreal Protocol. The 
rate of participation in the developed countries is estimated t o  be 100% 
and that  in the developing countries is estimated t o  the 85%. HCFC-22 is 
a 
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Figure 4. Estimation of GDP per capita. 
estimated t o  increase by 5% per annum by the end of this century, by 2.5% 
by the middle of the next century, and t o  be constant after that. More strict 
regulation of CFCs and Halons will be discussed a t  the fourth meeting of 
the Montreal Protocol in November 1992. 
As for land use changes, projections of future deforestation and refor- 
estation in the tropics (Houghton, 1990) are used. The rate of deforestation 
increases exponentially and the deforested area is estimated t o  be 34 million 
ha per annum by the middle of the next century. 
The amount of methane from municipal wastes, C 0 2  from cement pro- 
duction, greenhouse gases from agricultural activities are estimated based 
on population growth and GDP per capita increase. 
Scenarios of the global warming mechanism are based on climate sen- 
sitivities and feedback mechanisms. The missing sink is one of the main 
unknown factors. We assume three scenarios concerning the missing sink. 
The first is t o  assume that  the size of the missing sink is constant during 
the prediction period (1.43 billion tons of carbon per annum). The second is 
to  assume that  i t  increases in proportion t o  the atmospheric concentrations. 
This corresponds t o  a negative feedback. The third is t o  assume that  it 
decreases. The rate of decrease may be, for example, 2%. 
The standard climate sensitivity is assumed t o  be 3OC, the low sensitivity 
t o  be 2OC, and the high sensitivity t o  be 4OC, respectively. 
As for feedback effects, we take five factors. The first is the fertilization 
effect of C02 .  This effect is a negative feedback. The amount of carbon 
taken up by plants is assumed to increase in proportion to the atmospheric 
C 0 2  concentration and to be 90 billion tons of carbon in the case of C 0 2  
doubling. The second feedback effect is the effect of carbon release from 
terrestrial ecosystems due to the temperature increase. We assume it to be 
0.5 billion t-C/year/OC. The third effect is the increase in CH4 caused by 
the temperature increase. We assume it to be 200 million t-CH4/yearl0C. 
The fourth effect is caused by methane hydrates. We assume it to be 0.1 1 
billion t-CH4/year/OC, half of the figure in the Lashof report (Lashof, 1989). 
Finally we take into account the effect of ocean heat uptake. For exam- 
ple, when the surface temperature of the ocean increases 2OC compared with 
that before the Industrial Revolution, the amount of ocean heat uptake may 
change significantly. 
Combining these scenarios, we estimate greenhouse gas emissions in the 
following cases. First, we assume two standard "Business as Usual" cases: 
1. Low Standard Scenario. 
Low Population Scenario + Low GNP Scenario + High Efficiency 
Scenario 
2. High Standard Scenario. 
High Population Scenario + High GNP Scenario + Low Efficiency 
Scenario 
Then we estimate the cost of stabilizing and decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions by introducing a carbon tax. The tax rate is assumed to be equal 
worldwide. The rate of the carbon tax depends upon the scenario. Two tax 
rates corresponding to low and high standard scenarios are estimated. 
As for missing sink and feedback effects, we added their effects to the 
standard cases. For high estimates, three effects are considered. The first 
is the 2% decrease per annum in the missing sink. The second is forward 
feedback such as carbon release from terrestrial ecosystems, the increase in 
CH4 from wetlands, and the release of methane from methane hydrates. The 
third effect is the change in ocean circulation. For low estimates, two effects 
are considered, increase in the missing sink and negative feedback effects 
such as fertilization effects of C02.  
4. Simulation Results 
Global climate change based on future predictions of socioeconomic factors 
and natural factors are estimated. The results show that C 0 2  emissions in 
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Figure 5. Projections of C 0 2  emissions from fossil fuel consumption. 
2025 would be 1.4 to  2.4 times as large as those in 1990, and C 0 2  emissions 
in 2100 would be 2 to  7 times as large. Figure 5 shows the prediction of C 0 2  
emissions. The total C 0 2  emission from fossil fuel consumption in 1985 is 
assumed to be about 5.1 PgC. C 0 2  emissions are estimated to be about 39.6 
PgC in 2100 with the Low Standard Scenario and 11.2 PgC with the High 
Standard Scenario. Figure 6 shows the results of recent reports on future 
C 0 2  emissions. The dotted area shows the range of these simulation results. 
The area is within the recent reports. 
Figure 7 shows the trajectories of energy consumption based on the High 
Standard Scenario. The vertical axis represents energy resources and the 
horizontal axis represents their extraction cost. On the resource-extraction 
cost curves, the points for 2025 and 2100 are indicated. Based on the "Busi- 
ness as Usual" case, energy resources of oil and gas have almost all been 
consumed (about 90%) and coal has been about 37% consumed. This shows 
that we cannot predict that a lack of energy resources would solve global 
warming problems. 
Figure 8 shows the amount of carbon tax for the cases of stabilization and 
a 1% decrease. To stabilize C 0 2  emissions at the 1990 level by introducing 
the carbon tax, it is estimated that the required carbon tax would be 180 
to  440 1990US$/t-C in 2025 and 310 to 1,250 1990US$/t-C in 2100. The 
effects on world GDP are shown in Figure 9. The decrease in the world GNP 
caused by the carbon tax is estimated to be 1.5% to 2.8% in 2025 and 2.8% 
to 7.3% in 2100. We can conclude that the impacts on the world economy 
are not so high, even in the high standard case. 
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Figure 6. Recent estimates of future COz emissions from fossil fuel con- 
sumption. 
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Figure 9. Estimates of world GDP decrease. 
Global warming cannot be stopped only by stabilizing COz emissions. 
Another political option will be necessary. Even if the carbon tax were t o  be 
more than 2,000 1990US$, the world temperature might increase. Counter- 
measures such as plantation and the use of solar energy and biomass should 
be taken. 
Figure 10 shows the greenhouse gas concentration. Figure 10(a) shows 
the results of "Business as Usual" cases. Missing sink (MS), positive and 
negative feedbacks, and the effects of changes in ocean circulation are also 
considered. The greenhouse gas concentration is estimated t o  be 819 to  1,846 
ppmv with the High Standard Scenario and to  be 690 t o  2,379 ppmv with 
the Low Standard Scenario. In cases of stabilization scenarios, it ranges 
from 617 to  872 ppmv. Greenhouse gas concentration would be 713 ppmv 
without considering natural factors [Figure 10(b)]. Figure 10(c) shows the 
case of a 1% annual decrease. In this case, greenhouse gas concentration is 
estimated t o  be 573 ppmv without considering natural factors and ranges 
from 518 t o  780 ppmv with natural factors. 
Figure 11 shows the temperature increase caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions. Figures l l ( a ) ,  (b), and (c) correspond to  LLBusiness as Usual", 
"Stabilization" , and "1% decrease" cases, respectively. The effects of ocean 
circulation are estimated to have significant effects on global warming. In 
Figures 10 and 11, climate sensitivity is assumed to  be 3°C. In Figure 12 
climate sensitivity ranges from 2 to  4OC. In the case of a climate sensitivity 
of 4OC, the temperature increase is estimated to  range from 2.2 t o  10°C in 
2080. 
5. Conclusion 
AIM has been developed to  evaluate the impacts of policy options in each 
country from the Asian-Pacific region by simulating global environmental 
changes and world socioeconomic trends. The prototype model developed 
this year will be improved and applied to  other countries in the Asian-Pacific 
region. This model will be integrated into the global warming impact models 
in the Asian-Pacific region and will be used t o  estimate global warming 
impacts in this region. 
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Abstract 
The possibility that  C 0 2  emissions from fossil fuel use might lead to  global 
warming has become a leading environmental concern. Many scientific and 
environmental organizations have called for immediate action to  limit C 0 2  
production. For the most part, however, public debate has focused on a 
single policy instrument: a carbon t ax  applied t o  fossil fuels in proportion 
to  their carbon content. In this paper we present a detailed model of the 
US economy and use it t o  compare carbon taxes with two other instruments 
which could achieve the same reduction in carbon dioxide emissions: a tax  
on the energy content of fossil fuels (a BTU tax) and an ad valorem tax on 
fuel use. We find that  carbon taxes can achieve a given reduction with the 
least overall effect on the economy, but with a large effect on coal mining. 
Energy taxes are fairly similar to  carbon taxes but with slightly less impact 
on coal mining and slightly greater overall cost. In contrast, ad valorem 
taxes fall much more lightly on coal mining a t  the expense of having much 
greater effect on the economy as a whole. 
1. Introduction 
The possibility that  carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion might lead 
t o  global warming has emerged as an international environmental issue.' 
Multilateral action t o  reduce emissions will be discussed under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed by the United 
States and many other nations a t  the United Nations Conference on Environ- 
ment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The U.N. Framework Convention 
'A very thorough discussion of global warming and numerous references to the literature 
are given by EPA (1989). Overviews of the economics of global warming are presented by 
Nordhaus (1991) and Schelling (1992). 
calls for stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels, but leaves 
the choice of policy instruments to  be used for this purpose to  each of the 
signatory nations. 
The policy instrument for reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the 
United States most often recommended by economists is a carbon tax,2 a 
tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels. A carbon tax would lead to substi- 
tution away from these fuels and toward other inputs, such as capital, labor, 
and materials. In addition, a carbon tax would result in less intensive use of 
coal, which has a high carbon content, and more intensive use of natural gas, 
which has a low carbon content. The European Community has proposed 
an energy tax, levied on -primary fuels in proportion to  their energy (BTU) 
content. Finally, taxes proportional to  the value of individual fuels, such as 
an ad valorem tax on gasoline, have also been discussed. 
A great deal of valuable information about the economic impact of poli- 
cies to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases has been acc~mula ted .~  How- 
ever, the analysis of the impact on US economic growth of restrictions on 
these emissions is seriously incomplete. Alternative tax instruments, such 
as carbon, energy (BTU), and ad valorem taxes are intended to  reduce fossil 
fuel use by inducing producers and households to substitute toward other in- 
puts. In order to  capture these effects it is essential to  model the responses of 
businesses and households at a highly disaggregated level. A disaggregated 
model of producer behavior is required to incorporate differences among sec- 
tors in response to energy taxes. A disaggregated model of the household 
sector is necessary to  include differences in responses among households. 
Taxes on fossil fuels affect carbon dioxide emissions by changing relative 
prices. These price changes affect capital formation and the rate of economic 
growth, so that assessment of the impact of alternative tax instruments 
requires a model with endogeneous capital formation. In addition, these 
taxes will increase the price of energy to purchasers, which may reduce or 
accelerate the rate of productivity growth. In this paper we present a detailed 
model of the US economy with endogeneous economic growth. We use this 
model to  compare the economic impact of alternative tax instruments for 
2~ carbon tax was first analyzed by Nordhaus (1979) and has recently been discussed by 
the Congressional Budget Office (1990). Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1992) have examined 
the economic impact of using a carbon tax to achieve different restrictions on carbon 
dioxide emissions. Poterba (1991) and Jorgenson et 01. (1992) have considered equity and 
efficiency impacts of a carbon tax. 
3Detailed surveys of estimates of the impact of restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions 
are given by Cline (1992), Hoeller et 01. (1991), and Nordhaus (1990). 
stabilizing US carbon dioxide emissions a t  1990 levels, as stipulated in the 
U.N. Framework Convention. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
model of the US economy employed in our evaluation of the economic impact 
of alternative t ax  instruments for stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions. In 
Section 3 we compare these alternative instruments and find that  a carbon 
tax  will achieve the objective of stabilizing emissions with the least overall 
impact on the  US economy. However, such a tax will have a severe negative 
impact on coal production. An energy tax  is fairly similar in its economic 
impact to  a carbon tax,  but has less effect on coal mining and greater overall 
cost. By contrast, an ad valorem tax on fossil fuels has a smaller impact 
on coal mining, but a much greater negative impact on the growth of the 
US economy. In Section 4 we assess the alternative t ax  instruments and 
summarize our conclusions. 
2. An Overview of the Model 
Our analysis of the incidence of carbon, energy (BTU), and ad valorem taxes 
is based on simulations of US economic growth, using an intertemporal gen- 
eral equilibrium model of the US economy described in detail by Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen (1993). Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990b) have employed this 
model t o  assess the  impact of environmental regulations in the  United States. 
In this section we outline the key features of the model and describe its ap- 
plication t o  alternative tax  instruments for the  control of carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
2.1. Producer behavior 
Since carbon dioxide emissions are generated by fossil fuel combustion, a dis- 
aggregated model is essential for modeling differences in the response t o  al- 
ternative policies for controlling these emissions. Our submodel of producer 
behavior is disaggregated into thirty-five industrial sectors, listed in Table 
1. The model determines levels of output for thirty-five separate commodi- 
ties, each produced by one or more industries. The industries correspond, 
roughly, t o  two-digit industry groups in the  Standard Industrial Classifica- 
tion (SIC). This level of industrial level makes it possible t o  measure the 
effect of changes in tax  policy on relatively narrow segments of the  economy. 
We represent the  technology of each of the thirty-five industries in our 
model by means of a hierarchical tier structure of econometric models of 
producer behavior. At the highest level, the price of output in each industry 
Table 1. Definitions of the industries. 
No. Description No. Description 
1 Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 19 Stone, clay, and glass products 
2 Metal mining 20 Primary metals 
3 Coal mining 21 Fabricated metal products 
4 Crude petroleum and natural gas 22 Machinery, except electrical 
5 Nonmetallic mineral mining 23 Electrical machinery 
6 Construction 24 Motorvehicles 
7 Food and kindred products 25 other  transportation equipment 
8 Tobacco manufacturers 26 Instruments 
9 Textile mill products 27 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
10 Apparel and other textile products 28 Transportation and warehousing 
11 Lumber and wood products 29 Communication 
12 Furniture and fixtures 30 Electric utilities 
13 Paper and allied products 31 Gas utilities 
14 Printing and publishing 32 Trade 
15 Chemicals and allied products 33 Finance, insurance, and real estate 
16 Petroleum refining 34 Other services 
17 Rubber and plastic products 35 Government enterprises 
18 Leather and leather products 
is represented as a function of prices of energy, materials, and capital and 
labor services. Similarly, the price of energy is a function of prices of coal, 
crude petroleum, refined petroleum, electricity, and natural gas; the price 
of materials is a function of the prices of all other intermediate goods. We 
derive demands for inputs of capital and labor services and inputs of the 
thirty-five intermediate goods into each industry from the price function for 
that  industry. 
We have estimated the parameters of production models for the thirty- 
five industries econometrically. For this purpose, we have constructed a set 
of consistent inter-industry transactions tables for the US economy for the 
period 1947 through 1 9 8 5 . ~  Our econometric method for parameterization 
stands in sharp contrast to  the calibration method used in almost all applied 
general equilibrium models. Calibration involves choosing parameters to  
replicate the da ta  for a particular year.5 
'Data on inter-industry transactions are based on input-output tables for the U.S. 
constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1984). Income data are from the U.S. 
national income and product accounts, also developed by the Bureau of Economic Anal- 
ysis (1986). The data on capital and labor services are described by Jorgenson (1990b). 
Additional details are given by Wilcoxen (1988, Appendix C) and H o  (1989). 
5See Mansur and Whalley (1984) for more detail. An example of the calibration a p  
proach is Borges and Goulder (1984) who present a model of energy policy calibrated 
The econometric approach to parameterization has several advantages 
over the calibration approach. First, by using an extensive time series of 
data rather than a single data point, we are able to derive the response of 
production patterns to changes in prices from historical experience.6 This is 
particularly important for the analysis of alternative tax policies to  control 
carbon dioxide emissions, since energy prices have varied widely during our 
sample period. The calibration approach imposes responses to  price changes 
on the data through the choice of functional forms. For example, elasticities 
of substitution are set equal to unity by imposing the Cobb-Douglas func- 
tional form or zero by imposing the Leontief form. Similarly, all elasticities 
of substitution are set equal to each other by imposing the constant elasticity 
of substitution functional form. 
Empirical evidence on substitutability among inputs is essential in ana- 
lyzing the impact of alternative tax policies to control carbon dioxide emis- 
sions. If it is easy for industries to substitute among inputs, the effects of 
these policies will be very different than if substitution were limited. Al- 
though calibration avoids the burden of data collection required by econo- 
metric estimation, it also specifies the substitutability among inputs by as- 
sumption rather than relying on empirical evidence. This can easily lead to  
substantial distortions in estimating the effects of alternative policies. 
A second advantage of the econometric approach is that parameters esti- 
mated from time series are much less likely to  be affected by the peculiarities 
of the data for a particular time period. By construction, parameters by cal- 
ibration are forced to absorb all the random errors present in the data for 
a single benchmark year. This poses a severe problem when the benchmark 
year is unusual in some respect. For examples, parameters calibrated to  
data for 1973 would incorporate into the model all the distortions in energy 
markets that resulted from price controls and rationing of energy during the 
first oil crisis. Econometric parameterization greatly mitigates this problem 
by reducing the influence of random errors for any particular time period. 
An important feature of our producer submodel is that an industry's 
productivity growth can be biased toward some inputs and away from oth- 
ers. Biased productivity growth is a common feature of historical data, but 
is often excluded from models of production. By allowing for biased pro- 
ductivity growth, our model provides a separation between price-induced 
to data for the year 1973. Surveys of applied general equilibrium modeling are given by 
Bergman (1985; 1990). 
6 A  detailed discussion of our econometric methodology is presented by Jorgenson (1984; 
1986). 
reductions in energy utilization and those resulting from changes in technol- 
ogy. In addition, the rate of productivity growth for each industry in our 
model is determined endogeneously as a function of relative prices.7 
In summary, the salient features of our production model are, first, that  
it is disaggregated into thirty-five industries. Second, all parameters of the 
model are estimated econometrically from an extensive historical database 
developed specifically for this purpose. Third, the model determines rates 
of productivity growth endogeneously and allows for biased productivity 
change in each industry. Fourth, the model incorporates extensive historical 
evidence on the price responsiveness of input patterns, including changes in 
the mix of fossil fuels. We turn next to  a brief discussion of our modeling 
of final demands - consumption, investment, government expenditure, and 
foreign trade. 
2.2. Consumption 
Alternative tax policies t o  control carbon dioxide emissions have very differ- 
ent impacts on different households. For example, the imposition of a tax  
on energy affects the relative prices faced by consumers. An increase in the 
price of energy resulting from the tax adversely affects those consumers who 
devote a larger share of total expenditure to  energy. To capture these differ- 
ences among households, we have subdivided the household sector into 672 
demographic groups that  differ by characteristics such as family size, age of 
head, region of residence, race, and urban versus rural location. We treat 
each household as a consuming unit, so that  the household behaves like an  
individual maximizing a utility function. 
We represent the preferences of each household by means of an economet- 
ric model of consumer behavior. The econometric approach to  parameteri- 
zation enables us t o  derive the response of household expenditure patterns 
t o  changes in prices from historical experience. This approach t o  modeling 
consumer behavior has the same advantages over the calibration approach 
as those we have described for modeling producer behavior. Empirical evi- 
dence on substitutability among goods and services is essential in analyzing 
the impact of alternative tax policies t o  control carbon dioxide emissions. 
'Our approach to endogeneous productivity growth was originated by Jorgenson and 
Fraumeni (1981). A general equilibrium model of production that incorporates both sub- 
stitution among inputs and endogeneous productivity growth is presented by Jorgenson 
(1984). The implications of this model have been analyzed by Hogan and Jorgenson (1991). 
Further details are given by Jorgenson (1986) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993). 
If it is easy for households to substitute among commodities, the effects of 
these policies will be very different than if substitution were limited. 
Our model of household behavior is generated by a three-stage optimiza- 
tion process. At the first stage, each household allocates full wealth, defined 
as the sum of human and nonhuman wealth, across different time periods. 
We formalize this decision by introducing a representative agent who maxi- 
mizes an additive intertemporal utility function, subject to an intertemporal 
budget constraint. The optimal allocation satisfies a sequence of necessary 
conditions that can be summarized by means of an Euler equation.' This 
allocation is determined by the rate of time preference and the intertempo- 
ral elasticity of substitution. The Euler equation is forward-looking, so that 
the allocation of full wealth incorporates expectations about all future prices 
and discount rates. 
After households have allocated full wealth to the current time period, 
they proceed to the second stage of the optimization process - choosing 
the mix of leisure and goods. We represent household preferences between 
goods and leisure by means of a representative agent with an indirect utility 
function that depends on the prices of leisure and goods. We derive demands 
for leisure and goods as functions of these prices and the wealth allocated 
to the period. This implies an allocation of the household's exogeneously 
given time endowment between leisure time and the labor market, so that 
this stage of the optimization process determines labor supply. 
The third stage of the household optimization problem is the allocation 
of total expenditure among capital and labor services and the thirty-five 
commodity groups included in the model. At this stage, we replace the rep- 
resentative consumer approach by the approach of Jorgenson et al. (1982) for 
deriving a system of demand functions for each household. We distinguish 
among household types cross-classified by attributes such as the number of 
household members and the geographic region in which the household is 
located. For each type of household, we employ a hierarchical tier struc- 
ture of models of consumer behavior to represent demands for individual 
comm~di t ies .~  
'The Euler equation approach to modeling intertemporal consumer behavior was origi- 
nated by Hall (1978). Our application of this approach follows Jorgenson and Yun (1986). 
'Our model of personal consumption expenditures can be used to represent the behavior 
of individual households, as in Jorgenson and Slesnick (1987), or the behavior of the 
household sector as a whole, as in Jorgenson (1990a). Jorgenson et ol. (1992) have 
employed the results for individual households to separate the overall impact of a carbon 
tax into equity and efficiency improvements. 
The parameters of the behavioral equations for all three stages of our 
consumer model are estimated econ~metrically. '~ This includes the  Euler 
equation, demand functions for leisure and personal consumption expendi- 
tures, and demand functions for individual commodities. Our household 
model incorporates extensive time series data on the  price responsiveness 
of demand patterns by consumers and detailed cross section data on demo- 
graphic effects on consumer behavior. An important feature of our house- 
hold model is that  we do not require that  demands are homothetic. As 
levels of total expenditure increase, patterns of expenditure on individual 
commodities change, even in the absence of price changes. This captures an  
important feature of cross section data on household expenditure patterns 
that  is usually ignored in applied general equilibrium modeling. 
2.3. Investment and capital formation 
Our investment model, like our model of saving, is based on perfect foresight 
or  rational expectations. Under this assumption, the price of investment 
goods in every period is based on expectations of future capital service prices 
and discount rates that  are fulfilled by the solution of the model. In particu- 
lar, we require that  the price of new investment goods is always equal to  the 
present value of future capital services." The price of investment goods and 
the discounted value of future rental prices are brought into intertemporal 
equilibrium by adjustments in prices and the term structure of interest rates. 
This intertemporal equilibrium incorporates the forward-looking dynamics 
of asset pricing by producers. 
For tractability, we assume there is a single capital stock in the economy 
that  is perfectly malleable, so that  it can be reallocated among industries, 
and between industries and final demand categories a t  zero cost. Under this 
assumption, imposition of alternative tax  policies can affect the distribu- 
tion of capital and labor supplies among sectors, even in the short run. In 
each time period, the  supply of capital in our model is completely inelastic, 
since the stock of capital is determined by past investment. Investment dur- 
ing the  period is determined by the savings made available by households. 
The relationship between capital stock and past investment incorporates 
backward-looking dynamics into our model of intertemporal equilibrium. 
''Details on the econometric methodology are given by Jorgenson (1984; 1990a). Addi- 
tional details are provided by Wilcoxen (1988), Ho (1989), and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
(1993). 
"The relationship between the price of investment goods and the rental price of capital 
services is discussed in greater detail by Jorgenson (1989). 
We assume that  new capital goods are produced from individual com- 
modities, so that  the price of new capital depends on commodity prices. We 
have estimated the price function of new capital goods using final demand 
data  for investment over the period 1947-1985. Thus, our model incorporates 
substitution among inputs in the composition of the capital. This feature 
can play an  important role in the evaluation of alternative tax policies. Jor- 
genson and Wilcoxen (1990a) have found, for example, that  an  increase in 
the price of automobiles resulting from mandatory installation of pollution 
control devices shifts investment away from motor vehicles and toward other 
types of capital. 
In summary, capital formation in our model is the outcome of intertem- 
poral optimization by households and firms. Optimization by households is 
forward-looking and incorporates expectations about future prices, wages, 
and interest rates. Optimization by producers is also forward-looking and 
depends upon these same expectations. Both types of optimization are very 
important for modeling the impact of future restrictions on carbon dioxide 
emissions. The effects of these restrictions will be anticipated by house- 
holds and firms, so that  future policies will have important consequences for 
current decisions. 
2.4. Government and foreign trade 
The two remaining final demand categories in our model are the government 
and foreign sectors. We determine final demands for government consump- 
tion from the income-expenditure identity for the government sector. The 
first step is to  compute total tax revenue by applying exogeneous tax rates 
t o  appropriate transactions in the business and household sectors. We then 
add the capital income of government enterprises, determined endogeneously, 
and nontax receipts, also determined exogeneously, t o  tax revenue t o  obtain 
total government revenue. 
We assume that  the government budget deficit can be specified exoge- 
neously. We add the deficit t o  total revenue to  obtain total government 
spending. To arrive a t  government purchases of goods and services, we 
subtract interest paid to  domestic and foreign holders of government bonds 
together with government transfer payments to  domestic and foreign recipi- 
ents. We allocate the remainder among commodity groups according to  fixed 
shares constructed from historical data. Finally, we determine the quantity 
of each commodity by dividing the value of government spending on the 
good by its price. 
Foreign trade has two components - imports and exports. We assume 
that imports are imperfect substitutes for similar domestic cornmoditie~.'~ 
The goods actually purchased by households and firms reflect substitution 
between domestic and imported products. The price responsiveness of these 
purchases is estimated econometrically from historical data. In effect, each 
commodity is assigned a separate elasticity of substitution between domes- 
tic and imported goods. Since the prices of imports are given exogeneously, 
intermediate and final demands implicitly determine imports of each com- 
modity. 
Exports, on the other hand, are determined by a set of export demand 
equations, one for each commodity, that depend on exogeneously given for- 
eign income and the foreign price of US exports. Foreign prices are computed 
from domestic prices by adjusting for subsidies and the exchange rate. The 
demand elasticities in these equations are estimated from historical data. 
Without an elaborate model of international trade, it is impossible to  deter- 
mine both the current account balance and the exchange rate endogeneously. 
In the simulations reported below, we take the current account to  be exoge- 
neous and the exchange rate to be endogeneous. 
2.5. Estimating energy production and carbon emissions 
The most important remaining feature of the model is the way in which 
carbon dioxide emissions and the energy content (BTU) of fossil fuels are 
calculated. For tractability, we assume both are produced in fixed propor- 
tions to  fossil fuel use. This implicitly assumes that nothing can be done 
to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions or increase the energy produced by 
a given combustion process.13 For each fuel, Table 2 gives total domestic 
production, heat content per unit and total heat produced. Heat production 
is measured in quadrillion BTU (quads or QBTU). 
We have calculated the carbon content of each fuel by multiplying the 
heat content of the fuel by the carbon emitted. We obtain the average heat 
content of each fossil fuel in millions of BTU per quantity unit from the 
12This is the Armington (1969) approach. See Wilcoxen (1988), Ho (1989), and Jorgen- 
son and Wilcoxen (1993) for further details on our implementation of this approach. 
13This is largely the case in practice since carbon dioxide is one of the natural products 
of combustion. Little can be done to change the amount produced when burning any 
particular fuel. Similarly, the energy content of fossil fuels is largely unaffected by the 
combustion process, although the useful work that can be performed may be affected by 
the process. For comparability with other studies, we measure carbon dioxide emissions 
in tons of contained carbon. To convert to tons of carbon dioxide, the reader can multiply 
by 3.67. 
Table 2. Domestic production and heat content of fossil fuels. 
Domestic Heat content Total heat 
Unit output (MBTUIunit) (QBTU) 
Coal ton 916.9 x lo6 21.94 20.1 
Oil bbl 3033.2 x lo6 5.80 17.6 
Gas kcf 17.8 x lo9 1.03 16.8 
Table 3. Carbon emissions data for 1987. 
Item Coal Oil Gas 
Unit of measure ton bbl kcf 
Heat content 
( lo6 BTU per unit) 21.94 5.80 1.03 
Emissions rate 
(kg per lo6 BTU) 26.9 21.4 14.5 
(kg per unit) 590.2 124.1 14.9 
Total domestic output 
(10' units) 0.9169 0.3033 
Total carbon emissions 
( lo6 tons) 595.3 414.1 268.6 
Energy Information Administration (1990). We then obtain data from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (1988) on the amount of carbon emitted 
per million BTU generated from each fuel. Multiplying the emissions figures 
by the heating value gives the carbon content of each fuel. Total carbon 
emissions can then be calculated from fuel production. Table 3 gives data 
for each fuel in 1987. 
All prices in our model are normalized to unity in a common base year, 
so that quantities do not correspond directly to  physical units. Moreover, 
the model has a single sector for oil and gas extraction. To convert the 
data for this industry into a form appropriate for the model, we have added 
carbon production for crude petroleum and natural gas, and divided by the 
industry's output for 1987 to obtain the carbon coefficient for this industry. 
Similarly, the coefficient for coal was obtained by dividing total carbon pro- 
duction from coal by the model's 1987 value for coal mining output. These 
coefficients were used to  estimate carbon emissions in each simulation. We 
now turn to a brief discussion of the model's base case. 
2.6. The base case 
To simulate the US economy, we must provide values of the exogeneous vari- 
ables for all time periods. We have accomplished this in two steps. First, 
we have adopted a set of default assumptions about the time path of each 
exogeneous variable in the absence of changes in government policy. These 
assumptions are used in generating a simulation of US economic growth 
called the "base case". Our second step is to change certain exogeneous vari- 
ables to reflect the introduction of alternative tax policies and simulate US 
economic growth again to produce an "alternative case". We then compare 
the two simulations to assess the impact of the policy change. Obviously, 
the assumptions underlying the base case are important in interpreting the 
results. 
Since our model is based on agents with perfect foresight, we must solve 
the model indefinitely far into the future. To do this, we project values for 
all exogeneous variables over the period 1990-2050. After 2050 we assume 
the variables remain constant at their 2050 values, which allows the model 
to converge to a steady state by the year 2100.'~ First, we set all tax rates 
to their values in 1985, the last year in our sample period. Next, we assume 
that prices of imports in foreign currency remain constant in real terms at 
1985 levels before US tariffs are applied. 
We project a gradual decline in the government deficit through the year 
2025, after which the nominal value of the government debt is maintained 
at a constant ratio to the value of the national product. Finally, we project 
the current account deficit by allowing it to fall gradually to zero by the 
year 2000. After that we project a current account surplus sufficient to 
produce a stock of net claims on foreigners by the year 2050 equal to the 
same proportion of national wealth as in 1982. 
The most important exogeneous variables are those associated with 
growth of the US population and corresponding changes in the economy's 
time endowment. We project population by age, sex, and educational attain- 
ment through the year 2050, using demographic assumptions consistent with 
Social Security Administration projections.15 After 2050 we hold population 
constant, which is approximately in line with these projections. In addition, 
we project the educational composition of the population by holding the 
"Some of the most important projections are noted briefly below; a more detailed 
discussion is given by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1992). 
150ur breakdown of the US population by age, sex, and educational attainment is based 
on the system of demographic accounts compiled by Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989). The 
population projections are discussed in detail by Wilcoxen (1988, Appendix B). 
level of educational attainment constant, beginning with the cohort reach- 
ing age 35 in the year 1985. We transform our population projection into a 
projection of the time endowment by taking relative wages across different 
types of labor input t o  be constant a t  1985 levels. Since capital formation is 
endogeneous in our model, our projections of the time endowment effectively 
determine the  size of the economy in the more distant future. 
3. An Assessment of Different Instruments 
A strategy for controlling carbon dioxide emissions consists of a target path 
of emissions and a tax instrument t o  be used to  attain the target. We 
compare the economic impacts of three different sequences of t ax  instruments 
for holding US carbon dioxide emissions constant at  the  1990 level of 1,576 
million tons. All three instruments are taxes on fossil fuels. The specific 
taxes we considered are the following: 
1. A tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
2. A tax on the energy (BTU) content of fossil fuels. 
3. An ad valorem t ax  of fossil fuels. 
To measure the impact of adopting sequences of taxes that  hold US 
carbon dioxide emissions constant, we have constructed a number of alter- 
native simulations of US economic growth. In the base case, we simulate 
US economic growth with no limits on emissions. In the alternative cases, 
we simulate growth with emissions of carbon dioxide held constant. To hold 
the  level of emissions constant, we introduce endogeneous sequences of taxes 
applied to  fossil fuels in proportion to  their carbon content, their energy 
content, and their monetary value. 
Since each of the  t ax  sequences produces substantial revenue, we hold 
government spending constant a t  its base case level. We allow the aver- 
age tax  rate on labor income t o  adjust in order t o  keep the government 
deficit constant. We hold the marginal tax  rate on labor income constant, 
so that  adjustments in the average rate reflect changes in the implicit zero- 
tax  threshold. This tax  adjustment is equivalent t o  a lump sum transfer t o  
the  household sector. 
3.1. Long run effects 
The direct effect of all three tax  policies is t o  increase purchasers' prices 
of coal, oil, and natural gas. However, the t ax  bases for these policies are 
substantially different, so the alternative taxes will produce quantitatively 
different results. We next present the qualitative results of using a carbon 
tax to maintain emissions at 1990 levels in the year 2020. We then discuss 
how the results vary with alternative tax policies. 
In order to  achieve 1990 carbon emissions in the year 2020, a 14.4 percent 
reduction in emissions is required from the base case level. This requires a 
tax of $16.96 per ton of carbon contained in fossil fuels.16 Using the data in 
Table 2, this amounts to a tax of $11.01 per ton of coal, $2.31 per barrel of 
oil, and $0.28 per thousand cubic feet of gas. A carbon tax would generate 
additional government revenue of $26 billion annually, so that the average 
labor tax rate could be reduced by 0.45 percent. 
The rising price of fossil fuels results in substitution away from these 
fuels and toward other energy and nonenergy commodities by both firms 
and households. Total energy consumption falls to  about 68 quadrillion 
BTUs. This substitution toward nonenergy inputs results in a drop of 0.7 
percent in the capital stock and 0.5 percent in the national product by the 
year 2020. 
The impact of a carbon tax differs considerably among different types of 
fossil fuels. Figure 1 shows changes in the supply price of the 35 commodi- 
ties measured as percentage changes relative to the base case. The largest 
change occurs in the price of coal, which rises by forty percent. Electricity 
prices rise considerably less than coal prices because coal accounts for only 
about thirteen percent of total electric utility costs. Other prices showing 
significant effects are those for crude and refined petroleum, and gas utilities. 
These rise, directly or indirectly, because of the tax on the carbon content 
of oil and natural gas. 
Changes in relative prices affect demands for energy and nonenergy com- 
modities and lead to  a restructuring of industry outputs. The second panel 
of Figure 1 gives percentage changes in quantities produced by the thirty-five 
industries by the year 2020. Although most sectors show only small changes 
in output, the production of coal falls by 26.3 percent. Coal is strongly 
affected because its demand is elastic. Most coal is purchased by electric 
utilities. In our model these utilities can substitute other fuels for coal when 
the price rises. Moreover, the utilities also have some ability to substitute 
other inputs, such as labor and capital, for energy, further reducing the 
demand for coal. 
We next consider energy (BTU) and ad v a l o ~ m  tax policies that could 
be used to control carbon dioxide emissions. Neither of these taxes is as 
efficient as a carbon tax in controlling emissions. However, both taxes have 
16Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts are in 1989 prices. 
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Figure 1. Effect of CAR on prices (top) and on output (bottom). 
substantial impacts on fossil fuel use and might be preferable to a carbon 
tax in achieving other objectives. For example, an energy tax would reduce 
combustion of fossil fuels, providing environmental benefits other than lower 
carbon dioxide emissions. An ad valorem tax, on the other hand, may be 
easier to implement. In this section we discuss the impact of these alternative 
taxes in holding emissions at 1990 levels. 
For the first alternative tax simulation, we show that limiting carbon 
dioxide emissions in the year 2020 to 1990 levels would require an energy 
(BTU) tax of $0.47 per million BTU. Using data from Table 2 this can be 
converted to $10.21 per ton of coal, $2.70 per barrel of oil, and $0.48 per 
thousand cubic feet of gas. Compared to coal, oil and gas have greater heat 
content for a given amount of carbon dioxide emissions, so that an energy 
tax falls more heavily on oil and coal than a carbon tax. The difference 
between the energy and carbon taxes is a negative $0.80 per ton of coal, a 
positive $0.39 per barrel of oil, and a positive $0.20 per thousand cubic feet 
of gas. 
Total government revenue from an energy tax that would stabilize carbon 
dioxide emissions at 1990 levels is $31 billion by the year 2020, allowing the 
average labor tax rate to be lowered by 0.54 percent. Higher energy prices 
lead to a decline in the capital stock of 0.8 percent and fall in the national 
product of 0.6 percent, relative to the base case. These declines are slightly 
higher than for the carbon tax simulation, since the energy (BTU) tax creates 
greater distortions in the US economy. The impacts on commodity prices 
and industry outputs are given in Figure 2. The most important difference 
between this simulation and the carbon tax simulation given in Figure 1 
is that an energy tax has less effect on coal price and output and more 
effect on prices and outputs of petroleum and natural gas. However, the two 
simulation results are quite similar. 
Finally, we consider US economic growth with an ad valorem tax on 
fossil fuels that stabilizes carbon dioxide emissions at  1990 levels. Coal is 
much less expensive per BTU than petroleum or natural gas. Coal was 
selling around one dollar per million BTU in 1989, while the price of oil was 
$2.75 per million BTU.17 This difference means that an ad valorem tax falls 
much more heavily on oil than carbon or BTU taxes, so that the price of 
oil rises far more than in the previous simulations. This eliminates much of 
the interfuel substitution we have discussed above. In particular, it reduces 
I7In 1989, the price of coal was $2l/ton f.0.b. at the mine mouth. From Table 2, the 
heating value of a ton of coal is 21.94 MBTU, so the price per million BTU was $0.96. In 
the same year, the price of crude petroleum was $15.85/bbl, while its heating value is 5.80 
MBTU/bbl, yielding a price of $2.73 per million BTU. 
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Figure 2. Effect of BTU on prices (top) and on output (bottom). 
substitution of oil for coal by electric utilities, so that all energy prices rise 
substantially. 
In order to achieve 1990 carbon dioxide emissions rates in 2020 an ad 
valorem tax rate of 21.6 percent would be required. This would raise almost 
$53 billion in tax revenue, which is considerably more than the revenue raised 
by either carbon or BTU taxes. As a consequence, the average labor tax rate 
could be lowered by 0.90 percent. An ad valorem tax produces much greater 
economic distortions than either of the alternative taxes, so the capital stock 
falls by 1.4 percent and the national product drops by one percent, relative 
to the base case. 
Figure 3 gives the impacts of an ad valorem tax on commodity prices 
and industry outputs. The increase in coal prices is still substantial, but less 
drastic. The price of crude oil, however, rises much more than under carbon 
or energy taxes. This, in turn, raises prices of refined petroleum, electricity 
and natural gas. In the bottom panel of Figure 3, we show that higher 
energy prices have a marked effect on the outputs of the energy sectors. 
Both crude and refined petroleum decline by nearly ten percent, while gas 
and electric utilities fall somewhat less. As in earlier simulations, outputs of 
a few sectors, notably food and tobacco, actually increase with restrictions 
on carbon dioxide emissions. This results from lower personal consumption 
expenditures and shifting patterns of household consumption. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of all three simulations. A comparison 
among alternative tax instruments shows that a carbon tax, as expected, 
achieves the target reduction in carbon dioxide emissions with a minimum 
impact on the US economy. However, this tax has a very substantial negative 
effect on the output of the coal industry. The other end of the spectrum is 
provided by the ad valorem tax, which produces the greatest distortions in 
the economy and the least impact on coal mining. The difference arises from 
the fact that coal is much cheaper than oil for a given heat content. Carbon 
and energy taxes change the price of coal substantially, while affecting the 
price of oil only a little. 
3.2. Economic dynamics 
Carbon dioxide restrictions adopted today will have effects far into the fu- 
ture. At the same time, anticipated future restrictions will have effects today. 
To assess the intertemporal effects of alternative tax policies, we now turn 
to the model's dynamic results. As with the long run results, we begin 
by discussing a carbon tax designed to maintain emissions at 1990 levels. 
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Figure 3. Effect of ADVAL on prices (top) and on output (bottom). 
Table 4. Long run effects of different tax instruments. 
Instrument 
Variable Unit Carbon tax BTU tax Ad Valorem 
Carbon emissions %A -14.4 -14.4 -14.4 
Carbon tax  
BTU tax 
Ad valorem tax 
Tax on coal 
Tax on oil 
Tax on gas 
Labor tax rate 
Tax revenue 
BTU production 
Capital stock 
Real GNP 
Price of coal 
Quantity of coal 
Price of oil 
Following that ,  we examine the dynamic response of the US economy to  
alternative tax  policies to  lower emissions of carbon dioxide. 
The paths of the three taxes needed t o  maintain 1990 carbon dioxide 
emissions are shown in Figure 4. Base case emissions increase over time, 
so that  each tax rate rises gradually over the next several decades. Since 
the alternative tax policies stabilize emissions a t  1990 levels, they produce 
identical reductions in emissions, relative t o  the base case. These reductions 
are shown in Figure 5 as annual percentage changes from the base case. 
Emissions begin dropping immediately and are 14.4 percent below the base 
case level by the year 2020. 
The principal effect of the alternative tax policies is to  reduce the output 
of the coal industry. This is shown clearly in Figure 6, which gives percentage 
reductions in coal production from the base case. The impact of a carbon 
tax is shown as a solid line, an energy (BTU) tax as a dashed line, and 
an ad valorem tax as a line of dots and dashes." As each tax is phased 
in, production of coal gradually falls. It  does not, however, return to  its 
1990 level, since some of the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is due 
"We employ this convention in all subsequent figures. 
Year 
Figure 4. Carbon tax required (top), BTU tax required (middle), and Ad 
Valorem tax required (bottom) to maintain 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. 
rear 
Figure 5. Carbon emissions relative to the base case. 
rear 
Figure 6. Coal production relative to the base case. 
Year 
Figure 7. Oil and gas extraction relative to  the base case. 
t o  reductions in oil consumption. This can be seen in Figure 7, which gives 
percentages changes in crude petroleum and natural gas extraction. 
The rising price of energy reduces the rate of capital formation, as shown 
in Figure 8, giving percentage changes in the capital stock from the base case. 
The capital stock does not decline immediately; instead, it remains near its 
base case level for the first few years. This reflects intertemporal optimiza- 
tion by households. The household treats higher taxes as a reduction in 
wealth and reacts by lowering consumption in all periods. However, the 
drop in consumption leads to  an increase in saving and helps to  maintain 
capital formation. Eventually, however, the impact of the taxes is t o  reduce 
capital stock relative to  the base case. 
The decline in growth of the capital stock leads t o  a drop in the growth of 
the national product, as shown in Figure 9. Over time, the national product 
gradually falls relative t o  the base case. Slower capital stock growth is not 
the only factor contributing to  the decline. Higher energy prices reduce the 
rate of productivity growth, leading to  slower growth of output. Under the 
carbon tax, average annual growth of output over the period 1990-2020 is 
0.02 percentage points lower than in the base case. About half of this is due 
to  slower productivity growth and half due to  reduced capital formation. 
Figure 9 shows that  the most important difference among the three tax  
rear 
Figure 8. Capital stock. 
Table 5. Effects of carbon reduction policies 
on GNP growth. (Differences from base case 
annual average growth rates over 1990-2020.) 
Tax Effect on growth 
Carbon -0.02 
BTU -0.02 
Ad valorem -0.03 
policies is that  the ad valorem tax produces greater distortions in the US 
economy. 
Our final step in comparing the three alternative tax policies is t o  esti- 
mate the effect of each on the average rate of growth over the period 1990- 
2020. The results of this calculation are shown in Table 5. An ad valorem 
tax  is by far the most expensive in terms of economic growth. None of the 
tax  policies, however, has a substantial impact on the growth rate. 
1a.r 
Figure 9. Real GNP. 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the usefulness of econometric gen- 
eral equilibrium modeling as a practical guide t o  assessment of the impacts 
of alternative tax  policies for controlling emissions of carbon dioxide. The 
framework for the econometric approach to  modeling the impact of alter- 
native tax  policies is provided by intertemporal general equilibrium. We 
have distinguished among thirty-five industrial sectors of the US economy 
and have also identified thirty-five commodity groups, each one the pri- 
mary product of one of the industries. In modeling consumer behavior, we 
have distinguished among 672 different household types, broken down by de- 
mographic characteristics. Aggregate demand functions for components of 
consumer expenditures are constructed by summing over individual demand 
functions. 
The econometric method for parameterization used in modeling technol- 
ogy and preferences has important advantages over the calibration approach. 
The main advantage is that  the responses of production and consumption 
patterns t o  changes in prices of fossil fuels are derived from historical experi- 
ence. In Section 2 we have outlined a highly disaggregated model of the US 
economy suitable t o  analyzing alternative tax  policies for controlling carbon 
dioxide emissions. An important mechanism for adjusting to  changes in tax  
policy is through altering rates of capital formation. A second mechanism 
is the pricing of capital assets through forward-looking expectations of fu- 
ture prices and discount rates. This illustrates the critical importance of 
intertemporal equilibrium in modeling the dynamics of the response of the 
US economy to  alternative tax policies. 
In Section 3 we have analyzed the economic impact of three alternative 
tax policies for controlling carbon dioxide emissions - a carbon tax, an  energy 
(BTU) tax, and an ad valorem tax on energy. Each of these taxes results in 
price-induced energy conservation that has important feedbacks to  the rate 
of US economic growth through capital asset pricing and capital formation. 
The principal effects of each of these policies to  control carbon dioxide emis- 
sions would be to  reduce coal production and consumption. Other energy 
sectors would be significantly affected if a tax policy other than a carbon 
tax is adopted. The precise form of tax policies to  control carbon dioxide 
emissions will be vitally important to the energy industries that  are affected. 
The alternative tax policies for controlling carbon dioxide emissions have 
fairly modest impacts on the US economy. Even though large amounts of 
government revenue are raised by these taxes, the overall impact on the US 
economy occurs through introduction of distortions resulting from fossil fuel 
taxes. This conclusion is supported by the relatively small impact of the 
alternative policies on growth of the national product. Capital formation 
and the rate of productivity growth are affected only slightly, so the change 
in US economic growth is modest. However, there are important differences 
in economic impact among the alternative tax policies. 
Finally, our overall evaluation of three alternative tax policies for control- 
ling carbon dioxide emissions is that  a carbon tax has the smallest negative 
impact on the US economy as a whole. Carbon taxes do, however, have the 
most severe effect on coal mining. An energy (BTU) tax would shift some of 
the burden to  oil extraction but would be more costly to  the US economy. 
The worst policy is clearly an ad valorem tax on primary fuels. It  would 
increase energy prices far more than either of the other taxes in achieving 
the goal of stabilizing emissions. 
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New Challenges for Energy-Environment 
Long-term Modeling: 
Lessons from the French Case 
Jean-Charles Hourcade 
Centre International de Recherche sur 1'Environnement et le 
DCveloppement, Montrouge, France 
In this paper I wilI venture to  draw some lessons from a study carried out in a 
very specific context, the French "Commissariat GCnCral du Plan" (CGP)',  
because I think that  these lessons should be borne in mind while discussing 
our research agenda as regards modeling tools for long-term environmental 
issues. 
1. Which Factors are Flexible and which are 
Rigid in the Long Term? The Critical Role 
of Transportation 
1.1. Specific questions in the Fkench context 
To date, studies on the flexibility of our energy systems concentrated on how 
t o  increase energy efficiency and how to  promote carbon-free energies. This 
could not be the question posed by the French planning body, CGP, for two 
obvious reasons: 
r Firstly, the lowest cost potential energy savings have been tapped in 
France since 1973 and most of the remaining parts could be tapped 
rather easily in the next 15 years, according to  the conclusions drawn 
by "Atelier de prospective Cnergbtique", a subgroup within the CGP 
planning body (CGP, 1991). 
r Secondly, substitution of carbon-based electricity with carbon-free elec- 
tricity has been achieved (90% of electricity is based on hydro and nu- 
clear power). 
'In order to avoid any possible misinterpretation, let us recall that the French CGP 
does not aim for mandatory Ucommand and control" decisions. Bringing experts, business 
and trade union representatives together with public administration, it tries to attain some 
consensus on which to base long-term policies. 
Consequently, the crucial question was: "Will there remain any room for 
maneuver beyond 2005?" This is why the "F'rench case" may bring lessons 
for the future of other countries, as the Japanese case does in its own way. 
Although it is generally admitted that some emission abatement options 
exist over the next two decades (with more or less optimism on the range 
of magnitude of these possibilities), the critical issue raised by concern over 
the climate is whether or not, beyond these two decades, our countries will 
be faced with ultimate technical limits. The subsequent question is how far 
ahead they are and which signals are likely to shape innovation trends to 
push these limits further in the future. 
The very nature of these questions implies that  the issue can no longer 
be addressed through a description of the economic behavior given the set 
of techniques currently available. It is necessary to  account for changes in 
expectations which are likely to  generate new sets of techniques, of goods and 
of services. Some analytical progress has been made in this direction, owing 
to  the conceptual distinction between "price induced" and "autonomous" 
technical progress; but from a decision-making perspective, the difficulties in 
accurately assessing their relative role are exacerbated by two considerations, 
as follows. 
r First, the theoretical necessity of separating, in the price effect, the rel- 
ative weight of short- term, optimizing behavior (the substitution effect 
given a set of goods and techniques) from innovative behavior driven by 
changes in long-term expectations. 
r Second, autonomous progress encompasses structural changes in global 
output and in final demand, as well as non-price-induced technological 
progress. It also results directly from policies designed to enhance up- 
take of efficient techniques. Lack of analytical knowledge of the links 
between economic forces, institutions, and technical trajectories makes 
it difficult to  bridge the gap between economic pessimism and engineer- 
ing optimism, which tends to  add up favorable assumptions to  write 
low-cost abatement scenarios. The apparent economic pessimism is due 
to the consciousness of the risks associated with some sort of "technolog- 
ical forcing" to  account for feedbacks between technology and economic 
behavior and for the economic and political costs of removing market 
imperfections. 
However, conversely, models calibrated econometrically in the past, use- 
ful for catching the aggregate outcome of these contradictory factors over the 
short term, are less suitable over the long term. Moreover, the current eco- 
nomic data register the reactions to  non-anticipated energy price movements 
resulting from external oil shocks. The incentive tools currently considered 
here, such as a carbon taxation scheme respecting a fiscal neutrality princi- 
ple, are not meant to create an external shock on a system characterized by 
a given elasticity but to  act as a signal aimed at upgrading this elasticity. 
In the absence of a ready-made model, we designed a tool, IMACLIM 
(see Appendix), to explore contradictory assumptions about technical 
choices and structural change in industry and life styles, treating them not 
as being uniquely based on current trends but depending on general, con- 
troversial expert statements about the relative potential of each technical 
option, its long-term development costs, and the related social and political 
constraints that will ultimately determine its pace of penetration. 
The variants in technical options were then used for deriving the energy 
efficiency scenarios, one denoted by ME2, and another denoted by REF from 
reference laissez faire. 
An alternative set of assumptions about long-term development patterns 
was accounted for only in the structural change scenario (MS). These sce- 
narios focus on new orientations to be taken in two main fields: a growth 
based less on energy-intensive industries and a reduced demand for freight 
and passenger transportation. 
The three baseline scenarios (REF, ME, MS) on development strategies 
beyond 2005 up to 2030 were submitted to the planning body, CGP, as an 
experiment to determine a minimum consensus on their political and social 
acceptability. A carbon tax was then applied to each baseline scenario. The 
tax increases progressively up to about 200 $It-C. The scenarios derived 
with a carbon tax are denoted REF1, ME1 and MS1. 
1.2. Numerical results: the evidence of possible bifurcations 
The first numerical conclusion of the simulations is obviously the reversal of 
the current trend in decreasing C 0 2  emissions; in the REF scenario, the total 
C 0 2  emissions between today and 2030 increase even though the C02/GDP 
ratio decreases about 46%. 
This outcome is clearly related to the timing of the nuclear programme. 
Beyond 2005, electricity has indeed exhausted all its penetration niches and 
the French energy strategy hits a "hard core" of fossil fuel consumption for 
motor fuels and chemical uses, both among the most dynamic end-uses. 
The second set of numerical conclusions is related to  the range of possible 
emissions. As shown in Figure 1, the range is quite wide, from 1 to 2. It is 
'ME is for "maitrise de 1'CnergieS, literally energy mastership, a concept that originated 
from the name of a state agency: Agence Fran~aise pour la Maitrise de 1'Energie. 
Figure 1. France: COa emission scenarios (1970-2030). 
Figure 2. France: primary energy consumption scenarios (1970-2030). 
noteworthy that  France would fail in meeting the Toronto target3 even in the 
best case (ME2), when action is engaged immediately and not beyond 2005 
- under this hypothesis, abatement would reach only 17% between 1988 and 
2030. 
These findings can nevertheless be interpreted in a more positive way. 
France would be able to  significantly reduce its C 0 2 / G D P  ratio simply by 
riding its current energy trend, an achievement which if generalized to  all 
industrialized countries would stabilize global C 0 2  emissions by the mid- 
dle of the next century. However, on the other side, this perspective can 
be seen as unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, an  effective, preventive 
strategy requires more ambitious abatement levels; secondly, during a negoti- 
ation process, France cannot expect special treatment because of its previous 
achievements and therefore cannot ask for other countries to  act first. 
Obviously, more satisfactory results could be obtained through more 
optimistic technical hypotheses; however, in terms of policy implications, the 
most challenging conclusion is that  shifting from the highest to  the lowest 
scenario requires a mix of hypotheses encompassing price signals, no price 
incentives, and long-term development patterns. 
The implementation of the carbon tax  alone (from REF to  REF1) only 
leads to  a 21% abatement of GHG emissions (see Figure 2). 
An energy efficiency policy relying on incentives other than taxation 
(subsidies, information, standards, research and development programmes, 
etc.) would be able t o  stabilize emissions a t  the current level, but only if 
implemented together with a carbon tax. Although it is efficient in promot- 
ing energy savings in other sectors, this policy, however, fails in drastically 
lowering the total amount of emissions because of the rigidity in the trans- 
portation sector. This rigidity is due to  three factors: 
A carbon t ax  has a low impact on consumer prices because of current 
taxation levels in France: there would be an 8% increase of the gasoline 
price. 
The rail for road or rail for air substitutions are both slow and have low 
sensitivity to  pure price incentives as long as specific measures are not 
taken t o  enhance the consumer's preference for railways. 
Gains in energy efficiency observed since 1973 have taken advantage of 
the easiest technical improvements. From now on, opposing factors such 
as the improvement in the power of cars and the worsening of traffic 
conditions are expected t o  offset a good part of the additional gains in 
motor efficiency. These negative factors were clearly captured by the 
3Abaternent of about 50% in 2030. 
flatness of the logistic curve (see Appendix) describing the evolution of 
energy efficiency in this sector. 
Then, more ambitious abatement targets can only be met by resorting 
to additional structural hypotheses, as described in the MS family scenar- 
ios: intermodal substitution of rail transportation for freight, urban public 
transportation, etc. 
The critical point is that MS scenarios are "spontaneously" better in 
terms of C02 emission even if the choices behind them are likely to be taken 
irrespective of energy and climate change issues. 
The case of gasoline provides a good illustration. The increase in the 
final price due to  a high tax level is too marginal, and the competitive ad- 
vantage of oil-based car fuels is high enough to  discourage automobiles and 
refining industries from taking the risk of large-scale production of alterna- 
tive motors and fuels. This does not rule out the possibility of technological 
breakthroughs, it simply means that  these breakthroughs would be fostered 
by factors other than a concern for the greenhouse effect: the electrical car 
as a solution to local pollution in big cities, biofuels as an attempt to secure 
new markets for agricultural production, etc. 
Far from minimizing the advantages of a carbon tax, the above remarks 
help to  point out how critical it is to  specify in which overall context the 
implementation of the tax  is being considered. They lead to some method- 
ological issues. 
2. Some General Methodological Implications 
The methodological lessons from this "French case" are likely to  be of inter- 
est in other contexts. They come from the fact that once the substitution 
between fossil and non-fossil fuels in the energy sector is achieved, and once 
energy efficiency is brought up to  reasonable levels, the key role of structural 
factors beyond the energy price becomes obvious, be it for transportation and 
also for the substitutability between materials, or for lifestyles. The fact that  
measures in non-energy fields not related to  greenhouse issues are likely t o  
have a strong consequence on the long-term flexibility of our productive sys- 
tems raises two main methodological questions: the first one is related to  
the use of several baselines for long-term scenarios, and the second is related 
to  the definition of "no-regret strategies". 
2.1. Cost assessment analysis and choice of baselines 
Assessment studies of macroeconomic costs of greenhouse policies usually 
start from an optimized baseline projection and compute the shift induced by 
a taxation policy. However, the critical importance of non-energy-related and 
non-greenhouse-related factors on long-term development trends suggests 
than several "histories" are possible in the future, leading to  different costs 
for preventive strategies. This clearly advocates the systematic use of several 
baselines scenarios reflecting the diversity of expertise and expectations. I 
will emphasize later that this necessity can be proved stringent in the case 
of bifurcation in the development trends, of which I will give an  example. 
Current trends in the French freight sector will lead to  a doubling of road 
freight on highways within 15 years under the influence of the upcoming 
Single European Market. Abating this evolution will require decisions on 
infrastructures, but also on pricing and taxation systems in order to  account 
for the full cost of road transportation (to charge the users for total road 
maintenance, congestion costs, etc.). 
The critical problem comes from the fact that, if these decisions are not 
taken earlier, say, in 10 years' time, we will certainly have gone beyond a 
bifurcation point and be engaged in an irreversible process because of the 
amount of economic, social and political interest involved in the road system 
which would lead t o  an inflexible system without any economically efficient 
and politically acceptable alternatives. The narrow range of available choices 
and low flexibility of the economy would entail high economic and political 
costs in the case of future compulsory actions to  curb GHG emissions. 
The bifurcation issue is certainly broader. It also encompasses inno- 
vation choices on motor fuels and, surely the most difficult, the evolution 
of overall demand for transportation induced by alternative town-planning 
patterns. More generally, it concerns a lot of network industries where the 
market forces tend, beyond a point, to  reinforce the first choice instead of 
correcting it in a self-fulfilling process. 
This means that  a t  date "t" several possible market equilibria can still be 
envisaged for the "t+nV future, corresponding to  several contingent "states 
of the world" characterized by different technical contents, and not easily 
predictable from current trends. The only sound methodological answer is 
to  work on the basis of several baseline scenarios, characterized by alter- 
native assumptions on development patterns and innovation in contrast t o  
the current practice of writing scenarios with high, medium or low versions. 
However, the implication of this evolution of analytical tools is that ,  in terms 
of collective decision making, a cost assessment analysis can be meaningful 
only at the margin of each scenario and can no longer give a clear-cut, uni- 
vocal answer. 
Economists, in order to put some objectivity in discussions, must accept 
that scientific or technical controversies and disagreements about value or 
political judgments mean several possible histories; otherwise, they risk being 
refuted as giving totally arbitrary answers and justifications in favor of pre- 
existing choices. However, they are in a position to immediately recall that 
the viability of each scenario is conditional upon its economic consistency, 
i.e., its macroeconomic equilibrium and coordination of microeconomic be- 
havior. In order to play this role we need to elaborate appropriate tools for 
bridging the gap between economics, engineering and political sciences. 
New tendencies in long-term modeling take the right direction thanks to 
a more systematic use of the properties of the general equilibrium concept. 
This can indeed be helpful for the study of several baseline scenarios if we 
define a scenario as the final picture of each set of technical and economic 
expectations; with each set of explicit technical hypotheses can be associ- 
ated a set of economic hypotheses insuring the economic consistency of the 
resulting scenario. Usually implicit or neglected, these economic hypothe- 
ses can then be discussed in terms of their implications for technical and 
consumption trends. 
However, a more convincing progress is determined by two prerequisites: 
A.  Relaxing the Fixity of the Production Functions of the Non-energy Sectors 
The dangers of the assymmetry between the current treatment of technical 
progress in the energy and non-energy sectors in the available macroeconomic 
energy models must be stressed. Technical change in macroeconometrics is 
indeed, whatever the level of disaggregation, a "proxy" which encompasses 
several factors: technical innovation in the engineering sense, intersectoral 
and intrasectoral structural changes, business cycles, and strategic behavior. 
This makes it difficult to establish explicit links between production 
functions in economic models and projections on technology and to ac- 
curately determine the origins of the gaps between these two measures of 
"technical progress". Therefore, contrary to the case of the energy sector 
where it is possible to explore a wide range of alternative expert statements, 
the current practice of macroeconomic modeling is to use given production 
functions for each of the other sectors. This method is sound and reliable 
for short-term analysis, but there are few logical grounds for assuming that 
a set of price, or non-price, long-term incentives for innovation would have 
Table 1. Macroeconomic impacts of compensated 1,000 FF/t-C carbon tax 
sensitivity tests. 
REF Scenario 
X 0 0.5% 1% 2.8% 
DGDP + 1.65% +0.94% +0.24% -2.15% 
DN in million +574,000 +325,000 +83,000 -745,000 
MS Scenario 
DGDP +0.88% +0.18% -0.4% -2.61% 
DN in million +305,000 +64,000 -172,000 -970,000 
no effect on the production functions of the non-energy sectors over the long 
term. 
We have illustrated the high sensitivity of macroeconomic results to  
assumptions about global factor productivity (reflected in the price of the 
composite good of non-energy sectors) with a very simple model in which 
the macroeconomic effect of a carbon tax is the product of a quasi keynesian 
effect of lower taxes on labor and production, and of the regressive effect of 
higher energy costs. Thanks to a backward induction procedure combined 
with a general equilibrium approach (see Appendix), it was possible to solve 
the equilibrium equations without a priori restrictions on the implicit pro- 
duction function, and to  carry out sensitivity tests. 
x denotes the increase of the composite good due to  carbon tax. In the 
case of non-absolute substitutability between energy and other production 
factors, this increase is about 2.8% and the induced macroeconomic cost is 
between 2.15% and 2.61% of the GDP; it falls to between 1% and 1.5% if 
the substitution parameter between energy and other input to production is 
assumed to  be the same in the baseline and "taxed"  scenario^.^ However, a 
very slight change in this function is enough to  create a situation where the 
benefits of decreasing other taxes offset the deadweight costs of the carbon 
tax. The cost of the composite good could remain constant in the case of 
a higher but reasonable optimism; in this latter case, the positive effect of 
the taxation scheme would lead to  a slight increase in GDP. These results 
cannot be used for concluding that a response to  the greenhouse issue could 
be achieved at  no cost or at negative cost, but they point out to what extent 
the cost assessment of anti-greenhouse strategies can be changed without 
'These results are of the same order of magnitude as most assessment studies for OECD 
countries (2% for the European countries in Manne and Richels, 1991). 
drastic assumptions about the potential effect of a high tax on the long- 
term innovation process in the non-energy sectors. 
B. Behavioral Models and Mechanical Trajectories 
If we want to  bridge the gap between the macroeconomic description of pro- 
duction, for example, Jorgenson and Landau (1989), and a fuller description 
of the long-term prospects for technology and development, we need to  go 
beyond this type of linkages sketched out on the basis of long-term market 
equilibria. The description of transition paths between today and these pos- 
sible future equilibria, and the analysis of their viability, obviously entails 
more challenging difficulties (Aubin, 1992). 
This is the reason why some additional work is required to  model tech- 
nical trajectories, their response to  economic and non-economic signals, and 
their socio-political viability. This calls for additional work on behavioral 
submodels adapted to  each sector and technique beyond the simple solution 
we adopted here. For example, countering the intuitive idea of higher capi- 
tal requirements for rail systems, some French experts pointed out that the 
total investment is 0.3 F/tkm for trucks and 0.12 for rail if one includes the 
investment in vehicles. To check these data and to include them in a general 
equilibrium model would obviously change the long-term macroeconomic 
cost of an abatement scenario. However, investment decisions are made by 
very different agents with different economic behavior and it could be mis- 
leading to  carry out any cost assessment of raillroad substitution without a 
simplified description of these behavior. 
C .  Towads  a More Encompassing Definition of the "No Regret" Concept 
The debate on "no regret" strategies is currently strongly linked to  the "effi- 
ciency gap" controversy. To date, theoretically, a road-dominant system or a 
raillcanal-dominant system can be assumed to be without any slack at their 
efficiency maximum, and the consumers can be assumed to  be totally ratio- 
nal; but they are faced with a choice between the goods and services of either 
system, resulting from a long and cumulative process and characterized by 
very different energy contents. 
Manne and Richels (1992) are right to underline the risks of technological 
forcing involved in a mere engineering vision of energy efficiency. Here, 
we have another type of "technological forcing": in network industries and 
infrastructure activities public intervention is always necessary prior to  the 
realization of the  technical projects, and this will in fact determine, directly 
or not, the range of options (often a single one) a t  the disposal of consumers. 
Since these public choices determine in the long run a good part of the  
energy path embedded in transportation and urban structures, it is legiti- 
mate to question their underlying collective preference function. In France's 
freight system, for example, the long-term shift from rail t o  road comes from 
the flexibility of road transportation, the door-to-door services, but also the 
underpriced infrastructures for trucks, and the risk of strikes in the railway 
sector. However, having experienced last July the ease with which the truck 
drivers' corporation was able to block traffic all over France, and faced with 
local contestations against the  extension of highways, the public authorities 
may be incited to  introduce security and local environment as arguments of 
the  collective preference curve and review some components of the present 
incentive structure. 
From this perspective, climatic risks must be discussed as a new argu- 
ment of this function. The "no-regret" concept then goes further than the 
mere accounting of the "negative costs" of the improved energy efficiency of 
a specific equipment; it encompasses the fact that  GHG abatement becomes 
a joint product of improvements in other dimensions, such as the following. 
Reduction of other environmental costs at  local levels (congestion, air 
pollution, noise). 
National security. 
Prevention of irreversible trends leading to  uncontrolled fossil-fuel- 
intensive development patterns and technological paths. 
Macroeconomic benefits of removing existing distortionary taxes. 
The  research on "no-regret" strategies should therefore be focused on the  
core of actions where this "joint-product" of positive externalities is possible, 
and on the conditions for reaching a cooperative equilibrium from this basis. 
3. Conclusion 
As a conclusion, I would like t o  sketch here some ideas on the collaboration 
between energy and transportation economists, which has been proved to  be 
necessary to  address the  key issues of long-term development-environment 
analysis. 
In the past two decades, energy economists have carried out a paradig- 
matic revolution: they focused on energy-growth decoupling and elaborated 
demand-side approaches to  complement the supply-side optimization, study- 
ing the external determinants of end-use demand. It seems that  these types 
of questions have not yet reached the mainstream of transportation eco- 
nomics and they have not yet been used to  focus on the difficult problem 
of the choices between the means of transportation and optimization of the 
network infrastructures. 
Seizing the opportunity of climate change issues, energy modeling could 
play a provocative role, asking, for the sake of their own models, about the 
long-term determinants of transportation needs simply because the projec- 
tion of their current exponential growth would drastically reduce the chance 
of success of preventive policies. Fkeight transportation does not raise the 
most difficult theoretical problem; it can be solved, on one hand, by a better 
understanding of the geographic trends of the economic activity and, on the 
other hand, by a study of incentive structures which are better able t o  reflect 
the external costs of this sector (congestion, security, infrastructure mainte- 
nance, etc.). The issue of individual transportation (for work or leisure) is 
quite different because we are confronted with the risk of imposing undue 
normative constraints on the consumer. 
Similar approaches can be used in the energy field which aim t o  re- 
place the cost-minimization of a given toe or k w h  by the cost-minimization 
of end-use energy. The first problem is to  substitute the maximization of 
accessibility by the maximization of mobility as the key argument of the  
collective objective function in infrastructure policies. Indeed, an  increase in 
transportation needs can either reflect an increase in welfare, or  a response 
t o  new, unexpected constraints, which unfold as a result of development pat- 
terns. The substitution between transportation and telecommunication is, 
however, a partial response since the first trends observed in the 1980s in- 
dicate that  the explosion of new telecommunication tools has increased the 
geographical extent and the number of business contacts, inducing higher 
transportation requirements. 
This is why we cannot avoid a thorough description of constraints which 
are likely t o  enable us to  discover possible long-term saturation effects which 
are not reflected in the current trends. Given the uncertainty about these 
constraints, the time budget of an individual citizen could provide us with 
a solid accounting system which includes the ultimate constraints on the 
demand for individual transportation. There is a long way t o  go before any 
reliable results can be found on that  issue. However, linked with economic 
balances and energy balances, this accounting system could be the more ef- 
ficient way of connecting three types of expertise and of understanding some 
of the ultimate development issues raised by the climate concerns better. 
Appendix 
Linkages Between Technical Hypotheses and Economic Signals in 
the IMACLIM Model 
For the 2005 scenarios, the "Atelier de Prospective EnergCtique" used a dis- 
aggregated, bottom-up model of the French energy system with 165 energy 
end-uses, a precise description of vintages of equipment for each category of 
energy consumers and modeling of induced investments. 
Resulting from a consensus of the relevant scenarios t o  be constructed for 
the  sake of strategic analysis, the 2005 balances provided numerical pictures 
of the range of opinions of experts on the international background, the 
available technical degrees of freedom, and the social and political constraints 
which will ultimately determine the viability of each scenario. 
Taking the 2005 balances as starting points, the  long-term scenarios 
(2030) written by the  IMACLIM model are consequently strictly exploratory 
scenarios aimed a t  answering two sets of questions: 
Will France after 2005, having exploited the maximum possible substitu- 
tion between carbon-based electricity and nuclear energy, be faced with 
limits t o  its further reduction of energy intensity, making it unable t o  
accept any commitment t o  substantially reduce its C 0 2  emissions? If 
not, how far can technical innovation push these limits? 
What  would be the impacts of a 1,000 FF/ t -C carbon tax, as proposed 
by the Groupe Interministdriel sur 1'Effet de Serre (Martin, 1990)? This 
tax  level implies that  the tax will be offset by a decrease in income 
taxes, value added taxes or any other social contribution so as t o  give 
fiscal neutrality; its implementation depends on a prior commitment 
involving the main OECD countries in order to  avoid a distortionary 
effect on international  market^.^ 
In order to  bridge the gap, to  whatever extent is feasible, between the  
engineering perspective and the economic perspective, while designing a tool 
able to  explore controversial assumptions on technical progress, of structural 
changes in industry and lifestyles, we tried to  design an instrument adhering 
t o  three basic principles: 
5This perspective is similar to the aborted proposal of the EC. It remained exploratory 
and was never adopted officially at the political level. 
r to treat the assumptions on technology, structural changes and behavior 
not as based uniquely on current trends but as depending on controver- 
sial expert statements, and to  be able to test the impact of the current 
controversies on the results of the scenarios; 
r to distinguish explicitly the needs likely to reach saturation levels in the 
future from consumption trends with linear or exponential growth, a t  
least given our current knowledge; 
r to  avoid the risks of a mere multiplication of technical assumptions by 
accounting for the effect of institutional inertia on the diffusion of techni- 
cal and behavioral changes, verifying the consistency of the technological 
and structural assumptions with economic parameters such as personal 
income and relative prices. 
We adopted a solution which may seem simple, but tried to take ad- 
vantage of the institutional context of this study for which we had access to  
detailed exogenous expertise. It consists of using logistic functions in y = 
fk(r,p) and y = gk(t,p) with personal income (r) and prices (p) as arguments 
for the segments of demand expected to reach saturation ( d y / d r > ~ ) ~ ,  and 
time ( t )  and energy prices (p,) for the energy efficiency coefficients of each 
technology (dy/dt<O and dy/dp<O). In the latter case, the role of time is 
to  encompass the capital turn-over effects of the progressive diffusion of new 
technologies. 
The exogenous technical expertise determines the asymptotes "k" for 
these logistic curves which means that they can be changed in case of non- 
consensus. Given the value of the saturation levels7, each curve can be 
benchmarked for a corresponding technique or end-use, based on past obser- 
vations (1973-1988) and on future data, in this case A.P.E.'s 2005 scenarios. 
For a given set of expert statements, the price of energy acts mainly as an 
accelerator in the technical diffusion (Figure 3) and the benchmarking of the 
curve catches the non-economic and non-technical inertia observable in the 
past and accounted for (or expected) by the experts of the A.P.E in their 
2005 scenarios. 
Because of the scarcity of factual findings about the possible range of 
long-term variation of the production function coefficients of non-energy sec- 
tors, we used a backward induction procedure connected with a general equi- 
librium approach. Each scenario was considered consistent with a long-term 
6For the other segments, we worked with the usual log-linear functions of income and 
prices. 
'1x1 the case of energy efficiency, the long-term saturation levels can be changed, if 
necessary, resulting from the reaction of the innovation process to drastic increases in 
energy prices. 
Figure 3. Logistic curves combining price effects and inertia factors. 
static macroeconomic equilibrium (absence of public deficit, balance between 
income and expenditure for all sectors), this equilibrium being the result of 
non-specified production functions for non-energy sectors ( a  single compos- 
ite good in the first version of the model). The macroeconomic context 
of the scenario is then fully explained by our assumptions on technologies, 
structural change and demographics. Then the coefficients of the implicit 
production function can be calculated a t  the margin by interpreting (with a 
few ad hoc hypotheses) the results of taxation scenarios a t  constant economic 
growth as giving the partial derivatives to prices. 
Only one additional hypothesis is necessary to  solve the equation sys- 
tem and to  assess the impact of a carbon tax on the equilibrium of each 
scenario8, the impact of higher prices of fossil fuels on the cost of composite 
good. This in turn depends on the coefficients of the new production func- 
tion. It is then possible to  carry out sensitivity tests of the impact on the 
macroeconomic equilibrium of a wide range of values for final total produc- 
tivity: the production cost of the composite good is increased by the total 
value of the additional energy costs in the case of technical inflexibility, and 
'This tax is applied not as a shock disturbing a given equilibrium in 2030, but is applied 
today in order to switch towards another stabilized growth path. 
remains constant in the case of an efficient, long-term response to  the price 
signal. 
The modeled economy has three goods : 
a composite good Q (price p~ value added tax included) 
the energy consumed by production sector, e, (price p,) 
the energy consumed as a final demand em (households, mostly) (price 
~ m ) .  
The economy is characterized by four equilibrium equations : 
Macroeconomic equilibrium: 
(I) Y = C + I + M ,  
Y: gross domestic product 
C: final consumption 
I: investments, including investments made by the government 
Me: net energy imports 
Production sector budget balance and price of the composite good: 
E,: energy purchase; E, = e, - p, 
S: total labor expenditures (including social security) 
X: exogenous assumption of technical progress 
O: value added tax  in the baseline scenarios 
0': value added tax in the taxed scenarios 
Household budget balance: 
c: propensity to  consume 
r: (respectively r'): total wages of employed population (respectively 
unemployed population) 
N: (respectively N'): number of employed population (respectively un- 
employed population) 
R: other income of employed people 
C,: expenditures on the composite good 
Em: energy expenditures of the household sector, Em = em . p, 
Government budget balance: 
s: cost of labor (wages, social expenditures) 
0: value-added t ax  on the composite good 
re: (respectively t,): taxes on energy purchased by enterprises (resp. 
households) including value added tax, existing energy taxes, and 
the  carbon tax  
a: social share of security expenditures, included in the  cost of labor 
cp: ratio government budget in G D P  
An additional equation is necessary t o  solve the  system 
( V )  d N  = (6N/6Q) .dQ + (bN/6e,).de, . 
T h e  algorithm uses the  results of the techno-economics module which 
gives us the  parameters de, and de, a t  constant GDP. On the other hand, 
using the  properties of the  general equilibrium, we can write: 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to  review and discuss the existing major studies 
on quantitative macroeconomic impacts of controlling greenhouse gas emis- 
sions in Japan. In December 1991, the Center for Global Environmental 
Research in Tsukuba, Japan, organized a symposium on "Global Environ- 
mental Protection and Economic Growth: Evidence from Quantitative Stud- 
ies in Japan," and invited several leading modelers.' The major questions 
concerning the global warming issue that  occupied the minds of the partici- 
pants were: "What are the likely courses of C 0 2  emissions in Japan and in 
the world?" and "Will there be some policy measures that are able t o  limit or 
stabilize the carbon dioxide emissions without imposing too much burden on 
the economy?" Among the policy measures, interests in the environmental 
taxes (in particular, carbon taxes) were considerable. 
In the following sections, I will discuss the major findings of the ten 
models: seven studies are based on the Japanese models and three studies 
on global models. The main features of these models are briefly summarized 
in the Appendix. In the course of the following discussions, I will also refer 
t o  the results of the model comparison workshop a t  the OECD, and touch 
upon some important aspects of the carbon taxes that  must be subject t o  
closer review before such taxes are actually implemented. 
2. The Business-as-Usual Scenario 
Most authors expect that  C 0 2  emissions will continue t o  grow substantially 
unless something is done, although many people consider that  the rates 
- 
'The author is grateful to Dr. Tsuneyuki Morita of the Center for Global Environmental 
Research for his leadership in organizing the symposium, upon which the present paper is 
largely based (see Amano, 1992). The author also expresses his thanks to the participants 
who kindly provided various materials concerning their models. The present paper is 
financially supported by the Asahi Glass Foundation. 
of increase in C 0 2  emissions will decline in the future partly because of 
the  decline in GNP growth rates and partly because of the tendency for 
decoupling (i.e., the existence of wedges between GNP and C 0 2  growth rates; 
see Table 1). There are, however, some variations in the rates of decoupling. 
The expected average annual growth rate of real GNP in Japan during the  
period 1990-2000 ranges from 3.3 t o  3.9 percent with C 0 2  emission rates 
ranging from 0.8 to  2.7 percent. These ranges become 2.5-3.5 and 0.4-1.5 
percent, respectively, in 2000-2010. 
Results of a recent OECD simulation with GREEN are also reported 
in Table 1 for reference. Their results reported for Japan indicate that  the 
average rate of increase in C 0 2  emissions will become substantially smaller 
for the period 2000-2010, turning into a negative value; but there is no clear 
explanation why this will happen. 
3. The Carbon Tax Scenario 
Many authors ascertained the effectiveness of economic measures such as 
carbon taxes t o  curb C 0 2  emissions. There are disagreements, however, 
concerning the accompanying costs in terms of GNP losses. Most studies 
report percentage reductions of real GNP/GDP and of C 0 2  emissions mea- 
sured as relative differences from baseline paths and also the levels of carbon 
tax  t o  attain these results. However, it is not straightforward t o  make com- 
parison because of the  differences in the method of taxation and in time 
horizons. Therefore, in order t o  make comparison easier, I computed two ra- 
tios: one is the ratio of percentage reductions in real GNP/GDP t o  those in 
C 0 2  emissions (i.e., percentage GNP/GDP losses caused by one percentage 
point reduction of C 0 2  emissions relative t o  the baseline), and the other is 
the ratio of carbon tax levels (measured in $/TC) t o  percentage reductions 
in C 0 2  emissions (i.e., the amount of carbon tax  required to  achieve a one 
per cent reduction in C 0 2  emissions). Table 2 reports the results for the  
Japanese economy. Similar ratios are calculated for reference in Tables 3 
and 4, using the results of OECD GREEN and ManneRichels' Global 2100 
models, respectively, 
Comparing these tables, it can be seen that  model results reported in Ta- 
ble 2 may be grouped into three. The first group (Goto and Ban) obtained 
results similar to  those in Tables 3 and 4. OECD GREEN and Manne- 
Richels' Global 2100 models are computable general equilibrium models as 
the Goto model. These models generally indicate that  the GNP losses re- 
sulting from price-induced cuts in C 0 2  emissions are modest. In developed 
Table 1. Average rates of increase in the baseline scenario (%/yr). 
20001 20101 20201 20301 
Model 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Yamajia 
Ban 
Onishi 
Shishidob 
EPAC 
It0 
Yamazaki 
NIKKEI 
Mori 
Got0 
OECD  GREEN^ 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GDP 
CO2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GNP 
CO2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GDP 
co2 
dif. 
GNP 
co2 
dif. 
GDP 
co2 
dif. 
a2005/1988. 
bDeveloped Asia-Pacific. 
'EPA stands for Economic Planning Agency. 
*~urniaux et al., 1992. 
Table 2. Carbon tax and GNP loss ratios, Japan. 
Final GNP Reduction Carbon Tax 
Model year ratio ratio 
Goto 2030 0.02 2.7 
BanD 2000 0.05 5.6 
Mori 2020 0.22 
Yamaji 2005 0.23 
Ito 2010 0.29 
Yamazaki 2010 0.36 
NIKKEI 2010 0.16 
Shishidoalb 2000 1.16 
"The carbon tax ratio is calculated here on the assumption that the international price of 
crude oil is $30/bbl in 2000. 
b~eve loped Asia-Pacific. 
Table 3. Carbon tax and GNP loss ratios, OECD GREEN (2005).a 
GNP Reduction Carbon Tax 
Country/Region ratio ratio 
Former Soviet Union 0.01 0.9 
Central & Eastern Europe 0.01 1 . O  
United States 0.02 2.0 
EC 0.02 2.1 
Other OECD 0.01 2.0 
Rest of the World 0.01 2.6 
Japan 0.02 3.1 
China 0.03 3.2 
India 0.02 3.1 
Dynamic Asian Economies 0.03 6.5 
Brazil 0.04 6.5 
Energy Exporting LDCs 0.07 6.4 
"Burniaux et al.. 1992. 
countries, the GNP reduction ratio is around 0.02-0.03. This means that a 
20 percent cut in C 0 2  emissions, for example, will reduce the level of GNP by 
0.4-0.6 percent from the baseline path. If this is achieved within a ten-year 
period, the growth rate of GNP will be reduced only by 0.04-0.06 percent 
per annum. 
The result of Ban's model is fairly close to  those of this group. However, 
the model is econometric. It was constructed with special attention t o  esti- 
mating price elasticities of demand for energy. Table 5 reports the estimates 
of income and price elasticities of demand for energy for some models that  
Table 4. Carbon t ax  and GNP loss ratios, Global 2100 (2100)". 
GNP Reduction Carbon Tax 
Country /Region ratio ratio 
USA 0.03 2.4 
Other OECD 0.02 2.4 
Former USSR 0.06 8.6 
China 0.06 2.4 
Rest of the World 0.06 2.4 
QManne ( 1 9 9 2 ) .  
Table 5. Long-run income and price elasticities of demand for energy." 
Model Income Elasticity Price Elasticity 
Ban 1.42 -0.97 
Goto 1 .OO -0.43 
Mori 0.76 -0.44 
It0 0.58 -0.49 
Yamaji n.a. -0.64 
NIKKEI 0.71 -0.14 
%irnple averages. 
are available from papers a t  hand. The elasticities are simple averages for 
various sectors. The average price elasticity is around -0.4 for other models, 
but in the Ban model it is close to  -1.0. 
The second group (Mori, Yamaji, Ito, and Yamazaki) obtained some- 
what larger ratios on both counts. Models in this group are based on econo- 
metrically estimated forecasting macromodels of demand-determined type, 
combined with some sort of energy-sector submodels. The time horizon is 
generally short. The results within this group are fairly similar to  each other, 
and they tend t o  form a consensus view of the short-run effects of curbing 
C 0 2  emissions, because these models are often used for regular forecasting 
and what-if simulation exercises in major private institutions. 
Finally, the  third group (NIKKEI and Shishido) shows substantially 
higher levels of carbon t ax  t o  achieve a one percentage reduction of C 0 2  
emissions. Although not completely reported in Table 5, these models are 
characterized by rather small price effects compared t o  other models. 
One common problem encountered in this kind of simulation studies is 
that  estimates of economic losses (in terms of GNP reductions) vary quite 
widely. As can be seen from the above results, econometric models usually 
tend t o  yield larger reductions in output than CGE-type models in which re- 
sponses t o  price changes are more fully modeled and adjustments take place 
relatively more smoothly. An important question remains, however, whether 
CGE models can make realistic assessments of short t o  medium-term adjust- 
ment costs. Even if CGE models can represent the exact evaluation of possi- 
ble long-run macroeconomic effects of COz emission abatements, it is likely 
that  there exist some additional short-run losses. If these effects are real, 
they should be properly taken into account and adequate policy responses 
of transitory nature need to  be devised. 
On the other hand, some of the earlier models of the Japanese economy 
drew quite gloomy pictures for C 0 2  abatement policies using models with 
demand for fossil fuels being quite insensitive to  changes in relative energy 
prices. The EPA model cited in Table 1 reported a simulation result saying 
that  GNP grdwth rates would have to be reduced by 2 percentage point for 
the period 1990-2000 and by 1.2 percentage point for the period 2000-2010 
in order to  keep per capita C 0 2  emissions a t  the 1990 level after 2000 (see 
Appendix). If we compute a GNP reduction ratio as defined in Table 2 above 
from this result, we obtain a value of 1.03 for the period 1990-2000 and 0.99 
for 2000-2010, which are far larger than those reported for other models in 
that  table. Since C 0 2  emissions were reduced in the EPA simulations by 
directly decreasing production and consumption activities, it is natural that  
output reductions became substantial. However, it seems quite unrealistic t o  
suppose that  responses through relative price changes are actually negligible 
or very small, and there exists a danger of overstating necessary reductions 
of economic activities or a danger of over-reliance on subsidies for energy- 
saving technologies to  attain a certain target of emission abatement. 
Another problem is related to the availability of other policy measures 
that  can offset undesirable impacts of carbon (or other environmental) taxes. 
Some authors maintain that  the economic costs of a carbon tax  can be fully 
offset by using the revenues to remove severe distortions of pre-existing taxes 
(see Shackleton et al., 1991). Simulation exercises dealing with carbon taxes 
usually keep other policies unchanged in order to  isolate the effects of original 
changes. This does not mean, however, that "economic losses" are inevitable. 
We may conceive of a policy package involving various measures that  can 
neutralize undesirable side-effects of the initial set of measures. We shall 
come back to  this point in Section 5. 
4. Energy-Saving Investments and Subsidies 
The effects of energy-saving investments and subsidies to  encourage introduc- 
tion of less carbon-intensive technologies have been analyzed by Ito (1990), 
Table 6. Investment subsidy and C 0 2  emission reductions in 2005". 
Introduction Amount of Total C 0 2  emission 
Cost subsidy reduction 
(1,000 yen/TC) (Tril. yen/Year) (Mil. TC/Year) 
5 0.101 20.2 
- 
Source: Matsuhashi et al. (1991), Figures 7 and 8. 
Yamazaki (1991), and Matsuhashi et al. (1991). In the Ito model, a certain 
proportion of the total private fixed investment is directed toward energy- 
saving purposes. Since this type of investment does not contribute to  create 
productive capacity, such diversion will lower the potential growth rate of 
the economy. Energy-saving investments, on the other hand, will directly 
reduce the energy requirements per unit of production. He estimated that  
one million yen of energy-saving investment can reduce 2,500 liters of oil 
or 1.725 tons of carbon. (This is equivalent to  224 tons of carbon emission 
reduction per one million dollars of investment.) Therefore, if 2 percent of 
gross fixed investment in the private sector (roughly 2.2 trillion yen in 1990) 
is diverted to  energy-saving purposes, its direct effect can reduce the annual 
emission of carbon dioxide by 3.8 million tons of carbon or about 1.2 percent 
of the annual emissions. 
A research group at  the University of Tokyo (Matsuhashi et al., 1991) 
pursued a comprehensive approach in evaluating the efficacy of subsidies 
to encourage the introduction and diffusion of carbon-saving technologies. 
Based upon a survey on energylcarbon-saving technologies that  accompany 
investment expenditures, they first estimated the potential scale of C 0 2  
reduction and additional costs required per unit of carbon content of in- 
troducing these particular technologies. The results were then fed into a 
macroeconometric model to derive the relationship between the amount of 
subsidy and the extent of C 0 2  emission reductions. Table 6 summarizes the 
results. 
There are three interesting points. Firstly, the impact per yen is much 
larger than Ito's estimates. Secondly, fairly large emission reductions can be 
attained a t  very low costs. Thirdly, there is a clear tendency for diminishing 
returns. 
Obviously, this is an important area where model-based analyses have 
not been pursued extensively so far and further studies should be encour- 
aged. At the OECD workshop on global-model comparison studies, the 
importance of assumptions concerning the "AEEI" (autonomous energy ef- 
ficiency improvements) has been stressed, but the AEEIs are simply set 
exogenously in each model and no attempt has so far been made t o  justify 
the numbers theoretically or empirically.2 At the same time, the question of 
consistency between subsidies for investment or R&D and the Polluter Pays 
Principle should also be examined. The same is probably true for the ques- 
tion of international technology transfers, although only scanty attention has 
been paid t o  it so far. The greater part of energy-saving and clean-energy 
technologies is proprietary of the private sectors, therefore the areas and 
extent of required public promotion, together with financial requirements, 
need further investigations. 
5. Recycling of Tax Revenue 
Some papers discussed the question of recycling tax revenues. If the aim 
of carbon taxes is to  stabilize C 0 2  emission a t  around the current level or 
even t o  reduce it, the size of tax revenues can become substantial and their 
disposition may have important implications. In order t o  isolate the incentive 
effects of emission taxes as far as possible, it would be necessary t o  maintain 
revenues neutrality in analyzing their effects. However, the problem is that  
there are various ways of attaining revenue neutrality. Tax revenues can be 
used t o  reduce direct taxes, indirect taxes, social security contributions, or 
t o  increase investment tax credit, and so on. That is, attainment of revenue 
neutrality may have different implications on income distribution, sectoral 
prices, sectoral employment, etc. Therefore, in order t o  avoid confusion, 
the incentive aspects of carbon taxes should be analyzed by assuming, for 
example, revenue neutrality through reduction of indirect taxes or social 
security contributions. 
Table 7 reports some examples of the effects of tax revenue recycling in 
terms of GNP reduction ratios defined in Table 2. With tax revenue recycled, 
C 0 2  emission reductions tend t o  become smaller because of smaller GNP 
reductions. However, the substitution effects of carbon tax are not much 
'In a recently published book, however, Manne and Richels examined their assumptions 
concerning the AEEI and ESUB (the elasticity of substitution) by means of historical 
tracking tests (see Manne and Richels, 1992, Chapter 9). 
Table 7. Effects of tax revenue recycling: GNP Reduction Ratios. 
Tax Revenue 
Model Not Recycled Recycled 
Yamaji 0.23 0.19 
NIKKEI 0.22 0.16 
affected by this change, and the GNP reduction per one percentage point 
reduction in COz emissions can become smaller. 
The above discussion does not imply that carbon taxes should actually 
be introduced in such a fashion. In countries where non-trivial carbon taxes 
were introduced in the past, however, they usually accompanied some sort 
of tax reforms because of a big change in tax revenue. Questions such as 
the regressiveness of carbon taxes (see, e.g., Poterba, 1991) and different 
sectoral impacts can then be considered in this context. 
6.  International Aspects of Carbon Taxes 
When we look at  the problem from the international perspective, there are a 
few important channels through which impacts of carbon taxes in one coun- 
try or a group of countries can affect the international economy at  large. An 
important factor is changes in the world prices of fossil fuels resulting from 
decreased demand for energy. They can impart at least three different im- 
pacts. First, they alter the terms of trade of energy importers and exporters, 
favoring the former. No model developed in Japan has paid sufficient atten- 
tion to this problem, but the OECD study shows (see Burniaux et al., 1992) 
that the terms of trade effects on real incomes can be significant. This 
means that some compensation schemes might be required inter-regionally 
for energy exporters, or inter-sectorally in a country for coal producers, for 
instance. 
Secondly, the changes in energy prices may alter the structure of com- 
parative advantages in various countries. If carbon taxes are levied in an 
internationally uniform fashion, then the resulting problems, if any, are of 
short-term adjustment character. The optimal international division of labor 
will not be seriously disturbed by the carbon tax. Rather, it will make the 
price structures reflecting real social costs more adequate, leading to  a more 
efficient resource allocation. If, however, carbon taxes are introduced only 
in a subset of countries or with different intensities, then the supply sources 
of carbon-intensive products may shift from more efficient countries to less 
efficient countries because the latter adopt less restrictive tax schemes. This 
kind of trade-distorting effects of energy taxes are already present. Hoeller 
and Wallin (1991) have shown substantial differences in implicit carbon taxes 
among OECD countries, and Burniaux et al. (1992) revealed much wider 
differences in relative domestic energy prices in the world economy. Removal 
of these distortions will certainly improve the efficiency of energy use and 
carbon emissions. This point should doubtless be subject of careful attention 
when realistic simulation exercises are to  be performed. The OECD GREEN 
model indicated that existing taxes and subsidies can have significant effects 
upon the carbon tax structures. The reason is that many industrial coun- 
tries impose substantial implicit carbon taxes already whereas in some other 
countries energy is heavily subsidized (Burniaux et al., 1992). 
Finally, when only a certain group of countries introduce carbon taxes, 
the resulting reduction in international energy prices may induce increases 
in energy demand in non-participating countries. The original reduction 
in carbon emissions is offset by an increase in the latter group of coun- 
tries. This effect, combined with the second effect mentioned above, is called 
"carbon-leakage" by Rutherford (1992). The carbon-leakage rate, therefore, 
represents the percentage by which the effects of a unilateral cut are off- 
set by increased emissions in other regions. According to Rutherford, the 
carbon-leakage effect is fairly large, particularly for stricter controls of C 0 2  
emissions. His model suggests that the marginal leakage rate for unilateral 
OECD action is nearly 100 percent for cutbacks of rate of emission increase 
above 3 percent per annum in the period 2000-2100. In the year 2000, the 
"trade-diversion" and "substitution" components are estimated as roughly 
equal, both leakage rates being around 30 percent. 
In contrast, the latest simulation exercises by GREEN have shown that 
carbon-leakages of a unilateral stabilization action in OECD countries are 
quite small with a peak rate at  2.5 percent (Burniaux et al., 1992). On aver- 
age, over the period 1990-2050, the largest decline in the output of energy- 
intensive sector is only -2.6 percent (in Japan) and the smallest is -0.4 percent 
(in the United States). Since these opposing findings are both based on fairly 
aggregated trade models with only two types of goods (energy-intensive and 
other goods) being involved, it seems that further, more disaggregated stud- 
ies are needed. 
More recently, Manne and Rutherford (1992) reported somewhat smaller 
leakage ratios for the unilateral OECD action, ranging from around 10 to 35 
percent, which are still higher than those suggested by the GREEN model. 
Since the carbon-leakage effects are heavily dependent upon what happens 
in the world oil market, assumptions concerning the behavior of OPEC coun- 
tries seem to be quite important. 
In a recent article, Nicoletti and Oliveira-Martins (1992) also examined 
the carbon-leakage effects of the EC energylcarbon tax proposal by using 
the GREEN model. The net leakage effect measured by the ratio between 
the change in emissions outside the EC and the size of the emissions out in 
the EC is reported to be around 11 percent by the year 2000 and then to 
decline to zero toward the middle of the next century. 
Their simulation experiments indicated that the following two factors 
are important in determining the degree of carbon leakages: (a) the degree 
of trade linkage between countries participating in the unilateral agreement 
and non-participating countries, and (b) the supply elasticities of fossil fuels. 
A reason why the GREEN model yielded very small net leakage effects for 
the unilateral OECD carbon-tax exercise is that trade flows between OECD 
and non-OECD areas are relatively small. 
They also concluded that the degree of carbon leakages may be sensitive 
to assumptions concerning capital mobility (i.e., possibilities of international 
relocation of industries), the differentiation of goods in international trade 
and the behavior of oil prices. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
A final comment on the method of modeling analysis for mitigating global 
warming. As we have seen, economic measures to curb GHG emissions 
will tend to become rather comprehensive in order to avoid undesirable side 
effects. In order to evaluate possible macroeconomic and sectoral effects of 
such a policy package, we need to rely upon a detailed model of the domestic 
economy. On the other hand, the greenhouse effect is global in nature, and 
the abatement policies should have a global point of view. Problems such 
as impacts upon international energy prices, international leakage effects, 
and the creation of international markets for tradable emission permits can 
only be analyzed by a global model. However, it is not practical to link all 
detailed country models together to build a global model. 
It appears that we should have short to medium-term models of a partic- 
ular country with sufficient details of functional and sectoral disaggregation, 
on the one hand, and a global, long-term model with less sectoral disag- 
gregation but a wider geographical coverage of the world economy, on the 
other hand. Models of these two types could then be used simultaneously to  
obtain a globally consistent, and locally detailed view of appropriate policy 
packages to contain global warming. 
Appendix: Outline of Economy/C02 Interaction Models 
In this Appendix, a brief outline of the models and the results of represen- 
tative simulations are summarized. 
Japanese Models 
EPA (1 991): 1990-2010 
A long-term, multi-sectoral planning model of the Economic Planning 
Agency with 22 sectors. It is called a turnpike model because it is based 
on the consumption turnpike theory. It is a dynamic optimization model, 
maximizing the sum of discounted national utility arising from consumption 
of flow goods and flow services from stocks over the planning horizon under 
various constraints. Input coefficients for labor, capital and intermediate 
inputs in the planning period were formed on the basis of hearing inquiries 
a t  various sectors. 
Stabilization of per capita emissions of C 0 2  a t  the 1990 lever by 2000. 
Scenario 1: uniform reduction of output. Scenario 2: Scenario 1 with the rate 
of increase in energy demand in the household sector being halved from 4 
percent (past average) t o  2 percent per annum. Scenario 3: Scenario 2 with 
the same rates of energy saving in the industrial sectors as in the period 
1975-1986. 
Percentage reduction relative to  baseline 
GNP C02 
Scenario 1990-2000 2000-2010 1990-2000 2000-2010 
A dynamic optimization model with a detailed energy sector. Five primary 
fuels and nine secondary fuels. Nine industries and one residential sector. 
Annual C 0 2  emissions stabilized a t  320 MtC (around the 1990 level) after 
2000. 
Shadow price GNP losses 
of COz (Dev. from baseline) 
Year Yen/TC %/TC Year Tril. yen % 
2000 26,710 205 2000 1.3 0.22 
2010 32,500 250 2010 6.1 0.76 
2030 18,040 139 2040 14.2 0.99 
Yamaji (Nagata et al., 1991): 1988-2005 
A large-scale, medium-term econometric forecasting system developed by 
the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, composed of four 
sub-systems: World Energy Model, Domestic Multi-Sector Model, Interfuel 
Competition Model, and Domestic Regional Model. 
Carbon tax  of 4,000 yen/TC (about $31/TC) introduced in 1990, 
raised by the same amount every year until 2005 to  reach 64,000 yen/TC 
($492/TC). The COz emission level in 2005 is to be reduced to the level of 
1988. Annual real GNP growth rates are reduced by 0.4 percent when t ax  
revenue is not recycled, and by 0.3 percent when it is recycled via income 
tax  cut. 
Ban (1 991): 1991 -2000 
A macroeconometric model based on intertemporal optimization behavior of 
the energy demand in private sectors such as iron and steel, electric utilities, 
automobiles, and gasoline. Nuclear power generation and new energy sources 
are exogenous. 
Scenario 1: Carbon taxes to  stabilize COz emissions a t  the 1990 level; 24 
percent on oil, 16 percent on LNG, and 30 percent on coke and coal (about 
$66/TC in 2000) with tax  revenue recycled via indirect-tax cut. Scenario 2: 
Direct regulation; uniform cut in production and consumption (roughly by 
5 percent) to  reduce emissions as in Scenario 1. 
Cumulative reduction in real Equivalent reduction in constant 
Scenario GNP (1985 prices) in 2000 average growth rates (% p.a.) 
1 28 Tril. yen 0.10 
2 41 Tril. yen 0.15 
A macroeconometric model with a simple energy sector. Modeling the im- 
pacts of energy price changes and energy saving investments. 
Fossil fuel taxes. Scenario 1: 50 percent on coal, 40 percent on oil, and 
30 percent on LNG. Scenario 2: 100 percent on coal, 80 percent on oil, and 
60 percent on LNG. Scenario 3: the same as Scenario 1 with additional 
energy saving policies and foreign aid programs. 
- - 
Carbon tax rates Reductions in GNP 
($/TC) growth rates 
Scenario 2000 2010 1990-2000 2000-2010 
Mori (1 991): 1988-2020 
An econometric energy-sector model combined with a simple aggregate- 
demand block. Six primary energy sources and eight secondary energy 
sources. Three final demand sectors using thermal/electric energy. 
Carbon taxes introduced after 1993 t o  stabilize annual C 0 2  emissions a t  
around the 1990 level. Required carbon tax  rates: 17,500 yen/TC ($135/TC) 
on average for the 1993-2020 period. Maximum rate of G N P  reduction 
during the period is 3.6 percent relative to  the baseline ( tax revenue being 
not recycled). 
A medium-sized macroeconometric model combined with an energy model. 
Three final energy demand sectors and seven primary energy sources. 
Energy-saving investments partly explained by energy prices. Increases in 
energy prices also reduce relative importance of energy-intensive sectors in 
the economy, thus leading t o  a decline in the aggregate energy-intensity. 
Carbon t ax  is levied t o  stabilize C 0 2  emissions after 2000 a t  the 1990 
level. One third of energy-saving investments are subsidized by the carbon 
tax revenue. 
Percentage deviation 
from baseline Carbon tax 
Year GNP co2 ($/TC) 
2000 -5.88 -10.50 132.3 
2010 -4.51 -10.95 209.9 
Global Models 
Detailed global econometric model with 180 countries/regions based on an 
A1 oriented expert system. The model has been used for various other sim- 
ulation studies of the world economy. 
C 0 2  emissions stabilization at the 1990 level by 2000. Scenario A: all 
countries introduce carbon taxes of 10 percent on oil, 12 percent on coal, 
and 8 percent on natural gas; furthermore, all countries cut back non-housing 
investments to  attain their emission targets. Scenario B: developed countries 
increase R&D expenditures by 0.5 percent of GDP to reduce C 0 2  emissions; 
these countries also increase ODA by 20 percent compared to  the baseline 
case to  help reduce C 0 2  emissions in developing countries. Scenario C: most 
countries introduce at  least 5 percent carbon tax on fossil fuels; developed 
countries increase R&D expenditures by 0.25 percent of GDP to  reduce C 0 2  
emissions; these countries also increase ODA by 10 percent compared to  the 
baseline case to help reduce C 0 2  emissions in developing countries. 
Scenario 
- 
Changes in growth rates: 1991-2000 av. 
GDP CO2 
World -2.0 0.1 -0.4 -1.5 -2.2 -2.3 
DevelopedMarketEconomies -2.1 0.1 -0.4 -1.4 -2.2 -2.0 
Developing Market Economies -1.6 0.0 -0.3 -1.7 -5.0 -2.1 
Planned Economies" -2.0 0.1 -0.7 -1.4 -2.2 -2.5 
Japan -3.2 0.4 -0.6 -1.3 -1.9 -2.1 
"Including Eastern Europe and former USSR. 
Shishido (1 991): 1990-2000 
A global econometric model with 36 countries/regions, emphasizing sectoral 
details of production and trade in industrial countries. C 0 2  emissions are 
explained by production and prices. 
Fossil fuel taxes introduced only in G7 countries, starting from 10 per- 
cent in 1990, raised to  20 percent in 1995, and sustained thereafter. 
Percentage Deviation from the Baseline in 2000 
Region GDP ( 3 0 2  
World -0.85 
Developed Market Economies - 1.20 
Developing Market Economies -0.36 
Planned Economiesa -0.08 
Develo~ed Asia-Pacific -1.15 
"Including Eastern Europe and former USSR. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun/GEF-KANSA I (1991): 1991-2010 
A global econometric model with nine countries/regions, each having 
macroeconomic and energy blocks. 
Introduction of carbon taxes to stabilize COz emissions at  the 1990 level 
by 2000. Uniform tax is applied throughout the world with no tax revenue 
recycled. 
Reeion 
- - 
Percentage deviation from baseline Carbon t a x  
GDP CO2 ($/TC) 
World -3.5 -7.4 -17.4 -30.4 546 1,780 
Developed Market Economiesa -3.2 -5.9 -13.7 -22.3 
Developing Market Economies -5.2 -8.9 -23.1 -39.3 
Planned Economiesa -3.4 -12.4 -17.5 -31.6 
Japan -1.7 -4.3 -16.8 -26.9 
"Including Eastern Europe and former USSR. 
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Costs and Benefits of C 0 2  Reduction 
in Russia 
Igor Bashmakov 
The Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency 
Moscow, Russian Federation 
Introduction 
Dissolution of the former USSR inflated the results of analysis made last year 
by a group of Russian experts on a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission inven- 
tory, and short- and long-term projections of energy-related GHG emission. 
The value of these results has been reduced not because of the  use of a 
wrong analysis methodology or for any scientific reasons. The main reason 
is that  we are a t  present living in a world where several new independent 
states (NIS) replaced the former USSR. Now we need to  revaluate our re- 
sults for Russia and for other NIS separately. As the borders between former 
republics were not precisely determined and basic statistical data  were avail- 
able mainly for the  whole former USSR, the disaggregation of analysis into 
values for each independent state presents some difficulties and would def- 
initely require some time t o  implement. This work has already started in 
Russia. Due t o  insufficient financial support for this research, results for Rus- 
sia may only appear later this year. Nevertheless, some preliminary results 
already exist. In this paper I will use them, as well as extrapolations of some 
conclusions on Russia made for the former USSR. Further work definitely 
would correct these extrapolations, but I do believe that those corrections 
would be within a reasonable range of the existing extrapolations and will 
not alter the conclusions presented in this paper. 
1. Energy-related GHG Emission in Russia 
in 1990 
C02. Based on the preliminary results of Russian energy balance estimates 
made a t  the Energy Research Institute and the methodology of the GHG 
emission inventory developed by the OECD (Bashmakov, 1992), table of C 0 2  
emissions for Russia in 1990 was estimated (see Table 1). The total amount 
of C 0 2  emissions in Russia is about 650 million t-C or approximately 65% 
Table 1. Energy-related C 0 2  emissions in Russia in 1990a, in million tons 
of C. 
Other 
solid 
Coal fuels Oil Gas Tot a1 
Indigenous production 4.53 4.53 
Primary energy consumption 202.8 27.5 187.5 237.2 654.36 
Electricity generation 34.4 1.1 8.7 28.0 72.1 
CHP plants 28.4 2.2 19.3 38.7 86.8 
District heating 49.3 0.7 2.2 73.3 145.6 
Own use and losses 15.4 12.7 38.9 67.0 
Final energy consumption 75.2 18.5 124.6 58.3 276.6 
Industry 42.6 9.8 16.4 34.0 102.9 
Agriculture 1.8 0.8 15.7 0.6 19.0 
Transport 72.0 0 .2  72.2 
Residential and commercial 30.7 7.8 7.3 14.5 60.4 
Non-energy use 13.2 9.0 22.2 
aPreliminary estimates. 
Source: Author. 
of the former USSR's emissions and 10% of the global, energy-related C 0 2  
emissions. Russia occupies second place in the list of major C 0 2  emitters in 
the world. 
Processes of energy transformation, production, transportation, and dis- 
tribution are mainly responsible for the emissions. The contribution of final 
energy consumption is 42%. Natural gas dominates C 0 2  emissions from 
the use of fuels. This is understandable, keeping in mind that natural gas 
contributed 46% of fossil fuel consumption in Russia in 1990. 
CH4. The preliminary estimation of methane emissions is equal to 17.8 
million tons of CH4. This is approximately 73% of the emissions of the 
former USSR in 1990. The major source of methane emissions is the gas 
supply system (71%), followed by coal production (28.5%). 
CO. Total CO emissions equal 29.9 million tons of CO. The major source of 
these emissions is petroleum consumption by transport. 
NO,. NO, emissions equal 6.2 million tons of NO2. Among major contrib- 
utors are : transport, electricity, and heat generation. 
GHG. Total GHG emissions in terms of C 0 2  equivalent equal 3,110 million 
tons (see Table 2). The Russian contribution to the former USSR GHG 
emissions was 64% in 1990. 
Table 2. Energy-related GHG emissions in Russia in 1990a, in million tons 
of C 0 2 .  
Other 
solid 
Coal fuels Oil Gas Total 
Indigenous production 
Primary energy consumption 
Electricity generation 
CHP plants 
District heating 
Own use and losses 
Final energy consumption 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Transport 
Residential and commercial 
Non-energy use 
aPreliminary estimates. 
Source: Author. 
Among the major means of reducing C 0 2  and other GHG emissions 
are: energy efficiency improvements; more nuclear and renewable energy in 
the energy balance; change fossil fuel structure in favor of natural gas; and 
finally, C 0 2  removal. Due to  political and economic reasons (Makarov and 
Bashmakov, 1990), in Russia a t  present the most promising way to  deal with 
emission reduction is to  improve energy efficiency. According to  proposals 
for a new Russian energy program, hydro and nuclear power would develop 
very slowly up t o  the year 2005 (Energy Research Institute, 1992). Therefore, 
energy efficiency will be a t  the center of the costs and benefits analysis in 
this paper. 
2. Energy Conservation Potential 
2.1. Direct technological energy conservation potential: 
scale and structure 
As the former USSR has been exhausting oil, gas, and coal resources, it 
has simultaneously been accumulating the world's highest energy conserva- 
tion potential. Any study of energy conservation possibilities has t o  start  
with the accumulation and systematization of vast amounts of information 
on the possibilities for efficient use of energy in various spheres. The most 
Table 3. Direct and indirect technological energy conservation potential in 
the former USSR, in million tce. 
Coal 
OSF 
Oil 
Gas 
Electr. 
Heat 
Total 
Final energy consumers 
Directa Indirect Total 
Energy complex 
Direct Indirect Total 
20.5 23.4 43.9 
GHG emission 
reductionb 
695.5 
22.0 
335.4 
792.7 
Total 
171.3 
7.0 
133.0 
360.8 
69.4 
104.5 
846.0 
OOnly conservation of secondary energy carriers. 
'1n million tons of COz equivalent. 
Source: Author. 
recent study for the former USSR, carried out at  the Energy Research Insti- 
tute (Moscow) and sponsored by the Advanced International Studies Unit 
a t  Battelle, Pacific North West Laboratory, contains the technical and eco- 
nomic parameters for 120 aggregate measures t o  improve energy efficiency 
(Bashmakov and Chupyatov, 1992). This data base, together with more 
details on savings by energy carriers, was used in this paper. 
The aggregated structure of the potential for energy efficiency is pre- 
sented in Table 3. As far as the author knows, it is the first effort to  present 
energy efficiency potential in such a way. This approach allows us t o  iden- 
tify gaps in our knowledge of energy efficiency potential. For instance, sev- 
eral empty cells in Table 4 clearly display a lack of knowledge of energy 
efficiency improvement opportunities in the electricity and heat generation 
industries based on coal and petroleum, and in the agricultural sector. At 
the same time, this approach provides a very clear and systematic picture of 
the possible contribution of energy conservation to  the reduction of energy 
consumption by sectors and energy carriers. 
Only major, identified measures were included in the potential inven- 
tory and therefore are included in this table. However, even this relatively 
restricted vision of the potential provides an opportunity of saving 501 mil- 
lion tons of coal equivalent (tce) of secondary energy or 25.4% of primary 
energy consumption in the former USSR in 1990. According to  Makarov 
and Chupyatov (1992), Russia's share in this potential is 67-70% or approx- 
imately 350 million tce. 
Of course, not all this potential is cost effective for a l l  energy processes. 
The cost efficiency depends to  a high degree on energy prices and on such 
Table 4. Technological energy efficiency improvement potential in 1990- 
2005 in the  energy balance of the former Soviet Union in 1990a, in million 
tce. 
Other Elec- 
solid Nuc- tri- 
Coal fuels Oil Gas Hydro lear city Heat Total 
Indigenous production 425 811 964 28 79 2338 
Exports -2 3 -217 -215 -5 -370 
Imports 9 24 2 -35 
Stock changes -7 -7 -18 -32 
Primary energy 70.1 0 5 8 . 4 2 2 0  500.4 
consumptionb 404 30 611 823 28 79 -5 1971 
Electricity 89.9 89.9 
generation -80 -7 -27 -100 -28 -79 137 -185 
CHP plants - 8.5 23.8 
-70 -1 -80 -228 
District heating - 10 
-43 -7 -71 -118 
Own use - 12 - 7.2 - 20 30.1 10.1 79.4 
and losses -18 -32 -91 -49 -35 -226 
Final energy 49.6 51.2 76.3 45.6 66.3 288.8 
consumption 192 16 402 286 155 359 1409 
Industry 22.8 - 6.5 48.1 --- 28.4 36.8 142.6 
92 82 115 94 254 637 
Agriculture 3.3 3 - 0.6 0.4 7.3 
10 3 62 20 16 7 118 
Transport 
Residential and 26.8 - -  1.4 25.6 - 16.6 29.1 98.9 
commercial 85 13 17 89 33 95 331 
Non-energy use 5 85 59 148 
ONumerator = energy efficiency potential; denominator = energy consumption. 
b~otals  for secondary energy carriers. 
Source: Author. 
Table 5. Impact of energy prices and internal rate of return on the cost- 
efficiency of energy conservation measures in the former USSR, in million 
tce. 
Energy pricesa 
I R R ~  0.12 IRR = 0.5 Maximum 
1990 1991 1992 1992 potential 
Electricity and 
heat generation 130.9 130.9 132.2 130.9 132.2 
Energy sector 40.7 29.3 70.9 40.7 79.3 
Industrial sector , 134.5 121.5 149.6 134.0 149.6 
Residential and 
commercial 98.7 56.3 99.1 99.1 98.9 
Total 404.8 338.0 451.8 404.7 460.1 
Percentage of total 88.0 73.0 98.2 88.0 100.0 
- 
aUnder the assumption that  these real prices would last until 2005. 
Source: Author. 
capital budgeting rates as an internal rate of return (IRR). Previously in 
the former USSR, the normative IRR was equal to 12%. With this IRR and 
even a t  1990 energy prices nearly 90% of the potential is cost effective (see 
Table 5). However, cost-cutting investments were invisible in the process of 
central planning, and, as a result, in spite of the cost efficiency of the major 
part of the potential, very insignificant amounts of fixed investments were 
directed t o  the realization of energy efficiency measures. 
In new market conditions with high interest rates and a shortage of capi- 
tal, cost-cutting investments would be made with a shorter expected payback 
time: probably not more than two years or with IRR = 0.5. For mid-1992 
prices, even with IRR = 50%, 88% of the energy efficiency improvement 
investments are cost effective, and with IRR = 12%, almost 100% of energy 
efficiency projects could be economically justified. When energy prices ap- 
proach world prices all measures under consideration and many additional 
measures would be cost effective. 
As can be seen from Table 5, the energy sector and the residential and 
commercial sector are the most sensitive sectors t o  IRR and energy price 
fluctuations. Power and heat generation sectors are the least sensitive. It 
also means that  not all the relatively expensive possibilities for energy con- 
servation were identified in this sector. 
Table 6. Intermediate energy consumption by the energy complex in the 
former USSR in 1990, in million tce. 
Coal OSF Oil Gas Electr. Heat 
Coal 18.0 0.3 222.3 117.1 
Other solid fuels 20.0 1.3 
Oil 0.8 0.02 25.6 6.0 86.7 141.6 
Gas 1.3 4.0 86.2 215.6 243.1 
Electricity 3.0 0.01 10.0 4.4 30.2 1.5 
Heat 3.2 16.6 4.0 1 .O 10.0 
Total energy 
consumption 404.0 30.0 611.0 823.0 209.5 393.3 
Sources: Bashmakov et al. (1990); Bashmakov (1991, 1992); Narodnoye Khoziaistvo SSSR 
(1988, 1989); Sagers and Tretyakova (1988). 
2.2. Indirect technological energy conservation potential 
Only direct energy conservation potential was shown in Table 4. But there 
is an additional indirect one. The energy balance for any country could be 
presented in the following manner: 
where P E  = total energy consumption; F E  = final energy consumption; and 
A = I lad() ,  a matrix of coefficients, aij, where the energy carrier of type i is 
consumed to  produce and deliver one unit of energy carrier of type j. 
Data  for this matrix are shown in Table 6. This table was produced 
based on detailed information on energy consumption in the energy produc- 
tion and transformation sector split up according to  the processes and fuels 
used. Energy consumption and losses a t  various stages of production, trans- 
formation, enrichment, transportation (by pipeline), and distribution were 
included in the list of processes. For simplicity the name "energy complex" 
is used for all these processes. Thus this complex combines electricity, heat 
generation, and energy sector activities according to  the standard energy 
balances presentation in the OECD methodology. 
The row "coal" in Table 6 shows how much coal was used in 1990 by the 
energy complex to  produce, process, refine, transport, and distribute coal, 
other solid fuels, oil, natural gas, electricity, and heat. On the other hand, 
there is a need for petroleum, gas, electricity, and heat to  produce coal itself 
(see column "coal"). This table is a complete analog of a first quadrant in the 
input-output table. The data  for the former USSR are preliminary. More 
data  collection should be carried out t o  improve the accuracy of the results 
Table 7.  Direct coefficients of energy consumption by energy complex per 
unit of total energy consumption, in tceltce. 
Coal OSF Oil Gas Electr. Heat 
Coal 0.0289 0.01 0.9814 0.2680 
Other solid fuels 0.0955 0.0034 
Oil 0.0020 0.0005 0.0419 0.0073 0.4138 0.36 
Gas 0.0065 0.089 0.7409 0.544 
Electricity 0.0050 0.0003 0.0157 0.0052 0.1224 0.00373 
Heat 0.0077 0.0198 0.0047 0.0047 0.0173 
Sources: Calculations based on data from Table 6. 
presented. Nevertheless, the author believes that possible future corrections 
would not significantly change the numbers in Table 6, as well as the results 
achieved in this paper based on this primary information. 
The analogy with the input-output table leads to the calculation of 
matrix A by dividing elements of Table 6 by volumes of total primary energy 
consumption. There is one problem with computing these coefficients: part 
of the energy produced is exported. Therefore, energy used to  produce, 
transform, and deliver exported energy is not directly related to  primary 
energy consumption. This problem could be easily solved if energy export 
were to  be considered as a part of the final energy consumption. In this 
paper, we will not go into so much detail. 
The distribution of fuels to produce electricity and heat mirrors the 
real proportions in the 1990 energy balance of the former USSR under the 
proposal that  all electricity and heat should be produced by using fossil fuels. 
Table 7 displays direct coefficients. 
Knowing these data  and the volume of total primary energy consumption 
by fuel, it is possible t o  calculate how much of each different energy carrier 
would be needed by the energy complex to  transfer primary energy into 
secondary carriers t o  deliver it to  the final consumers: 
where EC is the energy consumption of the energy complex. 
The next step is a computation of the matrix of so-called "full" or "direct 
and indirect" coefficients, or, mathematically speaking, the matrix (E-A)-'. 
Using this matrix, total energy consumption could be presented as a function 
of final energy consumption: 
There are numerous possibilities for increasing energy efficiency in the 
energy complex of the former USSR. Calculations of the indirect effects of 
these measures should be viewed differently. The reason for this is that  any 
measure to improve energy efficiency in the energy complex has an impact 
on the values of direct coefficients or leads to  changes in the matrix A(A1). 
Therefore, correct calculations of the indirect effect should be carried out 
based on the new matrix: 
In this case indirect effects would be lower. Based on the distribution 
of measures by sector, fuel, and process in the energy complex (see Table 
4), matrix A' was estimated. Based on this new matrix, indirect energy 
conservation for all technological measures was estimated. The indirect effect 
of direct energy conservation by final energy consumers is that  the energy 
demand became lower by 49 million tce due to  improvements in the energy 
efficiency of processes in the energy complex. Without correcting matrix A, 
it would be overestimated. 
To supply a final consumer with a unit of coal, 0.11 units of energy 
would be consumed by the energy complex, and for electricity this ratio 
is 3.66, including 3.4 units of fossil fuel. This number is far above the 
normally calculated ratio for the amount of fossil fuel needed to  produce 
a unit of electricity with a given power generation efficiency (2.6:l for the 
former USSR). Therefore, because a more systematic approach is used, more 
complex, more correct, and more significant results were obtained: to  supply 
a unit of electricity to  the final consumer not 2.6 but 3.4 units of fossil fuel 
are needed, and to  produce a unit of heat not 1.3 but 1.52 units of fossil fuel 
are required. 
These da ta  show how much energy would be saved in the energy com- 
plex if a unit of secondary energy is saved by final consumers. This, in 
turn, means that  energy efficiency improvements in the utilization of any 
secondary energy resource by final consumers are always accompanied by 
significant additional or indirect energy savings in the energy complex. Nor- 
mally only calculations of partial indirect effects for electricity and heat are 
performed. 
Electricity is the first item in the list of total (direct plus indirect) en- 
ergy conservation effects produced by saving a unit of energy, followed, a t  
a significantly lower level, by heat, oil, natural gas, coal, and other solid 
fuels. A direct reduction in final energy consumption of d F E  is, therefore, 
accompanied by an indirect reduction equal to: 
Indirect energy savings appear as a result of structural changes in the en- 
ergy complex induced by technological changes. If the final consumer needs 
less electricity, all distribution and transportation losses and own electricity 
use by power plants related t o  the production and delivery of this unit t o  
the consumer would not appear, as well as all the energy embodied in and 
needed to  produce, transform, and deliver coal, oil, and natural gas t o  power 
plants t o  produce this unit of electricity. 
The indirect effect is very significant: generally speaking, any unit of 
energy saved by improving the energy efficiency of technologies is accompa- 
nied by an additional 0.69 units of energy savings [(250.4 + 96.4)/(288.7 + 
211.5) = 0.691 produced as a side effect of structural shifts caused by these 
improvements. 
Therefore, any improvement in energy efficiency by final consumers is 
accompanied by structural shifts in the energy complex and these struc- 
tural shifts bring an additional energy conservation effect with no extra 
cost. There is no need t o  spend any money t o  get this side effect. It comes 
automatically. While the  private investor benefits from the direct effect of 
any technological measure, society enjoys the side effects. This side effect 
calculation could be a basis for sharing the burden of energy efficiency im- 
provements between a private investor and society. 
The utilization of this approach could significantly change present esti- 
mates of the economic costs of energy conservation, as well as benefits. 
2.3. Total technological energy conservation potential 
The technological energy conservation potential for the former USSR de- 
scribed above was used t o  calculate the direct and indirect effects of iden- 
tified technological measures t o  improve energy efficiency. The potential is 
divided into two parts: 
energy efficiency improvements in the energy complex, and 
energy efficiency improvements by final consumers. 
Data  from Table 3 show that  the indirect effect is slightly higher than 
the direct one and the total effect is twice that  of the direct effect. In 
other words, the avemge costs of energy conservation measures for society 
are only half of those for the final consumer and the benefits are twice as 
large. Electricity and heat have higher indirect effects in terms of reduction 
of fossil fuel consumption than usually calculated based exclusively on the 
notion of efficiency of their generation. 
Similar calculations were made on the basis of the most recent input- 
outout table for the former USSR (Trelm, 1989). The 18-sector input-output 
table contains 4 energy industries: electric power, oil and gas, coal, and other 
fuels. All deliveries of energy t o  consumers are presented in Leontief's tables 
in monetary units. Therefore, there is no direct correspondence with data we 
used for the above calculations. These four sectors were aggregated into one 
energy sector. Then matrices of direct and full coefficients were estimated. 
According t o  these results, the full coefficient for the aggregated energy 
sector is equal t o  1.5. In other words, one unit of energy cost saved by the 
final consumer produces an additional 0.5 units of energy cost savings due 
t o  a reduction of energy consumption in the energy complex. 
Remembering that  electricity is much more expensive than fossil fuels, 
and that  oil is more expensive than coal and natural gas, the results in terms 
of physical units should not coincide with the results in terms of costs. Hence, 
it could be concluded that  the results produced by two different methods are 
very close. This gives the author additional confidence in stating that any 
unit of energy saved in the process of energy efficiency improvement, on 
average, is accompanied by an additional, free 0.7 units of energy saved in 
the energy sector. 
This general ratio could be applied when no information on the distribu- 
tion of energy conservation measures by type of energy carrier is available. 
In cases where this information does exist, more precise calculations based 
on matrix A could be done. 
Total energy conservation potential in terms of primary energy does not 
include reduction of secondary energy carriers - electricity and heat - be- 
cause of double counting. If calculated traditionally (taking into account 
only the efficiency of electricity and heat generation) it would be equal t o  
619 million tce. Based on the approach presented in this paper, this poten- 
tial equals 672 million tce (the first 4 cells in the "total" column of Table 
3). Including 3 million tce in the reduction in transport energy consump- 
tion caused by reduced energy resources transportation as a result of direct 
and indirect effects of the implementation of the technological potential, the 
total primary energy consumption reduction effect of energy efficiency im- 
provements up t o  the year 2005 equals 675 million tce or 34% of the energy 
consumption in the former USSR in 1990. 
The Russian share of this potential is approximately 70%, or 473 million 
tce. The GHG emission reduction calculated based on data  on direct and 
indirect coefficients equals 1,845 million tons C 0 2 .  If the Russian share is 
again 70%, then the GHG reduction potential through energy efficiency in 
Russia is 1,290 million tons COz, or 42% of the 1990 level of emission. 
2.4. Structural changes in the economy and energy 
efficiency improvements 
The process of transformation to  a market economy could not be successful if 
the old structure of the economy is preserved. Structural changes are neces- 
sary. The economy could be structured in many different ways, and changes 
in these structures would directly or indirectly affect overall energy efficiency. 
Only two kinds of impacts from structural changes are investigated here: 
a change of final product structure, and 
a changes of several basic materials' intensities. 
To estimate possible effects of structural changes on energy intensity and 
energy consumption, a set of calculations based on the 1988 input-output 
table was implemented. The 1988 input-output table contains four energy 
industries: electrical power, oil and gas, coal, and other fuels. It  creates 
some difficulties in implementing calculations, because oil and gas are not 
separated. To transfer results from monetary to  physical units, the following 
procedure was applied: monetary values were divided by physical units taken 
from the energy balance for 1988 (see Table 4). Average prices were obtained 
as a result of this procedure. These prices were very close to  real prices (see 
Table 6). This gives the  author more confidence in the reliability of the 
calculation results. 
The effects of four different measures were estimated: 
1. Reduction of capital investments in 1988 by one third. 
2. Complete elimination of losses. (It is, of course, an extreme case, be- 
cause this item in the input-output table includes terminated construc- 
tion projects, abandoned dry oil and gas wells, and accidental losses of 
livestock. These losses are not avoidable completely.) 
3. Reduction of military purchases by two-thirds. [In the 1988 input- 
output table there is an  item in the final demand called "other users" 
which lists deliveries to  the military including delivery of arms and 
weapons. These da ta  have never been published in the former USSR 
before (Trelm, 1989)l. 
4. Military research and development, as well as current expenditures on 
military end products (e.g., ammunition, fuel), is included in public 
Table 8. Impacts of structural changes on energy consumption in the former 
USSRa, in million tce. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Electricity 19.5 21.7 28.4 35.8 40.0 
Oil and gas 122.6 137.9 183.8 219.8 243.2 
Coal 24.8 27.2 35.1 47.3 58.7 
Other fuels 2.4 2.8 3.4 4.5 4.8 
Total 169.3 188.2 250.7 307.4 346.7 
1 = Reduction of capital investments in 1988 by one-third. 
2 = Complete elimination of losses. 
3 = Reduction of military purchases by two-thirds. 
4 = Reduction of public consumption by 20% (to mirror the reduction of military spending 
and the reduction of over-consumption by the bureaucratic apparatus). 
5 = Reduction by 10% of ferrous and non-ferrous metals and building materials intensities 
in all branches of the economy as a result of better management and equipment mainte- 
nance, and more rational utilization of these materials. 
OEach column shows the  cumulative reduction of energy consumption including previous 
measures. The  1988 input-output table was used t o  calculate the reduction of energy 
production: energy export was held constant, therefore, all reductions were attributed to  
energy consumption. 
Source: Author. 
consumption. This component of final demand was reduced by 20% to  
mirror the reduction in military spending and the reduction in over- 
consumption by the bureaucratic apparatus. 
5. Reduction by 10% of ferrous and non-ferrous metals and building ma- 
terials intensities in all branches of the economy as a result of better 
management and equipment maintenance, and more rational utilization 
of these materials. 
One important feature of all these experiments is keeping personal con- 
sumption constant. In other words, these structural changes bring about 
changes in value-added or national income, and other economic indicators, 
but not in private consumption. 
The results are shown in Table 8. There are two major structural changes 
which could bring significant economic benefits: a reduction in the  invest- 
ment intensity of the  economy (169 million tce) and its demilitarization 
(another 110 million tce). The total reduction due to  the implementation 
of all 5 measures is 340 million tce or 305 million tce in terms of primary 
energy consumption. This is more than the annual energy consumption in 
Germany. 
The effects of structural changes come a t  no cost as a side effect of 
programs t o  improve the overall efficiency of the economy. Of course, these 
programs are not free from expenses, but it is very difficult to attribute any 
of these investments to  energy efficiency improvements directly. 
If private consumption were to  grow, say, by 10% in 1990-2005 with 
preservation of the existing structure of the economy, the structural energy 
conservation potential would also be larger than in 1990 by 10% or would 
be equal to  374 million tce (335 million tce in terms of primary energy). 
The total potential for energy efficiency improvements in the former 
USSR in 2005 includes 675 million tce of technological potential (direct and 
indirect contributions t o  primary energy reduction) and 335 million tce of 
structural potential. Altogether it is 1,020 million tce in the year 2005, or  
51 % of the 1990 level of the primary energy consumption of the former USSR 
and 8% of world energy consumption. The Russian share of this potential 
is 710 million tce, equivalent to  56% of the primary energy consumption in 
Russia in 1990. 
3. Costs of Energy Conservation Programs 
The existence of energy conservation potential is a necessary but not suffi- 
cient condition for the realization of energy efficiency programs. In a market 
economy, implementation of these measures should be cost effective. There- 
fore, the costs of energy conservation programs should be considered and 
compared with costs of equivalent energy services provided by the increas- 
ing energy supply. The cheapest ways to  deliver energy services t o  final 
consumers should be realized. 
Several important points should be mentioned before costs are discussed: 
1. Costs could be attributed only t o  direct energy improvement projects: 
indirect energy conservation and contributions from structural changes 
are free. 
2. Only net costs should be considered. In other words, the difference be- 
tween the investment costs of efficient equipment and the regular equip- 
ment is attributed t o  the difference in energy consumption of these two 
types of equipment. The efficient equipment may cost less than the  
regular equipment, therefore, negative investment costs are possible. 
3. Some technological measures are implemented for reasons not directly 
related to  energy efficiency improvements. For example, the extensive 
application of continuous steel casting and construction of quality high- 
ways are mainly justified by non-energy considerations. These measures 
could be classified as accompanying measures and have zero cost because 
investments are not solely prescribed on the basis of energy savings. 
4. Some dedicated energy efficiency improvements have additional benefits 
in terms of higher productivity of other factors. These effects are not 
included in the considerations. 
5. The method of measuring energy conservation should be specified. Re- 
sults could be monitored in terms of secondary energy or primary energy, 
including direct only or also indirect effects. 
6. Investments in energy efficiency would be made by private and commer- 
cial enterprises, and therefore a demand for payback over not more than 
two years would be expected. 
7. The limitations of manufacturing industry in producing more energy- 
efficient equipment and the limitations of consumers in replacing regu- 
lar equipment ahead of its lifetime by energy-efficient equipment were 
already considered in the process of technological potential estimation. 
Costs of energy conservation measures are shown in Figure 1. All 120 
measures were rated according to the value of investments per unit or pri- 
mary energy saved (when transition from secondary to primary energy con- 
servation is made only on the basis of electricity- and heat-generation ef- 
ficiency). If a different method for the estimation of energy consumption 
reduction from the same variety of measures is applied, the sequence of 
measures arranged by level of costs, of course, could change. 
The curve for total primary energy efficiency mirrors the additional effect 
from structural changes in the energy sector. As mentioned earlier, this effect 
occurs automatically and costs nothing. The relationship between specific 
investments per unit of direct primary energy conservation and total primary 
energy conservation is shown in Figure 2. Several declines on this curve occur 
because of the changing ranges of measures: measures with electricity and 
heat conservation receive a higher ranking. Generally speaking, there is a 
16% cost premium compared with the traditional way of cost estimation. 
It was shown that the largest potential for improving utilization effi- 
ciency exists for natural gas. According to  Gandkin and Shamis (1991), 
in 2005 specific investments to produce and deliver natural gas to  the fi- 
nal consumers would cost 300 rubles(l990)/tce or 7,500-9,000 rubles (mid- 
1992)Itce. More than 92% of the total technological conservation potential 
is less capital intensive than additional production of natural gas. 
If only this part of the potential is considered and results for the former 
USSR were to  be extrapolated for Russia, the following conclusions from the 
analysis of energy efficiency improvement capital costs could be made: 
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Figure 1. Costs of energy conservation in the former USSR: 1990-2005. 
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Figure 2. Energy conservation costs, total versus direct. 
430 million tce/year could be saved up to the year 2005 with specific 
capital investments less than 7,500-9,000 rubles (1992)/tce/year or $38- 
45/tce/year (using a 200:l ruble to dollar exchange rate). 
The total amount of investments needed for the whole potential realiza- 
tion equals 720-860 billion rubles at 1992 prices or $3.6-4.3 billion. 
The average direct investment cost of 1 tce/year of primary energy saved 
equals 1,830-2,200 (1990) rubles or $9-1 1 and the corresponding average 
total costs are 1,600-1,900 rubles and $8-10. 
The energy conservation potential in Russia and the former USSR is 
not only the largest in the world, but also the cheapest one. Russia is 
Saudi Arabia in the energy efficiency area. If a 20% discount rate is 
applied and the average lifetime of energy conservation measures equals 
10 years, an average annualized cost of a barrel of oil equivalent saved 
in Russia is only 40 cents. 
With $4 billion, GHG emissions equal to 1,290 of C 0 2  equivalent could 
be mitigated in Russia, that is, at the specific investment cost of $3/t C02 .  
It seems very difficult to find any other country with such a large and such a 
cheap GHG conservation potential and with a relatively well-educated labor 
force capable of developing and realizing programs to capture this potential. 
4. Benefits of Energy Conservation Programs 
4.1. Economic benefits from energy conservation 
While the costs of energy efficiency improvement projects are attributable 
only to the direct technological energy conservation measures, benefits are 
attributable to both direct and indirect effects, as well as to structural change 
effects. Benefits from the latter are not considered here. 
Energy efficiency improvements bring multiple economic benefits: 
reduction of energy bills for consumers; 
reduction of costs to provide the necessary amounts of energy services; 
reduction of pressure on the natural resources base; 
reduction of investments in the energy complex; 
reduction of investments in environmental protection due to a reduction 
of energy-related pollution; 
growth of the competitiveness of Russian goods and services on the in- 
ternational markets due to the reduction of production costs; 
growth of energy export potential without an increase in energy produc- 
tion; 
liberalization of investment and export revenue resources to  increase the 
volume of consumer goods and services production, as well as residential 
building construction. 
It has already been mentioned that 88% of the technological potential 
would be cost effective with a new set of energy prices, even within a two-year 
payback period. Therefore, energy consumers would gain substantially from 
investments in energy efficiency improvement projects. The total economic 
effect for consumers calculated as the difference between the costs of energy 
saved and the annualized costs of energy efficiency improvement measures in 
2005 equals 1,050-1,269 billion (1990) rubleslyear, or $5.3-6.3 billion/year. 
While 430 million tce of primary energy would be saved, construction 
of 590 million tce of production capacity in the energy complex would be 
unnecessary. Coal production could be 200 million tons lower compared with 
the base case, with no effort in the energy efficiency direction, oil production 
could be 65 million tons lower, and natural gas production 218 billion m3 
lower. 
Electricity generation would be 395 billion k w h  lower in 2005. With 
an average utilization of 5,600 hours per year, this means that construction 
of 75 G W  of new power-generation capacity would be unnecessary, which 
would cost not less than 1,500 billion rubles at  1992 prices. 
Investments in the realization of the whole cost-effective technological 
potential for energy efficiency improvements in Russia would cost 720-860 
billion rubles a t  mid-1992 prices, but would save not less than 5,250 billion 
rubles of investments in the energy complex in 1990-2005. Annual invest- 
ments in the energy supply could be twice as low relative to  the sum of 
industrial investments as they were in the late 1980s. 
If technological energy conservation potential were to  be realized com- 
pletely by equal increases over the next 15 years, then the cumulative coal, 
oil, and natural gas consumption in the next 15 years would be correspond- 
ingly lower: by 1.6 billion tons, 525 million tons, and 1,750 billion m3, 
respectively. More fuel would be available for future generations a t  a much 
lower cost. 
Another alternative is to  maintain the level of energy production and 
to  export unused coal, oil, and gas abroad. The additional volume of fu- 
els available for export would be 200 million tons of coal, 60 million tons 
of oil, and 200 billion m3 of natural gas. These volumes are so large that  
international energy markets would probably be unable to absorb them com- 
pletely. Therefore, some rational combination of both approaches should be 
implemented. 
4.2. Social benefits 
The social benefits of energy conservation are numerous: a higher level of 
employment; higher standards of living; better working and environmental 
conditions and therefore better health; and a lower share of the labor force 
working in dangerous conditions in deep coal mines or in the extremely severe 
climate conditions of Siberia on oil and gas wells and pipeline construction, 
etc. Only the first two benefits are considered here in more detail. 
Every ruble invested in the production of energy efficiency equipment 
produces throughout the economy five times more jobs than a ruble invested 
in electricity generation and seven times more than a ruble invested in the 
oil and gas industry. Therefore, 720-860 billion rubles invested in energy 
will create as many jobs as 5,250 billion rubles invested in energy supply. 
If some part of the investments released were to go into light industry, 
the food industry, and residential buildings construction, it would simulta- 
neously create more jobs and increase the production of consumer goods, 
and as a result increase the level of well-being for the Russian population. 
The difference between 720-860 and 5,250 billion rubles of investment 
equals 40% of the total capital accumulated in residential buildings. In other 
words, it is energy efficiency which could release the necessary resources t o  
substantially improve present living conditions for the Russian population. 
4.3. Environmental benefits of energy efficiency 
improvements 
In the former USSR, economic growth with constant emphasis on production 
over efficiency led t o  the transformation of the formerly beautiful country 
into "toxic wasteland" ( US News and World Report, 1992). Improvements in 
energy efficiency provide the cheapest and the most effective way of stopping 
further environmental degradation. 
Reductions in the emission of different air pollutants and greenhouse 
gases were estimated (see Figure 3). The parameters of emission obtained 
in the process of collating the greenhouse gas emission inventory were used 
for direct greenhouse gas emission reduction estimates [COz, CO, NO,, and 
CH4 (Bashmakov, 1992)l. The realization of energy efficiency improvements 
would lead to  the reduction of COz emissions by 37%, of CO by 29%, of 
CH4 by 37%, and of NO, by 36%. Approximately a 14% reduction in ash 
emission and a 28% reduction in SO2 could be achieved through energy 
efficiency improvements. Including indirect effects, GHG emission reduction 
would reach 42%. 
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Figure 3. Ecological benefits of energy efficiency improvements; reduction 
in 2005 relative to  1990 (only due t o  technological energy conservation). 
In addition to  the substantial reduction of air pollution, much less land 
and water would be poisoned by energy supply enterprises, much less dam- 
age to  wildlife and nature would occur as a result of lower coal, oil, gas, 
electricity, and heat production and long-distance transportation, and there 
would be a much lower risk of another Chernobyl-type nuclear disaster if 
aggressive policies on electricity conservation were t o  be implemented and 
unsafe nuclear reactors were allowed to  shut down. 
Environmental benefits are directly related t o  economic benefits. Ac- 
cording t o  A. Styrikovich, t o  reduce SOz emissions to  permitted levels would 
cost 1,500 billion (1992) rubles (Energy, Economy, Ecology, 1991). According 
t o  the former Soviet Minister of Ecology, N. Vorontsov, every year economic 
losses from soil, water, and air pollution cost 2,550 billion (1991) rubles 
(Vorontsov, 1991). Energy efficiency improvements could reduce these eco- 
nomic losses by 20-30% with no special investments. This also means that  
720-860 billion rubles of investment in energy efficiency would replace not 
only 5,250 million rubles in energy supply, but also 1,500-2,000 billion rubles 
spent in the reduction of the level of pollution. With this effect taken into 
consideration the score in the competition for investments is 8:l in favor of 
energy efficiency. 
The Russian share of air pollution is approximately 65-80% (depending 
on the kind of pollution) of that of the former USSR. The reduction of emis- 
sions in terms of percentages is very similar t o  the former USSR numbers, but 
the reduction of pollution from oil and gas production and transportation - 
oil spills, methane leakages, gas flaring, pipeline breaks, and the like - would 
appear mainly in Russia. It is energy efficiency improvements which will 
allow Russians t o  breathe fresh air, drink clean water, and enjoy beautiful 
nature. 
The threat of global warming stresses the responsibility of the Russian 
energy complex, not only for local environmental degradation but also for 
global climate change. The importance of environmental interdependence is 
now recognized around the world. In the process of negotiating international 
environmental treaties, governments should take actions locally, as well as 
internationally, to  achieve globally desired results in reducing greenhouse 
gases with minimal global costs. Full implementation of the wide range of 
technological measures available t o  improve energy efficiency in Russia alone 
with very low costs could directly reduce COz emissions by 1,290 million tons 
in the year 2005. Even if only half of this potential were t o  be realized it 
would equal 20% of the 1990 GHG emissions in Russia and would neutralize 
the trend toward growth of GHG emissions after the recovery of the Russian 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
An ongoing growth of fossil fuel consumption in many countries leads to  
further degradation of the environment and in particular the atmosphere. A 
reduction in the energy intensity of the economy and a decrease in the fuel 
share (especially coal) of the energy balance are the most efficient ways of 
improving the negative tendency. 
During the last 20 years, a transition to a post-industrial society started 
in the USA, Germany, Japan, and some other countries, and fuel consump- 
tion per GNP unit decreased on average by 1-2% per year. At least 50% of 
this reduction was due to  structural changes in the economy. In the countries 
where industrialization is in progress, the energy intensity decreased much 
more slowly and the effect of the structural factor was not so profound, but it 
should be enhanced later on (Kononov et al., 1992). However, the processes 
of structural change and the reduction of the energy intensity of the economy 
occur more slowly everywhere than the local and global degradation of the 
environment. Therefore, there is an urgent necessity to introduce constraints 
on atmospheric pollution or make them more strict. These constraints will 
affect the future evolution of energy consumption and production, as well as 
economic development. 
The present paper analyzes some direct and indirect energylenvironment 
relations in the conditions formed in the territory of the former USSR. Quan- 
titative manifestations of these relations will naturally be different for indi- 
vidual countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but 
the qualitative results of the analysis will obviously be common. This is 
especially true for Russia whose share of GNP in 1990 accounted for 57% 
and whose resource consumption accounted for 64% in the total resource 
consumption of the USSR, with an approximately identical economy and 
energy structure in both countries. 
Cost estimates given below correspond to  prices in the early 1990s when 
the  real exchange rate between dollars and rubles was about 0.8-1.1.l 
2. Peculiarities in the Development of the CIS 
Economy and Their Effect on Air Pollution 
The USSR economy in the late 1980s corresponded to  the US level in the  
late 1960s and early 1970s in the main technoeconomic and structural char- 
acteristics, i.e., it was a t  the stage of completion of industrialization. This 
is evidenced by the GNP structure, in which the share of non-service sectors 
is higher than in the USA, almost twofold (The Economy and Life, 1990): 
USSR (1989) 
GNP 100 
Industry 32 
Agriculture 18 
Construction 10 
Transport and communication 6 
Trade 12 
Services 22 
USA (1987) 
100 
2 1 
2 
5 
9 
16 
47 
In the economic structure of Russia and many other CIS countries 
energy-intensive and environmentally harmful industries and production pre- 
vail. The following figures give an idea of the comparative adverse effect of 
different industries on the  atmosphere from the viewpoint of the emission of 
greenhouse gases.2 
COz emissions per 
unit of output (%) 
Machine building 100 
Chemistry 525 
Metallurgy 835 
Agriculture 295 
Construction 145 
Transport and communication 855 
Trade 50 
Due t o  high inertia and low efficiency, the USSR economic structure 
changed slowly and had a weak effect on the dynamics of its energy intensity 
'These figures were obtained using the available estimations of Soviet GNP in both 
currencies developed by Soviet and American experts. The same dollar/ruble ratio gives 
the total cost of Soviet exports and imports. 
'The estimates are given for the conditions in Russia in 1990 accounting for the fuel 
and electricity intensity of products and the structure of energy consumption in industries. 
(Kononov, 1990a). Consumption of primary energy per GNP unit in 1990 in 
the USSR was approximately 2.2 times higher than in the USA and 3 times 
higher than in Western Europe and Japan. 
The peculiarities of the economy indicated here predetermine a suffi- 
ciently high level of atmospheric pollution. In 1990 stationary plants in the 
USSR territory released 56 million tons of pollutants in which there were 12 
million tons of solid particles, 16 million tons of SO2, 5 million tons of NO,, 
13 million tons of CO, and 10 million tons of hydrocarbons (Statistical An- 
nual on the Soviet Economy, 1991). Emissions from motor cars accounted 
for about 35% of the  total emissions for the country and were only 1.6-1.8 
times lower than in the USA, although the number of cars in the USSR is 
10 times less. 
Harmful gaseous emissions per GNP unit in the USSR and Russia are 
approximately 2.4-2.7 times higher than in the USA and emissions of C 0 2  
are 2.3-2.5 times higher. The rates of pollution reduction in the CIS are 
lower than those in the developed countries. 
Progress toward a market economy including an increase in economic 
efficiency and acceleration of economic restructuring can change this picture. 
However, history provides no clear precedents for the transformations which 
are to  occur in the CIS. Even with the assumption that  this transition will be 
free from catastrophic disasters, difficulties abound in establishing a "most 
likely" case. 
The possible effects of three variants of the development of energy and 
the economy in the CIS on atmospheric pollution are considered below. 
The first (pessimistic) scenario is characterized by the most durable eco- 
nomic crisis and relatively slow rates of subsequent development of the na- 
tional economy. The levels of nuclear energy development and oil and gas 
production in this variant are minimal. According to  the second (optimistic) 
scenario, the economic reforms are more successfully realized and the eco- 
nomic growth rates are almost twice as high as in the first scenario. The 
third (maximal) scenario suggests active participation of foreign capital with 
intensive introduction of new technologies, more successful conversion of mil- 
itary industries, and more active and efficient foreign trade. All these factors 
would provide approximately 3.3% of the mean annual growth rates of the 
GNP between 1991-2010. 
Differences between the scenarios on fuel and energy consumption are 
much less than for the GNP value. The energy intensity of the economy is 
inversely proportional t o  the rates of economic growth and introduction of 
the  economic mechanism. This is explained by the fact that  the increased 
Table 1. Three scenarios of economic development and energy use. 
Scenarios 
1 (pessimistic) 2 (optimistic) 3 (maximum) 
GNP 125 170 190 
EnergyIGNP ratio 93 74 70 
Primary energy consumption 116 126 133 
Production 
Electricity 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Coal 
Nuclear 
Emissions 
co2 
NO, 
SO? 
economic growth rates promote the updating of technologies and the de- 
velopment of new production with low energy intensity, and the  market 
mechanisms stimulate energy conservation. 
According t o  calculations, emissions of NO,, SO2 and other harmful 
substances will be reduced in all the scenarios and emissions of greenhouse 
gases will grow. Emissions of C 0 2  by 2010 will exceed the level of 1990 by 
approximately 2.5% according to the pessimistic scenario, by 8% according 
t o  the  optimistic scenario and by 15% according t o  the maximal scenario 
(Table 1). 
3. Macroeconomic Effects of More Strict 
Environmental Constraints 
Large-scale changes in the national environmental protection policy can 
change the prices of energy and other commodities and influence the de- 
velopment of many sectors of the economy, as well as the capital and labor 
markets. 
In a simplified form these direct and feedback effects of carbon emissions 
reduction strategies are shown in Figure 1. These strategies may require 
capital investment in energy conservation or the development of new energy 
sources, above the base scenarios, which may lead t o  the additional pro- 
duction of specialized energy equipment, construction and other materials, 
and the development of an infrastructure. This in turn will require further 
use of labor, material, and energy resources. The equipment and materials 
required can be imported, but to  increase exports t o  compensate for this it 
will be necessary to  expand output, requiring additional capital investment 
and energy. 
The cumulative effect of changes in energy development on the con- 
sumption of goods and services, prices, and the state of the  environment 
is depicted by the quality of life. The dynamics of this index compared 
with the Base Case could determine social costs and be used as a criterion 
of the relative efficiency of the considered strategy. However, the problem 
of its quantitative estimation has yet t o  be solved. Therefore, the varia- 
tion in consumption during the specified period, taking into account certain 
environmental requirements, is more likely be used as such a criterion. 
The feedback effects of energy development alternatives on economic 
growth rates and energy consumption is non-linear in character and its slope 
largely depends on the  conditions of national economic development, the  
rates of growth, the balance of investments, economic flexibility, and so 
forth. 
A method for the analysis. Estimation of the possible change of final con- 
sumption and other macroeconomic indices require sequential solution of the  
following problems: 
1. Identification of the possible and most efficient methods for reducing 
coz. 
2. Determination of the impact of these methods on the development of 
the energy supply system (ESS) and its capital intensity. In this case 
one should take into account corresponding changes in the pollution of 
the  environment with ash, sulfur, nitrogen oxides and other harmful 
components. 
3. Determination of the impact of the above changes on the production 
structure of the national economy and macroeconomic indices. 
The first problem is solved by simple comparison of the possible alterna- 
tives. Dependence of their comparative efficiency on the scales of application 
is also taken into account. 
The second problem can be solved using the known simulation and opti- 
mization models of the  ESS that  take into account the energylenvironment 
relations. 
A simulation system of models, MAKROEN, has been developed in the 
Siberian Energy Institute for solving the third problem (Kononov, 1990b). 
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Figure 1. Impact of carbon emissions control strategies on energy pro- 
duction and the social sphere. Key: t- direct impact; t- - - indirect 
(feedback) impact. 
Table 2. Characteristics of some C 0 2  emission reduction strategiesSa 
Maximal possible Net marginal 
decrease, mill.tons capital cost 
C/year rubles/t-C 
Substitution of gas for coal 40-75 360-580 
Replacement of fuel-fired 
power plants by: 
Hydropower 
Nuclear power 
Solar photovoltaic power 
Additional energy conservation: 
Moderate 50-100 
Large 150-200 
Maximal 250-300 
"In addition to base scenarios. 
Its main element is the dynamic macroeconomic model MIDL. It  takes into 
account intersectoral relations and maximizes the private and governmental 
consumption within the given constraints on the development of individual 
branches, on the structure of a final product and labor resources. 
Capital costs of C02 reduction. Emissions of C 0 2  can be reduced by four 
main methods: (1) energy conservation; (2) substitution of coal by gas a t  
the power and boiler plants; (3) substitution of fossil fuel by nuclear energy 
or renewable energy sources; and (4) cleaning waste gases to  remove COz. 
Table 2 presents the capital intensity of these methods applied in addi- 
tion t o  the base scenarios. 
The analysis shows that even under the most favorable conditions the 
installed capacity of hydro- and solar power plants can hardly be increased 
by 10-13 million kW by the year 2010, and thus cannot reduce C 0 2  emission 
by more than 9-12 million t-C. Rapid development of nuclear energy might 
have yielded a larger effect at  a lesser cost: but even with a positive attitude 
from the population to  nuclear energy hardly more than another 35 million 
kW can be commissioned. 
The case scenarios envisage very high rates of gas industry development. 
Therefore, gas production by 2010 will increase by more than 100-200 billion 
m3. This would allow C 0 2  emissions to  be reduced by 40-75 million t-C, 
but would increase the danger of increased emission of another greenhouse 
gas - methane. According to  our estimates, its leakages from the Russian 
Table 3. Capital investment to  cut C 0 2  emission by 20% (billion rubles). 
Scenarios 
Structure 1 2 3 
Direct investment 
Energy conservation 240 372 863 
Energy supply -82 -117 -183 
NO, and SO2 reduction -14 -17 -20 
Indirect investment 
Energy conservation 
Energy supply 
Total investment 160 289 827 
gas supply system (including wells and distribution networks) exceed 3-4% 
of total gas production. 
Energy conservation is the most large-scale and efficient method of re- 
ducing C 0 2  emissions, but only t o  a certain extent. 
Each particular condition has its own optimal level of energy conser- 
vation. In excess, the additional direct and indirect capital investments in 
energy conservation measures can overlap the saving of investments in the 
energy supply system and related branches, as well as in measures t o  reduce 
environmental pollution by ash, sulfur, and nitrogen oxides. 
The base scenarios already incorporate the implementation of the cheap- 
est methods of energy conservation by the year 2010. Further reduction of 
C 0 2  emissions requires more costly energy conservation measures among 
which the thermal insulation of buildings and reduction of losses in the heat 
supply system play an important role. As the scale of energy conservation 
increases, its cost grows exponentially. At the same time the cheaper fuel 
is saved. This causes a nonlinear dependence of the total additional capital 
investments in energy saving, the ESS and related branches on the scale of 
the required reduction of C 0 2  emissions (see Table 3). 
Calculations have shown that  a 10% reduction in C 0 2  emissions by the 
year 2010 compared with 1990 will require an  additional 50 billion rubles t o  
be invested in the national economy in conditions of slow development, and 
70-110 billion rubles a t  higher rates of development. For a 20% reduction 
in emissions the figures increase 3-8 times and exceed the total capital in- 
vestments in energy supply and energy conservation envisaged in the base 
scenarios by 30-60%. In this case considerable capital investments would 
be required in the near future to  extend the production of energy-saving 
equipment and the required materials. 
Adaptation to  a deficit of capital investments in the existing economy 
is realized by changing the production structure, increasing the share of 
accumulation in the national income, and reducing private and government 
consumption. 
Macroeconomic costs of C02 reduction. Negative consequences for the econ- 
omy and society due t o  the introduction of constraints on C 0 2  emissions 
grow nonlinearly as these constraints become more strict, as follows from 
the  figures below. 
Reduction of C 0 2  (mill. tons) 100 200 300 
Losses from consumption fund 
during the period (rubleslt-C) 150-250 400-600 1,300 -1,800 
Lower figures correspond t o  the scenarios with more efficient develop- 
ment of the national economy. 
With increased rates of economic development the situation becomes 
more flexible and can be more easily adapted to the capital investment 
deficit. However, energy demand and COz emission grow simultaneously. 
Therefore, it is difficult to  realize the requirement t o  reduce emissions t o  
a certain level (by the same percent compared t o  1990) at  higher rates of 
economic growth and this results in serious negative consequences for the  
society. 
Figure 2 shows that  a 20% reduction in C02 emission can result in a 5% 
reduction in private and government consumption in the pessimistic scenario, 
an  8% reduction in the  optimistic scenario, and almost a 20% reduction in 
the  maximal scenario. 
4. Conclusions 
Among different technical measures, energy conservation is the  most effective 
way t o  bring about a large-scale decrease in carbon and other emissions from 
fossil fuels. Even this, however, would require large capital investment and 
might influence the economic welfare of the population. 
High rates of economic growth and the successful solution of environ- 
mental problems can be achieved only with deep structural shifts in the  
Russian economy: and the more strict the requirements for environmental 
quality, the faster the transition to  a post-industrial society has t o  be. This 
in turn requires acceleration of economic reforms and development of the  
market mechanisms in Russia. 
CO, decrease, % 
Figure 2. Impact of C 0 2  emission limits on final consumption of goods and 
services. Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are for GNP growth rates of 1.1%, 2.1%, and 
3.3%, respectively. 
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Abstract 
Energy efficiency improvement and fuel substitution by low C 0 2  emission 
and non-fossil fuel are the major technical strategy for reducing C 0 2  emis- 
sion. This paper introduces the potential for energy efficiency improvement 
in three energy-intensive sectors on the energy demand side - iron and steel, 
synthetic ammonia, cement - and possible ways of improving both energy 
conversion efficiency and energy substitution on the energy supply side. A 
dynamic optimization model of energy system technology options (ESTOM) 
is then established to study future energy systems' technology options and 
make a corresponding macro-economic assessment. Five scenarios of energy 
system development are studied, and the results show the primary energy 
composition, electricity composition, C 0 2  emission, technology choices of 
energy conservation, etc., in the target year of 2030. The costs of reducing 
C 0 2  emission in different ways are roughly estimated from the results. 
Key words: energy efficiency, energy substitution, energy composition, 
C 0 2  emission, technology options, scenarios, costs. 
1. Technological Options for Reducing 
Energy-relat ed C02 Emission in China's 
Energy System 
Under the prerequisite that the future final energy demand is guaranteed, the 
energy system's major technical strategy for reducing C 0 2  emission could 
cover two aspects. First, improving energy conversion and end-use efficiency, 
thus reducing losses in energy conversion and processing. Second, adopting 
a switch in fuel, developing fossil fuels with a low amount of C 0 2  emissions 
(e.g., natural gas) and non-fossil fuel, as well as renewable energy with no 
C 0 2  emission, to  replace coal which has a high amount of C 0 2  emissions. 
1.1. Energy demand side 
Final energy demand in the industrial sector accounted for nearly 70% of 
the total final energy consumption in recent years, and the iron and steel, 
chemical, building material manufacturing subsectors, etc., are the big en- 
ergy consumers yielding energy-intensive products such as steel, synthetic 
ammonia, cement, etc. So technologies which aim to improve energy ef- 
ficiency in these sectors are of significance for economic development and 
environmental protection. 
Iron and steel 
Iron and steel production is the largest energy consumer of all the industrial 
subsectors. Annual steel production in 1990 amounted to 66 million tons. 
Integrated energy consumption per ton of steel is 0.84-0.98 toe. China's av- 
erage energy consumption per ton of steel is 0.27 toe higher than Japan's (in 
Japan's accounting method), that of China's large iron and steel enterprises 
is 0.16 toe higher than the Japanese value. The reasons are: 
Low share of fine material in raw material and fuel for iron and steel 
smelting. 
The majority of the fuel mix is coal. 
High ironlsteel ratio in product composition. 
Bad recovery of waste energy. 
Backward management. 
If proper measures for improvement were employed in the above factors, 
the comparable energy consumption per ton of steel would decline by 0.17 
toe up to  the year 2000, and decline by 0.25 toe up to  the year 2030, which 
is close to the advanced level existing in Japan in the 1980s. 
Synthetic ammonia 
Chemical engineering is the second largest energy consumer in industry, 
and ammonia is the major energy-intensive product. The current annual 
production level is around 20 million tons, 114 of which is produced by large 
firms, the other 314 by medium and small ones. The two different kinds 
of enterprises have different scales as well as different raw materials. Large 
enterprises use natural gas or oil, whereas medium and small ones mainly use 
coal as the raw material. Due to the different raw material and processing 
techniques, the energy consumption per ton of ammonia in medium and 
small enterprises is 60-70% higher than that of large ones. 
In recent years, the energy consumption of ammonia production has been 
rising slightly rather than falling. The reason lies in the rapid development 
of local enterprises, in particular, most of them are small ones. Out of all 
the enterprises, small ones have the biggest energy consumption. Therefore, 
with the rise of the share of small enterprises, the nation's average energy 
consumption of ammonia has gone up slightly. 
In order to  guarantee the food supply of China's increasing, huge popu- 
lation, agricultural production always plays an important role: the demand 
for chemical fertilizer will keep rising. Limited by the shortage of oil and 
natural gas, the pattern of using coal as the major raw material for synthetic 
ammonia will not change substantially. Besides, large numbers of medium 
and small enterprises will retain their significant share. Therefore, arduous 
work should be done to decrease the energy consumption of synthetic ammo- 
nia production. The main measures could include improving the production 
techniques of small-sized, synthetic ammonia plants and reinforcing man- 
agement. In addition, the share of oil and natural gas should be increased 
as much as possible. The target is to decrease energy consumption by lo%, 
to  1.3 toe/t by 2000, and by another lo%, to 1.15 toe/t, by 2030. 
Cement 
China's annual cement production has reached more than 200 million tons. 
The annual energy consumption is 28 Mtoe, amounting to 0.14 toe/t. One- 
quarter of the total production is produced by large and medium enterprises, 
three-quarters is produced by small ones. Over half of the production in 
large and medium enterprises operates using the wet process, the energy 
consumption of clinker is 0.15 toe/t. The remaining part is produced using 
dry or half-dry processes, which are in fact improvements of the wet process. 
Thus the average energy consumption is 0.13 toe/t, far higher than 0.09 toe/t 
which represents the real level of the outside-kiln decomposition process - a 
dry process. 
Due to  the large amount of production and the high energy consump- 
tion, harnessing the energy-saving potential is of great importance in prac- 
tice. The major measures for this should include increasing the share of 
production by large enterprises and adopting the advanced dry process. It 
is expected that the share of production by large enterprises would reach 
over 40% by 2000, of which 30% is produced by the dry process; and energy 
consumption declines to 0.12 toe/t. By 2030, the share of production by 
large enterprises would be over 60%, of which 80% is by the dry process, to  
enable the energy consumption to  decline to  0.09 toe/t and then to  reach 
the world's current advanced level. 
1.2. Energy supply side 
Improvement of energy conversion eficiency 
Power generation. In 1990, China's thermal power generation amounted t o  
494.5 Twh, which required 136 Mtoe of fuel to  be burned. The fuel burned 
per Kwh was 0.276 Kgoe, which is equivalent to  a thermal efficiency of power 
generation of 31.2%. For China the amount of fuel burned per Kwh is about 
70 Kgoe higher than that  of the developed countries. In the fuel mix for 
thermal power generation, coal has a share of about 90%, which amounts 
to  270 Mt,  and accounts for 114 of the total coal consumption or 115 of 
the total primary energy consumption. Therefore raising the efficiency of 
coal-fired power plants could play a significant role in the reduction of COz 
emissions. 
The major reason for China's high coal consumption in power generation 
is the considerably large share of small-capacity and out-of-date units. The 
composition of China's generating units, by capacity, in recent years is the 
following: 23% of units are under 50 MW, 40% of units are 50-200 MW, 
and only 37% of units are over 200 MW. Small generating units have a 
much higher coal consumption than large ones. In 1990 China's average 
coal consumption per Kwh supplied was 299 goe, whereas that  of small 
units was as high as 388 goe. 
Measures t o  reduce the coal consumption of thermal power generation 
could be summarized as follows: 
Imposing a restriction on the development of steam condensing units 
and the construction of steam condensing units with a capacity below 
25 MW, developing co-generation, and reforming the current medium 
and s m d  steam condensing units to  heat-supply ones. 
Building high-coefficient, large-capacity and super-critical units and up- 
dating medium- and low-pressure units and out-of-date units. In the 
1990s and beyond, a majority of China's generating units will be 300 
MW and 600 MW units, and China will make a great effort t o  manu- 
facture super-critical units domestically as early as possible. The coal 
consumption of these units could decline t o  224 goe/Kwh, which is equiv- 
alent to  over 38% heat efficiency of power generation. 
Renovating fans, pumps and other power devices used in thermal power 
plants so as to reduce the electricity consumption of the plants them- 
selves. 
Developing and adopting more advanced power generating technologies 
such as pressurized fluidized bed (PFB), coal-gasification combined cycle 
technologies, etc. It is expected that PFB technologies could be applied 
on a large scale in China after the year 2000, and the total capacity 
adopting advanced technologies would equal a share of 213 of the total 
in 2030 which would result in reducing the fuel consumption of thermal 
power generation to about 210 goe/Kwh on average. 
Development of coal gasijlcation. China's energy supply will still be depen- 
dent on coal for a long time, and gas production from coal only amounted 
to  5.2 billion m3 in 1990, corresponding to a coal input of 3.6 million tons 
which accounted for 0.4% of the total coal consumption. Hence the devel- 
opment of coal gasification technology, with high efficiency and on a large 
scale to convert coal into a clean and convenient fuel which may be used in 
the household and as a raw material in the chemical industry, is not only 
an important energy supply policy in medium- and long-term economic de- 
velopment but also one of the important policy responses for reducing C 0 2  
emission. 
At present, demonstration plants of available gasification technologies 
have been put into operation in China, of which the Lurgi process is the 
typical type of city gas production. In addition, the HTW and KRW pro- 
cesses can substitute oxygen by air in producing industrial fuel gas. The 
TEXACO, SHELL, HTW processes, etc., can yield fuel gas which is used as 
feedstock in synthetic ammonia production. When compared with the out- 
of-date technologies, the efficiency of these advanced technologies could be 
20-30% higher, and 25-34% energy conservation would be obtained under 
the same production scale. 
Energy substitution 
To promote the use of fossil fuels with less C 0 2  emissions as well as non- 
fossil and renewable fuels with no C 0 2  emissions for replacing fuels with 
high mounts of C 0 2  emissions, is a major technical strategy in reducing 
C 0 2  emissions in China's future energy industry. 
Oil and natural gas. Compared with coal, oil and natural gas have a much 
lower amount of C 0 2  emissions when burned to generate the same amount of 
heat. The C 0 2  emission of natural gas is about half that of coal. According 
to  the analysis of China's oil potential, the resources base is equal to  78.7 
billion tons, but proven oil resources are not well prospected and production 
has not reached its peak. It is predicted that oil production would reach its 
peak around the year 2020 with annual production of 200-300 million tons. 
At present, exploitation and production of natural gas are very weak, as 
little work has been done, and it seems that it will not develop rapidly in the 
near future. The other reason for the low natural gas output is probably that 
the ratio between oil and natural gas production is 10:l (in heat equivalent 
terms), which is much lower than the world average of 1.5:l. Thus, this 
might show the comparative bright prospects for natural gas production in 
China. It is expected that natural gas production would increase from 15 
billion m3 in 1990 to 150 billion m3 in 2030. 
Hydropower. There are abundant hydropower resources in China. It is 
estimated that exploitable hydropower reaches a level as high as 380 GW, 
believed to  be among the largest in the world. At present, only about 9% of 
the available hydropower is utilized: hydropower accounts for about 20% of 
the total power supply so far. Why didn't China accelerate the development 
of abundant hydropower to  ease the power supply shortage situation a long 
time ago? The reasons might be as follows. 
First, the distribution of China's hydropower resource is unbalanced. 
67.8% of the available hydropower resources are concentrated in the South- 
west. The major power load centers are in the eastern coastal areas, but 
the hydropower resources in these areas only account for 6.8% of the total. 
At present, many favorably situated power stations near major load centers 
are under construction. The hydropower resources not exploited are mainly 
distributed in the southwestern and northwestern areas. After hydropower 
has been exploited in these areas, electricity has to  be transmitted to  major 
industrial and household centers via a 1,200-1,500 km transmission line. 
Second, there is a shortage of funds for power investment. In addition 
to  the investment of the hydropower station itself, the costs of resettlement, 
compensation for loss of the inundated area and funds for the long-distance 
transmission circuit should also be included in the hydropower investment 
calculations. Thus, when compared with coal-fired stations, which have a 
lower investment requirement and shorter construction period, hydropower 
possesses a low competitive capability under the condition of limited power 
investment . 
It is planned that  the total installed capacity of hydropower by the 
year 2000 would reach 65-80 GW, with annual electricity generation of 240- 
290 Twh: and 180 G W  of hydropower would be exploited by 2015, the 
hydropower resources in Eastern and Central China would be completely 
exploited then. The other resources would be adequately developed by the 
year 2030: a total of 280 G W  or so. The remaining 100 G W  of hydropower 
resources available are constrained by the geographic conditions and would 
be difficult to  exploit. 
Nuclear power. Nuclear energy is generally acknowledged to  be the most 
realistic form of energy which can substitute fossil fuel on a large scale in 
the short term. At present, world nuclear power is equal to  total installed 
capacity of 300 GW, and accounts for 17% of total electricity generation. In 
some countries, nuclear power accounts for more than half of the generation, 
e.g., it is close to  70% in France. Since the cost keeps rising and the public 
is greatly concerned about the impact of nuclear radiation on health and the  
environment, the development of nuclear power has slowed down in the past 
decade. 
At present, the ever-increasing global concern for the threat of global 
warming and acid rain, as well as the progress in the design of a new genera- 
tion of nuclear reactors with inherent safety, may lead t o  a further large-scale 
development of nuclear power stations. 
The main goals of China's nuclear power development by the year 2000 
are: grasping the manufacture of nuclear power stations as quickly as possi- 
ble, and once self-reliant in design and manufacturing, getting prepared for 
the faster development of nuclear power beyond 2000. Efforts will be made 
to  build nuclear power stations with a total capacity of 6 G W  by 2000. Ac- 
cording to  a preliminary program, the total capacity of nuclear power would 
reach 40-50 G W  by 2030. 
Renewable energy. Solar, wind, ocean, geothermal energy, etc., belong t o  
the class of renewable energies which do not release COz. Due t o  the global 
shortage of oil and natural gas in the next century, more and more emphasis 
will be put on the development of renewable energy in the world. Owing to  
the fact that  the total renewable energy supply amounted to  0.3 Mtoe a year 
in the past few years in China, which occupied a very, very small proportion 
(0.04%) of the total commercial energy supply, and the consideration of fi- 
nancial and technological difficulties in its development, it could be imagined 
that renewable energy taken as an alternative energy source would not play 
an important role for a long period in China. 
2. Energy System Technology Option Model 
2.1. Brief description of the model 
In order to evaluate the future energy system's technology options and the 
rational composition of primary energy, and to make a macro-economic as- 
sessment of the funds needed for developing the future energy system and 
the effect of C 0 2  emission reduction, a dynamic optimization model of en- 
ergy system technology options (ESTOM) was set up. The model goes up 
to  the year 2030, the horizon is from 1990-2030 with a span of 5 years in 
each period. The main constraints of the model include: 
Constraints of the resources. 
Constraints of energy end-use demand. 
Constraints of the balance between the capacity and production of en- 
ergy technology processes. 
Constraints of the transfer and replacement of the production capacity 
of energy technology processes. 
Constraints of the penetration of new energy technologies. 
Constraints of investment. 
Constraints of limitation on C 0 2  emission. 
Constraints of the energy import-export balance. 
The objective function of the model is the minimization of discounted 
supply cost of energy systems. The consideration of the energy technology 
options in the ESTOM model is shown in Figure 1. The energy end-use 
demand is given in terms of useful energy demand for households, and in 
terms of various types of final energy demand for the other sectors. In order 
to  further evaluate and compare the development of the energy industry, 
energy substitution and energy conservation in the energy consumption sec- 
tors, to  analyze the rational flow of investment and to  assess macro-economic 
performance, some technical process options in the final energy consumption 
of several major energy-intensive sectors are also introduced, in addition to  
the consideration of the energy supply system. 
The coefficients of energy production, conversion, and end-use shown in 
Figure 1 are listed in Table 1. 
Figure 1. Energy flow network. 
Table 1. Parameters of energy production and conversion (Yuana). 
Variable 
Technology options Specific investment operation costb 
1. Coal mining 180,80/t 53.55/t 
2. Oil mining 937.60/t l09.00/t 
3. N.G. mining 872.50/km3 74.50 km3 
4. Trans. of coal (railway) 86.50/t 11.40/t 
5. Trans. of oil (pipeline) 94.00/t 15.00/t 
6. Trans. of N.G. (pipeline) 109.50/km3 40.00/km3 
7. Coal washing 50.00/t 30.20/t 
8. Coking 350.00/t coke 25.00/t coke 
9. Oil refinery 350.00/t 75.00/t 
10. Urban coal gas 2300.00/toe 200.00/toe 
11. Coal liquefaction 1876.00/t 350.00/t 
12. Hydro 4365.OO/KWe O.Ol/KWh 
13. Nuclear 6500.00/KWec 0.036/KWh 
14. Wind 6OOO.OO/KWe O.Ol/KWh 
15. Coal-fired power 1926.OO/KWe 0.07/KWh 
16. Pressurized fluidized bed 264O.OO/KWe O.Ol/KWh 
17. Combined cycle 2855.OO/KWe O.Ol/KWh 
18. Fuel cell 2000.00/KWe O.O15/KWh 
19. Cogeneration 240O.OO/KWe O.O09/KWh 
20. Trans. and distri. of elec. 48O.OO/KWe 0.003/KWh 
21. Biogas 3830.00/toe 50.00/toe 
22. Solar 7715.00/toe 57.00/toe 
aInvestments and costs are expressed in Yuan (Chinese currency) at 1989 constant prices. 
The exchange rate in 1989 was US$l=Yuan 3.76. 
bExcluding energy cost in the system. 
'Including investment in fuel recycling systems. 
2.2. Arrangement of scenarios of energy system development 
On the basis of the analyses of the above technical energy measures, a num- 
ber of scenarios are generated, and optimization and comparison are carried 
out by the ESTOM model, which include: 
(a) Efficiencies of the technologies being developed for the future energy 
systems do not improve and primary energy composition remains un- 
changed. 
(b) Efficiencies of the  technologies being developed for the future energy sys- 
tems rise gradually, but primary energy composition remains unchanged. 
(c) Efficiencies of the technologies being developed for the future energy 
systems rise gradually, and primary energy composition switches toward 
an increasing share of non-fossil fuels or decreasing share of high-carbon- 
content fuels. 
(d) Intense measures for energy conservation are employed in energy end- 
use sectors, so that  the final energy demand correspondingly declines. 
Meanwhile, both the efficiency of the future techniques of the energy 
system and primary energy composition have substantial changes similar 
to  scenario (c). 
(e) Compared with scenario (c), C 0 2  emission induced by future energy 
consumption is reduced by 10%. 
For all scenarios, there are two options for the future final energy de- 
mand. First, if the economy were to  grow a t  a higher rate. Second, if the 
economy were t o  grow a t  a lower rate. 
Based on the above scenarios, computations are made for Case 1 and 
Case 2. The results will offer a series of conclusions, such as the future pri- 
mary energy composition, technical options adopted in the energy system, 
C 0 2  emissions of fossil fuels, energy import and export, foreign exchange bal- 
ance, etc., in each of the scenarios, so that  the effects of the future reduction 
of C 0 2  emissions can be assessed from the viewpoint of the macro-economy. 
2.3. Results and analyses 
The lower economic growth scenario is taken here as the basic reference 
scenario whose results and their brief analyses are given below. 
Economic growth and primary energy consumption 
The data of economic growth and energy consumption of scenarios (c) and 
(d) under the premise of a low growth rate are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that  the future annual rate of decline of energy intensity 
(energy/GNP) is over 1%, the energy elasticity is around 0.6-0.7. In (d), the 
energy elasticity during 2000-2030 is only 0.53, and the electricity elasticity 
is no more than 0.85. In the future energy system, the share of primary 
energy used for electricity generation will be rising, from the current 25% t o  
around 40% by 2030. The energy intensity would decrease correspondingly, 
namely, fall by half from 1990 t o  2030 (see Figure 2). In 2030, China's energy 
consumption per capita would be as low as 1,400 Kgoe, which is equal t o  
the current average world level. 
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Figure 2. Energy intensity figures for different scenarios. 
Tab le  3. Primary energy composition in 2030 (low economic growth op- 
tion). 
Scenario (c) Scenario (d) Scenario (e) 
Mtoe % Mtoe % Mtoe % 
1. Hydropower 234.2 11.8 234.2 13.4 234.2 11.9 
2. Nuclear 69.9 3.5 69.9 4.0 268.8 13.7 
3. Coal 1230.3 61.8 1032.9 59.0 1006.7 5 1.2 
4.  Oil 322.8 16.2 280.8 16.0 322.8 16.4 
5. Natural gas 121.0 6.1 121.0 6.9 121.0 6.2 
6. Renewable 12.4 0.6 12.4 0.7 12.4 0.6 
Total 1990.5 100 1751.3 100 1965.9 100 
Primary energy composition 
The mix in the primary energy in the future energy system corresponding 
t o  scenarios (c), (d) and (e) is shown in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
In the light of the characteristics of China's energy resources, China's 
primary energy composition, a majority of which is coal, will not undergo 
substantial change. Under the low economic growth premise, coal will form 
over 60% of the primary energy supply in 2030, but it will still have decreased 
u 
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Figure 3. Primary energy composition of scenario (c); low economic growth 
option. 
by more than 10% compared to the present level. The shares of non-fossil 
fuels, such as hydropower and nuclear power, in the future energy system 
will increase greatly: in 2030 the share of non-fossil fuels would go up from 
5.3% t o  15%, the share of natural gas from 2% t o  more than 6%, compared 
with those in 1990. A shortage of liquid fuels would become more and more 
serious in the coming years as the limitations of the oil resources in China 
were reached. China's oil exports will reduce gradually from their current 
level of about 25 million tons each year, and China would change from being 
an oil exporting country t o  a country with net oil imports around the year 
2020. I t  is estimated that  oil imports would be up t o  70 million tons yearly 
in 2030. The oil share of the primary energy consumption will remain a t  
the level of 16%, which is commensurate with the current one. Generally 
speaking, the change in the Chinese primary energy mix in the future will 
gradually reduce the C 0 2  intensity of energy consumption (C02/energy) 
and contribute ultimately to  the mitigation of C 0 2  emission. 
Table 4. China's electricity composition in 2030 (low economic growth 
option). 
Scenario (c) Scenario (d) 
1. Power generation (TWh) 
2. Composition (%) 
Thermal 
Hydro 
Nuclear 
Wind 
Tot a1 100 100 
Electricity composition 
In 1990, the total power generation capacity in China was 135 GW, and 
power generation was 618 Twh, of which hydropower made up 126 Twh and 
thermal power 492 Twh, accounting for about 80% of the total generation. 
Electricity composition in 2030 would consist of multiple components, shown 
in Table 4. 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the share of thermal power will decrease, 
hydropower increase, and nuclear power emerge from nothing and develop 
greatly in the next century, i.e., account for about 10% of power in 2030. 
Wind power and other renewable energy generation would also develop in 
the next century but their position in the power system would still be weak. 
Since there will be a shortage of oil and natural gas resources, the develop- 
ment of power stations fueled with oil and natural gas will be restricted by 
state energy policies. Considering the facts, that  the oil shortage will be- 
come more and more serious, and the increase in natural gas production will 
not be able to  satisfy the growing demand for gaseous fuels and compensate 
the demand deficit caused by inadequate oil production, the development of 
oil-burning or gas-burning power stations will not be a major consideration 
in the future power system. 
COz emission induced by  commercial energy consumption 
China's primary energy composition, in which coal is the major fuel, will 
lead to  a high COz emission intensity. However, in 2030, the share of coal in 
China's primary energy composition will decrease, which will result in some 
decrease in the C 0 2  emission intensity of energy consumption (see Table 5 
and Figure 4): by around 14% in 2030 compared with 1990. 
Table 5. C 0 2  emission intensity of commercial energy consumption (low 
economic growth option). 
2030 
Unit 1990 Scenario (c) Scenario (d) 
1. Commercial energy cons. Mtoe 686 1990 1752 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 1615 1395 
3. C 0 2  emission of energy cons. t-C/toe 0.94 0.81 0.80 
2. COz emission intensity kg-C/Yuan 0.38 0.18 0.16 
1 - c e n a r o  (a) + ~ S e n a r l o  @) + Scanarlo (c) 1 
+- Scenario (d) + Scenarto (e) I 
Figure 4. C 0 2  emission (low economic growth option). 
China's future economy needs to be .developed a t  a rapid rate in order 
to meet the ever-increasing demand of material and cultural life, so energy 
consumption and C 0 2  emission will increase at  a reasonable rate, but the 
growth rate of the GNP will be higher than that of commercial energy con- 
sumption. In addition, since the primary energy composition will change, the 
growth rate of C 0 2  emissions will be lower than that of commercial energy 
consumption (see Figure 5). The C 0 2  emission intensity of the GNP will 
correspondingly decrease (see Figure 6). Taking scenario (c), for instance, 
the C 0 2  emission intensity of the GNP will decrease from 1.43 kg-C/US$ in 
1990 to  0.69 kg-C/US$ in 2030, a decrease of over half. 
GNP Energy cons. 0 I 0 2  emission 
Figure 5. Growth rate of the GNP, energy consumption, and C 0 2  emission. 
Technology options for the energy system 
The technology options for the energy system are shown in Table 6. The 
table illustrates that advanced power generation technology will be greatly 
developed in the next century, the development is mainly limited by technical 
maturity and commercialization. Imported, advanced technology will push 
up energy conversion efficiency. To meet the same final energy demand, the 
primary energy consumption of (c) is about 5% less than that of (a). In (e), 
with coercive measures for reducing C 0 2  emission, nuclear energy should be 
vigorously developed as a substitute for coal: the nuclear power capacity 
would approach three times that of (c), so the share of non-fossil fuel in the 
primary energy composition is considerably raised. Due to  resource condi- 
tions and technical limitations, the shares of hydropower, wind, and solar 
power would not have changed substantially. In view of China's condition 
as regards resources and technology, the development of nuclear power will 
play an important role in the reduction of the C 0 2  emission intensity in a 
large scale and the improvement of the primary energy composition. 
Investment in the energy system and macro assessment of mitigating 
C02 emission 
Investment in the energy system and C 0 2  emission in various scenarios are 
summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Investment in the energy system and C 0 2  emission (low economic 
growth option). 
Total for 
Unit 1990 2000 2030 40 yearsa 
Scenario (a )  
1. Primary energy consumption Mtoe 686 1026 2110 - 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 949 1876 47105 
3. C 0 2  intensity t-C/toe 0.94 0.93 0.89 - 
4. Investment in the energy system Bb Yuan 78.3 92.7 204.8 930.3 
5. FEc demand for energy I M ~  and EXe B Yuan -20.2 -9.3 31.8 -150.9 
Scenario ( b )  
1. Primary energy consumption Mtoe 686 1003 1994 - 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 937 1782 45567 
3. CO2 intensity t-C/toe 0.94 0.93 0.89 - 
4. Investment in the energy system B Yuan 78.3 89.9 190.7 900.0 
5. F E  demand for energy IM and EX B Yuan -20.2 -9.2 32.6 -149.8 
Scenario (c )  
1. Primary energy consumption Mtoe 686 1002 1991 - 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 910 1615 43231 
3. C 0 2  intensity t-C/toe 0.94 0.91 0.81 - 
4. Investment in the energy system B Yuan 78.3 99.5 201.1 986.3 
5. F E  demand for energy IM and EX B Yuan -20.2 -89.9 33.8 -148.1 
Scenario ( d )  
1. Primary energy consumption Mtoe 686 984 1751 - 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 896 1395 40188 
3. C 0 2  intensity t-C/toe 0.94 0.91 0.80 - 
4. Investment in the energy system B Yuan 78.3 90.4 164.4 935.3 
5. F E  demand for energy IM and EX B Yuan -20.2 -19.2 10.3 -180.6 
Scenario (e )  
1. Primary energy consumption Mtoe 686 987 1966 - 
2. C 0 2  emission Mt-C 644 890 1380 39261 
3. C 0 2  intensity t-C/toe 0.94 0.90 0.70 - 
4. Investment in the energy system B Yuan 78.3 125.9 236.0 1025.6 
5. F E  demand for energy IM and EX B Yuan -20.2 -3.2 43.7 -125.5 
OInvestment in the energy system is shown in terms of discount value back to the year 
1990 at the discount rate of 10%. 
b~ = billion. 
"FE = foreign exchange. 
d~~ = import. 
'EX = export. 
kacf1000 Yuan) 
Scrnarlo (a) Scenario (b) 0 scenario (c) 
Scrnarlo (d) 0 scrnario (c) 
Figure 6. C 0 2  emission intensity of the GNP. 
Comparing scenarios (a)  and (b), both primary energy consumption and 
C 0 2  emissions are less in (b) than (a) due t o  efficiency improvement, e.g., 
total C 0 2  emissions in 40 years would decrease by 1,538 million tons of 
carbon, thus total investment in the energy system during the 40-year period 
would be US$37 billion less in (b) than (a). Efficiency improvements in the 
energy system result in positive economic benefits of about US$24/t-C for 
a long-term period based on saving energy and reducing C 0 2  emission. In 
conclusion, great efforts should be made t o  improve the efficiency of the 
future energy system. 
A fairly obvious reduction in C 0 2  emission will be obtained in (c) com- 
pared with (a)  and (b), e.g., total C 0 2  emissions during the 40-year period 
would decrease by 3,874 Mt-C, i.e., a cut of 8.3% compared with (a), and 
by 2,336 Mt-C, i.e., a cut of 5.1% compared with (b). However, investment 
in the energy system in (c) would increase by US$90.4 billion and US$127.7 
billion in comparison with (a) and (b) respectively, i.e., an increase of 5.7% 
and 8.8% respectively, because of the much bigger investment costs for hydro 
and nuclear power than thermal power. 
Conducting analyses on amounts of C 0 2  reduction and the extra invest- 
ment increase, it can be seen that  the C 0 2  reduction cost in terms of energy 
substitution would be US$55/t-C when a comparison is made between (b) 
and (c). However, when a comparison is made between (a) and (c), the C 0 2  
Table 8. Costs of C 0 2  reduction measures. 
Costs of COz 
reduction 
Measures (US$/t-C) 
(1) Energy efficiency improvement -37 
(2) Energy alternatives 55 
(3) Combination of (1) and (2) 24 
(4) Acceleration of policies 65 
reduction cost would then go down to  US$24/t-C in terms of the compre- 
hensive effects of both improvement of the efficiency of the energy system 
and energy substitution. Compulsory C 0 2  emission reduction is considered 
in (e), based on (c). Since there would be a decrease in the C 0 2  emission 
intensity of energy consumption, total C 0 2  emissions of the energy system 
in 2030 would be cut down by 235 Mt-C in (e compared with (c) under 
the condition of satisfying the same end-use energy demand. However, total 
investments in the energy system and expenditure on energy import and 
export would increase by US$161 billion in 40 years in (e) compared with 
(c). This means that  the specific investment in C 0 2  reduction would be 
US$4l/t-C on the basis of (c). It is clear from Table 3 that  the major dif- 
ference in primary energy composition in (e) compared with (c) lies in the 
replacement of coal by nuclear power: the share of nuclear power in 2030 
rises from 3.5% t o  13.7%, the share of coal drops from 61.8% t o  51.2%. 
In scenario (d), the implementation of some enhanced energy conserva- 
tion policies in end-use energy sectors is considered, but the optimization of 
the energy system is similar t o  that  in (c). The reduction in end-use energy 
demand, which is estimated t o  be 3,000 Mtoe in total, will result in a de- 
crease in primary energy consumption and finally in a reduction in energy 
supply system investment of US$122 billion (total for 40 years). 
In conclusion, the costs of C 0 2  reduction in terms of cost analysis of the 
development of the energy supply system are summarized in Table 8. 
3. Major Conclusions 
The improvement of the exploitation and conversion efficiency of the energy 
system in terms of developing new energy technologies will reduce energy 
consumption and then C 0 2  emission, a t  the same time reducing investment 
in the development of the energy system from the long-term viewpoint under 
the condition of satisfying the same end-use energy demand. 
China should actively develop and import new energy technologies, such 
as advanced power generation technologies like pressurized fluidized bed, 
combined cycle, fuel cells, etc., whose efficiency can reach 40% and where 
the benefits for the energy system would be distinct after commercialization. 
However, it is very difficult for developing countries t o  raise such an enormous 
amount of funds for spending on new technology development. 
Additionally, there is a long way t o  go in adopting new technologies, 
for instance, some new power generation technologies could not be put into 
operation until 2010 a t  least. Therefore, in order to  reduce the global C 0 2  
emission level, developed countries should transfer advanced technologies 
to  developing countries under the most favorable conditions and provide 
developing countries with favorable loans t o  study, develop, and diffuse new 
technologies t o  promote renovation of energy industries as well as t o  achieve 
the effect of reducing C 0 2  emission as early as possible. 
Alternative energy resources may be achieved by greatly expanding the 
capacities of hydropower and nuclear power. These are important measures 
t o  alleviate C 0 2  emission. Additional investments are required t o  accelerate 
energy replacement as specific capital investments are much higher for hydro- 
and nuclear power than coal power generation. A nuclear industrial system 
and nuclear power stations are being established step by step in China. The 
goal of nuclear power development would be that  the nuclear share of total 
power generation would account for 10% beyond the year 2030. China needs 
t o  set up an independent industrial system and master advanced technolo- 
gies. This requires that  China obtains assistance and support in terms of 
either technology or funds from around the world t o  conduct research and 
development. 
More economic benefits could be achieved if investment funds are dis- 
tributed for energy conservation in end-use sectors rather than for the de- 
velopment of the energy supply system, i.e., energy conservation in end-use 
sectors is of direct economic benefit and in accordance with the target of 
reducing C 0 2  emission, and no additional investment is needed for COz re- 
duction. However, it should be pointed out that  specific investment in energy 
conservation will rise constantly as the innovation cost of end-use technolo- 
gies becomes higher and higher, and it will ultimately exceed that  needed 
for the development of the energy system, then additional investment funds 
will have to  be raised for reducing C 0 2  emission by saving energy. In any 
case, promotion of energy conservation in end-use sectors, treated as either 
an  important measure for C 0 2  emission reduction or an option for easing 
the energy supply shortage in China, will be a key policy measure over a 
long period of time. 
Review of Costs to Developing Economies 
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1. Introduction 
The costs of COz mitigation for the developing countries present a set of 
complexities in analysis which differ in several ways from those related t o  
the  developed countries. This happens largely because several developing 
countries are still in the initial stages of establishing their economic infras- 
tructure. This reality brings in an  element of opportunity cost in terms of 
foregone possibilities for economic development which are generally not sig- 
nificant in the case of developed economic systems. Thus, for example, even 
if the mitigation strategies are funded on concessional terms (as is envisaged 
under the Framework Convention for Climate Change), the amortization 
and interest payments could impose a considerable burden on the develop- 
ing economies. 
One could carry this observation further by stating that  given a rea- 
sonably long time horizon, the cost of several mitigation measures which 
appears to  be low in the short run could actually turn out to  be large in 
magnitude over a long time horizon. Conceptually, i t  can be seen that  if a 
particular action results in reduction of C 0 2  emissions a t  low direct cost, 
but over a period of time slows down the removal of poverty, then this could 
lead to  large positive costs in the long run, for the following reasons: 
1. Poverty and population growth have a strong and positive correlation. 
2. Deforestation for fuel and fodder is also exacerbated by high levels of 
poverty. 
3. With limited modern infrastructure, a developing country may not have 
the  benefits of joint products to  the extent that  a developed country 
might have, as say in the case of reduced air pollution from public trans- 
port. 
Undoubtedly, the metropolitan areas of the developing world are far 
more polluted in several cases than cities in the developed world but, despite 
rapid growth, the metropolitan populations in the third world are still a very 
small percentage of the  non-urban populations in these countries. Hence, we 
cannot make sweeping generalizations about the benefits of reduced pollu- 
tion, as one might be able to do in the case of developed countries. Besides, 
the costs of pollution, even for comparable physical levels, differ markedly 
between low income countries and richer societies. The absence of well devel- 
oped data systems only exacerbates the problem of obtaining good estimates 
and neat conclusions. 
In assessing C02 mitigation costs, there is a need, therefore, for devel- 
oping methodologies that are comprehensive and reliable. There is a danger 
that with the growing global interest in quick numbers and pressure from 
several funding organizations to  arrive at cost estimates for ranking opportu- 
nities, several misleading and inaccurate estimates of costs may be produced 
to  serve the very limited purpose of global negotiations and financial trans- 
fers. However, such methodologies cannot be developed overnight, and would 
probably follow an evolutionary process. It is within this view that the Asian 
Energy Institute (AEI) has developed the order-of-magnitude estimates of 
costs for a number of member Asian countries and Brazil. 
2. The AEI Study on Abatement Costs 
It is generally predicted that several countries in Asia are likely to  experience 
higher rates of economic growth than other major regions of the world, well 
into the next century. Largely on this account, it is also believed that C 0 2  
emissions in Asia will increase at a faster rate than in any other region in 
the world. Further, it has been contended that Brazil emits a large quantity 
of C 0 2  attributable to deforestation. It is, therefore, important not only 
to study the sources and activities that produce these emissions, but also 
to  evaluate potential solutions by which these could be minimized in cost- 
effective ways in the future. 
The overall aim of the AEI study was to  identify and evaluate existing 
and emerging technologies to limit C02 emissions for different sectors in the 
participating countries. These technologies, which may be implemented by 
the year 2000, were broadly classified as follows: 
1. Improvements in energy efficiency and energy conservation. 
2. A shift to  lower carbon fuels such as natural gas and greater use of 
renewable resources such as hydro, solar, and wind. 
3. Afforestation t o  sequester atmospheric carbon. 
The broad plan of the study for each participating country was as follows: 
The feasible technologies were first identified. Then the potential for 
adoption of each technology by the year 2000, and the related costs and C 0 2  
abatements made possible over the lifetime of the technology, were analyzed. 
A country-specific approach was adopted keeping in mind the overall growth 
and other policy concerns of each country. The concept of "cost" varied 
across the different country studies which are, therefore, not comparable 
in this particular aspect. The detailed results for the Bangladesh, Brazil, 
China, and India country studies are presented in the Appendix. 
A cross country comparison reveals that in all of the countries included 
in the study the industrial sector consumes a major share of the total en- 
ergy supply. Therefore, improvements in energy efficiencies in this sector 
could lead t o  significant savings in C 0 2  emissions. Obviously, the particular 
measures adopted differ across countries. For example, in India improved 
housekeeping, installation of energy efficient equipment and better instru- 
mentation may well result in saving 88 million tonnes of carbon (Mt-C) at  
an investment of $ 3.5 billion. In Brazil, the package for the industrial sector 
includes better choice of electric motors (in terms of their size), appropriate 
design of the internal distribution of electric network, installation of small 
size transformers in parallel with the large ones, and correction of load factor, 
requiring an investment of $ 1 billion and saving 4.8 Mt-C. 
The electricity sector presents considerable opportunities for emission 
reduction in all of the countries studied. There is, for example, a large 
scope for reducing transmission and distribution losses which range from 
22% in India t o  40% in Bangladesh. Thus, if these losses were reduced t o  
16% by the year 2000 in India, an investment of $ 7.2 billion would yield a 
reduction of 210 Mt-C (assuming that the entire reduction in C 0 2  emissions 
is attributed to  reduced power generation by coal-based thermal plants). 
In China, an increase in the shares of pressured fluidized bed boilers and 
combined cycle plants (oil-based) which are more energy efficient than the 
conventional plants can together save 14.7 Mt-C at a total investment of 
$ 372 billion. 
A wide menu of options to  limit C 0 2  emissions is available in the trans- 
port sector. In Brazil, transport plays a key role in minimizing carbon 
emissions. Currently, this sector accounts for 32% of the total carbon emis- 
sions. Fuel substitution, highway improvements, efficient diesel engines, and 
improvements in vehicle efficiencies are the main options available. The high- 
way improvement program will cost as much as $ 2,954/t-c. In Bangladesh, 
the best way to  conserve energy in the transport sector is through improved 
road maintenance as it is easily implemented. This would require an invest- 
ment of $ 110 million and may save 1.2 Mt-C. Similarly, in India, enhanced 
mass urban transport (by increasing bus fleet and introducing metro rail 
systems) and increased rail freight movement could reduce significantly the 
energy consumption in the transport sector. The total investment of $ 48 
billion will save 279 Mt-C. 
In the residential sector, the strategy for C 0 2  abatement comprises im- 
provements in the energy efficiency of both cooking and lighting devices. Im- 
provements in cooking devices range from improved firewood chulha in India, 
t o  coal saving stoves in China, unnata chulhas (based on woody biomass) 
in Bangladesh. There are large differences arising in abatement potentials 
across countries due to  the difference in the fuel used. Thus, unnata chul- 
has in Bangladesh save only 2 Mt-C, whereas in China the improved coal 
stoves can save as much as 305 Mt-C. With respect to  improvements in 
lighting devices in Brazil, by the year 2000, a stock of residential lamps that  
comprises 50% improved incandescents, 30% fluorescents and 20% compact 
fluorescents will save 2.33 Mt-C a t  a specific cost of $ 545/t-c. On the other 
hand, in India, replacing 50% of the incandescents by fluorescents and 50% 
of the incandescents by compact fluorescents, by the year 2000, could save 
72.9 Mt-C a t  a total investment cost of $ 3.5 billion. The specific costs are 
$ 12/t-c and $ 86/t-c, respectively. 
Sequestration of carbon through afforestation can be an effective strat- 
egy t o  limit C 0 2  emissions. In fact, in India, afforesting one-third of the 
land mass by the year 2000 could save as much as 1,540 Mt-C. The specific 
cost would be $ 27/t-c. It is interesting that specific investment cost for af- 
forestation are quite comparable for India, China and Bangladesh. In China, 
afforesting 16-17% of the land area (48-63 million hectares) would imply a 
specific cost of $ 26.3/t-c while in Bangladesh the specific cost is $ 19.2/t-c 
for afforesting 2.64 million hectares. However, in all three countries it is felt 
that  afforestation programs require careful planning and management to  be 
successful. 
3. Conclusions 
Two points need t o  be emphasized in establishing the significance of this 
study: 
1. While the countries of Asia and Brazil have not been the major contrib- 
utors to the increased atmospheric concentrations of GHGs in the past, 
their share is likely t o  increase relative to  other regions in the future. 
Also, certain regions of Asia would perhaps be the most vulnerable t o  
the adverse effects of climate change. For example, the Maldives and 
other coastal areas of South Asia with respect t o  sea level rise; parts 
of Brazil, China, and India with respect t o  impacts on agriculture; and 
all the major river basins and deltas of Asia with respect to  changes in 
precipitation pat terns. 
2. In any global effort t o  limit the emissions of GHGs and measures to  
reduce their concentration in the atmosphere, policymakers and leaders 
of public opinion can perhaps best be persuaded by analysis and research 
by credible institutions located in the concerned countries themselves, 
rather than relying on the work of scholars who may have little first-hand 
knowledge of conditions and policy concerns of the respective countries. 
At the same time, a word of caution needs to  be added. The estimates 
of the AEI study are by no means sacrosanct. They only represent a first 
cut estimate. Each of the options considered needs t o  be studied carefully 
with special attention given to the practical aspects of their implementation 
because, in the final analysis, that  is the real solution t o  the problem a t  
hand. 
Appendix 
Table 1. Specific cost of technologies for limiting C o n  emission in 
Bangladesh. 
Technologies Carbon Investment Specific 
savedlfixed required cost 
(MT) ($MI ($IT) 
Electricity sector 
T & D Loss 2.4 82.2 34.3 
Industry sector 
Housekeeping + operation 
and Management 
Combustion control 
Simple retrofit 
Process improvement 
Cogeneration 
Transport sector 
Road maintenance 
Residential (rural) 
Unnata chulha 
Unnata Loopi 
Afforestation 65.4 1255 19.2 
Table 2. Strategies for abat ing C 0 2  emission (up t o  t he  year 2000) in China. 
Cumulative 
C 0 2  reduction Specific Specific 
during cost of C 0 2  cost of CO2 
Potential Total cost Lifetime lifetime reduction reduction 
(new added) (in US%) (years) (million T-C) (US$/T-C) (US%/T-C) 
1. Coal-saving stove 64 MH 1.5/H 10 305 0.3 9 
2. Retrofit of existing 
boilers 0.2 million 5,700 10 160 5 19 
3. Pressured fluidized 
bed 1.5 GW 150/KW 30 9.5 12 19 
4. Retrofit of existing 
kilns 46 thousand 65,000 8 92.5 19 35 
5. Hydropower 40 GW 1,01O/KW 5 0 1,900 20 18.4 
6. Nuclear power 6 GW 1,185/KW 30 284 24 15 
7. Solar heaters 1.9 M m2 1 15/m2 15 8 25 21 
8. Afforestation 34 Mha. 370/ha. 690 30 26.3 
9. Combining cycle 1.0 GW 290/KW 30 5.2 30 37 
10. Wind generation 48 MW 1,27O/KW 20 1.5 42 39 
11. Solar P.V. 9.3 MW 815/KW 20 1.5 49 45 
12. Urban gasification 49 MH 475/H. 30 360 50 42.3 
13. Solar cooker 60,000 50 10 0.05 68 64 
Notes: 
1. US$ is a t  1990 prices. 
2. MN means million households. 
3. Total cost includes investment cost, and operation & maintenance and fuel cost which have been discounted to the s tar t  of the year 
a t  the 10% of social discount rate. 
4. Specific cost of COz reduction in the fifth column covers the costs of capital investment, operation & maintenance, and fuels, but 
that  in the sixth column only involves capital investment cost. 
Table 3. Potential and  cost of various COz emission reduction options in India. 
Potential for 
reduction in C 0 2  Investment Specific cost of 
emissions over life cost C 0 2  reduction 
(Mt-C) (billion US$) (US$/t-C) 
1. Increase in energy utilization efficiency 
1.1. Electricity Sector 
Electricity generation 
- Coal washing 192.25 
- Replacement of coal TPS by gas combined cycle TPS 82.5 
Transmission and distribution 
- Reduction in transmission and distribution losses 210 
1.2. Industrial sector 
Improved housekeeping 28 
Installation of energy-efficient equipment 
and better instrumentation and control 35 
Upgrading industrial technology 25 
1.3. Transport sector 
Enhanced urban public transport 
- Increasing bus fleet 9.35 
- Metro rail systems 122.4 
Enhanced rail freight movement 147 
1.4. Agricultural Sector 
Pumpset rectification 50.6 
1.5. Domestic sector 
Improved firewood chulha 6 
Improved lighting 
- Replacement by tube fluorescent 37.2 
- Replacement by compact fluorescent 35.7 
Table 3. Continued. 
Potential for 
reduction in COz Investment Specific cost of 
emissions over life cost COz reduction 
(Mt-C) (billion US$) (US$/t-C) 
2.  Deployment of renewable energy technologies 
2.1. Biogas plants 
Solar thermal systems 
2.2. Electricity from other renewables 
Biomass 
Wind 
Small hydro 
Sewage sludge 
Distillery effluent 
Municipal solid waste 
PV pumps 
Windpumps 
Solar energy 
3. Afforestation 
Policy Instruments for C02 Mitigation: 
The Case of Brazil 
Jose' Roberto Moreim 
Biomass Users Network 
Sio Paulo, Brazil 
1. Introduction 
The emphasis of the paper is on carbon dioxide (C02) emissions, the princi- 
pal greenhouse gas (GHG), of which Brazil is a major contributor at a global 
level. It is widely recognized that the country's overwhelmingly large source 
of C 0 2  emissions is from clearing of the forest land for other uses. Quanti- 
tative estimates of this source are issues of active debate so that precision 
is impossible. Despite the preponderance of deforestation in C 0 2  emissions, 
this paper also considers fossil fuel emissions and the possibilities for its 
reduction. Some broad elements of a policy to decelerate deforestation, ac- 
celerate afforestation and to  estimate the costs will be outlined as well as 
the potential critical connections with energy policy. 
2. Quantification of Ant hropogenic 
C02  Emission 
2.1. COa energy emission sources 
In 1990, the total energy consumption in Brazil reached 183.7 million tons 
of oil equivalent (toe). Table 1 shows that 37% of Brazil's primary energy 
comes from fossil fuels, 26% from biomass fuels, and 37% from hydroelec- 
tricity. Notable aspects of this matrix are the preponderant role of hydro 
in electricity generation (94.4%), the relative large amount of biomass that 
is used at  an industrial scale (alcohol, charcoal and  wood - see Table 2), 
and the small penetration of natural gas. Energy system has resulted in the 
emission of approximately 51.6 million tons of carbon (tc) as C021 from the 
combustion of fossil fuels in 1990 (Table 3). 
'In this paper we are only considering carbon (C) emission due to COz production. C 
equivalent emission due to other greenhouse gases are not quoted. 
Table 1. Energy supply and consumption in Brazil, 1990 (in million tons of oil equivalent). 
Total fuel 
Natural P e t r e  Subtotal and other 
Coal gas leum fossil Biomass Hydro Nuclear Primarya Electricity 
Gross internal supply 9.21 3.75 55.06 68.02 47.33 67.75 0,58 183.68 n.a. 
Electricity generation 1.15 0 1.15 2.30 0.72 67.75 0.58 71.35 71.74 
Other energy sectorb 0.82 1.16 1.93 3.91 13.78 . . . . . .  17.69 10.88 
Non-energy use 0.06 0.59 8.94 9.59 0.33 . . . . . . 9.92 0 
Final energy demand 7.18 2.00 43.04 52.22 32.50 . . . . . . 84.72 60.86 
Residential 0 0.16 5.19 5.35 8.49 . . .  . . .  13.84 13.85 
Commercial/services 0 0.07 0.65 0.72 0.18 . . .  ... 0.90 12.09 
Agriculture 0 0 3.16 3.16 2.15 . . .  . . .  5.31 1.83 
Transport 0.01 0 26.77 26.78 5.65 . . . . . .  32.43 0.34 
Industry 7.17 1.76 7.28 16.21 15.92 . . . . . .  32.13 32.85 
" Gross internal supply and electricity generation include all energy consumption, thereafter electricity is excluded. The  actual inputs 
for electricity generation are included in this column since these are different than the coefficient of 0.29 toe used in the  last column - 
there is a slight discrepancy. 
bIncludes transformation and other losses and energy use (e.g., in refineries). 
General notes: Data for fuel include derivatives of the primary energy source (e.g., coke from coal, alcohol from sugarcane). Electricity 
(last column) is calculated assuming that  1 MWh = 0.29 toe. 
Sources: Boletin do Balanso Energdtico Nacional, 1991. 
Table 2. Biomass supply and consumption, 1990 (in million toe). 
Gross internal supply 
Electricity generation 
Other energy sectorC 
Non-energy use 
Final energy demand 
Residential 
Commercial/services 
Agriculture 
Transport 
Industrv 
Wood for Other Othera 
charcoal 
12.31 
0 
6.43 
0 
5.88' 
0.63 
0.06 
0.01 
0 
5.19 
wood 
15.14 
0.12 
0 
0 
15.14 
7.86 
0.12 
2.14 
0 
4.90 
Sugarcane 
18.14 
0 .23~  
7.41b 
0.33d 
10.17 
0 
0 
0 
5.65d 
4.52b 
biomass 
1.74 
0.37 
0.06 
0 
1.31 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.31 
Total 
47.33 
0.72 
13.78 
0.33 
32.50 
8.49 
0.18 
2.15 
5.65 
15.92 
"Basically pulp mill liquor. 
*sugarcane bagasse. 
'Includes transformation losses and fuel use; specifically losses in producing charcoal from 
wood and alcohol from cane. 
d ~ l c o h o l .  
'Charcoal. 
Source: Boletin d o  Balanso EnergCtico Nacional, 1991. 
Table 3. C 0 2  emissions from energy consumption (million tons of carbon). 
Fossil fuelsa ~ i o m a s s " ~ ~  Total 
Gross internal supply 51.64 (59.77)C 11.44 63.08 (71.21)" 
Electricity generation 2.24 0 2.24 
Other energy sector 3.29 3.31d 6.60 
Non-energy use (8.13)' 0 (8.13)' 
Final energy demand 46.11 8.13 54.24 
Residential 4.48 1.94 6.42 
Commercial/services 0.60 0.05 0.65 
Agriculture 2.72 0.44 3.16 
Transport 23.03 0 23.03 
Industrial 15.21 5.70 20.91 
"The conversion factors are: fuel oil, 72.6 tons of CO2/lOE12J; natural gas, 50.6 tons of 
C02/10E12J; coal, 100 tons of C02/10E12J; hydroelectricity, 0 ton of CO2; fuelwood, 
83.9 tons of CO2/lOE12J. 
b ~ u g a r c a n e  and "other biomass" are assumed t o  have no CO2 emissions. For wood it is 
assumed that  deforestation results from 20% of residential, commercial and agricultural 
use; 60% of industrial use, and 50% of charcoal use. These shares are somewhat arbitrary 
as discussed in the text. 
'Includes non-energy CO2 equivalent in parenthesis [see (e) below]. 
d ~ l l  due to  conversion of fuelwood t o  charcoal. 
"COz equivalent of fossil fuel used, if burnt (see text). 
For simplification a t  this stage of work, hydroelectricity is assumed t o  
have zero C 0 2  emission^.^ Similarly, sugarcane supply (alcohol and bagasse) 
and "other renewables" (pulp industry liquors) are assumed to  result in zero 
C 0 2  emissions as shown in Table 3. 
The emissions resulting from using wood are more problematic and vary 
widely. Most of the wood used in the residential and agricultural sectors 
do not exceed natural regeneration. In this way Brazil's fuelwood results in 
net C 0 2  emissions. Industrial fuelwood use is more concentrated and leads 
t o  deforestation when supply depends on natural forest, as is often the case 
in Brazil. Again, information is scarce. It has been assumed that  60% of 
industrial fuelwood contributes to  C 0 2  emissions. 
The conversion of wood to  charcoal (the largest use of fuelwood) and its 
impact on deforestation is highly controversial. Only one-third of charcoal is 
supplied from planted forest and the rest being from clearing natural forest 
(mostly drier forests of the cerrado). Since land is cleared for grazing and 
agriculture, it is arbitrarily assumed that three-fourths of the charcoal from 
natural forest contributes to  deforestation. Overall, 50% of fuelwood for 
charcoal (one-third of planted forest) is assumed not t o  result in C 0 2  net 
emissions. Thus, it is roughly estimated that 40% of total fuelwood use 
results in C 0 2  emissions of 11.4 Mtc or 22% of that  resulting from fossil-fuel 
energy use. In practice, fuelwood is still far from being a fully renewable 
resource. At the same time, it can be seen that the contribution of fuelwood 
t o  deforestation is small - only 3-4% of a total of about 300 Mtc from 
deforestation. In 1990, the total energy emissions of C 0 2  are thus estimated 
to  be about 63 Mtc (71 Mtc if non-energy use of fossil fuels is valued a t  its 
combustion equivalent). This is roughly 470 kg of carbon per capita. 
2.2. Deforestation and C 0 2  emission 
By far, the largest source of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emission in Brazil 
(mainly in ~ m a z o n i a )  is the result of deforestation. The carbon stock of 
seasonal and rainforest vegetation in Amazonia is estimated t o  range from 
140 t o  200 tc/ha, of pasture 10 tc/ha, and of cropland 5 tc/ha. The forest 
carbon stock may be adjusted by new information on below-ground biomass 
of vegetation. Changing landuse also reduces the carbon content of soil al- 
though less drastically. For example, in pastures, it may be about 10% or 
10 tc/ha (Houghton et a/., 1991). Thus, assuming a deforestation rate in 
'An estimate for the US is 3 tc/GWh (USDOE, 1990) but any extrapolation for Brazil, 
especially for reservoir filling, would be arbitrary. A complicating factor is the release of 
methane from reservoir (Moreira and Poole, 1992). 
Amazonia of 1.8 million hectares per year, the gross C 0 2  emissions would 
be 250-360 Mtc (although not all appears immediately in the atmosphere). 
Emissions from deforestation in other regions of Brazil should be added t o  
this, however, the estimates are not readily available. These will be substan- 
tially smaller but are not insignificant. At the same time, processes which 
accumulate carbon occur, for example, regrowth of natural vegetation on 
abandoned land or forest plantations. The rate of natural regrowth can vary 
by a factor of 20 in humid tropical areas depending on the local landuse 
situation (Nepstad et al., 1990). The scale of countervailing sequestration 
is poorly understood. Despite these uncertainties, it is clear that emissions 
from deforestation dwarf those of fossil fuel use (60 Mtc) as well as from 
biomass use for energy (about 11 Mtc). The latter is consistent with the 
observation that  fuelwood use is not a major factor in overall deforestation, 
although it may be significant in some regions (e.g., charcoal from cerrado; 
mangrove). The primary direct cause is the clearing for pasture and crop- 
land, with logging often opening up the occupation process. 
2.3. Energy policy and landuse trend synergism 
The relationship between landuse trends and energy policy has not been 
fully explored in Brazil. Some points of interaction exist, of which the most 
important are the following: 
Fuelwood for industry and charcoal. This is the most important direct 
energy-related source of deforestation. The key issue is whether a deci- 
sive move to put these uses on a sustainable basis is justified or whether 
they should be phased out; 
Hydroelectric development in Amazonia. The relative priority, rate of 
development and ultimate potential may all be influenced by a strategy 
to  minimize deforestation. The major concerns are infrastructure and 
migration occasioned by hydro. Some projects may provoke deforesta- 
tion while others help to decrease i t ,  for example, on the Tocantins river 
(Moreira et al., 1990). This effect is likely to  be larger than differences 
in direct C 0 2  emissions from electricity which results from alternative 
scenarios of hydro/thermal generations and is always considered in plan- 
ning electricity supply. 
Availability of electric power for isolated communities. In Amazonia, 
above all, power shortage is a constraint in economic development which 
may favor more extensive resource exploitation (Poole et al., 1990). 
Fuel subsidies, especially for diesel, in Amazonia (Reis, 1991). 
The common denominator of C 0 2  emissions reinforces the need to  con- 
sider energy, landuse and regional development altogether. 
3. C 0 2  Mitigation Strategy 
3.1. Energy conservation 
Energy conservation was first introduced in the electricity sector as an im- 
portant tool for reducing the strong demand on new hydroelectric plant 
construction which increased five-and-a-half times of the total installed ca- 
pacity during 1970 and 1990. The initiative began at  the University of Siio 
Paulo as early as 1980 and at Companhia Energetica de Siio Paulo in 1984. 
The aspect of C 0 2  emission was not seriously considered even as a side effect 
since 95% of electricity produced is from hydro. In 1985, the interest in elec- 
tricity conservation motivated the federal government t o  create a national 
program, PROCEL. Its activities along with the high involvement of some 
academic institutions caused the issue of C 0 2  avoidance to  be easily incor- 
porated as another argument for energy conservation (Geller and Moreira, 
1991). 
As observed from the profile of electricity production in Brazil (see Table 
I ) ,  it is out of the question to  practise conservation mainly as an instrument 
t o  decelerate the installation of new energy supply facilities rather than as 
an instrument to  reduce C 0 2  production. New energy supplies must be 
provided in the near future to  fulfill the necessity of the growing population 
but, more than that, t o  provide more comfort to the present population. In 
the case of electricity, the astronomical cost of new hydro projects along with 
the present high cost of money are strong arguments for significant changes 
in the traditional hydroelectric approach. 
More recently, the increase in natural gas supply is being considered as 
a better economic solution for electricity production. National and imported 
coal, presently responsible for less than 2% of the national electricity supply, 
has a chance of becoming a more important source of electricity generation. 
Within this framework, electricity conservation can also become a tool to  
avoid explosive growth of C 0 2  emission in the long term. The concept 
of energy conservation for other sources of energy is relatively new and has 
gained importance only in the last five years since global warming has become 
a major concern. Fossil fuels are used mainly in industrial, transportation 
and household sectors. Recently, an organization similar to  PROCEL was 
created at the federal government level. This entity, CONPET, has a major 
responsibility to  improve energy uses from oil and natural gas. Obviously, 
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Figure 1. Consumption of primary fuels. 
the well-designed policies in this area will have a greater impact on CO;! 
mitigation than the efforts of PROCEL. 
3.2. Renewable energy supply 
Traditionally, Brazil and other countries in Latin America have invested 
heavily in hydroelectricity because of the following reasons: 
1. Availability of water resources compared with other regions of the globe 
(Table 4). 
2. Low investment cost for exploiting the best water resources opportuni- 
ties. 
3. Policies defined by Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) which prior- 
itize large projects due to convenience in administration and the guaran- 
tee that investment will be fully used since operational costs are minimal. 
Biomass is also an important source of fuel for the country. Contrary to 
the general trend in the world - relative participatory reduction in the energy 
matrix as countries develop - this has not been observed in Brazil due to  high 
commercial use of biomass (mainly, charcoal, ethanol sugarcane bagasse, and 
pulp residues). Figure 1 illustrates the decline in non-commercial uses being 
off-set by the increase in commercial uses. 
Table 4. Annual world water balance. 
Surface 
area Precipitation Evaporation Runoff 
(lo6 km2) (mm) (lo3 km3) (mm) (lo3 km3) (mm) (lo3 km3) 
Europe 10.5 790 8.3 507 5.3 283 3.0 
Europe 43.5 740 32.2 416 18.1 324 14.1 
Africa 30.1 740 22.3 587 17.7 153 4.6 
N. America 24.2 756 18.3 418 10.1 339 8.2 
S. America 17.8 1,600 28.4 910 16.2 685 12.2 
Australia and 
Oceania 8.9 791 7.1 511 4.6 280 2.5 
Antarctica 14.0 165 2.3 0 0 165 2.3 
Total land 
area 149.0 800 119.0~ 485 72.0 315 47 .0~  
Pacific 
ocean 178.7 1,460 260.0 1,510 269.7 -83 -14.8 
Atlantic 
ocean 91.7 1,010 92.7 1,360 124.4 -226 -20.8 
Indian 
ocean 76.2 1,320 100.4 1,420 108.0 -81 -6.1 
Arctic 
ocean 14.7 361 5.3 220 8.2 -335 -5.2 
Total ocean 
area 361.0~ 1,270 458.0~ 1,400 505.0~ -130 -47.0~ 
Globe 510.0 1,130 577.0 1,130 577.0 0 0 
OOutflow of water from continents into ocean. 
b~ rna l l  differences are due to roundoff. 
Source: Atlas (1977). 
The global environment advantages in using hydro and biomass have 
been considered in market promotion only in the last five years. Even then, 
the advantages are not fully recognized since greenhouse gas emissions from 
inundated biomass rich areas exist, and one-third of the total commercial 
biomass used is delivered from native forests (see Section 2.1). Also, local 
environment aggressions are reported due to  ethanol production and water 
dam construction. Nevertheless, the global benign effects of these energy 
sources are well recognized. C O z  production and the localized problems 
were also reduced mainly in the ethanol producing industries. 
3.3. Forest preservation 
Deforestation releases COz in the atmosphere because trees and forest soils 
hold 20-50 times more carbon than the crop or pasture system which typ- 
ically replaces forests when they are cut (Houghton, 1991). Estimates of 
carbon emission due to  deforestation in the tropics are highly uncertain due 
to  three main factors: rates of forest loss and clearing versus degradation, 
carbon stocks in various types of forest and soils, and the fate of deforested 
land, especially whether forests are cleared permanently or for shifting culti- 
vation in which short periods of cropping alternate with long fallow intervals 
during which the  forest regrows. 
In Brazil, concern with regard to  forest preservation is focused on the  
closed forest of the Amazon. Past policies favored the  exploitation of the 
Amazon for pasture and cropland. Logging and hunger for land by small 
farmers are also responsible for the usage of the forest area. 
Reduction in financial and fiscal incentives for commercial activities, de- 
crease in the country's economic activity, enforcement of existing legislation, 
and strong publicity in the importance of green areas preservation have de- 
creased the rate of deforestation in the Amazon. Measurements by satellite 
have shown a n  average annual deforestation rate of 1.8 Mha in the last 2 
years. Such efforts are expensive and require fundamental policy changes 
a t  every level from international and national t o  the individual. Macroe- 
conomic modeling suggests that  for every 1% reduction in deforestation, 
the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Amazon State would have t o  fall 
roughly 1.7% (Reis, 1991). While pessimistic in this sense, the model sug- 
gests a first approximation of COz abatement cost a t  the margin which is 
roughly US$4/tc according t o  the model's author. This low cost (equivalent 
to  a tax  of 0.50/barrel of oil) is probably an  upper limit since the model 
assumes historical relationships. 
3.4. Creation of C02  sinks 
The possibility of using fertile land and abundant water together with trop- 
ical temperatures t o  grow artificial forests t o  enable to  store C 0 2  is continu- 
ously under analysis (Marland, 1988; Myers, 1989; Noordwijk, 1989; Trexler 
et al., 1989). It is unquestionable that  advanced forestry, science, and good 
management can make afforestation growth rates mentioned in the above 
references look conservative. In Brazil, eucalyptus plantations produce over 
30 t/ha/year, with records over 70 tons (Hall and Rosillo-Calle 1990). In 
1989, a project known as FLORAN was presented with an objective of refor- 
esting and afforesting a total of 20 Mha with a mix of native and exogenous 
wood tree species (Ab'saber et al., 1989). 
4. Energy Conservation Policies 
Developing countries need energy services to raise productivity and to im- 
prove the standard of living. But the traditional way of meeting these energy 
needs, by increasing energy supplies with little attention to the efficiency of 
energy use, raises serious financial, institutional and environmental prob- 
lems. The magnitude of these problems underlines the need for improving 
efficiency with which energy is currently used and produced in developing 
countries. While the advantages of energy saving technologies are usually 
recognized, the common perception is that its widespread adoption will not 
occur because of high initial cost which is an important consideration for 
poor, heavily indebted countries. Studies show, however, that when the cap- 
ital requirements of both supply and end-use technologies are combined on 
a system-wide basis, highly efficient technologies reduce overall capital costs 
(Geller, 1990a; Goldemberg et al., 1988). The higher capital costs of the 
energy-efficient end-use equipment are offset by lower investment required 
for electricity generation. 
The rapid adoption of these technologies is, however, being retarded by a 
variety of technical, institutional, economic and financial barriers that occur 
throughout the entire technology transfer and diffusion process. 
Technical: Many improved technologies, although well established in 
industrial countries, may not be well adapted to  conditions 
in developing countries. People in developing countries may 
not be aware of new technologies or have access to the train- 
ing necessary to make effective use of new technologies. 
Institutional: Both public and private developers are organized to fund 
large-scale conventional energy supply expansion rather 
than demand-side energy efficiency projects. Rules and 
practices in the critically important electric power sector do 
not often weigh efficiency and renewable energy equally with 
conventional large-scale supply options in providing energy 
services. 
Economic Energy prices are frequently subsidized in developing coun- 
and tries and therefore provide neither the economic incentives 
financial: for energy-efficient equipment nor adequate revenues for sys- 
tem expansion. Particularly in poor countries, consumers 
may not have access t o  the capital needed for high initial 
costs of energy-efficient equipment (even though these tech- 
nologies reduce costs to  the user over the product's lifetime 
and lower overall capital costs for the nation). 
4.1. Technical policies 
(a) Publicity Campaigns 
Probably, the most widespread publicity campaign for energy conservation 
was carried out mainly through television by the incandescent light bulb 
manufacturers. Sponsored by Philips and General Electric, the campaign 
was launched t o  introduce an incandescent bulb that  was 10% more energy 
efficient. The motive for the private interest is not a t  all clear, but it can be 
attributed to  the interest of the government to  conserve energy in addition 
t o  commercial concern regarding the existence of official price control regu- 
lations. The campaign called the attention of the public to  the importance 
of conserving energy and was also implemented by the federal government 
during 1988, designated as the Year of Energy Conservation. 
At the state level, a campaign was carried out by the state of S i b  Paulo 
with the help of the state utilities. The campaign was based in popular 
fairs and designed t o  attract the people by presenting efficient products 
and technologies, and extensive use of computer softwares that  could 
evaluate the  cost /benefits of a particular technology. 
PROCEL spent over half of its budget for the period 1986-1989 on 
education, promotion, and information dissemination (ELETROBRAS, 
1990). 
Other utilities and energy agencies also funded information and educa- 
tion programs. 
Universities introduced graduate courses in energy planning with em- 
phasis on energy conservation. The first one which started as early as 
1982 was a t  the  Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, followed by the 
University of Campinas in 1987, and the University of Siio Paulo in 1989. 
These courses were attended by a variety of students, a significant num- 
ber of which were professionals working in utilities and oil industries. 
Seminars and workshops sponsored by the federal government, the Na- 
tional Congress, public utilities, and private enterprises are frequently 
held. Two major events (held biannually) are the Congresso Brasileiro 
de Energia and Congresso Brasileiro de Conserva~ao de Energia. 
Manuals and other educational materials in energy conservation have 
been produced for all consumer groups (Agencia, 1990). Data banks with 
information on energy conservation are available for all users with remote 
access to computer modem (Agencia, 1990). Studies and publications have 
been stimulated by sponsoring organizations, giving premium to the best 
ones. The most well known were the Pirelli premium in Energy Conservation 
and the Energy Conservation context of Secretaria de Ciencia e Tecnologia. 
Some daily newspapers have often carried out information on energy conser- 
vation and its achievements, and technical journals have advertised products 
based on its energy efficiency. 
Organizations created by the federal government have played an impor- 
tant role in disseminating information. The Executive Group for Rational 
Production and Use of Energy (GERE), an inter-ministerial organization 
quite active in 1990-1991, created a special program to disseminate infor- 
mation to all public institutions. The internal commission for energy con- 
servation (CICE) was officially installed in all public institutions with a de- 
mand for electricity and/or oil derivatives above a minimum level (Moreira 
and Iturra, 1992). The members of the commission (consisting of 5 or more) 
were instructed through workshops and direct mail about available technolo- 
gies and more efficient products which could be useful should expansions or 
retrofittings occur in their organizations. They should also be responsible 
for the energy bill and to initiate actions of better management in favor of 
energy consumption reduction. In early 1992, CICE has attracted more than 
700 members (Moreira and Iturra, 1992). The results of its activities are still 
not properly documented with the exception of one that was carried out on 
government buildings situated at the Esplanada dos Ministerios in Brasilia. 
At this site, 1.2 million dollars in electricity saving was achieved in one year, 
owing to better management (Moreira and Iturra, 1992). 
Another important achievement of GERE was the creation of CONPET 
in 1991, an official program similar to  PROCEL, only it addressed the issues 
on oil and natural gas conservation. The objective of the program was to 
improve the flow of information within the employees of the oil industry 
and its major clients and users in the same way as PROCEL has done with 
electricity. 
(6) Energy Audits 
Energy audits have become a popular tool for increasing the interest in en- 
ergy conservation. The auditing was performed by some state utilities in 
an  independent way but the main program was carried out under the aus- 
pices of PROCEL which sponsored and stimulated the auditing of small 
and medium-sized industrial and commercial buildings so as t o  identify no- 
cost and low-cost electricity conservation measures. Local utilities and their 
contractors promote and conduct the audits. During 1987-1989, PROCEL 
directly sponsored about 2,400 audits and CEMIG nearly a similar num- 
ber. In most industries, the audits have identified the measures that  could 
cut electricity use by an estimated 8-15% (Geller, 1990b). The evaluation 
showed that  some industries have immediately taken action which yielded 
about 30% of the total savings potential (Lattore et al., 1990). 
(c) Labels and Guidelines 
Appliance labeling programs have been used to  upgrade the stock of appli- 
ances by influencing manufacturers and providing consistent, comparative 
information to  consumers. Although few consumers use the labels in their 
purchasing decision, the program was considered incremental and cost ef- 
fective in improving the efficiency of appliances by introducing competition 
among manufacturers. 
In 1990, PROCEL proposed a series of efficiency regulations for new 
appliances, lamps, ballast and motors. The proposals were presented t o  
manufacturers as voluntary protocols rather than mandatory requirements. 
Both the appliance and lighting industries have signed protocols with PRO- 
CEL which call for technical cooperation as well as for efficiency improve- 
ment where possible, but without specific efficiency goals. Presently, all 
one-door refrigerators, wall-mounted air conditioners, and instant electric 
showers used for bathing purposes carry an  efficiency label. Recently, a joint 
effort of one large refrigerator manufacturer and a public utility a t  S h  Paulo 
has developed and introduced one-door refrigerators (270 1 capacity) with en- 
ergy consumption of 31 kwhlmonth and two-door refrigerators with energy 
consumption of 74 kwhlmonth.  These figures should be compared with the 
average consumption of replaced refrigerators, 43.6 and 98.0 kwhlmonth,  
respectively (Vodianitskaia and Schmid, 1992). 
GERE has been very active in trying to sign protocols with the auto- 
motive industry to  introduce efficiency labeling. However, the effort has not 
been successful due to the present economic difficulties being experienced by 
car manufacturers. 
4.2. Institutional policies 
Regulations and standards for energy conservation are still not operational 
in Brazil. Standards are efficiency levels established by governments for 
appliances, buildings or passenger cars. These are usually mandatory. Reg- 
ulations refer to controlling or directing conservation actions through gov- 
ernment rules or restriction. 
GERE has recently started to work in regulations. Its objective is to  
satisfy most of the federal government's electricity-intensive equipment and 
vehicles by using minimum energy requirement. CICE was recognized as a 
good instrument to  follow-up such procedures. One example of this action is 
being carried on a mammoth scale in a country-wide educational project with 
the purpose of constructing 3,000 new schools. For such buildings the illu- 
mination project requires minimum energy efficiency standards (PROMON, 
1991). 
A draft bill for Congress dealing with minimum compulsory standards 
for residential and commercial appliances has been subject to discussion 
for almost two years. Presently, a few private entrepreneurs and new NGO 
organizations such as the Instituto Nacional de Eficiencia Energetica (INEE) 
and International Energy Initiatives (IEI) has been supporting programs 
similar to the GREEN LIGHT project in the USA with an objective of using 
environmental protection actions as a tool to improve efficient energy use. 
Other efforts are being conducted by private enterprises to  install Energy 
Saving Companies (ESCO). 
Electricity tariffs are set by the federal government and are the same 
throughout Brazil. High-voltage industrial customers and low-consumption 
residential customers (the largest fraction of households) have received highly 
subsidized electricity in recent years (Geller, 1990a). For example, in 1989, 
high-voltage industrial consumers typically paid below $0.03/kWh and low- 
consumption residential consumers (less than 300 kWh/per month) typically 
paid under $0.05/kWh. During the last two years, the federal government 
has increased the cost of electricity mainly due to  financial crisis experienced 
by the electric utilities. The present average cost of electricity is shown in 
Table 5. 
In the medium term, tariffs are expected to increase even further to 
reduce pressures from MDB and to  generate money for utilities in order to  
Table 5. Example of electricity costs in Brazil, August 1992. 
Utilization Tariff Tax Final Cost 
Category factor (%)a (US$/MWh) (US$/MWh) (US$/MWh) 
High voltage 80 30.00 State 6.61 48.11 
Users 230 kV Federal 11.50 
and above 
Industries 70 34.65 State 7.60 53.75 
88 kV and above Federal 11.50 
Small industries 50 60.63 State 13.30 85.43 
Commerce Federal 11.50 
Residential 
300 kWh/month 
79.20 State 15.70 94.90 
Residential 97.70 State 24.10 116.80 
600 kWh/rnonth 
"Assumption was made for tariff evaluation since it is composed of a power cost (kW) and 
energy cost (kwh) .  It is assumed that a certain percent of the year the users will be in 
operation. Also it is assumed that the utilization factor is the same during dry and rain 
seasons. 
sustain a minimum supply expansion program. This effect should bring more 
room for energy-efficient technologies. 
4.3. Financial and economic policies 
With an encouragement from PROCEL, the National Development Bank 
started two financing programs for conservation projects by industrial, com- 
mercial and public sector enterprises. These two programs, PROEN (1986- 
1989) and PROEN AUTOMATIC0 (1989-1990), were poorly used by pri- 
vately owned enterprises because of insufficient promotion of the programs 
and low electricity prices during the period. Therefore they were discontin- 
ued. Efforts are now underway by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as INEE and KLABIN foundation, to  reopen the programs under the  
appeal of high electricity prices and concern for environmental preservation. 
Loans charge low interest rates (approx. lO%/year) and cover 70 to  80% of 
the total investment and a loan term of five years. The existence of such a 
program is an important condition for promoting energy conservation mea- 
sures that  are quite often cost-effective but unable t o  provide return in a 
short period of time compared to  commercial loans with an  annual interest 
rate on loans as high as 35%. 
Another possible way of implementing energy efficiency is through the 
operation of ESCO enterprises which could be supported partially by low 
cost external money. Compared with the Brazilian market, the interest 
rates in developed countries are much lower and good opportunities are open 
t o  outside investors. An obvious way is the utilization of MDB t o  finance 
projects and/or for the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to  grant them. 
Unfortunately, the MDB has high operational cost t o  administer low value 
projects that  are typical in the area of energy conservation. One attempt 
made in 1989, and a total volume of US$30 million was tied t o  a major 
amount which would be addressed t o  electricity supply. Difficulties in sat- 
isfying tariffs levels required by MDB impeded the disbursement for energy 
supply projects and consequently the minor amount. The loan was cancelled 
a t  the beginning of 1992. 
G E F  is totally open to  cost-effective projects in the area of energy con- 
servation and can provide grants t o  cover a portion of the total investment. 
Since ESCO companies are still in its initial stage of operation, and the fi- 
nancial situation is unlikely t o  motivate private investors, there has not been 
any attempt t o  prepare a proposal for consideration by GEF. 
5. Renewable Energy Supply 
Renewable energy sources are being pursued as cleaner options to  those de- 
rived from fossil fuels. In Brazil, hydroelectricity and biomass energy are 
the most favorable. In the area of hydroelectricity, competence for the con- 
struction and administration of medium and large projects are available. 
Some hydroplants are under construction but the present surplus of supply 
of nearly 3,000 MW of electricity, in a market of 25,000 MW, is obviously 
an  impediment for new initiatives. Simultaneously, the high cost of money 
(with interest rates of above lO%/year) limits the cost-effectiveness of such 
investments especially when the best sites are already explored as in the case 
of Brazil. The temptation is t o  shift from an almost pure hydro system t o  
the construction of thermoelectric plants which would be less expensive on a 
per capita basis and installable in a time frame shorter than the conventional 
hydro (Larson and Williams, 1988). Thermoelectric plants under consider- 
ation would use high viscosity oil, natural gas and biomass as sources of 
energy and operate with steam or gas turbines. 
Biomass is being considered as an  excellent option for tropical countries 
with significant land availability. Ethanol production from sugarcane is very 
successful, with a n  annual production of 14 million m3. Unfortunately, low 
oil prices have stagnated ethanol production since 1988. There is an interest 
now in this sector to use sugarcane bagasse, a residue of ethanol and sugar 
mills, as a source of extra electricity generation in these units. 
5.1. Technical policies 
Information on renewable sources of energy is spreading fast as a result of 
graduate courses at  universities, environment legislation being issued, gov- 
ernment and privately sponsored seminars and workshops, and increase in 
circulation of technical books and journals. A consortium of public and pri- 
vate enterprises supported a project for using biomass as a source of energy 
(BRASCEP, 1991), and part of the total investment is being covered by 
a grant from the GEF. The use of the advanced technology (conversion of 
wood in gases which will be burned in gas turbine combustors) demonstrates 
that technical competence is available. 
5.2. Institutional policies 
The government has set several institutional policies to foster ethanol use. 
All of the policies were introduced a long time ago when C 0 2  issues were 
not so popular (Geller and Moreira, 1991). Procurement, price regulation 
and preference for low cost loans are still in use today. In early 1990 when 
the federal government was reviewing its position with respect to alcohol 
use as a fuel, the issues of Global Warming and Social Fringe Benefits were 
included to justify its use (Secretaria, 1990). Thus, in an indirect way, it 
can be claimed that institutional policies for C02  mitigation, at least for one 
particular renewable energy source, exist. 
At the state level, a compromise between the government of SZo Paulo 
and sugarlethano1 producers was agreed in early 1992. The measure stated 
that electricity would be acquired by the utilities at  the marginal genera- 
tion cost when residues of the mills would be used as a primary fuel (Siio 
Paulo Governo, 1992). Thus, the market space is preserved by institutional 
action. Tied to the same interest, Eletrobras - holding of public electric 
utilities - has decided to guarantee special tariffs for electricity produced 
from the demonstration unit above the market price, and this was partially 
sponsored by the GEF project. This decision recognizes the necessity to 
promote demonstration projects for modern technologies. 
The use of ethanol and its impact regarding COz production has ben- 
efited from institutional measures prepared for other purposes. Carbon 
monoxide (CO) is the major concern regarding air quality in big cities. The 
use of 78% gasoline and 22% ethanol blended to power 60% of all automo- 
biles in Brazil has been guaranteed at least in the city of Si5o Paulo to avoid 
excessive CO engine exhaust release when ethanol fraction is less than the 
specification, to which proper engine tune-up was performed. Other state 
legislation, imposed by the Secretary of Environment, exists which requires 
the maintenance of 22% content of ethanol (Decree 1553, State of Parana, 
published on August 19, 1992). Since ethanol shortage and opposing inter- 
ests from the oil industry have always retarded ethanol use, such measures 
have avoided market reduction with the frame benefit of adding near zero 
COz emission to the atmosphere. 
Deregulation of fuel prices is being considered by the federal government. 
The issues were discussed with the ethanol producers at the beginning of 
1990. The major conclusion was that a significant number of sugar/ethanol 
mills located in the State of Sib Paulo should be able to compete with gaso- 
line in a free market. Competition will be possible provided that no further 
investments would be made in the mills' production expansion. Since only 
the producers from the State of Sib Paulo (with exception of a few regions) 
would be able to survive, the action would destroy the Alcohol Program in 
the country because nobody would buy an automobile which could run ex- 
clusively in one particular state. Thus, deregulation, if introduced, should 
be partial, preserving some economic advantage for ethanol against gasoline. 
5.3. Financial and economic policies 
Ethanol use as an automotive fuel has not been economically feasible. Sub- 
sidies were always used as a way to guarantee commercial competition. The 
volume of subsidies has changed over time. They are much less today than 
during the 1975-1985 period. Subsidies will also be provided for the demon- 
stration unit of electricity generation through biomass gasification. Low 
interest rates on capital to finance private enterprises are available from the 
Federal Development Bank. Such loans treat energy and renewable energy 
on the same level as other investments and are able to cover up to 60% of 
the total cost. As mentioned in Section 4.3, a special loan program already 
existed for energy and negotiations are currently underway to re-establish 
it. 
6. Forest Preservation 
6.1. Technical policies 
As discussed in Section 2.1, biomass is used as a significant source of energy 
and as a raw material for charcoal, the pulp and paper industries. End-use 
efficiency of biomass is very poor for most of its energy use. Cooking with 
wood requires 0.6 ton of wood per capita per year compared to cooking with 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) that  requires an amount of energy equiva- 
lent t o  0.15 tons of wood per capita per year (Goldemberg et al., 1988). 
Improvements in stove efficiency are well known and fuel switching is even 
more recommended. 
The charcoal industry is much more aggressive t o  forests than cooking. 
Charcoal is widely used for the production of pig iron and steel. The overall 
amount of energy used per ton of pig iron and steel is larger than coal-based 
steel. Technical improvements are required to  increase the conversion rate 
of wood in charcoal and to  reduce the amount of charcoal consumed for 
each ton of steel. Biomass consumption can be reduced by 30% with low 
cost technologies (Moreira and Poole, 1991). More modern technologies are 
available for the production of charcoal but there is a lack of information 
about them. 
The pulp and paper industry uses raw material from man-made eucalyp- 
tus forests and competes in the international market to  export a significant 
part of its production. A policy for technological improvement related t o  
energy consumption in the processing phase is necessary to  compete in the 
market. 
Change in land-use trends is a major source of deforestation. Technolog- 
ical policies to  avoid the problem range from more productive agricultural 
exploitation t o  confined cattle ranching. Again, the alternatives are well 
known but more intensive marketing of these approaches must be carried 
out. 
6.2. Institutional policies 
The vast biological diversity and extensive area of Brazil are factors which 
cause difficulties in the preparation of a National Forestry Policy. Analysis 
on forest legislation shows that  the main document dealing with targets and 
objectives of such subjects is the Forestry Code which was issued as Bill 
Number 4771 in 1965. This document has, unfortunately, set rules and reg- 
ulations for land occupation as the only way of protecting natural forests. 
Such an approach emanated from the issue of native soil occupation which 
was a major concern at that time. The Code has set economic mechanisms to 
stimulate afforestation and reforestation, but only the fiscal incentives were 
completely adapted and used. This particular mechanism induced reforesta- 
tion on 6 million hectares within a 20-year time span with an investment of 
US$5 billion. 
During the last few years, the mechanism was abolished. Simultaneously, 
an increased awareness on the importance of environmental preservation 
motivated a build-up of legislation requiring compulsory reforestation from 
rural and industrial entrepreneurs who used biomass as raw material for 
their economic activities. One possible legislation was Bill Number 0242 of 
1988 which required all commercial organizations using forest products as 
raw material to have man-made forests satisfy their needs completely. 
Another potential legislation is a bill, still being discussed in Congress, 
which defines forest policies for the Amazon Region with the following goals: 
1. Preservation of Amazon ecosystem 
2. Sustainable use of natural resources 
3. Integration of the Amazon in the country 
4. Protection to the indigenous population 
5. National security 
To achieve the goals the following actions should be implemented: 
1. Build complete ecologic and economic zoning; 
2. Discipline and regulate the process of human occupation and land prop- 
erty areas; 
3. Define government property areas; 
4. Define Indian reserves; 
5. Create and implement in native preserved areas (as defined in item 1) 
the appropriate exploration activities; 
6. Set rules and regulations for rational exploitation of fauna and flora; 
7. Intensify research on fauna and flora and on the preparation of qualified 
human resources; and 
8. Promote environmental preservation through better education. 
6.3. Financial and economic policies 
The Brazilian Forestry Code, in effect since 1965, was designed to use several 
financial and economic tools to enhance forestry activities. Unfortunately, 
most of them as credit, interest rate and appropriate financing term were 
never the object of regulations; tax exemption on man-made forest prod- 
ucts was cancelled; tax exemption on land property covered by forest which 
was established on the code was cancelled and treated on the same basis 
as agricultural land; income-tax exemption from profits due to  man-made 
forest exploitation was vetoed and the total deduction on the income tax 
from investment required for the establishment of man-made forest was sub- 
stantially modified as time went by. Fiscal incentives for reforestation have 
been the only financial policy for forest development. The results from this 
program were already discussed in Section 6.2. 
Regarding new tree plantation due t o  commercial forest exploitation, 
a Fund for Compulsory Forest Replantation was formed. With the funds 
collected, a reforestation program was implemented (REPEMIR). This pro- 
gram was promoted in few states and was an important incentive mechanism 
for entrepreneurs to  plant new forests. 
7. C 0 2  Sinks 
Since carbon-free energy sources (e.g., safe nuclear, solar, renewable bio- 
mass, and wind) are future technologies that  may take decades before making 
significant global contribution to  energy supply and may not be useful for 
all countries, carbon scrubbing is a very important priority. The advantage 
of removing C 0 2  from a large, concentrated source such as the flue gas of 
a power plant compared to  direct removal from the atmosphere is obvious. 
C 0 2  is nearly 500 times more concentrated in flue gases compared to  its 
dilution in the ambient atmosphere. 
At least three different scrubbing technologies for C 0 2  removal exists: 
cryogenic distillation of C 0 2  from flue gases, separation by membrane, and 
chemical absorption. The cost estimates of the various options range from 
U S 2 5  to  US$45 per ton of C 0 2  removed (Hendriks et al., 1991). Unfor- 
tunately, the amount of carbon generated by scrubbing alone would be gi- 
gantic. For example, a single automobile produces its own weight in carbon 
per year. Thus, the best solution would be its use as raw material for plas- 
tics and construction materials, but this possibility is still far from being 
operational. 
Another method of C 0 2  sequestration is the use of biomass. Photo- 
synthesis by plants is the only viable,technology for absorbing carbon from 
the atmosphere. Thus it is not surprising that  energy experts see massive 
afforestation as an opportunity for removing large amounts of C 0 2  emit- 
ted. Many difficulties are anticipated for the success of such technology, but 
the cost of C 0 2  sequestration seems quite reasonable. An evaluation of the 
FLORAN project - a mega-reforestation world effort where the Brazilian 
participation will require tree plantation over 20.1 million ha  in a period of 
30 years - will absorb 7.7 tc/ha/year with the final result of 5xlOE9 t c  ab- 
sorbed as COs, representing 4.3% of the excess of atmospheric carbon above 
the pre-industrial index of 273 ppm (Ab'saber 1989). Since the typical re- 
forestation costs in Brazil are estimated by FLORAN as US $400-1000/ha, 
the total investment will be US$15 billion or US$3/tc absorbed with zero 
interest rate. At a more realistic interest rate of 3%/year (the historical 
average cost of money in developed countries), the cost would be US$7.3/tc. 
7.1. Technical policies 
Improved forest management will yield sizeable payofis. Man-made forests 
for the pulp and paper industry have achieved high yields (see Section 3.4). 
Replication of successful innovations and best practices are probably more 
important than new research. Decentralized approaches are needed, includ- 
ing support from the local people. In the area of innovation, there is a 
space for improved crop and tree genotypes, and for specific agro-ecological 
conditions where large productivity gains are possible (e.g., in the case of 
sugarcane crops in Brazil, productivity gain of 4% per year was achieved in 
a decade of research with annual investments under US$30 million) (COP- 
ERSUCAR, 1989). 
The strengthening of land-related institutions and training is needed 
in the country. Forest departments still have low status compared with 
agriculture. Also, information dissemination on the importance of C 0 2  sinks 
would circulate more rapidly if there was a carbon tax. 
7.2. Institutional policies 
Emission taxes or charges (i.e., t o  tax  emissions or raw material inputs, 
e.g., carbon proportional to  emissions) is a possible way t o  enhance man- 
made forest growth. Money generated from tax collection could be used 
in reforestation. Limiting the total quantity of emissions and allocation 
of the rights t o  emit carbon dioxide in accordance with some principle of 
equity, and permitting t o  buy and sell for money is another interesting policy. 
Emission taxes or the creation of tradable rights t o  emit would have a similar 
and direct effect on the price of carbonaceous fuels. The outcome could be 
positive for reforestation since this could be understood as a way of offsetting 
C 0 2  emissions. Such policies are difficult t o  implement since they require a 
global agreement (or involvement of most developed countries). 
Once mega-reforestation starts it will be necessary to  guarantee the 
preservation of the areas. This can be achieved through appropriate legisla- 
tion and continuous surveillance. Forests are very often planted for reasons 
other than for its use as raw material and energy source. Soil protection, 
reduction in erosion and consequently water dam siltation have motivated 
investments in tree growth. Institutional measures that  set limits on the 
amount of sediments carried by water in strategic rivers used for electricity 
generation would stimulate man-made forests. Such limits should be set in 
accordance with the local value of energy. 
Another way to  promote reforestation for C 0 2  abatement is the ratio- 
nale of the "long view" of the damage done. But the long view is inconsistent 
with the economic approach to  discounting. Conventional benefit-cost ap- 
proaches would regard $1 of future damage as being less important that  $1 
of damage now because of the phenomenon of discounting. The problem is 
that  discounting discriminates against future generations. 
As cited by Pearce (1991) there are two options for accommodating the 
distant nature of the effects of global warming and other environmental costs. 
The first requires that  some intergenerational criterion of sustainability be 
imposed, leaving the "conventional" discount rate unmodified. The second 
involves seeking some quantitative adjustment to  the conventional discount 
rate. 
7.3. Economic and financial policies 
Much of deforestation and land degradation is simply due to  lack of in- 
vestments and interest by central governments and planners. The amount of 
money involved is huge as was roughly quoted for implementing project FLO- 
RAN. The unique possibility is the establishment of international sources of 
financing and grants. One obvious way t o  collect the necessary fund is t o  
charge the mitigation costs for C 0 2  abatement to  the cost of energy pro- 
duced from fossil fuels. This seems a natural consequence of what is being 
practised today in most energy supply projects. New dams for hydropower 
production, for example, must incorporate in its cost a variety of expen- 
ditures required t o  finance actions t o  reduce the social impact of people 
displacement, the biological impact due to  extermination of native species, 
and all other risks associated with the project. This practice is a requirement 
either from the government of a country or from the financing organization 
(MDB). In a similar way, fossil uses should incorporate in their costs the 
amount of money required to  finance C 0 2  sequestration a t  a global level. 
8. Conclusion 
A historical review of policies used and implemented in Brazil with direct and 
indirect effects on C 0 2  mitigation was presented. In some cases, desirable 
policies and arguments in their favor were discussed. 
Efficient energy end-use is probably the easiest option to  achieve the goal 
since most of the required new technologies are cost-effective and provide 
short payback time to  users and society. Renewable energy sources, mainly 
biomass, is the natural option to  curb C 0 2  emission when more energy is 
added to  the supply system. 
Deforestation and afforestation are much more complex issues when it 
comes to  economic analysis. Capital investment is required t o  avoid defor- 
estation, to  create new job opportunities, and to  make the necessary research. 
Better life conditions must be offered to  the poor in order to  curtail using 
natural forest as a source of survival. 
Financial support from developed countries is necessary in the form of 
low cost loans for efficient energy end-use and new energy based on renew- 
able sources. Grants from external organizations must be addressed to  the 
country to  overcome the economically infeasible question of deforestation 
avoidance and afforestation. Only under these circumstances will policies 
already in use as well as others being proposed in this paper be effective. 
C o n  emission is a global problem and has to be solved with global money. 
Brazil and some other developing countries have already made significant 
economic efforts to reduce global warming through massive investments in 
hydroelectricity and ethanol. Such options are costlier than the traditional 
ones and represent participation of the Brazilians in solving the global prob- 
lem. Continuation of such efforts or significant action in other areas are 
beyond the country's economic capability. 
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1. Introduction 
In parallel with the negotiation process leading to the Framework Conven- 
tion on Climate Change (UN, 1992), there has been widespread activity on 
assessing the costs associated with the possible effects of climate change and 
the possible ways of avoiding or reducing them. This has involved the appli- 
cation of various types of models representing global, regional, and national 
aspects, and focusing on time scales from the short to  long term. The use 
of a wide variety of model types with divergent results and conclusions has 
emphasized the urgent need for comparable cost estimates and standard- 
ization of methods and assumptions. This is complicated by the intimate 
interrelation between global and national economic development, and by the 
very different national settings. 
The UNEP costing study was started in December 1991 (UNEP, 1992a) 
with the aim of developing comparable national GHG costing studies for 
developed and developing countries. In the first phase the participating 
countries were Zimbabwe, India, the Netherlands, and Denmark. These 
have now been joined by Brazil, Venezuela, Egypt, Senegal, and Thailand 
for the second phase of the project. The first phase was primarily a review 
of already conducted global and national GHG costing studies, while the 
second phase comprises a joint methodological and empirical effort, using 
common guidelines and economic assumptions for the national studies in 
participating countries (UNEP, 1992b). 
This paper focuses on the methodological background for defining com- 
patible economic assumptions for national abatement costing studies. The 
discussion is specifically related to the "agreed incremental cost" concept as 
stated in the Climate Convention (UN, 1992) and to the problems associated 
with constructing suitable national reference and abatement scenarios. Fi- 
nally, the methodological discussion is related to modeling experiences in the 
UNEP country studies of Zimbabwe, India, the Netherlands, and Denmark. 
2. Relation to the Climate Convention 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN, 1992) which was signed 
at the UNCED meeting in Ftio de Janeiro in June 1992 lays considerable em- 
phasis on issues of cost. The precautionary approach is accepted, subject 
to the caveat that measures adopted should be "cost effective". This is not 
defined, but clearly questions relating to the economic cost of limiting emis- 
sions (as well as the benefits of doing so) will be crucial to the future policy 
debate. Furthermore, the convention focuses upon "incremental cost" in 
relation to the transfer of financial resources for GHG abatement in the de- 
veloping countries. "Incremental cost" is not defined in detail in the climate 
convention, but can be understood both in relation to project implementa- 
tion and to more general economics of total abatement strategies. 
There are a number of potential definitions of "cost" and "incremental 
cost". Some studies underway are attempting to clarify appropriate defi- 
nitions for use in relation to the convention (King and Munasinghe, 1992; 
London Economics, 1992). There are also extensive debates on the quan- 
tification of benefits to be gained from limiting emissions (Nordhaus, 1991; 
Cline, 1992). 
Avoided climate effects will provide both global and national benefits. 
Economic theory indicates that an efficient global GHG reduction policy 
should fulfill the condition that the marginal global benefit of GHG reduction 
is equal to the marginal cost of the reduction. The benefits of avoided climate 
effects, seen from a national point of view, cannot be expected to be the same 
as the global benefits. Countries which gain a relatively small benefit from 
global GHG reduction could therefore argue that they need some kind of 
"compensation" in order to live up to globally specified emission reduction 
targets. This is particularly important because of the widespread view in 
developing countries that the "responsibility" for current atmospheric GHG 
concentrations is that of the developed countries. 
In view of the considerable uncertainties inherent in climate impact as- 
sessment, the present UNEP project does not include the estimation of the 
benefits of reduced climate change. This means that benefits of avoided 
climate impacts cannot be used as a metric for the "results or gains" of a 
GHG abatement strategy. Instead, a GHG emission reduction target com- 
pared with baseline emission in a given year can be defined as the goal. The 
aim is then to assess GHG abatement costs in the countries involved for an 
interval of reduction targets, covering small reductions as well as relatively 
far-reaching reductions. 
The use of discounting factors for GHG emissions has recently been 
advocated in discussions on the comparison of abatement projects imple- 
mented a t  different times and with different emission patterns over time. 
Such a transformation could also include a weighting of different greenhouse 
gases according to  their atmospheric life times. A positive discounting fac- 
tor would give short-term reductions higher value than long-term reduc- 
tions. The use of discounting assumes a specific exponential form for the 
time-dependent "benefits" associated with GHG reduction, which may be 
an over-simplification of the time dependence problem. It is, moreover, very 
important to  distinguish between time dependence related to global and 
national emission-reduction targets. The time dependence of emission re- 
ductions must be determined at  the global level where all types of GHG 
emissions and national contributions are taken into consideration, and this 
cannot enter directly into partial national analyses. A more appropriate pro- 
cedure would be to  carry out country specific abatement cost assessments 
for a range of reduction targets and GHGs and for different time steps, and 
afterwards use this information as input to global cost-efficiency studies. 
3. Joint Benefits of GHG Abatement 
GHG abatement can lead to a number of economic and environmental ef- 
fects other than climate impact and this complicates the assessment of GHG 
abatement costs. These effects may include employment, balance-of-trade 
and equity effects, and reduced environmental impacts like local air pollu- 
tion, acidification, water pollution, and solid waste. These related benefits 
must be defined and measured according to  a specific national goal function. 
A strict definition of incremental costs would imply that international 
funding for GHG abatement in any country should be reduced to  account 
for any related benefits which that country would receive. Local benefits 
would be assumed to be in the national economic interest and should there- 
fore be achieved by local means, and this could present severe problems in 
relation to developing countries. The definition of incremental cost is thus 
an extremely difficult and potentially controversial problem which is likely to  
involve competing interests between different groups, and conflicts between 
different economic and environmental issues. 
Following economic theory, the benefits of a given action must be mea- 
sured according to  the preferences of the agents who are affected by the 
action. In practice these preferences can be difficult or even impossible to  
reveal, especially for non-traded goods, such as environmental effects. A 
further complication is that  agents who are negatively or positively affected 
by an environmental externality caused by GHG abatement, will have an 
interest in "overvaluing" or "undervaluing" the importance of the effect, re- 
spectively, either because they expect to  gain an economic compensation, or 
because they do not expect t o  pay the bill for reducing the externality (the 
so-called "free-rider" problem). 
This can be exemplified by the problems associated with measuring the 
costs and benefits of a GHG abatement option like the construction of large 
hydropower plants. Several external effects are associated with such an in- 
vestment, including direct economic loss to  the agricultural and other pro- 
duction sectors, loss of recreational and optional values, and health impact. 
The higher these values are measured to  be, the higher the incremental cost 
will appear. 
It is not possible to solve these valuation problems in any simple way, ei- 
ther by internationally agreed assumptions or by national research and judg- 
ment. However, it may be instructive t o  go as far as possible in the  physical 
and economic estimation of costs and benefits associated with specific op- 
tions and abatement policies, and to  discuss the importance and weight of 
the different parameters as seen from the national and international points 
of view. It is essential that  this information is submitted for open and de- 
tailed scrutiny so as to  allow critical investigation by international experts 
on implicit valuation attributes. 
4. Defining Scenarios 
The determination of abatement cost involves the comparison of an abate- 
ment scenario with a "non-abatement" reference situation. The definition of 
the  scenario for the reference case, however, may present considerable diffi- 
culties. This is particularly evident in developing countries where economic 
and technological development may be expected t o  fluctuate and continue t o  
be dependent on external funding t o  a greater or lesser degree for some time 
into the future. Reference scenarios for many developing countries cannot 
therefore be derived on the normal "business as usual" basis. 
Reference scenarios for developing countries should assume no particu- 
lar GHG abatement. This means, for example, that  there should be no bias 
against the use of fossil fuels, a t  least for GHG abatement reasons. The ref- 
erence scenario should assume a continued development of the  energy system 
along similar lines t o  the past decade. It must be assumed, however, that  
modern efficient technology is installed, as capacity is replaced or extended. 
It may be particularly appropriate to  include two reference scenarios: 
a n  optimistic future, in which developmental goals are fulfilled according to  
official plans and the required resources are available, and a more pessimistic 
future in which funding is heavily constrained, and planned industrial and 
social development is not achieved as rapidly as hoped. 
The GHG abatement scenarios should assume a bias against fossil fuel 
use, particularly coal, toward higher efficiency than the reference, increased 
use of renewable energy, including large and small hydropower, and concen- 
tration on the use of sustainable biomass resources for the production of 
modern fuels. 
As with the cost and benefit measurement referred to  above, there is 
a "bias problem" associated with the definition of the reference scenario. 
Full and detailed information on the reference scenario must be presented, 
and this information should be discussed in relation to  any relevant official 
forecast made by national authorities or international organizations. 
National scenarios must be constructed on the basis of consistent global 
scenarios describing economic growth and fuel price projections, and some 
indication of technological development. Recently developed scenarios pro- 
vide convenient common reference points (WEC, 1992; IPCC, 1992). The 
precise relation between global and regional scenarios and national scenarios 
is difficult t o  define in general, and therefore it is left t o  the judgment of the 
national teams in the UNEP project to  decide on how the exogenous global 
scenario assumptions influence national growth patterns and energy system 
development, etc. 
The abatement costs in each country are, in principle, dependent on the 
actions of every other country, through the effect on fuel prices, industrial 
competitiveness, trade, etc. This makes it difficult t o  define national ref- 
erence and abatement scenarios in a consistent way relative to  the global 
situation. It can generally be concluded from a broad review of GHG cost- 
ing studies (UNEP, 1992a) that the effect of a 50% reduction in projected 
global COz emissions from fossil fuels on average global GDP is likely t o  be 
small, amounting a t  most to  a few percent compared t o  baseline in 2020 or 
2030. Therefore, it seems appropriate to  assume the same average global 
G D P  growth rates in the reference and abatement scenarios. 
Fuel prices, on the other hand, must be expected to  change as countries 
introduce significant abatement measures, leading to  depressed demand for 
fossil fuels. The extent and timing of such reaction will be the result of 
the concerted abatement efforts in many countries, rather than one country 
alone. This can be solved pragmatically by defining two global fuel price 
scenarios, consistent with current thinking, to  be used as the exogenous 
background for the country studies. 
Partial national abatement studies assume implicitly that  the abate- 
ment cost in each country is assessed within a static global environment in 
which the abatement actions of the remaining countries are predetermined. 
The alternative t o  this would be a full simultaneous optimization where all 
countries and abatement options are represented. Such an analysis would 
inevitably be a t  a more aggregated level. 
The global fuel price assumptions can be incorporated in the national 
abatement analysis in three distinct ways as described below. 
First, the national reference scenario and an abatement scenario can be 
constructed on the basis of the global reference fuel price scenario. This 
combination can be interpreted as representing abatement in one country, 
in a world in which fuel prices have not yet been affected by a substantial 
worldwide abatement effort. 
Secondly, both the national reference and abatement scenarios can be 
based on global fuel prices affected by considerable worldwide abatement. 
This represents the case of a country undertaking abatement in a world in 
which compliance with a far-reaching agreement on global GHG limitations 
is already a reality and therefore has affected international fuel prices. 
Thirdly, the national reference scenario can be based on the global ref- 
erence fuel prices, while the national abatement scenario assumes the global 
abatement-affected fuel prices. This corresponds to  the theoretical case in 
which one calculates the cost incurred in one country of simultaneous global 
compliance with a climate agreement from a starting point of no abatement 
a t  all. This cost can be interpreted as the economic loss to  the country which 
follows from a binding global climate convention which may embody varying 
benefits for different countries. The result is an important indicator of the 
country-specific interest in the establishment of such an agreement. On the 
other hand, when an agreement is in fact established and being implemented, 
globally affected fuel prices will eventually be a reality for the countries, irre- 
spective of whether they undertake abatement. Therefore, a cost assessment 
using different global fuel prices in the national reference and abatement 
scenario will not be an appropriate indicator for the necessary compensation 
t o  equalize national and global benefits of GHG limitation. 
In conclusion, it seems that  the most consistent and informative way 
of using global fuel price scenarios in partial national studies is to  calculate 
cost differences pairwise between national reference and abatement, keeping 
global fuel prices constant, either a t  the reference level or a t  the global level. 
5.  Construction of Abatement Cost Curves 
One of the most important results of a national GHG abatement analysis is 
the construction of an abatement cost curve, which shows the relationship 
between emission reduction targets and associated costs. Ideally, such a 
curve should cover a wide range where both small GHG reductions and 
larger reductions are represented. Thus a GHG reduction cost curve must, 
by nature, be an aggregate of many different technical and structural changes 
and this needs to be treated in a detailed integrated system model. 
GHG reduction in the energy system can be achieved through changes a t  
many stages, involving a.wide variety of different energy technologies. Fully 
cost-efficient abatement should consider all available abatement options on 
an equal footing, a t  end-use, conversion, and production stages. A cost- 
efficiency analysis of GHG abatement in the energy system must therefore 
be able to compare all these different options in an integrated procedure. 
One important background concept for GHG reduction cost curves is 
the Least Cost Utility Planning approach developed in the USA during the 
1970s and 1980s. The method was originally designed to  treat electricity 
savings and electricity supply technologies together. Thus electricity sav- 
ing appliances (such as new refrigerators or low-energy light bulbs) could 
be considered in the planning process alongside new power plants and other 
supply-side developments. Since either type of technology achieved the so- 
cietal goal of satisfying an energy service requirement, a true "least cost" 
solution was feasible. The method was developed in opposition to  the dom- 
inating planning method, still used in many countries, which neglected po- 
tential energy savings and planned new supply capacity on the basis that 
the utility could or would not influence future demand. 
An important part of the Least Cost utility approach is that both elec- 
tricity "demand technologies" and "supply technologies" are measured by 
the same economic, technical, and environmental parameters. This means 
that all demand technologies such as refrigerators, low-energy light bulbs, 
electricity efficient industrial processes, etc., are assigned energy efficiency 
and emission factors. These attributes are defined in relation to  the refer- 
ence power system behind the analysis and have in some studies been directly 
translated into an abatement cost curve (Lovins and Lovins, 1991). 
Such a procedure can be satisfactory for the lower part of the cost curve 
where each abatement option can be recognized as representing a marginal 
adjustment of the total energy system. If, however, more fundamental, non- 
marginal, structural changes of the supply system, such as fuel substitu- 
tion and the introduction of combined heat and power (CHP) systems, are 
considered, then the economic and GHG emission "values" for the demand 
technologies are not unique and cannot be determined independently of the 
supply system. Any investment alone can influence the total economy and 
GHG intensity of the energy system. Technologies must therefore be assigned 
different economic and GHG emission "values" depending on the system in 
which they take part. 
Different types of existing energy system models can be used t o  estimate 
such an advanced cost curve. Energy system optimization models as well 
as integrated energy system simulation models are relevant (UNEP, 1992b). 
The idea of both these types of models is t o  determine any point on the 
cost curve as the least cost solution for a total energy system compared 
with a reference system, where in principle all demand and supply system 
parameters can vary. 
The procedure in constructing a cost curve using an integrated energy 
system simulation model will include the following main elements: 
1. Ranking of possible technological options on a partial basis related t o  a 
reference case calculated with an energy system model 
2. Introduction of different "baskets" of GHG reduction technology options 
(chosen with starting point in step 1) calculating a large number of 
scenarios for possible GHG reductions and related costs. 
3. Choice of the lowest costs for a given reduction of GHG, thus establishing 
an envelope curve for the annual GHG emissions reduced and the annual 
costs related. 
A probable result of such an analysis is that  a given GHG emission tar- 
get can be fulfilled with several energy system solutions which on the whole 
are economically equivalent. Such energy system solutions may, however, be 
quite different technically, for example, with regard t o  the dominant power- 
generation technology, or the weighting of investments in demand or supply 
technologies. It must be expected that  the technical variety among the eco- 
nomically "comparable" energy system solutions will expand with increasing 
GHG reduction targets. This is, in itself, an important conclusion, which in- 
troduces the possibility of other parallel criteria for project judgment such as 
complementary environmental effects or specific national economic interests. 
According t o  this method, a GHG reduction cost curve must be consid- 
ered as a kind of theoretical relationship between GHG emissions and energy 
system costs. It  is not possible t o  identify a unique technical energy solution 
at all points on the curve, but the procedure aims a t  showing the magnitude 
of the cost of GHG reductions throughout the range. At the same time, the 
curve shows some energy system solutions which are economically relevant 
for the fulfillment of a given GHG reduction target. 
In order t o  investigate the time dependence of abatement strategies, 
the potential development pathways for a few selected energy system so- 
lutions (abatement strategies) on the cost curve can be examined in more 
detail. The first part of the cost curve should represent the partial cost and 
emission-reduction values of the most valuable projects. The next part of 
the curve should subsequently include the next most valuable projects and 
should be calculated on the assumption that the technologies in the first 
part are implemented, and so on for the rest of the curve. The purpose of 
making such a detailed time-dependent analysis is t o  determine the  robust- 
ness of a presumably efficient energy system in relation to irreversibility and 
uncertainties. 
Although some elements of the problem have been treated in different 
energy model studies, the cost curve concept is not fully developed yet. 
Studies must be extended t o  investigate system integration aspects in more 
detail. It is especially important to make the cost curve concept dynamic 
with respect t o  technical constraints, and to  analyze time dependence in the 
costing of abatement options. 
Priority should also be given to  attempts t o  integrate macroeconomic 
impact assessments into the cost curves constructed by energy system mod- 
els. The  most important links which could be included are macroeconomic 
forecasts of energy demand and factor price effects originating from relatively 
large abatement efforts. On the other hand, investment requirements asso- 
ciated with implementing a given energy system solution should be coupled 
t o  a macroeconomic investment function. An example of such an integration 
is the MARKAL-MACRO model (Manne and Wene, 1991). 
6.  Modeling Experience in Country Case Studies 
The  country case studies of Zimbabwe, India, the Netherlands, and Denmark 
in the first phase of the UNEP project have identified some very important 
practical problems in abatement scenario construction and cost assessment. 
For Zimbabwe and India, appropriate emission forecasts, and energy and 
economic system data  are not presently available and must be built up as 
part of the  abatement costing study. For the Netherlands and Denmark, 
a great deal of useful da ta  and models exist and efforts are already well 
underway to link technical-economic and macroeconomic models and to an- 
alyze regulation schemes in detail. A brief summary of the methodological 
elements in the country studies is given below. 
Zimbabwe. The Department of Energy along with a local consultancy, South- 
ern Centre for Energy and Environment, are conducting the country study 
in cooperation with a Danish project team (Maya e t  al., 1992). The main 
activity in the project is to establish an emission data base and an energy 
system model, where energy system and biomass emissions can be treated 
in a consistent way. This will be related to the official economic plan of the 
Zimbabwe government. This plan is not generated by a formal macroeco- 
nomic model, and therefore it will only be possible to investigate the energy 
system-economic system link qualitatively in the country study. 
The market plays a minor role for the energy sector in Zimbabwe at 
present. For example, the coal mines are heavily subsidized due to national 
economic interests. For this reason, economic regulation mechanisms are less 
appropriate for encouraging GHG limitation in the current situation. Im- 
portant national, social, and economic interests are embodied in the existing 
regulation system for the energy system and the economy as a whole, and 
GHG emission reductions are not given a particularly high priority. In view 
of the scarcity of financial resources in Zimbabwe, the implementation of 
GHG abatement options is heavily dependent on international agreements 
and transfers. 
India. A country study is being carried out by Tata Energy Research Insti- 
tute (TERI, 1992). 
Relatively detailed emission and energy system data are available for 
India and these have been used for constructing an abatement cost curve by 
ranking "up-front" investments. In the next step, this analysis will provide 
input to a more comprehensive energy optimization model. 
Macroeconomic forecasting is difficult to carry out for the Indian econ- 
omy because the market generally plays a minor role, although a wide rang- 
ing liberalization is now taking place. At the same time, there is a large 
informal sector which is not covered by official economic statistics. For this 
reason, the project team has chosen to analyze the macroeconomic effects 
of abatement strategies in a Computable General Equilibrium Model using 
shadow prices for scarce natural and economic resources. 
GHG abatement is recognized as only one among several important na- 
tional goals for economic policy, employment, equity, and environmental 
effects. Similarly, capital scarcity and relations to international aid organiza- 
tions are important restrictions for the implementation of GHG abatement. 
The Netherlands. The country case study is carried out as a cooperation 
between a technical-economic expert team at  ECN and a macroeconomic 
team from the Free University of Amsterdam (van der Burg et al., 1992). 
Several technical-economic and macroeconomic studies of GHG abate- 
ment costs have been carried out, but they are not comparable because of 
inconsistent assumptions. The most advanced energy system studies have 
been made using an LP optimization model (MARKAL), deriving one op- 
timal abatement strategy for a given reduction target over a time period. 
This solution cannot be directly related to a more specific GHG reduction 
path. Neither can it provide the detailed sectoral investment and consump- 
tion information which is needed if a macroeconomic model is to be coupled 
to  the analysis. 
Implementation issues and related costs are not treated in the technical- 
economic models and therefore it has been difficult to use the results together 
with macroeconomic results where economic regulation, such as GHG taxes, 
are considered. At the same time the abatement cost estimates made by 
macroeconomic models seem to have been very dependent on tax recycling 
schemes and related investments. 
Denmark. The Danish case study is being carried out by a technical- 
economic project team at Riso National Laboratory (Morthorst and Grohn- 
heit, 1992). 
A wide ranging planning activity was carried out in conjunction with 
the Danish Energy 2000 action plan. Part of this involved the construction 
of a purpose-built energy system simulation model. This technical-economic 
model contains a very detailed data base for electricity and heating savings 
for households, service sector and, industry coupled to end-use technologies. 
The forecasts for energy demand and technological development were only 
partly coupled to  macroeconomic analysis. In the current activity, new sce- 
nario calculations are being made, involving direct coupling of the official 
macroeconomic model of the Danish Ministry of Finance to the technical- 
economic model. 
Previous Danish GHG abatement costing studies have concluded that 
a number of "no-regret" options exist, and consequently, that C 0 2  emis- 
sion reductions compared to  1990 emissions can be made relatively cheap 
over the next twenty years. In order to  validate these results, a parallel 
research activity is studying different means of regulation and the political, 
organizational, and social barriers to energy savings. 
7. Conclusion 
The Convention on Climate Change will enter into force ninety days after 
it has been ratified by a t  least fifty countries. In the period leading up t o  
ratification, a number of points and concepts in the convention will have 
t o  be clarified and expanded upon so that  signatory countries have a clear 
understanding of what the obligations involve. One important area for such 
clarification is that  of costing, in particular the obligations of each country 
for reporting of the cost of limiting GHG emissions. The ongoing UNEP 
study referred t o  in this paper aims to  contribute through the formulation 
and refinement of guidelines, including the execution of national studies in 
selected countries by local teams. 
A central notion in the UNEP activity is the building of local expertise 
and familiarity with the concepts of GHG abatement costing in the countries 
concerned. The small core of countries involved in the first phase of the 
project is now being expanded with the addition of Brazil, Egypt, Senegal, 
Thailand, Venezuela, and possibly others. Thus the study will cover a wide 
range of geographical, economic, and developmental settings, allowing the 
proposed methodological guidelines t o  be discussed and tested in a broad 
forum. 
It is unlikely that  the difficulties inherent in the concepts such as "agreed 
incremental cost" and the definition of reference and abatement scenarios 
will be solved completely by undisputed "scientific" means. The difficulties 
should rather be treated pragmatically through broad discussion, and def- 
initions sought which can meet with consensus and which best reflect the 
aims of the convention. National abatement analysis should therefore be car- 
ried out as a collaborative effort between national technical and economic 
experts, and public authorities, and thereafter laid open t o  international 
scientific discussion and investigation. 
The costing methodologies and models are bound t o  vary from country 
t o  country depending on local traditions and availability of data. Never- 
theless, general consensus on some basic concepts, such as the definition of 
the baseline scenario and the construction of cost curves, is likely to  con- 
tribute t o  a better understanding and acceptance of the procedures within 
the Climate Convention. We believe that the UNEP study represents and 
important step in this direction. 
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Abstract 
This paper states knowns and unknowns about efforts to curtail greenhouse 
gas emissions (mitigation) and lessen the harm of climate change (adapta- 
tion). The knowns about mitigation are that decarbonization and efficiency 
of the energy system are advancing steadily; some mitigation will be cheap; 
strict curtailing of emissions might cost 2 percent of gross domestic prod- 
uct (GDP); gradual control steps are better; and doubling of atmospheric 
concentration is not inevitable. Knowns about adaptation are that vulnera- 
bility to climate is lessening; climate change might cost 0-2 percent of GDP; 
analysts should assume adaptation rather than dumb farmers; and analyses 
of mitigation and adaptation need integration. Questions are how energy 
prices affect emissions; whether it is preferable to regulate emission prices or 
quantities; the shape of the damage function from climate change; ways to 
improve long-term predictions of socio-technical systems; how much policies 
intended to  affect emissions matter; and the opportunity costs of focus on 
the climate issue. In conclusion, prosperity and technical progress may make 
both mitigation and adaptation affordable and avert the climatic danger. 
1. Introduction 
Greenhouse warming vexes us because destruction threatens on one side if 
we do nothing to curtail emissions but bankruptcy threatens on the other if 
we do much. Can the growing evidence that both adapting to the climate 
change and curtailing the emissions will be affordable resolve the dilemma 
and still our vexation? 
This dangerous question animated the Workshop on Costs, Impacts, and 
Possible Benefits of COz Mitigation held in September 1992 in Laxenburg, 
Austria, under the auspices of the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis (IIASA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). This essay draws on the papers and discussions at the Workshop 
first to state the answers which the Workshop and related recent research 
allow and then to  ask the questions the answers provoke. "Mitigation" is 
the curtailing of emissions. "Adaptation" is the lessening of the harm or the 
increasing of the benefits of climate change. 
2. Answers About Mitigation 
Decarbonization and eficiency of the energy system are advancing steadily. 
Decarbonization is the progressive lightening of the amount of carbon used 
to  produce a given amount of energy, as the energy system favors molecules 
that favor hydrogen over carbon (Figure 1). Twenty years of energy analyses, 
largely by Arnulf Griibler, Cesare Marchetti, and NebojSa NakiCenoviC at  
IIASA, were needed to reveal and establish firmly this most fundamental 
of all trends in the energy system, which has held for 150 years (Figure 2). 
Appreciation of decarbonization is recent (Ausubel, 1991a). 
Decarbonization began long before organized research and development 
in energy and has continued with its growth. The long-term rate of decar- 
bonization is about 0.3 percent per year. Many ways to  continue down the 
curve have been documented (NakiCenoviC, 1992). 
During the 1970s and the 1980s the countries that reduced their carbon 
emissions were for the most part countries that expanded nuclear energy 
(Figure 3). The 150-year history suggests an ever-changing evolutionary 
envelope of opportunities. 
The history of the efficiency of the energy system is similarly encour- 
aging. Though each country follows its own path, dependent on specifics 
of geography, capital stock, and other factors, the direction is decisively ef- 
ficient (Figure 4). In the United States, as an example, on average it has 
taken about one percent less energy to  produce a good or service each year 
since 1800. Thus, it takes less carbon to produce not only a unit of energy 
but a unit of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 5). 
Some mitigation will be cheap. 
Many estimate that a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 20 percent 
below what they would otherwise be comes at  low or no cost (Weyant, this 
volume; National Academy of Sciences, 1992; Pearman, 1992). Estimates 
range between 10-40 percent, depending on approach and assumptions. It 
will not be difficult to  achieve lower rates of emissions, hewing to  the courses 
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Figure 1. The atomic structure of typical molecules of coal, oil and gas, 
and ratio of hydrogen to carbon atoms. 
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Figure 2. Decarbonization or the changing carbon intensity of primary 
energy for the world. Carbon intensity is calculated as the ratio of the sum 
of the carbon content of all fuels to the sum of the energy content of all 
primary energy sources. Carbon emission in tons carbon per kilowatt year 
are: wood, 0.84; coal, 0.73; oil, 0.55; and gas, 0.44. Courtesy A. Griibler 
and N. Nakitenovit. 
of both decarbonization and efficiency, even in China (Jiankun et al., this 
volume). Pieces of ripe fruit are hanging low, waiting to  be picked. Some 
argue that  low hanging fruit will continue to  ripen with each decade. 
Strictly curtailing emissions might cost two percent. 
What if society chooses t o  go beyond the  favorable "dynamics-as-usual" of 
the energy system? After all, population and economic growth can dominate 
efficiency gains and decarbonization, resulting in absolute emission growth. 
Studies of Brazil, Japan, Russia, the European Community, and developing 
countries, and a survey of models suggest that  the price of strictly curtailing 
greenhouse gases might be 2 percent of gross domestic product (see respec- 
tively, Moreira, Amano, Bashmakov, Koopman et al., Pachauri and Khanna, 
and Dean, this volume). Globally, 2 percent of gross world product might 
stabilize emissions a t  present levels. Some confidence in the estimate comes 
from the  lack of contradiction in the results of diverse models. The models 
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Figure 3. Decrease in COz from 1973-1988 for major OECD countries from 
nuclear power. Source: After Bodansky, 1991; data from OECD, 1990. 
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may be more reliable than a few years ago. Coefficients are estimated with 
more and better data. Superior algorithms calculate the results. 
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Gradual control steps are better. 
Gradual use of policy instruments to  control emissions is preferable to  abrupt 
moves. Quantifiable benefits exist for acquiring new information about costs 
that  can influence policy design (Kolstad, Peck and Teisberg (a), this vol- 
ume). An economically efficient path is more likely if policies evolve through 
regular rounds of review and negotiation. 
Doubling of concentration is not inevitable. 
Studies of the greenhouse effect conventionally analyze the climate when 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are twice the pre-industrial 
level, or 600 ppm, usually estimated to  occur about 2070 AD. The good news 
from studies of mitigation is that the canonical doubling of concentration 
kgoelUSS 1985 GDP 
China 
1988 - 2.m.93 USA 1 1820 - 2,4711.27 
t France 
kg Ckgoe 
1 
Decarbonization of Energy 
Figure 4. Trajectories of energy efficiency and decarbonization for selected 
countries. Courtesy A. Griibler and N. NakiCenoviC. 
can be avoided. Cresting around 500 ppm is feasible, if we stay on course to  
wring most of the carbon out of the energy system over the next 100 years. 
This conclusion is important for adaptation studies, because most adap- 
tation studies have been pegged to at least a 600 ppm world, which may 
well be more distant than 2070 or never come. Doubling is founded on 
technological and political stagnation. Interestingly, a scenario in which de- 
carbonization was reversed and efficiency almost freezes was labelled by the 
IPCC (1989, p. 341) "business-as-usual" and served as the reference case for 
most IPCC adaptation studies. 
3. Answers About Adaptation 
Vulnerability to climate is lessening. 
A range of social and technological developments have lessened human vul- 
nerability to  the natural environment, including climate (Ausubel, 1991b). 
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Figure 5. Diminishing carbon intensity of GDP for selected nations. Anal- 
ysis includes fuelwood and other renewable sources of energy. Source: 
NakiCenoviC, 1992. 
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The lessening trend is widely repeated throughout the  world, explained by 
industrialization, better built structures, telecommunications, and institu- 
tional innovations, in short, development. 
Compare yourself to your grandparents and great grandparents. Cli- 
mate surely mattered more for our ancestors who crossed perilous seas in 
windblown boats, struggled with horses and wagons through the mud when 
it rained, prayed for a shining harvest moon, and dried fruits and canned 
vegetables to  tide them over the long winter. 
Numerous facts confirm the lessening. For example, the tornado death 
rate has decreased sharply in the United States in this century (Figure 6). 
With indoor malls for shopping and domed stadiums for athletic events, 
climate matters less. 
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Figure 6. Tornado death rate: Actual (solid line) and fitted trend (dashed 
line) for the United States, 1917-1990. Source: National Safety Council, 
1992. 
Is the trend valid globally and for developing countries? Nordhaus (per- 
sonal communication) addressed this question by analyzing the changing 
shares of population and output associated with agriculture. Indices of 
agriculture, the prime activity exposed to  climate, are probably the best 
measures of vulnerability to  climate. In 1987 agriculture provided about 
15 percent of total world output. As Figure 7 shows, a small fraction of 
world output is currently produced in economies that  are heavily depen- 
dent on agriculture. In 2050 only about 5 percent of global output may be 
agriculture. 
This measure elevates goods rather than people. Though the developed 
nations may account for 80 percent of current gross world product, only one 
billion people dwell in these less vulnerable economies, while over 4 billion 
struggle in the developing world. Though most of the developing countries 
hope to  develop substantially by 2050, some certainly will fall short. 
The proportion of population (by nation) gaining income from agricul- 
ture shows that  people vulnerable to  climate change are more plentiful than 
World Output (%) 
Figure 7. Distribution of the share of economic activity in agriculture ar- 
rayed by the fraction of world output (sum of gross national products) for 
1987 (solid line) and projected for 2050 (dashed line). The area under the 
line, representing in total the share of world output in agriculture, is a mea- 
sure of vulnerability. For any given segment of gross world output, the closer 
to  the horizontal axis, the lower the vulnerability. To project the situation 
in a new climate, GDP in 2050 for each country is estimated by extending 
average growth rates 1965-1987 to  2050, with some downward adjustments 
for countries such as Japan and Korea that have had high growth rates un- 
likely to be sustained for six more decades. Then the relationship between 
per capita GDP and the share of the economy in agriculture that existed 
in 1987 for the cross-section of countries is applied. Source: After William 
Nordhaus, New Haven, Connecticut, USA, personal communication. 
output (Figure 8). In the industrialized countries, the vulnerable are few. 
But, 60 percent of the world's population still earns 40 percent or more of its 
income in agriculture. Yet, the trend again is toward a lessening of vulner- 
ability to  climate. By 2050 the share of world population heavily reliant on 
agriculture is projected to  halve, though the absolute number would remain 
about the same. 
Hazard is a largely human construct. As the American engineer Nor- 
man Augustine (1987) observed, trailer parks cause tornadoes. Typhoons 
World Populatlon (%) 
Figure 8. Distribution of the share of economic activity in agriculture 
arrayed by the fraction of world population (sum of national populations) for 
1987 (solid line) and projected for 2050 (dashed line). Source: After William 
Nordhaus, New Haven, Connecticut, USA, personal communication. 
matter when an empty low-lying coastal island in the  Bay of Bengal gains 
100,000 residents. Hurricanes pass without legacy unless buildings are badly 
constructed and sited, as many were in southern Florida. Grain reserves, 
crop insurance, and futures markets decrease the disaster of drought. 
Climate change might cost 0-2 percent. 
Studies suggest that  the cost to  gross world product of the  climate change 
accompanying a C 0 2  doubling might be between about 0.25-2.0 percent 
(Fankhauser, Scheraga et al., this volume). The amount is logical. If agri- 
culture is heading toward 5 percent of world product in a 600 ppm world, 
loss of 20 percent of farm output would take 1 percent. Losing even the 20 
percent of farming output and 1 percent of total output is unlikely as well as 
intolerable. Nevertheless, this 1 percent plus another 1 percent from other 
problems, such as rising seas, does add t o  a loss within the range mentioned. 
If estimates of costs of climate change are biased to  date, the bias is likely 
to excess costs because most studies incorporate little or no adaptive behav- 
ior, as discussed below. Reassuringly, a novel, independent way of assessing 
the economic worth of climate through land values, which already reflect 
adaptation, produces preliminary results that also point to small numbers 
(Mendelsohn et al., this volume). 
Though the small numbers may reassure the person on the street, they 
can upset people who have invested their time in climate change or want t o  
avoid all risks. 
One reason is that the small impact numbers cause a political problem 
for budgets of science and environmentalism. High estimates of the cost of 
impacts have been used to justify large expenditures for research projects, 
particularly for satellite programs, and drastic surgery on the energy system. 
The small numbers also cause discomfort when compared to  other rel- 
evant numbers. When used in a cost-benefit analysis, the conclusion might 
be that no social response is warranted, if avoiding the problem costs 2 per- 
cent and incurring the problem costs only 1 percent. Costs could outweigh 
benefits (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, this volume). 
Four serious defenses are mounted against the small percentages. 
One is that in absolute terms the numbers are large. 1 percent of today's 
gross world product is about $200 billion. 2 percent of gross domestic prod- 
uct is about what industrialized nations, including the private and public 
sectors, now spend on environmental quality in total. The numbers may be 
hard t o  discern in statistical tables but not in the political process. 
A second defense is that the distribution of costs will exacerbate prob- 
lems well above what the magnitude suggests. In short, the poor will suffer 
more (Scheraga et al., this volume), and they will add heat to warming. 
A third defense is that further research on impacts and adaptation may 
reveal added costs. People search for neglected considerations or flaws in the 
analyses. 
Threats to  health hold hopes of high costs. What about deaths from 
hot weather? In the United States in 1989 of 95,000 killed in accidents, 201 
died of the heat and 94 in storms (Table 1). Cold took five times as many 
as heat. From that perspective global warming does not appear a direct 
hazard to public health. The conjecture that greenhouse warmth will aid 
the emergence of alarming new viruses can form a fallback position. 
More compelling is the scarce understanding of consequences for ecosys- 
tems and other non-marketed goods (Jansen, this volume). Results from 
one experiment with an artificially constructed tropical ecosystem suggest 
that increased COz fertilization can promote losses of soil carbon and the 
Table 1. Deaths due to injury, United States, 1989. 
All Accidental Deaths 95,028 
of which: 
Transport 50,436 
Falls 12,151 
Poison 6,524 
Fire 4,716 
Drowning 4,015 
Medical 2,850 
Excessive cold 1,015 
Excessive heat 20 1 
Storms & floods 94 
Source: National Safety Council, 1992. 
release of mineral nutrients similar to the effects when sugar is added to 
soils (Koerner and Arnone, 1992). Yet, natural vegetation near gas vents 
which create a chronically C02-enriched atmosphere suggests that plants 
have acclimated without trauma (Miglietta and Raschi, 1993). We are in 
speculation. By changing the climate, the context for nature and conserva- 
tion shifts. The consequences could be large. Assessment is hard, especially 
in monetary terms. 
The fourth defense is that actions must be evaluated not only for ex- 
pected net costs (or benefits), but also for the levels of uncertainty surround- 
ing them. Here the "Precautionary Principle" for environmental manage- 
ment comes into play. The Precautionary Principle is a legal term found in 
a growing number of international environmental agreements (Cameron and 
Abouchar, 1991). The declarations of the Second World Climate Conference 
and the UN Conference on Environment and Development cite it. Basically 
it requires that proof of no harm exist before an activity is allowed.' 
The Precautionary Principle may be understood as the appropriate 
treatment of uncertainty. To a considerable extent it equates with risk aver- 
sion. The Precautionary Principle should significantly influence decision 
making where there are abrupt thresholds in loss functions or possibilities 
of very large or infinite damages. 
When asked the question "Would you prefer a certain million dollars or 
a gamble with an expected value of a million dollars?", most respondents will 
prefer the certain million. If the level of uncertainty surrounding the benefits 
is high, this fact is extremely important in the formation of strategy. Such 
'In the extreme, the Precautionary Principle equates with "guilty until proven inno- 
cent," or, in Robert Frosch's words, the injunction, "Don't do anything for the first time." 
uncertainty is a reason the insurance business is profitable. I t  also accounts 
for the popularity of casinos, where, however, most people play for small 
stakes. 
The Precautionary Principle is a warning to  take into account risk aver- 
sion in making decisions under uncertainty. Making the Principle opera- 
tional for global warming is difficult because decision-makers disagree about 
the probability and size of potential losses. Within economics, this disagree- 
ment is usually displayed in divergences over the appropriate discount rate. 
Environmentalists resort t o  the possibility of climatic calamity as a 
trump card (Cline, Grubb, this volume). Should, therefore, the central esti- 
mates or best guesses about costs and benefits of mitigation and adaptation 
be ignored in favor of contingencies based on outlying possibilities? 
The specter of doom always hangs. The Old Testament of The Bible 
records the prophet Jeremiah in 612 B.C.: "I looked upon the earth and lo 
it was waste and void, and to  the heavens and they had no light. I looked 
on the mountains and lo they were quaking, and all the hills moved t o  and 
fro. I looked and lo there was no man and all the birds of the air had fled. I 
looked and lo the fruitful land was a desert and the cities were laid in ruins." 
(Jer 4:23-26) 
The climate issue deals with deep human fears, the oldest human fears. 
It evokes the list of Kates (1992): Are we too many, will there be enough, is 
there too much, will humankind, any kind, survive? 
The debate over climate is the latest occasion for these concerns, and 
we want to  hedge against catastrophe. Whether the probability of climatic 
catastrophe is 1-1000,l-100, or 1-2 is unknown and perhaps unknowable. A 
survey of 19 experts suggests the mean probability of extremely unfavorable 
impacts for a 3OC warming over a century is about 1-20 (Nordhaus, personal 
communication). Additional research in the natural sciences may not help 
reduce the number of possible worlds but increase it. 
Our ancient fears will never go away. Jeremiah preached for forty years, 
and during that  time, as far as we are aware, nature was not unusually harsh. 
Political catastrophes befell the Jewish people, including the Babylonian 
exile. Concern, like energy and matter, is conserved, and catastrophe always 
could happen. The climate issue ultimately reduces not t o  what is known 
but t o  fear of the unknown. 
In short, f 1 percent may well remain the reference estimate for cost of 
climate change, with arguments raging about the shape of the distribution 
in which this is a good guess. 
Assume adaptation, not dumb farmers. 
Most studies of the impact of climate change assume that the climate shifts 
over the next decades and other matters such as technology, trade, and diet 
change little or not at all. The impact of climate is usually calculated as 
the difference in production between today's output and that in a different 
climate superimposed on today's farm or city. Because today's activities 
are adapted to today's climate, the estimated impacts of climate change are 
usually losses. 
Scaling up or multiplying studies made for small areas to cover larger 
ones tends to create a further negative bias. Compensating possibilities 
for trade, migration, and emergence of new activities to benefit from new 
conditions are neglected. 
The Adaptation Panel of the National Academy of Sciences (1992) study 
on global warming definitively ends the reliance in climate impact studies on 
"dumb farmer" scenarios in which people, like turkeys, stare up at the rain 
with open mouths until they drown. After the massive political and media 
attention to climate during recent years, many people who need to know 
that climate is likely to change over the next decades and century are now 
aware of it. Even without the media attention, people are alert to changes in 
their environment. We should study the responses of smart farmers, smart 
businessmen, and smart householders, as well as dumb ones. 
Climate change should not be superimposed on the world as it is, but 
on the world as it may be. The Missouri-Iowa-Nebraska-Kansas (MINK) 
study offers an advanced approach to considering impacts and adaptation 
(Rosenberg and Crosson, 1991). The effort to foresee climate 30 years hence 
is matched by effort to foresee other changes in the region over the same 
period. 
Importantly, adaptation does not require waiting. Much adaptation is 
anticipatory. Like its counterpart mitigation, adaptation often takes the 
form of investment. 
A prime example of adaptation is weather forecasting. The weather 
forecast precedes the storm, so behavior can adjust. Adaptation need not 
rely on one climate scenario but can prepare for a variety of conditions: 
dryer, wetter, hotter, stormier, more variable. 
In fact, fitting human life better to a warm environment is a necessity. 
About 75 percent of today's population of 5.3 billion live in what are now 
developing countries, which are largely hot countries. By 2020 the world's 
population is expected to exceed 8.2 billion, and 85 percent of that will be in 
the countries now categorized as developing. Growth rates are highest where 
annual average temperature is above 20°C. Regardless of climate change, a 
growing share of the world's population will dwell in high temperatures in 
the next century. Changes in the percent of the world's population living in 
different climate zones will be influenced much more by population growth 
than by changes in climate, for several decades a t  least. 
Global warming is a reality for the human population even if our emis- 
sions stop today. More efficient, pleasing, and less environmentally damaging 
ways t o  live in hot areas can help billions of people regardless of climatic 
shifts associated with greenhouse gases.' 
The vulnerability of societies to  environmental hazards can certainly 
be further lessened, especially in developing countries. We need to identify 
the actions which can reduce vulnerability and avoid the behaviors which 
increase it. These are the central tasks of adaptation and justify the impor- 
tance of adaptation research. 
Integrate analyses of mitigation and adaptation. 
Almost always analysts set mitigation and adaptation in opposition or con- 
sider them unrelated alternatives. Setting mitigation and adaptation against 
one another may enliven the debate, but it makes the debate academic as 
well as unsound. 
The production that  creates emissions creates the income that  pays for 
both mitigation and adaptation. Rising incomes have provided countries, 
regions, and individuals the means for overcoming a sequence of environ- 
mental problems. The World Bank (1992) has proposed a provocative set of 
relationships between income and pollution (Figure 9). The Bank finds that  
increasing per capita income is applied early to provide water supply and 
urban sanitation. As income rises further, problems with local air quality 
continue t o  worsen, but these also crest and are solved by prosperity. 
In contrast, the Bank concludes that  the production of carbon dioxide 
and garbage have yet to show signs of abating with increase in per capita 
wealth. The analysis of NakiCenoviC (1992) suggests the Bank's picture of 
carbon dioxide emissions is not complete and possibly wrong. Per capita 
carbon dioxide emissions must be viewed as a function of both technology 
21t is curious that this Unaturalw warming is ignored. The preference for addressing 
Uman-madew additions to the environment also appears in regulation of carcinogens and 
radiation. If the goal is to reduce risks to human health and safety, high payoffs may 
well come from reducing exposure to natural carcinogens and radiation. In the case of 
climate change, adapting to actually existing climate variation may be more rewarding 
than planning for sea level rise. 
Figure 9. Relationship between environmental problems and income 
growth, based on cross-country regression analysis for data from 1980s. Ap- 
proaches based on time series for individual countries may yield a different 
pattern for carbon dioxide emissions. Source: After World Bank, 1992. 
and income and may well be at  or near saturation in many industrialized 
nations. 
To illustrate the influence of income, consider the scenario prepared by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency t o  study impacts of unimpeded 
growth in the emissions of greenhouse gases (Lashof and Tirpak, 1989). An- 
nual global income in the year 2100 reaches $35,600 per capita, about 8 times 
the present level. The economic activity producing such incomes can surely 
emit much gas. It also permits purchase of water desalinating plants, dikes, 
and umbrellas, as well as energy-efficient and low-carbon devices. Moreover, 
technologies for energy efficiency can aid both mitigation and adaptation. 
A well-engineered residence or office can reduce both emissions and vulner- 
ability to  weather and climate. 
Nearly all studies to  date have failed to  address thoughtfully the question 
of the resources that  may become available for adaptation or how wealth 
itself may enhance the preference for clean energy. The resources available 
for adaptation are largely the same ones as for mitigation. It is curious to  
propose that  societies will be rich in looking a t  energy alternatives and poor 
in considering approaches to  provision of water and food. 
The common sets of resources that  should be considered in analyzing 
mitigation and adaptation are social as well as financial and technical. Cer- 
tain mitigation strategies may require a cooperative social order or new 
lifestyles, within a nation or internationally. Assumptions about social or- 
der and structure also have implications for the capacity to  adapt. 
Conversely, the knowledge haunts us that, if development fails, many 
problems will be more serious for nations than climate change. 
Explicit treatment of the rate of technical change is particularly impor- 
tant  for an  improved, consistent set of analyses of mitigation and adapta- 
tion. With respect to  mitigation, it is fashionable to assume rapid progress 
in energy technologies, particularly for energy efficiency. Yet, comparable 
assumptions are scorned with regard to  plant genetics, protection of human 
health, and supplies of freshwater. If the worldwide research and devel- 
opment enterprise is successful in energy over the next 50 years, work in 
materials, information, telecommunications, and other fields important for 
adaptation is unlikely to  trail behind. The same cluster of technologies will 
determine practice in the future with respect to  emissions and adaptation, 
just as the electric motor is found in both power plants and household ap- 
pliances today. 
Adaptation and mitigation must be analyzed within a consistent, dy- 
namic framework. This needs to  be reflected in the organization of academic 
research, within national studies, and in the activities of the IPCC. 
At a national level, exemplary progress is found in the study of the 
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (1992), based on the well- 
posed question: "For a warmer planet with more people, more trade, and 
more C 0 2  in the air, can U.S. farming and industry prepare within a few 
decades to sustain more production while emitting less and stashing away 
more greenhouse gases?" 
At a global level, the first dynamic, integrated model of climate change 
and the economy now functions (Nordhaus, 1992a; 199223). Enough infor- 
mation about adaptation and mitigation exists to calculate an  optimal in- 
vestment in curtailing C 0 2  emissions. The calculation has been made and 
cannot be ignored. 
Though the broad understanding of mitigation and adaptation has ad- 
vanced rapidly, vexing questions remain, some technical and some funda- 
mental. 
4. Technical Questions 
How do energy prices affect emissions? 
The questions of how and when prices matter are baneful for energy 
economists. Powerful short-run effects have been demonstrated by the oil 
price flares of the 1970s. Studies comparing energy use in countries where 
consumers face different prices argue for strong relationships as well. But 
major questions remain about transferability of experience from one setting 
to  another and about long-run behavior (Hourcade, this volume). Long-run 
price elasticities in the energy sector are not well-understood. 
A problem is that  energy prices do not want to change. Crude oil prices, 
one of the most telling index prices for energy, have been strikingly constant 
since about 1915 except for the few flares (Santini, 1990). Neither resource 
depletion nor market manipulation by producers or consumers has had a 
sustained effect. A strong invisible hand does indeed appear to  be a t  work. 
This hand may not help those who see high prices as the best route to  low 
emissions. 
Of course, prices paid a t  the gas pump may vary greatly even if those a t  
the wellhead do not. Filling a tank costs much more in Rome than in Riyadh. 
Better understanding of end-use behavior is critical t o  the success of policies 
that  rely on taxing energy or changing its price t o  reflect full social costs. I t  
is impressive that  even the price flares which were sustained for 5-10 years, 
while they brought recessions and temporarily depressed emissions for heavy 
energy users, left the configuration of the energy system intact. In energy, 
the price of repression may be affordable for a few years but the price of 
revolution out of reach. 
In fact, most of the emissions "saved" or avoided globally since the early 
1970s are not attributable to  actual price rises. Rather they are caused by 
growth of nuclear energy (now saving about 112 Gt C/yr over the probable 
alternatives); global economic slow-down which has lessened energy demand 
by 10-20 percent of what it otherwise would be; and "autonomous" efficiency 
gains proceeding a t  1-2 percent year. Of course, expectations about prices, 
as  well as actual prices, may have played a role. 
More insight would be helpful as a new round of aggressive play with 
energy taxes begins. It would hardly be surprising if high energy prices 
(disguised as taxes) fall quickly after a few years. Transport, housing, food, 
and other sectors resist alteration in the share of the social budget which 
they receive. 
One price puzzle is how innovative technologies become economically 
superior to those they replace. At the time of introduction, the fresh com- 
petitors are often decidedly inferior by standard bottom-line calculations. A 
combination of continuing technical improvements, productivity change in 
related industries, economies of scale in production, and the growth of re- 
lated networks for provision of goods and services work to  their advantage. 
Also, richer consumers change tastes. 
In brief, as much as prices may pinch, they are not sufficient alone t o  
explain quantities. 
An important asymmetry has also appeared in the price debate. Scarcely 
anyone thinks now about the virtues of cheap energy, a popular theme in the 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Should all the benefits of low energy prices 
be forgotten because of environmental issues? 
Is i t  preferable to regulate emission prices or quantities? 
In a classic paper, Weitzman (1974) pointed out that  under conditions of 
perfect information prices and quantities are equivalent control instruments. 
With perfect information a market-based system is superfluous, because a 
center could specify the efficient output (quantity) for every producer. In- 
formation is imperfect, and several studies conclude that  an approach based 
on prices (including taxes) may be economically several times as efficient as 
regulation of quantities. 
But, where marginal costs are uncertain, an error in the quantity of out- 
puts (including pollution) may occur. The reduction that would be achieved, 
for example, in greenhouse gas emissions by a given price or tax  for carbon is 
not known in advance. If the impacts of climate change on society are highly 
nonlinear, as the proponents of Precautionary behavior uphold, then even 
small quantity errors may be intolerable. Reliance on taxes then becomes 
risky. 
A system of marketable permits could achieve a specified reduction while 
equalizing marginal costs (Okada and Yamaji, this volume). A market for 
emissions trading requires high quality data  about baseline emissions, infor- 
mation about the characteristics of site operations, sound models of conse- 
quences, and means for emitters to  identify and contact one another. Some 
have expressed optimism about creation of a worldwide greenhouse gas per- 
mit market (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1992). 
Others, less sanguine, argue that  the market will take decades t o  form and 
trading will be thin. Experience with the Clean Air Act in the United States 
suggests that  pollution markets are still experimental and may need twenty 
or thirty years t o  bustle. 
Will institutional and other considerations allow market formation and 
operation quick enough to  respond to  the fears that  are driving social action? 
Idealized discussion is often shocked by the harsh tests of practice. What-  
ever the analytic community will propose will be distorted by politics and 
institutions. The resulting laws and regulations will also have some perverse 
effects. 
Moreover, in most countries green taxes will prove unpopular like other 
taxes. People hate taxes. Public skepticism is warranted that  governments 
will make carbon taxes revenue-neutral. Tax collectors have been shot and 
killed all over the biosphere. Green camouflage may not provide protection 
if the arm inside it reaches deep into many pockets. Thus, carbon taxes will 
likely have a largely symbolic value, a t  least in the United States (Schelling, 
1992). 
Uniform approaches for carbon or energy taxes, sometimes proposed for 
all of the European Community or all of the industrialized nations, also 
worry. Countries have historically taken different paths toward the desti- 
nation of low carbon and high efficiency (Figure 4). Moving down either 
axis reduces emissions. Each country is on a particular historical path and 
faces specific technological and other choices. Diverse instruments thus apply 
(Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, this volume). Uniform policies may fail to  appre- 
ciate the heterogeneity and specificity of individual countries. On the other 
hand, international trade may confound diverse national strategies (Manne 
and Rutherford, this volume). 
As theoretically appealing as market-based strategies are, serious study 
of quantity approaches needs to  be sustained. We should not put all our 
eggs into the market basket. We ought to examine carefully the experiences 
in Britain, Japan, and Poland with proposals to shut down or vastly reduce 
their coal industries. What would abandonment of coal involve globally and 
for key nations such as China? It may be as feasible as global taxes, and, 
with transfer payments and retraining, reliable and even economical. 
What is the shape of the damage function from climate change? 
The search is underway for the shape of the climatic damage function, which 
relates loss of gross domestic or world product to climate change over time. 
Rather than tamely linear, its form could be quadratic or cubic, changing 
abruptly (Peck, this volume). 
The question can never be fully resolved. Climate change will not be 
experienced apart from the general tangle of the one economic history of 
the Earth. Experiments to verify the shape of the function over decades are 
hard to envision. But, several approaches are possible. One is to estimate 
cumulative expenditure on adaptation which would otherwise not be made. 
Analogies with other chronic problems and surveys of expert opinion may 
also be suggestive. 
5. Fundamental Questions 
Can we improve long-term predictions of socio-technical systems? 
Long-term means more than 20 years. Global climate modeling and carbon 
cycle modeling are supported generously around the world. Comparable 
support for study of the socio- technical dimensions of the climate problem 
is due. New computational tools set off a wave of futures studies in the 1970s. 
Few new approaches have been tried since the early 1980s. An ambitious, 
fresh worldwide research program for long-term analysis of socio-technical 
systems is needed. 
A new generation of socioeconomic and socio-technical models involves 
ways to chart not only future development, but to understand long-run eco- 
nomic history as well. Reconstruction of long times series of data about eco- 
nomic performance and the diffusion of technologies is needed, going back as 
far as possible, and at least a hundred years. Such series exist for only the 
United States, Sweden, United Kingdom, and a handful of other countries. 
For most of the world, especially developing countries, quantitative economic 
history has yet to be written. With imaginative use of sources, the record 
can be built with which to calibrate models and predict more confidently. 
A vexing problem is the inability of almost all current models to  repro- 
duce the historical decarbonization trend and the changing historical market 
shares of primary energy sources. 
Areas for improvements in analytic tools are recognized. One is tech- 
nical change and the issue of "autonomous energy efficiency improvement ." 
What exactly does autonomous mean? To what extent is it price-induced? 
To what extent can it be made endogenous through incorporating more re- 
alistic treatment of R&D in models? What about the view that  technology 
advances in certain directions and is not fine-tuned to changing demand and 
cost conditions? Better ways to  understand and show uncertainty ranges 
and forecast errors are needed. Advances in the generic study of complex 
systems may provide a fresh analytic vocabulary. 
Empirical data  on how people budget their time and where flexibility 
lies are required to  separate probable scenarios from wishful thinking. Clas- 
Ot to  Wene pointed ironically in the Workshop to  the poor match between 
"the top-up and the bottom-down models." Time budgets and the budgets 
for expenditures in various social sectors are among the checks to  achieve 
consistency a t  the various levels of analysis. 
The set of world regions to  use for analysis is in question. The political 
geography that  underlay the global studies of the 1970s and the 1980s has 
fractured. Today's division of developing and developed countries is already 
blurred and surely will not apply in 2050 or 2070. When we do not know 
East from West and North from South, it is time to  begin again. 
Many models are still inappropriately constrained by availability of en- 
ergy resources. Updated geological knowledge shows oil and natural gas 
resources will be plentiful through the 21st century (WEC, 1992). 
Imaginative thinking is needed about the far future of energy, food, 
transport, and other human wants. The needs go well beyond economic 
modeling, but long-term economic modeling may provide a framework t o  
raise many of the right questions. 
How much do policies intended to aflect emissions matter? 
Recall the analyses of the factors modifying population growth. Billions of 
dollars are spent each year under the rubric of family planning. Reviews 
of the literature (Lapham and Maudlin, 1987) show that  the slowing of 
births has been largely the result of factors incidental t o  other social and 
economic changes underway, changes primarily associated with development. 
Perhaps 15-20 percent of the change is attributable t o  intentional population 
programs. Some scientists report lower efficacy. 
Deliberate policies t o  affect greenhouse gas emissions may also account 
for only 15-20 percent of the change in emissions that  will take place. More 
thought is needed about the factors that  will account for the other 80+ 
percent. These include growth of general productivity as well as population 
(Birdsall, 1992). According t o  Ogawa's (1991) analysis of the factors that  
contributed t o  global growth in COz emissions 1973-1987, the net annual 
+ 1.75 percent increase owed t o  population increase (+ 1.74), GDP per capita 
increase (+0.99), energy/GDP ratio decline (efficiency gains) (-0.59), and 
COz/energy ratio decline (decarbonization) (-0.39). 
What are the opportunity costs of focus on the climate issue? 
The 2 percent that  a stringent regime might cost is equal t o  the average 
current total national expenditure of industrialized nations on environmental 
quality. If society wants t o  double its green budget, should the full amount 
be allocated to the climate issue? Alternatively, is the world focusing its 
environmental investments on the most serious problems? Largely due to  
bad water, 800 million people have hookworm, and 750 million children a 
year suffer from diarrhea, of whom 4 million die. The list of risks in the 
human environment remains long. Will commitment to  strict greenhouse 
gas control leave money for other important issues? Opportunity costs must 
be considered. 
The fundamental question is "What are rational allocations of funds for 
environment around the globe?" The UN Conference on Environment and 
Development produced no priorities, only rosters of problems and renewed 
competition among issue entrepreneurs seeking to  micro-optimize. New in- 
stitutional means are required for international consultations on the agenda 
for environmental research and development worldwide (Carnegie Commis- 
sion, 1992). 
In considering mitigation and adaptation for climate change, "tie-ins" 
and "no regrets" strategies are much mentioned. How much other profit will 
accompany the greenhouse gas emission reductions to  help justify the sums 
expended? Large collateral benefits are promised for investments in energy 
efficiency, water use efficiency, and coastal zone management. The economics 
of these investments needs to  be rigorously evaluated. Recognizing that  
solving one environmental problem may help solve others, we must not forget 
the hard, unfinished environmental problems such as water quality, waste 
disposal, and degraded lands that climate-oriented policies are unlikely t o  
alleviate. Tradeoffs will remain. 
6.  Climate Change Amidst Global Change: 
Fin-de-Si&cle Then and Now 
Let us close with a thought experiment about the climate question as it might 
have arisen in the 1890s. Toward the end of the last century the Swedish 
geochemist Svante Arrhenius (1896) published his classic article projecting 
a warming as high as 5OC for doubling of COz. Suppose this came to  the 
attention of the leading governments . . . . 
The Swedes contacted the British, French, and Germans, who were 
deeply concerned. An enormous, populous, coal-burning nation loomed on 
the far shore of the ocean. Called the United States, it was building rail- 
roads, steel mills, and power plants a t  a furious rate. Its population had 
soared from 5 t o  80 million in the 19th century. Emissions would surely rise 
rapidly. 
To prepare memoranda for governmental use, the European Panel on 
Climate Change (EPCC) was created. The rest of the world did not count 
scientifically. The British assumed the chairmanship. They selected for 
the role the world's foremost expert on economic growth, Alfred Marshall, 
author of Principles of Economics (1890). Marshall had excelled in his 
advisory capacity with the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade 
and Industry in 1886. 
Marshall assembled leading experts from diverse fields. From France 
came Henri Poincarb, to  assess the mathematics; Antoine Becquerel, to  con- 
sider energy; and Gabriel Tardb, specialist on the diffusion of innovations. 
From Norway came oceanographer Fridtjof Nansen, from Russia fluid dy- 
namicist Alexander Lyapunov, from Austria-Hungary the geologist Eduard 
Suess, and from Italy sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. Marshall added fellow 
Englishmen in physics, William Thompson (Lord Kelvin) and John Strutt 
(Lord Rayleigh), and statistics (Francis Galton). Germany contributed engi- 
neer Karl Benz, climatologist Vladimir Koppen, and zoologist Ernst Haeckel, 
inventor of "ecology." 
The EPCC considered energy and emissions. About 65 percent of world 
energy came from coal and about 30 percent from wood and hay. The 
geological community asserted energy was not a question: coal was king. 
Oil was a novelty that  would soon be depleted. Coal consumption was 500 
million tons in 1890 and emissions 340 million tons. The growth rate of 
emissions 1850-1890 had been 4.7 percent. 
The "business-as-usual" forecast was troubling. If the rate of emission 
growth and airborne fraction were maintained, the atmospheric concentra- 
tion of C 0 2  would rise from the 290 ppm recorded currently a t  the observa- 
tories t o  double that  level by the year 2000. 
Poincarb was alarmed about chaotic behavior of the climate system, 
Nansen worried that  the ice caps would melt, and Suess pointed out that  
such changes had not occurred for millions of years. Koppen and Haeckel 
feared that  vegetation would be mismatched with the new atmosphere and 
the intricate web of life destroyed. Anxious letters kept arriving from water 
expert John Wesley Powell, head of the United States Geological Survey. In 
short, catastrophic and irreversible developments were underway. 
Marshall himself was sensitive to  the fact that England imported many of 
its food staples from poor, unstable regions such as Ireland and the Ukraine. 
"Corn laws" to  protect domestic farmers and prevent dependence on foreign 
food supplies had caused massive political crises earlier in the 19th century. 
Gross domestic product per capita in Western Europe in 1890 had reached 
$1,000 per capita and gross world product $1.4 trillion ($1985). Who would 
responsibly jeopardize this achievement? 
But, Lord Rayleigh was unsatisfied with the energy balance in Arrhenius' 
model, and Lyapunov was concerned about the stability of the equations and 
missing feedbacks. Galton questioned the reliability of the data and insisted 
on the need t o  show the confidence with which conclusions were stated. 
Becquerel and Benz asserted that innovations in energy and transport were 
sure to  come. Tard6 and Pareto insisted societies would adapt; the social 
and economic transformation of European societies in the 19th century was 
surely more rapid than what added sunshine would bring. And, after all, 
Europeans were competing madly to  colonize tropical territories. 
Marshall set out to  define a compromise. An eager consumer of statis- 
tics, Marshall noted that  economic growth since the start of the industrial 
revolution had averaged about 3 percent. If emissions rose at this rate, which 
assumed advances in efficiency and fuels, then concentrations would reach 
about 355 ppm a hundred years later. The atmosphere would warm by a t  
least 0.6OC, and possibly as much as 2OC, depending on the climate's sen- 
sitivity. Earth would still be the hottest it had been for 1,000 years. This 
seemed a reasonable case t o  consider. 
As an economist, Marshall sought t o  reckon how much income the world 
should forego to  stay a t  290 ppm. To answer, he wondered what would 
be the gross world product in 1990 if Earth warmed and if it retained the 
climate of 1890. Working with an actuary, Marshall laboriously calculated 
what the next 100 years might bring. Assuming the established rate of long- 
term growth continued, the result was that  between 1890 and 1990 world 
product would grow from $1.4 trillion to  $20 trillion, and income per capita 
from $1,000 t o  $10,000 dollars in Western Europe. 
Marshall was astonished. Both adaptation and mitigation would be 
affordable. In fact, the 0.6"C warming would be lost in the noise of such 
massive change. Provided there was genuine development, neither would 
emissions rise a t  a reckless rate, nor would climate threaten human survival. 
Marshall circulated a draft report with his prognosis for global change. 
Almost the entire panel was disbelieving. Lord Kelvin's copy came back 
with derisive marginal annotations about prospects for technical progress: 
"Heavier than air flying machines are impossible" and "Radio has no future." 
Marshall was suddenly called t o  work on urgent near-term issues of unem- 
ployment. Tensions between the European powers worsened. The report of 
the EPCC was forgotten. 
Marshall, of course, was right. 
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A Simulation Study on Tradable C 0 2  Emission Permits 
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